


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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW



The **American Civil War** (1861–1865) was a civil war in the United States of America. Eleven Southern slave states declared their secession from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America, also known as "the Confederacy". Led by Jefferson Davis, the Confederacy fought for its independence from the United States. The U.S. federal government was supported by twenty mostly-Northern free states in which slavery already had been abolished, and by five slave states that became known as the border states. These twenty-five states, referred to as the Union, had a much larger base of population and industry than the South. After four years of bloody, devastating warfare (mostly within the Southern states), the Confederacy surrendered and slavery was outlawed everywhere in the nation. The restoration of the Union, and the Reconstruction Era that followed, dealt with issues that remained unresolved for generations.

In the presidential election of 1860, the Republican Party, led by Abraham Lincoln, had campaigned against the expansion of slavery beyond the states in which it already existed. The Republicans were strong advocates of nationalism and in their 1860 platform explicitly denounced threats of disunion as avowals of treason. After a Republican victory, but before the new administration took office on March 4, 1861, seven cotton states declared their secession and joined together to form the Confederate States of America. Both the outgoing administration of President James Buchanan and the incoming administration rejected the legality of secession, considering it rebellion. The other eight slave states rejected calls for secession at this point. No country in the world recognized the Confederacy.

Hostilities began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces attacked a U.S. military installation at Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Lincoln responded by calling for a volunteer army from each state to recapture federal property. This led to declarations of secession by four more slave states. Both sides raised armies as the Union seized control of the border states early in the war and established a naval blockade that virtually ended cotton sales on which the South depended for its wealth, and blocked most imports. Land warfare in the East was inconclusive in 1861–62, as the Confederacy beat back Union efforts to capture its capital, Richmond, Virginia. In September 1862, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation made ending slavery in the South a war goal,² and dissuaded the British from intervening.³


Confederate commander Robert E. Lee won battles in Virginia, but in 1863 his northward advance was turned back with heavy casualties after the Battle of Gettysburg. To the west, the Union gained control of the Mississippi River after their capture of Vicksburg, Mississippi, thereby splitting the Confederacy in two. The Union was able to capitalize on its long-term advantages in men and materiel by 1864 when Ulysses S. Grant fought battles of attrition against Lee, while Union general William Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta and marched to the sea. Confederate resistance ended after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

The American Civil War was one of the earliest true industrial wars. Railroads, the telegraph, steamships, and mass-produced weapons were employed extensively. The practices of total war,

developed by Sherman in Georgia, and of trench warfare around Petersburg foreshadowed World War I in Europe. It remains the deadliest war in American history, resulting in the deaths of 620,000 soldiers and an undetermined number of civilian casualties. According to John Huddleston, "Ten percent of all Northern males 20–45 years of age died, as did 30 percent of all Southern white males aged 18–40."⁴ Victory for the North meant the end of the Confederacy and of slavery in the United States, and strengthened the role of the federal government. The social, political, economic and racial issues of the war decisively shaped the reconstruction era that lasted to 1877.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_War

EASTERN THEATER



President Lincoln visiting the Army of the Potomac at the Antietam battlefield, September 1862. Photo by Alexander Gardner.

Theater of operations

The Eastern Theater included the states of Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and the coastal fortifications and seaports of North Carolina. (Operations in the interior of the Carolinas in 1865 are considered part of the Western Theater.)

The Eastern Theater included the campaigns that are generally most famous in the history of the war, if not for their strategic significance, but for their proximity to the large population centers, the major newspapers, and the capital cities of the opposing parties. The imaginations of both Northerners and Southerners were captured by the epic struggles between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac, under a series of less successful commanders. The bloodiest battle of the war (Gettysburg) and the bloodiest single day of the war (Antietam) were both fought in this theater. The capitals of Washington, D.C., and Richmond were both attacked or besieged. It has been argued that the Western Theater was more strategically important in defeating the Confederacy, but it is inconceivable that the civilian populations of both sides could have considered the war to be at an end without the resolution of Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865.

The theater was bounded by the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. By far, the majority of battles occurred in the 100 miles between the cities of Washington and Richmond. This terrain favored the Confederate defenders because a series of rivers ran primarily west to east, making them obstacles rather than avenues of approach and lines of communication for the Union. This was quite different than the early years of the Western theater, and since the Union Army had to rely solely on the primitive road system of the era for its primary transportation, it limited winter campaigning for both sides. The Union advantage was control of the sea and major rivers, which

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would allow an army that stayed close to the ocean to be reinforced and supplied.

The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service¹ is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 160 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

Principal commanders of the Eastern Theater



Early operations (1861)

After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, both sides scrambled to create armies. President Abraham Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, which immediately caused the secession of four additional states, including Virginia. The United States Army had only around 16,000 men, with more than half spread out in the West. The army was commanded by the elderly Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War. On the Confederate side, only a handful of Federal officers and men resigned and joined the Confederacy; the formation of the Confederate States Army was a matter initially undertaken by the individual states. (The decentralized nature of the Confederate defenses, encouraged by the states' distrust of a strong central government, was one of the disadvantages suffered by the South during the war.)

Some of the first hostilities occurred in western Virginia (now the state of West Virginia). Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Department of the Ohio, ordered troops to march from Grafton and attack the Confederates under Col. George A. Porterfield. The skirmish on June 3, 1861, known as the Battle of Philippi, or the "Philippi Races", had little significance other than to raise public awareness of the young general. His victory at the Battle of Rich Mountain in July was instrumental in his promotion that fall to command the Army of the Potomac. As the campaign continued through a series of

minor battles, General Robert E. Lee, who, despite his excellent reputation as a former U.S. Army colonel, had no combat command experience, gave a lackluster performance that earned him the derogatory nickname "Granny Lee". He was soon transferred to the Carolinas to construct fortifications.

The first significant battle of the war took place in eastern Virginia on June 10. Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, based at Fort Monroe, sent converging columns from Hampton and Newport News against advanced Confederate outposts. At Big Bethel, near Fort Monroe, Colonel John B. Magruder won the first Confederate victory.

First Bull Run (First Manassas)

In early summer, the commander of Union field forces around Washington was Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, an inexperienced combat officer in command of volunteer soldiers with even less experience. Many of them had enlisted for only 90 days, a period soon to expire. McDowell was pressured by politicians and major newspapers in the North to take immediate action, exhorting him "On to Richmond!" His plan was to march with 35,000 men and attack the 20,000 Confederates under Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas. The second major Confederate force in the area, 12,000 men under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, was to be held in place by Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with 18,000 men menacing Harpers Ferry, preventing the two Confederate armies from combining against McDowell.

On July 21, McDowell's Army of Northeast Virginia executed a complex turning movement against Beauregard's Confederate Army of the Potomac, beginning the First Battle of Bull Run (also known as First Manassas). Although the Union troops enjoyed an early advantage and drove the Confederates back, the battle advantage turned that afternoon. Col. Thomas J. Jackson inspired his Virginia brigade to withstand a strong Union attack, and he received his famous nickname, "Stonewall" Jackson. Timely reinforcements arrived by railroad from Johnston's army; Patterson had been ineffective in keeping them occupied. The inexperienced Union soldiers began to fall back, and it turned into a panicky retreat, with many running almost as far as Washington, D.C. Civilian and political observers, some of whom had treated the battle as festive entertainment, were caught up in the panic. The army returned safely to Washington; Beauregard's army was too tired and inexperienced to launch a pursuit. The Union defeat at First Bull Run shocked the North, and a new sense of grim determination swept the United States as military and civilians alike realized that they would need to invest significant money and manpower to win a protracted, bloody war.

George B. McClellan was summoned east in August to command the newly forming Army of the Potomac, which would become the principal army of the Eastern Theater. As a former railroad executive, he possessed outstanding organizational skills well-suited to the tasks of training and administration. He was also strongly ambitious, and by November 1, he had maneuvered around Winfield Scott and was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies, despite the embarrassing defeat of an expedition he sent up the Potomac River at the Battle of Balls Bluff in October.

North Carolina coast (1861-65)

North Carolina was an important area to the Confederacy because of the vital seaport of Wilmington and because the Outer Banks were valuable bases for ships attempting to evade the Union blockade. Benjamin Butler sailed from Fort Monroe and captured the batteries at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861. In February 1862, Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside organized an amphibious expedition, also from Fort Monroe, that captured Roanoke Island, a little-known but important Union strategic victory. The Goldsboro Expedition in late 1862 marched briefly inland from the coast to destroy railroad tracks and bridges.

The remainder of operations on the North Carolina coast began in late 1864, with Benjamin Butler's and David D. Porter's failed attempt to capture Fort Fisher, which guarded the seaport of Wilmington. Union forces at the Second Battle of Fort Fisher, led by Alfred H. Terry, Adelbert Ames, and Porter, in January 1865, were successful in defeating Gen. Braxton Bragg, and Wilmington fell in February. During this period, the Western

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Theater armies of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman were marching up the interior of the Carolinas, where they eventually forced the surrender of the last major Confederate field army, under Joseph E. Johnston, in late April 1865.

The Valley (1862)



Valley Campaign: Kernstown to McDowell.

In the spring of 1862, Confederate exuberance over First Bull Run declined quickly, following the early successes of the Union armies in the Western Theater, such as Fort Donelson and Shiloh. George B. McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was approaching Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps was poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army threatened the rich agricultural area of the Shenandoah Valley.



Valley Campaign: Front Royal to Port Republic.

To the rescue of Southern morale came an eccentric former professor at VMI, Stonewall Jackson, bearing his nickname earned at First Bull Run. His command included the Stonewall Brigade and a variety of militia units insufficient for offensive operations. While Banks remain north of the Potomac River, Jackson's cavalry commander, Col. Turner Ashby, raided the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Banks reacted by crossing the Potomac in late February and moving south to protect the canal and railroad from Ashby. Jackson's command was operating as the left wing of Joseph E. Johnston's army, and when Johnston moved from Manassas to Culpeper in March, Jackson's position at Winchester was isolated. On March 12, Banks continued his advance to the southwest ("up the Valley") and occupied Winchester. Jackson had withdrawn to Strasburg. Banks's orders, as part of

McClellan's overall strategy, were to move farther south and drive Jackson from the Valley. After accomplishing this, he was to withdraw to a position nearer Washington. A strong advance force began the movement south from Winchester on March 17, about the same time that McClellan began his amphibious movement to the Virginia Peninsula.

Jackson's orders from Johnston were to avoid general combat because he was seriously outnumbered, but at the same time he was to keep Banks occupied enough to prevent the detachment of troops to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula. Receiving incorrect intelligence, Banks concluded that Jackson had left the Valley, and he proceeded to move east, back to the vicinity of Washington. Jackson was dismayed at this movement because Banks was doing exactly what Jackson had been directed to prevent.

At the First Battle of Kernstown (March 23, 1862), the Federals stopped Jackson's advance and then counterattacked, turning his left flank and forcing him to retreat, his only defeat during the campaign. Although a tactical defeat for Jackson, it was a strategic victory for the Confederacy, forcing President Lincoln to keep Banks's forces in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's Peninsula invasion force.

Jackson, now reinforced to 17,000 men, decided to attack the Union forces piecemeal rather than waiting for them to combine and overwhelm him. While marching on a devious route to mask his intentions, he was attacked at the Battle of McDowell on May 8 but was able to repulse the Union army after severe fighting. Banks sent a division to reinforce Irvin McDowell's forces at Fredericksburg, leaving Banks only 8,000 troops, which he relocated to a strong position at Strasburg, Virginia.

On May 21, Jackson marched his command east from New Market and proceeded northward. Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent his horse cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, but his plan was to defeat the small outpost at Front Royal and quickly attack Banks's line of communication at Harpers Ferry.

On May 23, at the Battle of Front Royal, Jackson's army surprised and overran the pickets of the 1,000-man Union garrison. Jackson's victory forced Banks at Strasburg into a rapid retreat towards Winchester. Although Jackson attempted to pursue, his troops were exhausted and looted Union supply trains, slowing them down immensely. On May 25, at the First Battle of Winchester, Banks's army was attacked by converging Confederate columns and was soundly defeated. They withdrew north across the Potomac River. Jackson attempted pursuit but was unsuccessful.

In Washington, President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (even though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). They ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Frémont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut. The immediate repercussion of this move was to abort McDowell's coordinated attack with McClellan on Richmond.

On June 2, two columns of Union forces pursued Jackson. His army took up defensive positions in Cross Keys and Port Republic, where he was able to defeat Frémont and Shields, respectively, on June 8 and June 9.

Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley. Jackson joined Robert E. Lee on the Peninsula for the Seven Days Battles (where he delivered an uncharacteristically lethargic performance, perhaps because of the strains of the Valley Campaign). He had accomplished his mission, withholding over 50,000 needed troops from McClellan. With the success of his Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the public. In a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver, he pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against combined foes of 60,000.

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Peninsula Campaign (1862)

George B. McClellan spent the winter of 1861–62 training his new Army of the Potomac and fighting off calls from President Lincoln to advance against the Confederates. Lincoln was particularly concerned about the army of General Joseph E. Johnston at Centreville, just 30 miles (50 km) from Washington. McClellan overestimated Johnston's strength and shifted his objective from that army to the Confederate capital of Richmond. He proposed to move by water to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River and then overland to Richmond before Johnston could move to block him. Although Lincoln favored the overland approach because it would shield Washington from any attack while the operation was in progress, McClellan argued that the road conditions in Virginia were intolerable, that he had arranged adequate defenses for the capital, and that Johnston would certainly follow him if he moved on Richmond. This plan was discussed for three months in the capital until Lincoln approved McClellan's proposal in early March. By March 9, however, Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville to Culpeper, making McClellan's Urbanna plan impracticable. McClellan then proposed to sail to Fort Monroe and then up the Virginia Peninsula (the narrow strip of land between the James and York rivers) to Richmond. Lincoln reluctantly agreed.

Before departing for the Peninsula, McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac to Centreville on a "shakedown" march. He discovered there how weak Johnston's force and position had really been, and he faced mounting criticism. On March 11, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his position as general-in-chief of the Union armies so that he could devote his full attention to the difficult campaign ahead of him. Lincoln himself, with the assistance of Secretary of War Stanton and a War Board of officers, assumed command of the Union armies for the next four months. The Army of the Potomac began to embark for Fort Monroe on March 17. The departure was accompanied by a newfound sense of concern. The first combat of ironclad ships occurred on March 8 and March 9 as the CSS *Virginia* and the USS *Monitor* fought the inconclusive Battle of Hampton Roads. The concern for the Army was that their transport ships would be attacked by this new weapon directly in their path. And the U.S. Navy failed to assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his idea of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4. On April 5, McClellan was informed that Lincoln had canceled the movement of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps to Fort Monroe, taking this action because McClellan had failed to leave the number of troops previously agreed upon at Washington, and because Jackson's Valley Campaign was causing concern. McClellan protested vociferously that he was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway.

Up the Peninsula

The Union forces advanced to Yorktown, and after a lengthy delay building up siege resources, McClellan defeated the Confederates in a skirmish, the Battle of Yorktown. During the campaign, the Union Army also seized Hampton Roads and occupied Norfolk. As the Union forces chased withdrawing Confederate forces up the Peninsula (northwest) in the direction of Richmond, the inconclusive single-day Battle of Williamsburg took place at and around Fort Magruder, one mile (1.5 km) east of the old colonial capital.

By the end of May, the Union forces had successfully advanced to within several miles of Richmond, but progress was slow. McClellan had planned for massive siege operations and brought immense stores of equipment and siege mortars. Poor weather and inadequate roads kept his advance to a crawl. And McClellan was by nature a cautious general. He was nervous about attacking a force he believed was twice his in size. In fact, his imagination and his intelligence operations failed him; the proportions were roughly the reverse. During Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's slow retreat up the Peninsula, his forces practiced deceptive operations. In particular, the division under John B. Magruder, who was an amateur actor before the war, was able to fool McClellan by ostentatiously marching small numbers of troops past the same position multiple times, appearing to be a larger force.



Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines.

As the Union Army drew towards the outer defenses of Richmond, it became divided by the Chickahominy River, weakening its ability to move troops back and forth along the front. The Battle of Seven Pines (also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks) took place on May 31 – June 1, 1862, as the Confederates struck at the smaller Union force south of the river. The battle was tactically inconclusive, but there were two strategic effects. First, Johnston was wounded during the battle and was replaced by the more aggressive General Robert E. Lee, who would lead this Army of Northern Virginia to many victories in the war. Second, General McClellan chose to abandon his offensive operations to lay siege and await reinforcements he had requested from President Lincoln. He never regained his strategic momentum.

Lee used the month-long pause in McClellan's advance to fortify the defenses of Richmond. On the south side of the James River, defensive lines were built south to a point below Petersburg. The total length of the new defensive line was about 30 miles (50 km). To buy time to complete the new defensive line and prepare for an offensive, Lee repeated the tactic of making a small number of troops seem more numerous than they really were. McClellan was also unnerved by Confederate Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's audacious (but otherwise militarily pointless) cavalry ride completely around the Union army (June 13–15).

Seven Days

Lee then moved onto the offensive, conducting a series of battles that lasted seven days (June 25 – July 1) and pushed McClellan back to a safe but nonthreatening position on the James River.

The first major battle of the Seven Days was Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam Creek, on June 26. Lee observed that McClellan had positioned his army straddling the Chickahominy River and could be defeated in detail. He struck McClellan's right flank on the northern bank and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Despite being a Union tactical victory, it was the start of a strategic debacle. McClellan withdrew to the southeast.

Lee continued his offensive at the Battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war. (It occurred in almost the same location as the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor and had similar numbers of casualties.) The attack was poorly coordinated, and the Union lines held for most of the day, but Lee eventually broke through and McClellan withdrew again, heading for a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James River.

The Battle of Glendale on June 30 was a bloody battle in which three Confederate divisions converged on the retreating Union forces in the White Oak Swamp, near Frayser's Farm, another name for the battle. Because of a lackluster performance by Stonewall Jackson, Lee's army failed in its last attempt to cut off the Union army before it reached the James.

The final battle of the Seven Days, July 1, consisted of reckless Confederate assaults against the impregnable Union defenses—

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buttressed by masterful artillery placements—on Malvern Hill. Lee's army suffered over 5,000 casualties in this wasted effort. The Seven Days Battles ended the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan withdrew to the safety of the James River, protected by fire from Union gunboats. The Army of the Potomac stayed there until August, when they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln in the run-up to the Second Battle of Bull Run. Although McClellan retained command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln showed his displeasure by appointing Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies on July 11, 1862.



June 26–27, 1862. Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill

The cost to both sides was high. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered almost 20,000 casualties out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days, McClellan almost 16,000 out of 105,445.

After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and Lee's clumsy tactical performance, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Northern Virginia and Maryland Campaigns.

Northern Virginia and Maryland (1862)

Following his success against McClellan on the Peninsula, Lee initiated two campaigns that can be considered one almost continuous offensive operation: defeating the second army that threatened Richmond and then continuing north on an invasion of Maryland.

Army of Virginia

President Lincoln reacted to McClellan's failure by appointing John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan. The Army of Virginia consisted of over 50,000 men in three corps. Three corps of McClellan's Army of the Potomac later were added for combat operations. Two cavalry brigades were attached directly to two of the infantry corps, which presented a lack of centralized control that had negative effects in the campaign.



June 30, 1862. Battle of Glendale



Northern Virginia Campaign, August 7–28, 1862.

Pope's mission was to fulfill two objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Gordonsville. Pope started on the latter by dispatching cavalry to break the railroad connecting Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg. The cavalry got off to a slow start and found that Stonewall Jackson had occupied Gordonsville with over 14,000 men.

Lee perceived that McClellan was no longer a threat to him on the Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the railroad. Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union Army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were widely separated, Lee saw an opening to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. Believing that Ambrose Burnside's troops from North Carolina were being shipped to reinforce Pope, and wanting to take immediate action before those troops were in position, Lee committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men, while distracting McClellan to keep him immobilized.

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On July 29, Pope moved some of his forces to a position near Cedar Mountain, from whence he could launch raids on Gordonsville. Jackson advanced to Culpeper on August 7, hoping to attack one of Pope's corps before the rest of the army could be concentrated. On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage. A Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, when he withdrew to Gordonsville.

On August 13, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to reinforce Jackson and on the following day sent all of his remaining forces except for two brigades, after he was certain that McClellan was leaving the Peninsula. Lee himself arrived at Gordonsville to take command on August 15. His plan was to defeat Pope before McClellan's army could arrive to reinforce it by cutting bridges in Pope's rear and then attacking his left flank and rear. Pope withdrew to the line of the Rappahannock River. He was aware of Lee's plan because a Union cavalry raid captured a copy of the written order.

A series of skirmishes between August 22 and August 25 kept the attention of Pope's army along the river. By August 25, three corps from the Army of the Potomac had arrived from the Peninsula to reinforce Pope. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable.

On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank, Jackson's wing of the army struck the railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope into an abrupt retreat from his defensive line along the Rappahannock. During the night of August 27–28, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run (Manassas) battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade. Longstreet's wing of the army marched through the Thoroughfare Gap to join Jackson, uniting the two wings of Lee's army.

Second Bull Run

In order to draw Pope's army into battle, Jackson ordered an attack on a Federal column that was passing across his front on August 28, beginning the Second Battle of Bull Run, the decisive battle of the Northern Virginia Campaign. The fighting lasted several hours and resulted in a stalemate. Pope became convinced that he had trapped Jackson and concentrated the bulk of his army against him. On August 29, Pope launched a series of assaults against Jackson's position along the unfinished railroad grade. The attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides. At noon, Longstreet arrived on the field and took position on Jackson's right flank. On August 30, Pope renewed his attacks, seemingly unaware that Longstreet was on the field. When massed Confederate artillery devastated a Union assault, Longstreet's wing of 28,000 men counterattacked in the largest simultaneous mass assault of the war. The Union left flank was crushed and the army driven back to Bull Run. Only an effective Union rearguard action prevented a replay of the First Bull Run disaster. Pope's retreat to Centreville was precipitous, nonetheless. The next day, Lee ordered his army in pursuit.

Making a wide flanking march, Jackson hoped to cut off the Union retreat. On September 1, Jackson sent his divisions against two Union divisions in the Battle of Chantilly. Confederate attacks were stopped by fierce fighting during a severe thunderstorm. Recognizing that his army was still in danger, Pope ordered the retreat to continue to Washington.

Invasion of Maryland

Lee decided that his army, despite taking heavy losses during the spring and summer, was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to penetrate the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington. He also needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. And he wished to

lower Northern morale, believing that an invading army wreaking havoc inside the North might force Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war, particularly if he would be able to incite an uprising in the slave-holding state of Maryland.



Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to September 15, 1862.

The Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. Lee's specific goals were thought to be an advance towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, cutting the east-west railroad links to the Northeast, followed by operations against one of the major eastern cities, such as Philadelphia. News of the invasion caused panic in the North, and Lincoln was forced to take quick action. George B. McClellan had been in military limbo since returning from the Peninsula, but Lincoln restored him to command of all forces around Washington and ordered him to deal with Lee.

Lee divided his army. Longstreet was sent to Hagerstown, while Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which commanded Lee's supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley; it was also a tempting target, virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused. In the Battle of Harpers Ferry, Jackson placed artillery on the heights overlooking the town, forcing the surrender of the garrison of more than 12,000 men on September 15. Jackson led most of his soldiers to join the rest of Lee's army, leaving A.P. Hill's division to complete the occupation of the town.

McClellan moved out of Washington with his 87,000-man army in a slow pursuit, reaching Frederick on September 13. There, two Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's army—General Order Number 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence, a delay that almost squandered his opportunity. That night, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain where elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the mountain passes. At the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, the Confederate defenders were driven back by the numerically superior Union forces, and McClellan was in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate.

Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggression, and learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised, frantically moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet,

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because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. Instead, he chose to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland.

Antietam



Overview of the Battle of Antietam.


On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, the Battle of Antietam began, with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounting a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In the afternoon, Burnside's corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three quarters of his army. This enabled Lee to shift brigades and concentrate on each individual Union assault. At over 23,000 casualties, it remains the bloodiest single day in American history. Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. Despite being tactically inconclusive, the battle of Antietam is considered a strategic victory for the Union. Lee's strategic initiative to invade Maryland was defeated. But more importantly, President Lincoln used this opportunity to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, after which the prospect of European powers intervening in the war on behalf of the Confederacy was significantly diminished.

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (1862-63)

On November 7, 1862, President Lincoln relieved McClellan of command because of his failure to pursue and defeat Lee's retreating army from Sharpsburg. Ambrose Burnside, despite his indifferent performance as a corps commander at Antietam, was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac. Once again, Lincoln pressured his general to launch an offensive as quickly as possible. Burnside rose to the task and planned to drive directly south toward Richmond. He hoped to outflank Robert E. Lee by quickly crossing the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and placing himself in between the Confederate army and their capital. Administrative difficulties prevented the

pontoon bridging boats from arriving on time, and his army was forced to wait across the river from Fredericksburg while Lee took that opportunity to fortify a defensive line on the heights behind the city. Rather than giving up or finding another way to advance, Burnside crossed the river and on December 13, launched massive frontal assaults against Marye's Heights on Lee's left flank. His attacks were more successful on Lee's right, but he did not follow up and persisted in pounding the fortified heights with waves of futile attacks. The Union Army lost over 12,000 men that day; Confederate casualties were significantly less.

Despite the defeat and the dismay felt in Washington, Burnside was not yet relieved from command. He planned to resume his offensive south of Fredericksburg, but it went amiss in January 1863 in the humiliating Mud March. Following this, a cabal of his subordinate generals made it clear to the government that Burnside was incapable of leading the army. One of those conspirators was Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863. Hooker, who had an excellent record as a corps commander in previous campaigns, spent the remainder of the winter reorganizing and resupplying his army, paying special attention to health and morale issues. And being known for his aggressive nature, he planned a complex spring campaign against Robert E. Lee.



Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

Both armies remained in their positions before Fredericksburg. Hooker planned to send his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, deep into the Confederate rear to disrupt supply lines. While one corps remained to fix Lee's attention at Fredericksburg, the others were to slip away and make a stealthy flanking march that would put the bulk of Hooker's army behind Lee, catching him in a vise. Lee, who had dispatched a corps of his army under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to forage in southern Virginia, was outnumbered 57,000 to 97,000.

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Chancellorsville Campaign



May 1, 1863. Hooker loses his nerve.



May 2. Jackson's flank attack.



May 3. Lee's assaults against Chancellorsville.

The plan began executing well, and the bulk of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and was in position on May 1. However, after minor initial contact with the enemy, Hooker began to lose his confidence, and rather than striking the Army of Northern Virginia in its rear as planned, he withdrew to a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville. On May 2, Robert E. Lee executed one of the boldest maneuvers of the war. Having already split his army to address both wings of Hooker's attack, he split again, sending 20,000 men under Stonewall Jackson on a lengthy flanking march to attack Hooker's unprotected right flank. Achieving almost complete surprise, Jackson's corps routed the Union XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Following this success Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire while scouting in front of his army.

While Lee pounded the Chancellorsville defense line with repeated, costly assaults on May 3, the Union VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, finally achieved what Ambrose Burnside could not, by successfully assaulting the reduced forces on Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg. The corps began moving westward, once again threatening Lee's rear. Lee was able to

deal with both wings of the Army of the Potomac, keeping the stunned Hooker in a defensive posture and dispatching a division to deal with Sedgwick's tentative approach. By May 7, Hooker withdrew all of his forces north of the Rappahannock. It was an expensive victory for Lee, who lost 13,000 men, or 25% of his army. Hooker lost 17,000, a lower casualty rate.



May 3. Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church.



May 4-6. Union withdrawals.

Gettysburg and fall maneuvering (1863)

In June 1863, Robert E. Lee decided to capitalize on his victory at Chancellorsville by repeating his strategy of 1862 and once again invading the North. He did this to resupply his army, give the farmers of Virginia a respite from war, and threaten the morale of Northern civilians, possibly by seizing an important northern city, such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or Baltimore, Maryland. The Confederate government agreed to this strategy only reluctantly because Jefferson Davis was concerned about the fate of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the river fortress being threatened by Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg campaign. Following the death of Jackson, Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia into three corps, led by Lt. Gens. James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill.

Lee began moving his army northwest from Fredericksburg into the Shenandoah Valley, where the Blue Ridge Mountains screened their northward movements. Joseph Hooker, still in command of the Army of the Potomac, sent cavalry forces to find Lee. On June 9, the clash at Brandy Station was the largest predominantly cavalry battle of the war but ended inconclusively. Hooker started his entire army in pursuit, but on June 28, President Lincoln lost patience with him and relieved him of command, replacing him with V Corps commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

Lee was surprised to find that the Federal army was moving as quickly as it was. As they crossed the Potomac and entered Frederick, Maryland, the Confederates were spread out over a considerable distance in Pennsylvania, with Richard Ewell across the Susquehanna River from Harrisburg and James Longstreet behind the mountains in Chambersburg. His cavalry,

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under Jeb Stuart, was engaged in a wide-ranging raid around the eastern flank of the Union army and was uncharacteristically out of touch with headquarters, leaving Lee blind as to his enemy's position and intentions. Lee realized that, just as in the Maryland Campaign, he had to concentrate his army before it could be defeated in detail. He ordered all units to move to the general vicinity of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.


Gettysburg Campaign



Initial movements in the campaign, through July 3; cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.

The Battle of Gettysburg is often considered the war's turning point. Meade defeated Lee in a three-day battle fought by 160,000 soldiers, with 51,000 casualties. It started as a meeting engagement on the morning of July 1, when brigades from Henry Heth's division clashed with Buford's cavalry, and then John F. Reynolds's I Corps. As the Union XI Corps arrived, they and the I Corps were smashed by Ewell's and Hill's corps arriving from the north and forced back through the town, taking up defensive positions on high ground south of town. On July 2, Lee launched a massive pair of assaults against the left and right flanks of Meade's army. Fierce battles raged at Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, East Cemetery Hill, and Culp's Hill. Meade was able to shift his defenders along interior lines, and they repulsed the Confederate advances. On July 3, Lee launched Pickett's Charge against the Union center, and almost three divisions were slaughtered. By this time, Stuart had returned, and he fought an inconclusive cavalry duel to the east of the main battlefield, attempting to drive into the Union rear area. The two armies stayed in position on July 4 (the same day the Battle of Vicksburg ended in a stunning Union victory), and then Lee ordered a retreat back across the Potomac to Virginia.

Meade's pursuit of Lee was tentative and unsuccessful. He received considerable criticism from President Lincoln and others, who believed he could have ended the war in the aftermath of Gettysburg. His two final offensive campaigns in the fall of 1863, Bristoe and Mine Run, were inconsequential. In both cases, Lee repeatedly outmaneuvered Meade, who was reluctant to lose men in frontal assaults.



Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863.



Battle of Gettysburg, July 2.

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Battle of Gettysburg, July 3.



Retreat, July 5-14.

Grant versus Lee (1864-65)

In March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all the Union armies. He devised a coordinated strategy to apply pressure on the Confederacy from many points, something President Lincoln had urged his generals to do from the beginning of the war. Grant put Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in immediate command of all forces in the West and moved his own headquarters to be with the Army of the Potomac (still commanded by George Meade) in Virginia, where he intended to maneuver Lee's army to a decisive battle; his secondary objective was to capture Richmond, but Grant knew that the latter would happen automatically once the former was accomplished. His coordinated strategy called for Grant and Meade to attack Lee from the north, while Benjamin Butler drove toward Richmond from the southeast; Franz Sigel to control the Shenandoah Valley; Sherman to invade Georgia, defeat Joseph E. Johnston, and capture Atlanta; George Crook and William W. Averell to operate against railroad supply lines in West Virginia; and Nathaniel P. Banks to capture Mobile, Alabama.²

Most of these initiatives failed, often because of the assignment of generals to Grant for political rather than military reasons. Butler's Army of the James bogged down against inferior forces under P.G.T. Beauregard before Richmond in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Sigel was soundly defeated at the Battle of New Market in May and was soon afterward replaced by David Hunter. Banks was distracted by the Red River Campaign and failed to move on Mobile. However, Crook and Averell were able to cut the last railway linking Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's Atlanta campaign was a success, although it dragged on through the fall.³

Overland Campaign

In early May, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and entered the area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. There, in dense woods that nullified the Union army's advantages in artillery, Robert E. Lee surprised Grant and Meade with aggressive assaults. The two-day Battle of the Wilderness was tactically inconclusive, although very damaging to both sides. However, unlike his predecessors, Grant did not retreat after the battle; he sent his army to the southeast and began a campaign of maneuver that kept Lee on the defensive through a series of bloody battles and moved closer to Richmond. Grant knew that his larger army and base of manpower in the North could sustain a war of attrition better than Lee and the Confederacy could. And although Grant suffered high losses—approximately 55,000 casualties—during the campaign, Lee lost even higher percentages of his men, losses that could not be replaced.

In the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Lee was able to beat Grant to the crossroads town and establish a strong defensive position. In a series of attacks over two weeks, Grant hammered away at the Confederate lines, mostly centered on a salient known as the "Mule Shoe". A massive assault by Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps on the "Bloody Angle" portion of this line on May 12 foreshadowed the breakthrough tactics employed against trenches late in World War I. Grant once again disengaged and slipped to the southeast.



Overland Campaign, from the Wilderness to crossing the James River.

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
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Intercepting Grant's movement, Lee positioned his forces behind the North Anna River in a salient to force Grant to divide his army to attack it. Lee had the opportunity to defeat Grant but failed to attack in the manner necessary to spring the trap he had set, possibly because of an illness. Grant continued moving southeast.

On May 31, Union cavalry seized the vital crossroads of Old Cold Harbor while the Confederates arrived from Richmond and from the Totopotomoy Creek lines. Late on June 1, two Union corps reached Cold Harbor and assaulted the Confederate works with some success. By June 2, both armies were on the field, forming on a seven-mile (11 km) front. At dawn on June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted the line and were slaughtered at all points in the Battle of Cold Harbor. Grant lost over 12,000 men in a battle that he regretted more than any other and Northern newspapers thereafter frequently referred to him as a "butcher".

On the night of June 12, Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to the James River. He was able to disguise his intentions from Lee, and his army crossed the river on a bridge of pontoons that stretched over 2,100 feet (640 m).⁴ What Lee had feared most of all—that Grant would force him into a siege of the capital city—was poised to occur.

Petersburg



Richmond-Petersburg Theater, fall 1864.

Grant had decided, however, that there was a more efficient way to get at Richmond and Lee. A few miles to the south, the city of Petersburg contained crucial rail links supplying the capital. If the Union Army could seize it, Richmond would be taken. However, Benjamin Butler had failed to capture it earlier and then indecisive advances by Grant's subordinates also failed to break through the thin lines manned by P.G.T. Beauregard's men, allowing Lee's army to arrive and erect defenses. Both sides settled in for a siege.

In an attempt to break the siege, Union troops in Ambrose Burnside's corps mined a tunnel under the Confederate line. On July 30, they detonated the explosives, creating a crater some 135 feet (41 m) in diameter that remains visible to this day. Almost 350 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast. Despite the ingenuity of the Union's plan, the lengthy, bloody Battle of the Crater, as it came to be called, was marred by poor tactical planning and was a decisive Confederate victory.

Through the fall and winter, both armies constructed elaborate series of trenches, eventually spanning more than 30 miles (50 km), as the Union Army attempted to get around the right (western) flank of the Confederates and destroy their supply

lines. Although the Northern public became quite dispirited by the seeming lack of progress at Petersburg, the dramatic success of Sherman at Atlanta helped ensure the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, which guaranteed that the war would be fought to a conclusion.

Shenandoah Valley (1864–65)

Valley Campaigns of 1864



Valley operations, May-August 1864.

The Shenandoah Valley was a crucial region for the Confederacy. It was one of the most important agricultural regions in Virginia and was a prime invasion route against the North. Grant hoped that an army from the Department of West Virginia under Franz Sigel could seize control of the Valley, moving "up the Valley" (southwest to the higher elevations) with 10,000 men to destroy the railroad center at Lynchburg. Sigel immediately suffered defeat at the Battle of New Market and was soon replaced by David Hunter, who also failed in his mission.

Robert E. Lee, now besieged in Petersburg, was concerned about Hunter's advances and sent Jubal Early's corps to sweep Union forces from the Valley and, if possible, to menace Washington, D.C., hoping to compel Grant to dilute his forces around Petersburg. Early got off to a good start. He drove down the Valley without opposition, bypassed Harpers Ferry, crossed the Potomac River, and advanced into Maryland. Grant dispatched a corps under Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright and other troops under George Crook to reinforce Washington and pursue Early.

At the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), Early defeated a smaller force under Lew Wallace near Frederick, Maryland, but this battle delayed his progress enough to allow time for reinforcing the defenses of Washington. Early attacked a fort on the northwest defensive perimeter of Washington (Fort Stevens (July 11–12) without success and withdrew back to Virginia. He successfully fought a series of minor battles in the Valley through early August and prevented Wright's corps from returning to Grant at Petersburg. He also burned the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

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Valley operations in August 1864 – March 1865.

Grant knew that Washington remained vulnerable if Early was still on the loose. He found a new commander aggressive enough to defeat Early: Philip Sheridan, the cavalry commander of the Army of the Potomac, who was given command of all forces in the area, calling them the Army of the Shenandoah. Sheridan initially started slowly, primarily because the impending presidential election of 1864 demanded a cautious approach, avoiding any disaster that might lead to the defeat of Abraham Lincoln.

Sheridan began moving aggressively in September. He defeated Early in the Third Battle of Winchester and the Battle of Fisher's Hill. With Early damaged and pinned down, the Valley lay open to the Union. Adding Sherman's capture of Atlanta, Lincoln's re-election seemed assured. Sheridan pulled back slowly down the Valley and conducted a scorched earth campaign that presaged Sherman's March to the Sea in November. The goal was to deny the Confederacy the means of feeding its armies in Virginia, and Sheridan's army burned crops, barns, mills, and factories.

The campaign was effectively concluded at the Battle of Cedar Creek (October 19, 1864). In a brilliant surprise attack, Early routed two thirds of the Union army, but his troops were hungry and exhausted and fell out of their ranks to pillage the Union camp; Sheridan managed to rally his troops and defeat Early decisively. Sheridan returned to assist Grant at Petersburg. Most of the men of Early's corps rejoined Lee at Petersburg in December, while Early remained to command a skeleton force until he was relieved of command in March 1865.

Appomattox (1865)

In January 1865, Robert E. Lee became the general-in-chief of all Confederate armies, but this move came too late to help the Southern cause.

As the siege of Petersburg continued, Grant attempted to break or encircle the Confederate forces in multiple attacks moving from east to west. By March, the siege had taken an enormous toll on both armies, and Lee decided to pull out of Petersburg. Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon then devised a plan to have the army attack Fort Stedman on the eastern end of the Union Lines, forcing the Union forces to shorten their lines. Although initially a success, his outnumbered corps was forced back.

Sheridan returned from the Valley and was tasked with flanking the Confederate Army, which forced Lee to send forces under Maj. Gen. George Pickett to defend the flank. Grant then deployed a corps to cut off Pickett's forces, who were forced to withdraw to Five Forks on March 31. In the following days, the

Union continued to press the attack, flanking Pickett's forces and destroying the Confederate left.



Grant's final Petersburg assaults and the start of Lee's retreat.



Lee's retreat in the Appomattox Campaign, April 3–9, 1865.

After the victory at Five Forks, Grant ordered an assault along the entire Confederate line, called the Third Battle of Petersburg, resulting in dramatic breakthroughs. In the following days, Lee pulled his forces out from Petersburg and Richmond and headed west to Danville, the destination of the fleeing Confederate government, and then south to meet up with General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. The capital city of Richmond surrendered on the morning of April 3.

The campaign became a race between Lee and Sheridan, with Lee attempting to obtain supplies for his retreat and Sheridan attempting to cut him off. At Sayler's Creek on April 6, nearly a quarter of the Confederate Army (about 8,000 men, the heart of two corps) was cut off and forced to surrender. Many of the Confederate supply trains were also captured. In Lee's final stand on April 9, John B. Gordon's depleted corps attempted to break the Union lines and reach the supplies in Lynchburg. They pushed back Sheridan's cavalry briefly but found themselves faced with the full Union V Corps. They were surrounded on three sides, and Lee surrendered his army to Grant at Appomattox Court House.

There were further minor battles and further surrenders of Confederate armies, but Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865, marked the effective end of the Civil War. The premier army of the Confederacy and its greatest general had been defeated and were offered generous and honorable terms of surrender. Lee, rejecting advice from some of his staff, wanted to ensure that his army did not melt away into the countryside to continue the war as guerrillas, helping immeasurably to heal the divisions of the country.

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
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War



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WESTERN THEATER



Theater of operations

The Western Theater was an area defined by both geography and the sequence of campaigning. It originally represented the area east of the Mississippi River and west of the Appalachian Mountains. It excluded operations against the Gulf Coast and the Eastern Seaboard, but as the war progressed and William Tecumseh Sherman's Union armies moved southeast from Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1864 and 1865, the definition of the theater expanded to encompass their operations in Georgia and the Carolinas. For operations in the Southwest see Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War.

The West was by some measures the most important theater of the war. The Confederacy was forced to defend with limited resources an enormous land mass, which was subject to Union thrusts along multiple avenues of approach, including major rivers that led directly to the agricultural heartland of the South. Capture of the Mississippi River was one of the key tenets of Union General Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan.

The Virginia front was by far the more prestigious theater. ... Yet the war's outcome was decided not there but in the vast expanse that stretched west from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi and beyond. Here, in the West, the truly decisive battles were fought.

Stephen E. Woodworth, *Jefferson Davis and His Generals*¹

The Eastern Theater received considerably more attention than the Western, both at the time and in subsequent historical accounts. This is due to a number of factors, including the proximity of the opposing capitals, the concentration of newspapers in the major cities of the East, several unanticipated Confederate victories, and the fame of Eastern generals such as Robert E. Lee, George B. McClellan, and Stonewall Jackson. Because of this, the progress that Union forces made in defeating Confederate armies in the West and overtaking Confederate territory went nearly unnoticed.

Military historian J. F. C. Fuller has described the Union invasion as an immense turning movement, a left wheel that started in Kentucky, headed south down the Mississippi River, and then east through Tennessee, Georgia, and the Carolinas. With the exception of the Battle of Chickamauga and some daring raids by cavalry or guerrilla forces, the four years in the West marked a string of almost continuous defeats for the Confederates; or, at best, tactical draws that eventually turned out to be strategic reversals. And the arguably most successful Union generals of the war (Grant, Thomas, Sherman, and Sheridan) came from this theater, consistently outclassing most of their Confederate opponents (with the possible exception of cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest).

The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service² is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 117 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

Principal commanders of the Western Theater



Early operations (June 1861 – January 1862)



From Belmont (November 1861) to Shiloh (April 1862).

The focus early in the war was on two critical states: Missouri and Kentucky. The loss of either would have been a crippling blow to the Union cause. Primarily because of the successes of Captain Nathaniel Lyon and his victory at Boonville in June, Missouri was held in the Union. The state of Kentucky, with a pro-Confederate governor and a pro-Union legislature, had declared neutrality between the opposing sides. This neutrality was first violated on September 3, when Confederate Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk occupied Columbus, considered key to controlling the Lower Mississippi, and two days later Union Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, displaying the personal initiative that would characterize his later career, seized Paducah. Henceforth, neither adversary respected the proclaimed neutrality of the state. This sequence of events is considered a

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victory for the Union because Kentucky never formally sided with the Confederacy, and if the Union had been prevented from maneuvering within Kentucky, its later successful campaigns in Tennessee would have been more difficult.

On the Confederate side, General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all forces from Arkansas to the Cumberland Gap. He was faced with the problem of defending a broad front with numerically inferior forces, but he had an excellent system of lateral communications, permitting him to move troops rapidly where they were needed, and he had two able subordinates, Polk and Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee. Johnston also gained political support from secessionists in central and western counties of Kentucky via a new Confederate capital at Bowling Green, set up by the Russellville Convention. The alternative government was recognized by the Confederate government, which admitted Kentucky into the Confederacy in December 1861. Using the rail system resources of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, Polk was able to quickly fortify and equip the Confederate base at Columbus.³

The Union military command in the West, however, suffered from a lack of unified command, organized by November into three separate departments: the Department of Kansas, under Maj. Gen. David Hunter, the Department of Missouri, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, and the Department of the Ohio, under Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell (who had replaced Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman). By January 1862, this disunity of command was apparent because no strategy for operations in the Western theater could be agreed upon. Buell, under political pressure to invade and hold pro-Union East Tennessee, moved slowly in the direction of Nashville, but achieved nothing more substantial toward his goal than a minor victory at Mill Springs under Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas. (Mill Springs was a significant victory in a strategic sense because it broke the end of the Confederate Western defensive line and opened the Cumberland Gap to East Tennessee, but it got Buell no closer to Nashville.) In Halleck's department, Grant demonstrated up the Tennessee River to divert attention from Buell's intended advance, which did not occur. On February 1, 1862, after repeated requests by Grant, Halleck authorized Grant to move against Fort Henry on the Tennessee.

Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi Rivers (February–June 1862)

Grant moved swiftly, starting his troops down the Tennessee River toward Fort Henry on river transports on February 2. His operations in the campaign were well coordinated with United States Navy Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. The fort was poorly situated on a floodplain and virtually indefensible against gunboats, with many of its guns under water. Because of the previous neutrality of Kentucky, the Confederates could not build river defenses at a more strategic location inside the state, so they settled for a site just inside the border of Tennessee. Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman withdrew almost all of his garrison on February 5, moving them across country 11 miles (18 km) to the east to Fort Donelson. The Tennessee River was then open for future Union operations into the South.

Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, was more defensible than Henry, and Navy assaults on the fort were ineffective. Grant's army marched cross-country in pursuit of Tilghman and attempted immediate assaults on the fort from the rear, but they were unsuccessful. On February 15, the Confederate forces under Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd attempted to escape and launched a surprise assault against the Union right flank (commanded by Brig. Gen. John A. McClelland), driving McClelland's division back but not creating the opening they needed to slip away. Grant recovered from this temporary reversal and assaulted the weakened Confederate right. Trapped in the fort and the town of Dover, Tennessee, Confederate Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner surrendered his command of 11,500 men and many needed guns and supplies to Grant's demand for "unconditional surrender". The combined victories at Henry and Donelson were the first significant Union victories in the war, and two major rivers became available for invasions into Tennessee.

Johnston's forward defense was broken. As Grant had anticipated, Polk's position at Columbus was untenable, and he withdrew soon after Donelson fell. Grant had also cut the

Memphis and Ohio Railroad that previously had allowed Confederate forces to move laterally in support of each other. General P.G.T. Beauregard had arrived from the East to report to Johnston in February, and he commanded all Confederate forces between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, which effectively divided the unity of command so that Johnston controlled only a small force at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Beauregard planned to concentrate his forces in the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi, and prepare for an offensive. Johnston moved his force to concentrate with Beauregard's by late March.

The preparations for the Union campaign did not proceed smoothly, and Halleck seemed more concerned with his standing in relation to General-in-Chief George B. McClellan than he did with understanding the Confederate Army was divided and could be defeated in detail. Further, he could not agree with his peer, Buell, now in Nashville, on a joint course of action. He sent Grant up the Tennessee River while Buell remained in Nashville. On March 11, President Lincoln appointed Halleck the commander of all forces from the Missouri River to Knoxville, Tennessee, thus achieving the needed unity of command, and Halleck ordered Buell to join Grant's forces at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River.

On April 6, the combined Confederate forces under Beauregard and Johnston surprised Grant's unprepared Army of West Tennessee with a massive dawn assault at Pittsburg Landing in the Battle of Shiloh. In the first day of the battle, the Confederate onslaught drove Grant back against the Tennessee but could not defeat him. Johnston died that day; he was considered by Jefferson Davis to be the most effective general in the Confederacy at that time. On the second day, April 7, Grant received reinforcements from Buell and launched a counterattack that drove back the Confederates. Grant failed to pursue the retreating enemy and received enormous criticism for this and for the great loss of life—more casualties (almost 24,000) than all previous American battles combined.

Union control of the Mississippi River began to tighten. On April 7, while the Confederates were retreating from Shiloh, Union Maj. Gen. John Pope defeated Beauregard's isolated force at Island Number 10, opening the river almost as far south as Memphis. On May 18, Admiral David Farragut captured New Orleans, the South's most significant seaport. Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler occupied the city with a strong military government that caused considerable resentment among the civilian population.

Although Beauregard had little concentrated strength available to oppose a southward movement by Halleck, the Union general showed insufficient drive to take advantage of the situation. He waited until he assembled a large army, combining the forces of Buell's Army of the Ohio, Grant's Army of West Tennessee, and Pope's Army of the Mississippi, to converge at Pittsburg Landing. He moved slowly in the direction of the critical rail junction at Corinth, taking four weeks to cover the twenty miles (32 km) from Shiloh, stopping nightly to entrench. The slowness of this movement has led this campaign to be nicknamed the Siege of Corinth. When he finally reached the fortified city, his opponent, Beauregard, decided not to make a costly defensive stand and withdrew without hostilities on May 29.

Grant did not command directly in the Corinth campaign. Halleck had reorganized his army, giving Grant the powerless position of second-in-command and shuffling divisions from the three armies into three "wings". When Halleck moved east to replace McClellan as general-in-chief, Grant resumed his field command. But before he left, Halleck squandered any opportunity to pursue and destroy Beauregard. He sent Buell to Chattanooga, Sherman to Memphis, one division to Arkansas, and Pope was ordered to hold a covering position south of Corinth.

Kentucky, Tennessee, and northern Mississippi (June 1862 – January 1863)

While Halleck accomplished little following Corinth, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg succeeded Beauregard (on June 27, for health reasons) in command of his 56,000 troops of the Army of Tennessee, in Tupelo, Mississippi, due south of Corinth. But he determined that an advance directly north from Tupelo was not practical. He left Maj. Gens. Sterling Price and

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Earl Van Dorn to distract Grant and shifted 35,000 men by rail through Mobile, Alabama, to Chattanooga. Even though he did not leave Tupelo until July 21, he was able to reach Chattanooga before Buell could. Bragg's general plan was to invade Kentucky in a joint operation with Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, cut Buell's lines of communications, defeat him, and then turn back to defeat Grant.



From Corinth (May 1862) to Perryville (October 1862).

Kirby Smith left Knoxville on August 14, forced the Union to evacuate Cumberland Gap, defeated a small Union force at the Battle of Richmond (Kentucky), and reached Lexington on August 30. Bragg departed Chattanooga just before Smith reached Lexington, while Buell moved north from Nashville to Bowling Green. But Bragg moved quickly and by September 14 had interposed his army on Buell's supply lines from Louisville. Bragg was reluctant to develop this situation because he was outnumbered by Buell; if he had been able to combine with Kirby Smith, he would have been numerically equal, but Smith's command was separate, and Smith believed that Bragg could capture Louisville without his assistance.

Buell, under pressure from the government to take aggressive action, was almost relieved of duty (only the personal reluctance of George H. Thomas to assume command from his superior at the start of a campaign prevented it). As he approached Perryville, Kentucky, he began to concentrate his army in the face of Confederate forces there. Bragg was not initially present with his army, having decided to attend the inauguration ceremony of a Confederate governor of Kentucky in Frankfort. On October 8, fighting began at Perryville over possession of water sources, and as the fighting escalated, Bragg's Army of Mississippi achieved some tactical success in an assault against a single corps of Buell's Army of the Ohio. That evening Bragg realized that he was facing Buell's entire army and ordered a retreat to Harrodsburg, where he was joined by Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky on October 10. Despite having a strong combined force, Bragg made no attempt to regain the initiative. Buell was equally passive. Bragg retreated through the Cumberland Gap and returned to Murfreesboro by way of Chattanooga.

While Buell was facing Bragg's threat in Kentucky, Confederate operations in northern Mississippi were aimed at preventing Buell's reinforcement by Grant, who was preparing for his upcoming Vicksburg campaign. Halleck had departed for Washington, and Grant was left without interference as commander of the District of West Tennessee. On September 14, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price moved his Confederate Army of the West to Iuka, 20 miles (32 km) east of Corinth. He intended to link up with Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's Army of West Tennessee and operate against Grant. But Grant sent forces under Maj. Gens. William S. Rosecrans and Edward Ord to attack Price and Van Dorn at Iuka. Rosecrans won a minor victory at the Battle of Iuka (September 19), but poor coordination of forces allowed Price to escape from the intended Union double envelopment.

Price and Van Dorn decided to attack the concentration of Union troops at Corinth and then advance into West or Middle Tennessee. In the Second Battle of Corinth (October 3-4), they attacked the fortified Union troops but were repulsed with

serious losses. Retreating to the northwest, they escaped pursuit by Rosecrans's exhausted army, but their objectives of threatening Middle Tennessee and supporting Bragg were foiled. As winter set in, the Union government replaced Buell with Rosecrans. After a period of resupplying and training his army in Nashville, Rosecrans moved against Bragg at Murfreesboro just after Christmas. In the Battle of Stones River, Bragg surprised Rosecrans with a powerful assault on December 31, pushing the Union forces back to a small perimeter against the Tennessee River. But on January 2, 1863, further attempts to assault Rosecrans were beaten back decisively and Bragg withdrew his army southeast to Tullahoma. In proportion to the size of the armies, the casualties at Stones River (about 12,000 on each side) made it the bloodiest battle of the war. At the end of the campaign, Bragg's threat against Kentucky been defeated, and he effectively yielded control of Middle Tennessee.

Vicksburg Campaigns (December 1862 – July 1863)

Abraham Lincoln believed that the river fortress city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, was a key to winning the war. Vicksburg and Port Hudson were the last remaining strongholds that prevented full Union control of the Mississippi River. Situated on high bluffs overlooking a sharp bend in the river and called the "Gibraltar of the Mississippi", Vicksburg was nearly invulnerable to naval assault. Admiral David Farragut had found this directly in his failed operations of May 1862.

The overall plan to capture Vicksburg was for Ulysses S. Grant to move south from Memphis and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks to move north from Baton Rouge. Banks's advance was slow to develop and bogged down at Port Hudson, offering little assistance to Grant.



Operations against Vicksburg and Grant's Bayou Operations.

First campaign

Grant's first campaign was a two-pronged movement. William T. Sherman sailed down the Mississippi River with 32,000 men while Grant was to move in parallel through Mississippi by railroad with 40,000. Grant advanced 80 miles (130 km), but his supply lines were cut by Confederate cavalry under Earl Van Dorn at Holly Springs, forcing him to fall back. Sherman reached the Yazoo River just north of the city of Vicksburg, but

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without support from Grant's half of the mission, he was repulsed in bloody assaults against Chickasaw Bayou in late December.

Political considerations then intruded. Illinois politician and Maj. Gen. John A. McClelland obtained permission from Lincoln to recruit an army in southern Illinois and command it on a river-born expedition aimed at Vicksburg. He was able to get Sherman's corps assigned to him, but it departed Memphis before McClelland could arrive. When Sherman returned from the Yazoo, McClelland asserted control. He inexplicably detoured from his primary objective by capturing Arkansas Post on the Arkansas River, but before he could resume his main advance, Grant had reasserted control, and McClelland became a corps commander in Grant's army. For the rest of the winter, Grant attempted five separate projects to reach the city by moving through or reengineering rivers, canals, and bayous to the north of Vicksburg. All five were unsuccessful; Grant explained afterward that he had expected these setbacks and was simply attempting to keep his army busy and motivated, but many historians believe he really hoped that some would succeed and that they were too ambitious.

Second campaign



Grant's operations against Vicksburg.

The second campaign, beginning in the spring of 1863, was successful and is considered Grant's greatest achievement of the war (and a classic campaign of military history). He knew that he could not attack through Mississippi from the northwest because of the vulnerability of his supply line; river-born approaches had failed repeatedly. So after movement became possible on dirt roads that were finally drying from the winter rains, Grant moved the bulk of his army down the western bank of the Mississippi. On April 16, U.S. Navy gunboats and troop transports managed at great risk to slip past the Vicksburg defensive guns and were able to ferry Grant's army across the river to land south of Vicksburg at Bruinsburg. Grant employed two strategic diversions to mask his intentions: a feint by Sherman north of Vicksburg and a daring cavalry raid through central Mississippi by Colonel Benjamin Grierson, known as Grierson's Raid. The former was inconclusive, but the latter was a success. Grierson was able to draw out significant Confederate forces, dispersing them around the state.

Grant faced two Confederate armies in his campaign: the Vicksburg garrison, commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, and forces in Jackson, commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the overall theater commander. Rather than simply heading directly north to the city, Grant chose to cut the line of communications (and reinforcement) between the two Confederate armies. His army headed swiftly northeast toward Jackson. Meanwhile, Grant brought with him a limited supply line. The conventional history of the campaign indicates that he cut loose from *all* of his supplies, perplexing Pemberton, who attempted to interdict his nonexistent lines at Raymond on May 12. In reality, Grant relied on the local economy to provide him only foodstuffs for men and animals, but there was a constant stream of wagons carrying ammunition, coffee, hardtack, salt, and other supplies for his army.

Sherman's corps captured Jackson on May 14. The entire army then turned west to confront Pemberton in front of Vicksburg. The decisive battle was at Champion Hill, the effective last stand for Pemberton before he withdrew into his entrenchments around the city. Grant's army assaulted the Confederate works twice at great cost at the start of the Siege of Vicksburg but then settled in for a lengthy siege.

The soldiers and civilians in Vicksburg suffered greatly from Union bombardment and impending starvation. They clung to hope that General Johnston would arrive with reinforcements, but Johnston was both cut off and too cautious. On July 4, Pemberton surrendered his army and the city to Grant. In conjunction with the defeat of Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg the previous day, Vicksburg is widely considered one of the turning points of the war. By July 8, after Banks captured Port Hudson, the entire Mississippi River was in Union hands, and the Confederacy was split in two.

Tullahoma, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga (June–December 1863)



Tullahoma Campaign.

After his victory at Stones River, Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro for almost six months while Bragg rested in Tullahoma, establishing a long defensive line that was intended to block Union advances against the strategic city of Chattanooga in his rear. In April, Union cavalry under Col. Abel Streight moved against the railroad that supplied Bragg's army in Middle Tennessee, hoping it would cause them to withdraw to Georgia. Streight's brigade raided through Mississippi and Alabama, fighting against Nathan Bedford Forrest. Streight's Raid ended when his exhausted men surrendered near Rome, Georgia, on May 3. In June, Rosecrans finally advanced against Bragg in a brilliant, almost bloodless, campaign of maneuver, the Tullahoma Campaign, and drove Bragg from Middle Tennessee.

During this period, Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan and his 2,460 Confederate cavalymen rode west from Sparta in middle Tennessee on June 11, intending to divert the attention of Ambrose Burnside's Army of the Ohio, which was moving toward Knoxville, from Southern forces in the state. At the start of the Tullahoma Campaign, Morgan moved northward. For 46 days as they rode over 1,000 miles (1,600 km), Morgan's cavalymen terrorized a region from Tennessee to northern Ohio, destroying bridges, railroads, and government stores before being captured; in November they made a daring escape from the Ohio Penitentiary, at Columbus, Ohio, and returned to the South.

After delaying for several weeks in Tullahoma, Rosecrans planned to flush Bragg out of Chattanooga by crossing the Tennessee River, heading south, and interdicting the Confederate supply lines from Georgia. He began operations on August 18 and used a two-week bombardment of Chattanooga as a diversion. The Confederate high command reinforced Bragg with a division from Mississippi and a corps (Longstreet's) from Virginia. Rosecrans pursued Bragg into the rugged mountains of northwestern Georgia, only to find that a trap had been set. Bragg started the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863) when he launched a three-division assault against the

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corps of George H. Thomas. A command misunderstanding allowed a major gap to appear in the Union line as reinforcements arrived, and Longstreet was able to drive his corps into that gap and send the Union Army into retreat. If not for the defensive stand by a portion of the line led by Thomas ("The Rock of Chickamauga"), the Union Army would have been completely routed. Rosecrans, devastated by his defeat, withdrew his army to Chattanooga, where Bragg besieged it, occupying the high ground dominating the city.



From Vicksburg (December 1862 – July 1863) to Chickamauga (September 1863).

Back in Vicksburg, Grant was resting his army and planning for a campaign that would capture Mobile and push east. But when news of the dire straits of Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland reached Washington, Grant was ordered to rescue them. On October 17, he was given command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, controlling all of the armies in the Western Theater. He replaced Rosecrans with Thomas and traveled to Chattanooga, where he approved a plan to open a new supply line (the "Cracker Line"), allowing supplies and reinforcements to reach the city. Soon the troops were joined by 40,000 more, under Sherman and Joseph Hooker. While the Union army expanded, the Confederate army contracted; Bragg dispatched Longstreet's corps to Knoxville to hold off an advance by Burnside.

The Battles for Chattanooga began in earnest on November 24, 1863, as Hooker took Lookout Mountain, which is one of two dominant peaks over the city. The next day, Grant planned a double envelopment of Bragg's position on the other mountain, Missionary Ridge. Sherman was to attack from the north, Hooker from the south, and Thomas was to hold the center. But Sherman's attack bogged down in confusion, and Grant ordered Thomas to launch a minor attack as a diversion to relieve pressure on Sherman. Thomas's troops, caught up in enthusiasm and anxious to redeem themselves after their humiliation at Chickamauga, continued their initial attack by charging up the imposing ridge, breaking the Confederate line and causing them to retreat. Chattanooga was saved; along with the failure of Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign against Burnside, politically sensitive eastern Tennessee was free of Confederate control. An avenue of invasion pointed directly to Atlanta and the heart of the Confederacy. Bragg, whose personal friendship with Confederate President Jefferson Davis saved his command following his defeats at Perryville and Stones River, was finally relieved of duty and replaced by General Joseph E. Johnston.



Battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Chattanooga Campaign.

Atlanta Campaign (May–September 1864)



Map of the Atlanta Campaign.

In March 1864, Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and went east to assume command of all the Union armies. Sherman succeeded him in command of the Western Theater. Grant devised a strategy for simultaneous advances across the Confederacy. It was intended to destroy or fix Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia with three major thrusts (under Meade, Butler, and Sigel) launched in the direction of Richmond and in the Shenandoah Valley; capture Mobile with an army under Nathaniel Banks; and destroy Johnston's army while driving toward Atlanta. Most of the initiatives failed: Butler became bogged down in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign; Sigel was quickly defeated in the valley; Banks became occupied in the ill-fated Red River Campaign; Meade and Grant experienced many setbacks and much bloodshed in the Overland Campaign before finally settling down to a siege of Petersburg. Sherman's Atlanta Campaign was more successful.

At the start of the campaign, Sherman's Military Division of the Mississippi consisted of three armies: James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee (Sherman's old army under Grant), John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio, and George H. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland. Opposing him, the Army of Tennessee was commanded by Joseph E. Johnston. Sherman outnumbered

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Johnston 98,000 to 50,000, but his ranks were depleted by many furloughed soldiers, and Johnston received 15,000 reinforcements from Alabama.

The campaign opened with several battles in May and June 1864 as Sherman pressed Johnston southeast through mountainous terrain. Sherman prudently avoided frontal assaults against most of Johnston's positions; instead he maneuvered in flanking marches around the defenses. When Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost exclusively around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain (June 27) was a notable exception, in which Sherman attempted a frontal assault and suffered significant losses. Both armies took advantage of the railroads as supply lines, with Johnston shortening his supply lines as he drew closer to Atlanta, and Sherman lengthening his own.

Just before the Battle of Peachtree Creek (July 20) in the outskirts of Atlanta, Jefferson Davis lost patience with Johnston's strategy and replaced him with the more aggressive Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood. This turned out to be a strategic error because Hood, after occupying strong defensive works around Atlanta for a few weeks, chose to fight Sherman on open ground, a fight that his smaller army could not win. Sherman eventually cut Hood's supply lines from the south. Knowing that he was trapped, Hood evacuated Atlanta on the night of September 1, burning military supplies and installations, causing a great conflagration in the city.

Coincident with Sherman's triumph in Atlanta, Admiral David Farragut won the decisive naval Battle of Mobile Bay on August 24. The city itself, long a desired target of Grant's, remained untouched until 1865, but the last seaport east of the Mississippi on the Gulf Coast was closed, further tightening the Union blockade. The capture of Atlanta and Mobile Bay together boosted Northern morale and made an enormous contribution to the re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

Franklin-Nashville Campaign (September–December 1864)



Franklin-Nashville Campaign.

While Sherman rested his army in preparation for offensive operations to the east, Hood embarked on a campaign to defeat Sherman by interfering with his lines of communications from Chattanooga. He drove west through Alabama and turned north toward Tennessee, hoping that Sherman would follow him and do battle. This was partially effective because his movements, and raids by Nathan Bedford Forrest, were causing considerable consternation to Sherman. However, the Union general did not fully engage. He sent Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to Nashville to coordinate a defense against Hood, while taking the remainder of his army in the direction of Savannah, Georgia.

Thomas's forces were divided. Half were with him in Nashville and the other half with John M. Schofield, moving in pursuit from Atlanta. Hood hoped to defeat Schofield before he could concentrate his forces with Thomas. He had the chance at the Battle of Spring Hill in Tennessee (November 29, 1864), but the Union troops were able to slip through the trap. At the Battle of Franklin the following day, Hood launched repeated massive frontal assaults against strong entrenchments and suffered severe casualties. It has been said that he mortally wounded his army at Franklin but killed it at the Battle of Nashville (December 15–

16).⁴ There, facing the combined force of Schofield and Thomas, he dug in a few miles south of the city and waited. After a two-week preparation period in winter weather, during which he received great pressure from Grant and the Union government to attack, Thomas unleashed an overwhelming assault that sent Hood and his survivors in retreat to Franklin and then to Mississippi, never to recover as a fighting force.

Sherman's March to the Sea (November–December 1864)



Sherman's March to the Sea.

Sherman's Savannah Campaign is more popularly known as the March to the Sea. He and Grant believed that the Civil War would end only if the Confederacy's strategic, economic, and psychological capacity for warfare were decisively broken. Sherman therefore applied the principles of scorched earth, ordering his troops to burn crops, kill livestock, consume supplies, and destroy civilian infrastructure along their path. This policy is one of the key tenets of a strategy of total war.

Sherman's army left Atlanta on November 15, 1864, and was conducted in two columns separated by about 60 miles (100 km), the right under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard and the left under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Between these columns, the destruction was significant and spawned hatred for generations. At Savannah, Sherman encountered about 10,000 defending troops under Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee. Following lengthy artillery bombardments, Hardee abandoned the city and Sherman entered on December 22, 1864. He telegraphed to President Lincoln, "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the City of Savannah"

Carolinas Campaign (February–March 1865)

After Sherman captured Savannah, he was ordered by Grant to embark his army on ships to reinforce the Union armies in Virginia, where Grant was bogged down in the Siege of Petersburg against Robert E. Lee. Sherman proposed an alternative strategy. He persuaded Grant that he should march north through the Carolinas instead, destroying everything of military value along the way, similar to his march to the sea through Georgia. He was particularly interested in targeting South Carolina, the first state to secede from the Union, for the effect it would have on Southern morale.

Sherman's plan was to bypass the minor Confederate troop concentrations at Augusta, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina, and reach Goldsboro, North Carolina, by March 15, 1865. As with his Georgia operations, he marched his armies in multiple directions simultaneously, confusing the scattered Confederate defenders as to his first true objective, which was the state capital Columbia. He faced the smaller and battered Army of Tennessee, again under the command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.

On February 17, Columbia surrendered to Sherman. Fires began in the city, and most of the central city was destroyed. The

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burning of Columbia has engendered controversy ever since, with some claiming the fires were accidental, others a deliberate act of vengeance. On that same day, the Confederates evacuated Charleston. On February 18, Sherman's forces destroyed virtually anything of military value in Columbia. The last significant Confederate seaport, Wilmington, surrendered on February 22.



Carolinas Campaign.

Johnston's last stand was at the Battle of Bentonville (March 19–21), where he unsuccessfully attempted to defeat a wing of Sherman's army (under Slocum) before it could reach Goldsboro. Sherman pursued Johnston toward Raleigh.

On April 18, three days after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, Johnston signed an armistice with Sherman at Bennett Place, a farmhouse near Durham Station. Sherman got himself into political trouble by offering terms of surrender to Johnston that encompassed political issues as well as military, without authorization from General Grant or the United States government. The confusion on this issue lasted until April 26, when Johnston agreed to purely military terms and formally surrendered his army and all Confederate forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. It was the second significant surrender that month; on April 9, Robert E. Lee had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House. It was the virtual end for the Confederacy, although some smaller forces held out, particularly in the Trans-Mississippi region, into the summer.

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War



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TRANS-MISSISSIPPI THEATER



Map of Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War, featuring only the major battles.

The **Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War** was the major military and naval operations west of the Mississippi River. The area excluded the states and territories bordering the Pacific Ocean, which formed the Pacific Coast Theater of the American Civil War.

The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service¹ is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 75 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

Trans-Mississippi Department

The Confederate **Trans-Mississippi Department** was formed May 26, 1862, to include Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Indian Territory (now Oklahoma), and Louisiana west of the Mississippi River. It absorbed the Trans-Mississippi District (Department Number Two), which had been organized January 10, 1862, to include that part of Louisiana north of the Red River, the Indian Territory, and the states of Missouri and Arkansas, except for the country east of St. Francis County, Arkansas, to Scott County, Missouri. The combined department had its headquarters at Shreveport, Louisiana, and Marshall, Texas.

Commanders

- Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn (January 10, 1862 – May 23, 1862, District part of Department Number Two)
- Brig. Gen. Paul O. Hébert (May 26, 1862 – June 20, 1862)
- Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder (assigned June 20, 1862, but did not accept)
- Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (June 20, 1862 – July 16, 1862)
- Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (July 30, 1862 – February 9, 1863)
- Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith (March 7, 1863 – April 19, 1865)
- Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner (April 19, 1865 – April 22, 1865)
- General Edmund Kirby Smith (April 22, 1865 – May 26, 1865)

Confederate Arizona and New Mexico Territory

In 1861, the Confederate States Army launched a successful campaign into the territory of present day Arizona and New Mexico. Residents in the southern portions of this territory adopted a secession ordinance of their own and requested that

Confederate forces stationed in nearby Texas assist them in removing Union Army forces still stationed there. The Confederate territory of Arizona was proclaimed by Col. John Baylor after victories in the Battle of Mesilla at Mesilla, New Mexico, and the capture of several Union forces. Confederate troops were unsuccessful in attempts to press northward in the territory and withdrew from Arizona completely in 1862 when Union reinforcements arrived from California.

The Battle of Glorieta Pass was a small skirmish in terms of both numbers involved and losses (140 Union, 190 Confederate). Yet the issues were large, and the battle was decisive in resolving them. The Confederates might well have taken Fort Union and Denver had they not been stopped at Glorieta. As one Texan put it, "If it had not been for those devils from Pike's Peak, this country would have been ours."

This small battle dissolved any possibility of the Confederacy taking New Mexico and the far west territories. In April, Union volunteers from California pushed the remaining Confederates out of present-day Arizona at the Battle of Picacho Pass. In the Eastern United States, the fighting dragged on for three more years, but in the Southwest the war was over.

Several battles occurred between Confederate soldiers and or militia within Confederate Arizona, the height of the Apache campaigns against rebel forces was during mid to late 1861.

Missouri

Though a slave state with a highly organized and militant secessionist movement, thanks to the pro-slavery "border ruffians" who battled antislavery militias in Kansas in the 1850s, Missourians sided with the Union by a ratio of two or three to one. Pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne F. Jackson and his small state guard under General Sterling Price linked up with Confederate forces under General Ben McCulloch. After victories at the Battle of Wilson's Creek and at Lexington, Missouri, Confederate forces were driven out of the state by the arrival of large Union forces in February 1862 and were effectively locked out by defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 7 and March 8.

A guerrilla conflict began to wrack Missouri. Gangs of Confederate insurgents, commonly known as "bushwhackers", ambushed and battled Union troops and Unionist state militia forces. Much of the fighting was between Missourians of different persuasions; both sides carried out large-scale atrocities against civilians, ranging from forced resettlement to murder. Historians estimate that the population of the state fell by one-third during the war; most survived but fled or were driven out by one side or the other. Many of the most brutal bushwhacker leaders, such as William C. Quantrill and William T. "Bloody Bill" Anderson, won national notoriety. A group of their followers remained under arms and carried out robberies and murders for sixteen years after the war, under the leadership of Jesse James, his brother Frank James, and Cole Younger and his brothers.

Texas and Louisiana

The Union mounted several attempts to capture the trans-Mississippi regions of Texas and Louisiana from 1862 until the war's end. With ports to the east under blockade or captured, Texas in particular became a blockade-running haven. Referred to as the "back door" of the Confederacy, Texas and western Louisiana continued to provide cotton crops that were transferred overland to the Mexican border towns of Matamoros and the port of Bagdad, and shipped to Europe in exchange for supplies.

Determined to close this trade, the Union mounted several invasion attempts of Texas, each of them unsuccessful. Confederate victories at Galveston, Texas, and the Battle of Sabine Pass repulsed invasion forces. The Union's disastrous Red River Campaign in western Louisiana, including a defeat at the Battle of Mansfield, effectively ended the Union's final invasion attempt of the region until the fall of the Confederacy. Jeffery Prushankin argues that Kirby Smith's "pride, poor judgment, and lack of military skill" prevented General Richard Taylor from potentially winning a victory that could have greatly affected the military and political situation east of the Mississippi River.²

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Isolated from events in the east, the Civil War continued at a low level in the Trans-Mississippi theater for several months after Lee's surrender in April 1865. The last battle of the war occurred at Palmito Ranch in southern Texas – a Confederate victory.

Indian Territory

Indian Territory occupied most land of the current U.S. state of Oklahoma and served as an unorganized region set aside for Native American tribes of the Southeastern United States after being removed from their lands more than thirty years before the war. The area hosted numerous skirmishes and seven officially recognized battles³ involving Native American units allied with the Confederate States of America, Native Americans loyal to the United States government, and Union and Confederate troops. A campaign led by Union General James G. Blunt to secure Indian Territory culminated with the Battle of Honey Springs on July 17, 1863. Though his force included Native Americans, the Union did not incorporate Native American soldiers into its regular army.⁴ Officers and soldiers supplied to the Confederacy from Native American lands numbered at 7,860⁴ and came largely from the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.⁵ Among these was Brig. Gen. Stand Watie, who raided Union positions in Indian Territory with his 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles regiment well after the Confederacy abandoned the area. He became the last Confederate General to surrender on June 25, 1865.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Mississippi_Theater_of_the_American_Civil_War



SPECIAL RULES



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SPECIAL RULES

AMBUSH

Units with *Ambush* can use the small table edges when entering the battlefield as Reserve.

ENTRENCHMENT (200pts)

The player can field an entrenchment within his deployment zone before deployment, with a length of up to 16".

IRISH (optional)

An Irish unit became *Warband* and *Undisciplined* if a colored unit is within 10".

IRON CLAD SUPPORT (optional)

If model available can be used as additional gun and doesn't count against the Artillery limit.

ORDERS

Each character model enables a unit (test with 2d6, SIP usage allowed but are discarded) to have extra movement or change formation before the normal movement phase. The extra movement does not include a double or triple move. In case the test of the unit is not successful the unit have to remain stationary for this turn, is not able to shoot and count as moved. **Range:** Division General 15", Brigade General 10", Officer 5" **Explanation:** A unit moved with the order cannot charge a unit that wasn't visible or allowed to attack before the move and cannot charge flank or rear of a unit if it wasn't in flank or rear before it performed the order.

Allowed Orders:

- units may perform an additional movement phase without marching or charging
- artillery may limber/unlimber

PISTOLS

Range 8", KA3, no penalty for long range or move&shoot

QUAKER GUN (10pts)

Wooden cannons, to bluff the enemy. Will be detected as deception if enemy is within 10".

RAILWAY GUN SUPPORT (optional)

If model available can be used as additional gun and doesn't count against the Artillery limit.

REBEL YELL (optional)

The union player general has to make a moral test, if failed the Strategic Advance of the first round is lost, roll normal otherwise.

REDOUBT (50pts)

The unit is covered with 1" earthwork at front and both flanks, which counts as obstacle. Unit remains stationary or have to turn and leave the redoubt by manoeuvre or if fleeing. Must be deployed first.

REPEATING RIFLE

Range 18", KA3, no penalty for long range or move&shoot

RESERVE

Up to 33% of the army can be declared as reserve. One or all units from the reserve can be deployed with a successful order from the general somewhere at the own table edge. SIP usage allowed. Those units successfully deployed cannot declare a charge in that turn but act as normal otherwise. Only Horse Artillery is allowed to be reserve, no other artillery.

RIFLE

- range 24", KA3,KA4 at effective range, can move&shoot

UNMOTIVATED

Units not allowed to use SIP for.

ARTILLERY

BATTERY

A battery always contains 2-4 guns of the same type at the start of the game, one gun can be exchanged for a howitzer. Minimum size of a battery is 2, one will be removed. Shooting at batteries get -1.

Deployment : Count as regular infantry unit. Can never in terrain that modifies the movement.

Entrenchment: All batteries can be deployed as entrenched for 20pts per gun. The entrenchment is lost as soon as the battery moves. With entrenchment the battery count as being behind defended obstacle. Entrenched batteries must be deployed first.

Movement: Batteries can be moved up to 4" but not double pace. Moved batteries, even through order, cannot shoot. Can never charge.

Limber Gun/Howitzer: To limber or unlimber cost a full movement phase and works without a test. Limbered batteries can move 7", double pace (no triple march) and count as cavalry.

Flee&Pursuit: An unlimbered battery that flees will not be moved, only turned 180° and marked this way as unable to fire. As soon as an enemy touches an abandoned battery the battery is destroyed. If the crew rally later in the game and the battery is still not destroyed the battery can shoot normally next turn, move it back 180°. Batteries never pursuit. Limbered batteries flee like cavalry.

Officer: Can be attached and gives SA4 to the battery

Cannister Shot: Cannons and howitzers can fire a cannister shot. Range is 9/12/15" and hit automatically, also as charge reaction.

Shrapnel: 3" template placed with the middle directly over the leader, misfire = nothing happens, except of a 1 = lifepoints of the gun will be reduced by D6. In case of a hit all models full or partly under the template get a KA3/4/5 hit.

Rifled Gun: Ignore the roll to hit of 1 in case of a Shrapnel

Grand Battery: Two batteries can be merged to a Grand Battery.

Gun Smoke: After three shots without a pause the cannon/howitzer have to wait for one round to shoot again. During this pause is a cloud of gun smoke within 10" of the cannon which make -1 SA to shoot/shoot at.

GUNS (75/100/125pts) AND HOWITZERS (100/125/150pts)

	CA	SA	KA	S	Mo	L
Gun&Crew	2	3	3	2	7	4

Equipment: Hand weapon. Crew of 4 men

Has a 60x80mm base. Durability 7

Gun: Light (6pdr)/ Medium (9pdr)/ Heavy ("Napoleon", 12pdr): Range 60", in case of a hit one model per rank (up to five) with KA 3/4/5. D3 hits in case of Skirmishers.

Each gun of the Battery may be Rifled (10pts)

Howitzer: Light (12pdr)/ Medium (24pdr) / Heavy (32pdr):

Range 60", in case of a hit one model per rank (up to five) with KA 4/5/6. D3 hits in case of Skirmishers, do not suffer penalties for shooting through skirmishers or at units behind cover.

Special Rules: *Artillery*

HORSE ARTILLERY (+10pts per Cannon/Howitzer)

Count as Light artillery and can move&shoot. Can limber and move (not march) or unlimber and shoot in the same turn with order.

GATLING GUN (50pts)

	CA	SA	KA	S	Mo	L
Cannon&Crew	3	3	3	2	7	3

Equipment: Hand weapon. Crew of three men. Durability 8 Range 24", D6 KA4 hits in case of a hit, D3 for skirmishers.

Special Rules: *Cannon*, Only in 1865

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SONDERREGELN

AMBUSH (Hinterhalt)

Solche Einheiten dürfen über die Seiten kommen, wenn sie als Reserve erscheinen.

ENTRENCHMENT (Graben, 200pts)

Der Spieler kann eine Verschanzung/Graben in seiner Aufstellungszone platzieren vor der Aufstellung, mit einer Länge von bis zu 16".

IRISCH (optional)

Eine irische Einheit wird *Warband* und *Undisciplined* wenn eine Einheit Farbig innerhalb von 10" ist.

IRON CLAD SUPPORT (Panzerschiff, optional)

Wenn ein passendes Modell vorhanden ist kann dies als Kanone eingesetzt werden und zählt nicht gegen das Artillerie-Limit.

ORDERS (Befehle)

Jedes Charaktermodell kann einer Einheit (Test mit 2W6, SIP sind erlaubt, verfallen dann aber) einen Befehl erteilen wodurch sie zusätzliche Bewegung oder eine freie Umformierung bekommt vor der Bewegungsphase. Die extra Bewegung beinhaltet kein doppelt Bewegen oder Angreifen. Verpatzt die Einheit den Test, bleibt sie diese Runde stehen, darf auch nicht schießen und zählt als bewegt.

Kommandozone: Divisionsgeneral 15", Brigadegeneral 10", Offizier 5".

Erklärung: Einheiten die sich per Befehl bewegt haben dürfen nicht in Flanke oder Rücken angreifen wenn sie nicht schon vor dem Befehl dort gestanden haben und keine Einheiten angreifen die sie vor dem Befehl nicht sehen konnten oder angreifen durften.

Erlaubte Befehle:

- Einheiten können eine zusätzliche Bewegungsphase ausführen ohne marschieren oder angreifen
- Artillerie darf auf- und abprotzen

PISTOLS

8", KA3, kein Abzug für weit oder bewegen&schießen

QUAKER GUN (Kanonen-Attrappe, 10pts)

Kanonen aus Holz, um den Feind in die Irre zu führen. Werden erst in 10" Nähe vom Gegner als Täuschung erkannt.

RAILWAY GUN SUPPORT (Eisenbahngeschütz, optional)

Wenn ein passendes Modell vorhanden ist kann dies als Kanone eingesetzt werden und zählt nicht gegen das Artillerie-Limit.

REBEL YELL (optional)

Der General der Union muss Moraltest bestehen oder er verliert automatisch den Strategischen Vorteil in der ersten Runde.

REDOUBT (Verschanzung, 50pts)

Die Einheit ist verschanzt hinter 1" Erdaufschüttung an der Front und den Flanken, welche als harte Deckung zählt. Die Einheit kann nur mit 180° Drehen die Verschanzung verlassen

REPEATING RIFLE (Repetiergewehr)

18", KA3, kein Abzug für weit oder bewegen&schießen

RIFLE (Gewehr)

24", KA3, 4 auf kurze Distanz, kann bewegen&schießen

RESERVE

Bis zu 33% der Armee kann als Reserve deklariert werden. Eine oder mehrere Einheiten der Reserve können per erfolgreicher Order des Generals irgendwo an der eigenen Tischkante erscheinen. SIP kann benutzt werden. Diese Einheiten können ausser anzugreifen normal agieren. Nur Berittene Artillerie kann in Reserve gehen, sonst keine Artillerie.

UNMOTIVIERT

Für diese Einheiten dürfen keine SIP verwendet werden.

ARTILLERIE

BATTERY (Geschütz-Batterie)

Eine Batterie besteht anfangs immer aus 2-4 Kanonen gleichen Typs, eine Kanone kann durch eine leichte Haubitze ersetzt werden. Mindestgröße der Batterie ist 2, eine wird aufgelöst. Beschuss auf Batterien erleidet einen Abzug von -1.

Aufstellung: Eine Batterie zählt als reguläre Infanterie-Formation. Artillerie kann niemals in Gelände das die Bewegungsfähigkeit verändert.

Verschanzung: Alle Batterien können verschanzt aufgestellt werden. Dies kostet 20 Punkte pro Kanone. Die Batterie verliert die Verschanzung sobald sie bewegt wird. Solange sie als verschanzt gilt wird die Batterie wie hinter verteidigtem Hindernis behandelt. Verschanzte Batterien müssen als erste Einheit aufgestellt werden.

Bewegung: Batterien können sich zu Fuss bis zu 4" bewegen und nicht marschieren. Schiessen nach Bewegung (auch per Order) ist nicht erlaubt. Sie dürfen nicht angreifen.

Auf- und Abprotzen: Kostet eine komplette Bewegungsphase und gelingt automatisch. Wenn aufgeprotzt können sich Batterien schneller bewegen (M7) und sogar marschieren (jedoch nicht dreifach).

Fliehen & Verfolgen: Eine abgeprotzte Batterie die flieht wird nicht bewegt, lediglich die Modelle werden 180° umgedreht und die Batterie somit als unbemannt markiert. Kommt eine feindliche Einheit in Kontakt mit einer unbemannten Batterie gilt diese als vernichtet. Sammelt sich die Besatzung in den folgenden Runden und ist die Batterie noch nicht vernichtet, werden die Modelle wieder um 180° gedreht und die Batterie ist in der folgenden Runde wieder einsatzfähig. Artillerie verfolgt niemals. Aufgeprotzte Batterien fliehen wie Kavallerie.

Offizier: Angeschlossen gibt dieser der Batterie SA4

Kartätsche: Kanonen und Haubitzen können Kartätschen abfeuern. Reichweite 15" und Treffen automatisch, auch als Angriffsreaktion.

Schrapnell: 3" Schablone wird dem Loch direkt auf den Leader platziert, wird nicht getroffen passiert nichts. Wird beim Trefferwurf eine 1 gewürfelt bekommt die Kanone W6 Punkte LP-Verlust. Im Falle eines Treffers bekommen alle halb oder voll unter der Schablone einen KA3/4/5 Treffer ab.

Gezogenes Rohr: Ignoriere den Wurf einer 1 beim Schrapnell

Groß-Batterie: Zwei Batterien können zu einer Groß-Batterie zusammengefügt werden.

Rauchwolke: Nach drei Schuss in Folge müssen Kanonen/Haubitzen eine Runde aussetzen. In dieser Pause liegt eine Rauchwolke über allen Kanonen/Haubitzen in 10" Umkreis. In diesem Bereich bekommt jeder Beschuss raus und rein -1 SA.

KANONEN (75/100/125pts) & HAUBITZEN (75/100/125pts)

	CA	SA	KA	S	Mo	L
Kanone&Crew	2	3	3	2	7	4

Ausrüstung: Handwaffe. Vier Mann Besatzung

Basierung 60x80mm. Widerstand 7

Kanone: Leicht (6pdr)/ Mittel (9pdr)/ Schwer (12pdr):

Reichweite 60", ein Treffer pro Glied (max. 5) mit KA 3/4/5.

W3 Treffer bei Plänklern.

Jede Kanonen kann ein Gezogenes Rohr haben (+10pts)

Haubitze: Leicht (12pdr)/ Mittel (24pdr) / Schwer (32pdr):

Reichweite 60", ein Treffer pro Glied (max. 5) mit KA 4/5/6.

W3 Treffer bei Plänklern, kein Abzug für durch Plänkler

schießen oder Ziel in Deckung (Bogenschluss)

Sonderregeln: Artillerie

BERITTENE ARTILLERIE (+10pts pro Kanone/Haubitze)

Zählen als Leichte Kanonen/Haubitzen und dürfen per Order Abprotzen und dann noch normal schießen.

GATLING GUN (50pts, optional)

	CA	SA	KA	S	Mo	L
Cannon&Crew	3	3	3	2	7	3

Equipment: Handwaffe. Drei Mann Besatzung. Widerstand 7 Reichweite 24", W6 KA4 Treffer, W3 bei Plänklern.

Special Rules: Artillerie, nur 1865



FIELD ARTILLERY



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Field artillery in the American Civil War refers to the important artillery weapons, equipment, and practices used by the Artillery branch to support the infantry and cavalry forces in the field. It does not include siege artillery, use of artillery in fixed fortifications, or coastal or naval artillery. Nor does it include smaller, specialized artillery termed as small arms.

SMOOTHBORES

Smoothbore artillery refers to weapons that are not rifled. At the time of the Civil War, metallurgy and other supporting technologies had just recently evolved to a point allowing the large scale production of rifled field artillery. As such, many smoothbore weapons were still in use and production even at the end of the war. Smoothbore field artillery of the day fit into two role-based categories: guns and howitzers. Further classifications of the weapons were made based on the type of metal used, typically bronze or iron (cast or wrought), although some examples of steel were produced. Additionally, the artillery was often identified by the year of design in the Ordnance department references.

The smoothbore artillery was also categorized by the bore dimensions, based on the rough weight of the solid shot projectile fired from the weapon. For instance a 12-pounder field gun fired a 12 pound solid shot projectile from its 4.62-inch (117 mm) diameter bore. It was practice, dating back to the 18th century, to mix gun and howitzers into batteries. Pre-war allocations called for 6-pounder field guns matched with 12-pounder howitzers, 9 and 12-pounder field guns matched with 24-pounder howitzers. But the rapid expansions of both combatant armies, mass introduction of rifled artillery, and the versatility of the 12-pounder "Napoleon" class of weapons all contributed to a change in the mixed battery practices.

Guns

Smoothbore guns were designed to fire solid shot projectiles at high velocity, over low trajectories at targets in the open, although shot and canister were acceptable for use. The barrels of the guns were longer than corresponding howitzers, and called for higher powder charges to achieve the desired performance. Field guns were produced in 6-pounder (3.67 inch bore), 9-pounder (4.2 inch bore), and 12-pounder (4.62 inch bore) versions. Although some older iron weapons were pressed into service, and the Confederacy produced some new iron field guns, most of those used on the battlefields were of bronze construction.

The 6-pounder field gun was well represented by bronze Models of 1835, 1838, 1839, and 1841 early in the war. Even a few older iron Model of 1819 weapons were pressed into service. Several hundred were used by the armies of both sides in 1861. But in practice the limited payload of the projectile was seen as a shortcoming of this weapon. From mid-war on, few 6-pounders saw action in the main field armies.

The larger 9- and 12-pounders were less well represented. While the 9-pounder was still listed on Ordnance and Artillery manuals in 1861, very few were ever produced after the War of 1812 and only scant references exist to Civil War use of the weapons. The 12-pounder field gun appeared in a series of models mirroring the 6-pounder, but in far less numbers. At least one Federal battery, the 13th Indiana, took the 12-pounder field gun into service early in the war. The major shortcoming of these heavy field guns was mobility, as they required eight-horse teams as opposed to the six-horse teams of the lighter guns. A small quantity of 12-pounder field guns were rifled early in the war, but these were more experimental weapons, and no field service is recorded.

By far the most popular of the smoothbore cannon was the 12-pounder Model of 1857, Light, commonly called "Napoleon". The Model 1857 was of lighter weight than the previous 12-

pounder guns, and could be pulled by a six-horse draft, yet offered the heavier projectile payload of the larger bore. It is sometimes called, confusingly, a "gun-howitzer" (because it possessed characteristics of both gun and howitzer) and is discussed in more detail separately below.

Howitzers

Howitzers were short-barreled guns that were optimized for firing explosive shells in a high trajectory, but also for spherical case shot and canister, over a shorter range than the guns. While field use alluded to firing at targets consisting of enemy forces arrayed in the open, Howitzers were considered the weapon of choice if the opposing forces were concealed behind terrain features or fortifications. Howitzers used lower powder charges than guns of corresponding caliber. Field Howitzer calibers used in the Civil War were 12-pounder (4.62 inch bore), 24-pounder (5.82 inch bore), and 32-pounder (6.41 inch bore). Most of the howitzers used in the war were bronze, with notable exceptions of some of Confederate manufacture.

Coupled to the 6-pounder field gun in allocations of the pre-war Army, the 12-pounder field Howitzer was represented by Models of 1838 and 1841. With a light weight and respectable projectile payload, the 12-pounder was only cycled out of the main field army inventories as production and availability of the 12-pounder "Napoleon" rose, and would see action in the Confederate armies up to the very end.

As with the corresponding heavy field guns, the heavier Howitzers were available in limited quantities early in the war. Both Federal and Confederate contracts list examples of 24-pounders delivered during the war, and surviving examples exist of imported Austrian types of this caliber used by the Confederates. These 24-pounder Howitzers found use in the "reserve" batteries of the respective armies, but were gradually replaced over time with heavy rifled guns. Both the 24- and 32-pounders were more widely used in fixed fortifications, but at least one of the later large weapons was with the 1st Connecticut Artillery as late as 1864.

Finally, the lesser known but highly-mobile 12-pounder mountain Howitzer saw service with infantry and cavalry forces in the rugged western theaters and prairies, and continued in service during the Indian Wars. This versatile piece could utilize one of two carriages: a small carriage that could be drawn by a single animal or could be rapidly broken down to carry on the backs of pack animals, or a slightly larger prairie carriage to be drawn by two animals. A veteran of the Mexican-American War, several hundred more of these diminutive tubes were produced by Union foundries during the Civil War, and the Confederate Tredegar foundry turned out as many as 21 more.[14] A Federal battery of four proved "highly effective" at the decisive battle of Glorieta, New Mexico, and Nathan Bedford Forrest frequently employed mountain howitzers for the rapid close-in combat that he favored.



12-pounder Napoleon

The twelve-pound cannon "Napoleon" was the most popular smoothbore cannon used during the war. It was named after

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Napoleon III of France and was widely admired because of its safety, reliability, and killing power, especially at close range. In Union Ordnance manuals it was referred to as the "light 12-pounder gun" to distinguish it from the heavier and longer 12 pounder gun (which was virtually unused in field service.) It did not reach America until 1857. It was the last cast bronze gun used by an American army. The Federal version of the Napoleon can be recognized by the flared front end of the barrel, called the muzzle-swell. It was, however, relatively heavy compared to other artillery pieces and difficult to move across rough terrain.

Confederate Napoleons were produced in at least six variations, most of which had straight muzzles, but at least eight catalogued survivors of 133 identified have muzzle swells. Additionally, four iron Confederate Napoleons produced by Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond have been identified, of an estimated 125 cast. In early 1863 Robert E. Lee sent nearly all of the Army of Northern Virginia's bronze 6-pounder guns to Tredegar to be melted down and recast as Napoleons. Copper for casting bronze pieces became increasingly scarce to the Confederacy throughout the war and became acute in November 1863 when the Ducktown copper mines near Chattanooga were lost to Union forces. Casting of bronze Napoleons by the Confederacy ceased and in January 1864 Tredegar began producing iron Napoleons.

RIFLED GUNS

Rifling adds spiral grooves along the inside of the gun barrel for the purpose of spinning the shell or shot and enacting gyroscopic force that increases the accuracy of the gun by preventing the shell from rotating along axes other than the axis parallel to the gun barrel. Adding rifling to a gun tube made it more difficult and expensive to manufacture and increased the length of the tube, but it increased the range and accuracy of the piece. While most of the rifled guns in the Civil War were muzzle-loaded, a small number of breech-loaded guns were used.

3-inch rifle

The 3-inch (76 mm) rifle was the most widely used rifled gun during the war. Invented by John Griffen, it was extremely durable, with the barrel made of wrought iron, primarily produced by the Phoenix Iron Company of Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. There are few cases on record of the tube fracturing or bursting, a problem that plagued other rifles made of brittle cast iron. The rifle had exceptional accuracy. During the Battle of Atlanta, a Confederate gunner was quoted: "The Yankee three-inch rifle was a dead shot at any distance under a mile. They could hit the end of a flour barrel more often than miss, unless the gunner got rattled." The 1st Minnesota Light Artillery Battery converted into the 3-inch Rifle on March 5, 1864, though they were considered "3-inch Rodman's guns" in a Nov. 11, 1864 letter from 1st Lieutenant Henry S. Hurter to the Minnesota Adjutant General. The 1st Minnesota Light Artillery took part in the Atlanta Campaign.



Parrott rifles

The Parrott rifle, invented by Robert Parker Parrott, was manufactured in different sizes, from 10-pounders up to the rare 300-pounder. The 10- and 20-pounder versions were used by both armies in the field. The smaller size was much more prevalent; it came in two bore sizes: 2.9-inch (74 mm) and 3.0-inch (76 mm). Confederate forces used both bore sizes during the war, which added to the complication of supplying the appropriate ammunition to its batteries. Until 1864, Union batteries used only the 2.9 inch Parrott, but they also employed 3" Ordnance rifles. During the 1st day of Gettysburg, three Parrott rifles were temporarily disabled when 3" ammunition was issued to the battery by mistake. Following this plans were made to re-rifle all of the 2.9" Parrotts to 3" and no further 2.9" Parrotts were to be produced.[22] The M1863, with a 3-inch (76 mm) bore, had firing characteristics similar to the earlier model; it can be recognized by its straight barrel, without muzzle-swell.



Parrotts were manufactured with a combination of cast iron and wrought iron. The cast iron improved the accuracy of the gun but was brittle enough to suffer fractures. On the Parrott, a large wrought iron reinforcing band was overlaid on the breech. Although accurate, the Parrott had a poor reputation for safety, and they were shunned by many artillerymen. (At the end of 1862, Henry J. Hunt attempted to get the Parrott eliminated from the Army of the Potomac's inventory.) The 20-pounder was the largest field gun used during the war, with the barrel alone weighing over 1,800 pounds (800 kg).

James rifles

James rifles were an early solution to the need for rifled artillery at the start of the war. 6-pounder bronze guns could be rifled to fire the projectiles invented by Charles T. James. Some were simply rifled from their initial 3.67" bore, others were reamed to 3.80" then rifled. Reaming to 3.80" was preferred to eliminate wear deformities from service. Nomenclature for the two sizes could be muddled and varied, but the effective descriptions for the 3.67" are "rifled 6-pounder" or "12-pounder James rifle", while the 3.80" variant was known as the 14-pounder James rifle. To add to the confusion new bronze (and a few iron) variants of the 3.80" bore rifle (14-pounder James rifle) were also produced with a longer, heavier tube utilizing the Ordnance profile.

Although the James rifles were reported to be extremely accurate, bronze rifling wears rapidly and the James rifles and projectiles soon fell out of favor. No new James rifles were known to have been produced after 1862. The total numbers of James rifles are uncertain, but the 1862 Ohio Quartermaster General annual report recorded 82 rifled bronze pieces (44 of those specified as "3.80 bore [James rifles]") out of a total of 162 of all field artillery types. Unusual or out of favor types migrated to the Western theaters.

Whitworth

The Whitworth, designed by Joseph Whitworth and manufactured in England, was a rare gun during the war, but was an interesting precursor to modern artillery in that it was loaded from the breech and had exceptional accuracy over great

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distance. An engineering magazine wrote in 1864 that, "At 1600 yards [1500 m] the Whitworth gun fired 10 shots with a lateral deviation of only 5 inches." This degree of accuracy made it effective in counter-battery fire, used almost as the equivalent of a sharpshooter's rifle, and also for firing over bodies of water. It was not popular as an anti-infantry weapon. It had a caliber of 2.75 inches (70 mm). The bore was hexagonal in cross-section, and the projectile was a long bolt that twisted to conform to the rifling. It is said that the bolts made a very distinctive eerie sound when fired, which could be distinguished from other projectiles.



AMMUNITION

Ammunition came in wide varieties, designed to attack specific targets. A typical Union artillery battery (armed with six 12-pounder Napoleons) carried the following ammunition going into battle: 288 shot, 96 shells, 288 spherical cases, and 96 canisters.

Shot (or bolt)

Shot was a solid projectile that included no explosive charge. For a smoothbore, the projectile was a round "cannonball". For a rifled gun, the projectile was referred to as a bolt and had a cylindrical or spherical shape. In both cases, the projectile was used to impart kinetic energy for a battering effect, particularly effective for the destruction of enemy guns, limbers and caissons, and wagons. It was also effective for mowing down columns of infantry and cavalry and had psychological effects against its targets. Despite its effectiveness, many artillerymen were reluctant to use solid shot, preferring the explosive types of ordnance. With solid projectiles, accuracy was the paramount consideration, and they also caused more tube wear than their explosive counterparts.

While rifled cannon had much greater accuracy on average than smoothbores, the smoothbores had an advantage firing round shot relative to the bolts fired from rifled pieces. Round shot could be employed in ricochet or rolling fire extending the depth and range of its effect on land or water while bolts tended to dig in rather than ricochet.

Shell

Shells included an explosive charge and were designed to burst into fragments in the midst of enemy infantry or artillery. For smoothbores, the projectile was referred to as "spherical shell". Shells were more effective against troops behind obstacles or earthworks, and they were good for destroying wooden buildings by setting them on fire. They were ineffective against good quality masonry. A primary weakness of shell was that it typically produced only a few large fragments, the count increasing with caliber of the shell. A Confederate mid-war innovation perhaps influenced by British ordnance/munition imports was the "polygonal cavity" or "segmented" shell which used a polyhedral cavity core to create lines of weakness in the shell wall that would yield more regular fragmentation patterns—typically 12 similarly sized fragments. While

segmented designs were most common in spherical shell, it was applied to specific rifled projectiles as well.

Spherical shell used time fuses, while rifled shell could use timed fuse or be detonated on impact by percussion fuse. Fuse reliability was a concern; any shell that buried itself into the earth before detonating had little anti-personnel effectiveness. However, large caliber shells, such as the 32-pounder spherical were effective at breaching entrenchments.

Case (or shrapnel)

Case (or "spherical case" for smoothbores) were anti-personnel projectiles carrying a smaller burst charge than shell, but designed to be more effective against exposed troops. While shell produced only a few large fragments, case was loaded with lead or iron balls and was designed to burst above and before the enemy line, showering down many more small but destructive projectiles on the enemy. The effect was analogous to a weaker version of canister. With case the lethality of the balls and fragments came from the velocity of the bursting projectile itself—the small burst charge only fragmented the case and dispersed the shrapnel. The spherical case used in a 12-pounder Napoleon contained 78 balls. The name shrapnel derives from its inventor, Henry Shrapnel.

The primary limitations to case effectiveness came in judging the range, setting the fuse accordingly, and the reliability and variability of the fuse itself.

Canister

Canister shot was the deadliest type of ammunition, consisting of a thin metal container loaded with layers of lead or iron balls packed in sawdust. Upon exiting the muzzle, the container disintegrated, and the balls fanned out as the equivalent of a shotgun blast. The effective range of canister was only 400 yards (370 m), but within that range dozens of enemy infantrymen could be mowed down. Even more devastating was "double canister", generally used only in dire circumstances at extremely close range, where two containers of balls were fired simultaneously.

Grapeshot

Grapeshot was the predecessor of, and a variation on, canister, in which a smaller number of larger metal balls were arranged on stacked iron plates with a threaded bolt running down the center to hold them as a unit inside the barrel. It was used at a time when some cannons burst when loaded with too much gunpowder, but as cannons got stronger, grapeshot was replaced by canister. A grapeshot round (or "stand") used in a 12-pounder Napoleon contained 9 balls, contrasted against the 27 smaller balls in a canister round. By the time of the Civil War, grapeshot was obsolete and largely replaced by canister. The period Ordnance and Gunnery work states that grape was excluded from "field and mountain services." Few, if any, rounds were issued to field artillery batteries.

EQUIPMENT

The most pervasive piece of artillery equipment was the horse.

Horse

Horses were required to pull the enormous weight of the cannon and ammunition; on average, each horse pulled about 700 pounds (317.5 kg). Each gun in a battery used two six-horse teams: one team pulled a limber that towed the gun, the other pulled a limber that towed a caisson. The large number of horses posed a logistical challenge for the artillery, because they had to be fed, maintained, and replaced when worn out or injured. Artillery horses were generally selected second from the pool of high quality animals; cavalry mounts were the best horses. The life expectancy of an artillery horse was under eight months. They suffered from disease, exhaustion from long marches—typically 16 miles (25.8 km) in 10 hours—and battle injuries.

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Horses were larger and stupider than men than when subjected to counter-battery fire, and their movements were made difficult because they were harnessed together into teams. Robert Stiles wrote about Union fire striking a Confederate battery on Benner's Hill at the Battle of Gettysburg:

Such a scene as it presented—guns dismounted and disabled, carriages splintered and crushed, ammunition chests exploded, limbers upset, wounded horses plunging and kicking, dashing out the brains of men tangled in the harness; while cannoneers with pistols were crawling around through the wreck shooting the struggling horses to save the lives of wounded men.

The term "horse artillery" refers to the faster moving artillery batteries that typically supported cavalry regiments. The term "flying artillery" is sometimes used as well. In such batteries, the artillerymen were all mounted, in contrast to batteries in which the artillerymen walked alongside their guns. A prominent organization of such artillery in the Union Army was the U.S. Horse Artillery Brigade.

Limber

The limber was a two-wheeled carriage that carried an ammunition chest. It was connected directly behind the team of six horses and towed either a gun or a caisson. In either case, the combination provided the equivalent of a four-wheeled vehicle, which distributed the load over two axles but was easier to maneuver on rough terrain than a four-wheeled wagon. The combination of a Napoleon gun and a packed limber weighed 3,865 pounds (1,753.1 kg).



Caisson

The caisson was also a two-wheeled carriage. It carried two ammunition chests and a spare wheel. A fully loaded limber and caisson combination weighed 3,811 pounds (1728.6 kg).

The limbers, caissons, and gun carriages were all constructed of oak. Each ammunition chest typically carried about 500 pounds (226.8 kg) of ammunition or supplies. In addition to these vehicles, there were also battery supply wagons and portable forges that were used to service the guns.

ORGANIZATION

Union artillery

The Union Army entered the war with a strong advantage in artillery. It had ample manufacturing capacity in Northern factories, and it had a well-trained and professional officer corps manning that branch of the service. Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, who was the chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac for part of the war, was well recognized as a most efficient organizer of artillery forces, and he had few peers in the practice of the sciences of gunnery and logistics. Another example was John Gibbon, the author of the influential *Artillerist's Manual* published in 1863 (although Gibbon would achieve considerably more fame as an infantry general during the war). Shortly after the outbreak of war, Brig. Gen. James Wolfe Ripley, Chief of

Ordnance, ordered the conversion of old smoothbores into rifled cannon and the manufacture of Parrott guns.

The basic unit of Union artillery was the battery, which usually consisted of six guns. Attempts were made to ensure that all six guns in a battery were of the same caliber, simplifying training and logistics. Each gun, or "piece", was operated by a gun crew of eight, plus four additional men to handle the horses and equipment. Two guns operating under the control of a lieutenant were known as a "section". The battery of six guns was commanded by a captain. Artillery brigades composed of five batteries were commanded by colonels and supported the infantry organizations as follows: each infantry corps was supported directly by one artillery brigade and, in the case of the Army of the Potomac, five brigades formed the Artillery Reserve. This arrangement, championed by Hunt, allowed artillery to be massed in support of the entire army's objective, rather than being dispersed all across the battlefield. An example of the tension between infantry commanders and artillery commanders was during the massive Confederate bombardment of Cemetery Ridge on 3 July 1863, the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg. Hunt had difficulty persuading the infantry commanders, such as Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, against using all of their artillery ammunition in response to the Confederate bombardment, understanding the value to the defenders of saving the ammunition for the infantry assault to come, Pickett's Charge.

At the start of the war, the U.S. Army had 2,283 guns on hand, but only about 10% of these were field artillery pieces. By the end of the war, the army had 3,325 guns, of which 53% were field pieces. The army reported as "supplied to the army during the war" the following quantities: 7,892 guns, 6,335,295 artillery projectiles, 2,862,177 rounds of fixed artillery ammunition, 45,258 tons of lead metal, and 13,320 tons of gunpowder.

Confederate artillery

The South was at a relative disadvantage to the North for deployment of artillery. The industrial North had far greater capacity for manufacturing weapons, and the Union blockade of Southern ports prevented many foreign arms from reaching the Southern armies. The Confederacy had to rely to a significant extent on captured Union artillery pieces (either on the battlefield or by capturing armories, such as Harpers Ferry); it is estimated that two thirds of all Confederate field artillery was captured from the Union. The Confederate cannons built in the South often suffered from the shortage of quality metals and shoddy workmanship. Another disadvantage was the quality of ammunition. The fuses needed for detonating shells and cases were frequently inaccurate, causing premature or delayed explosions. All that, coupled with the Union gunners' initial competence and experience gained as the war progressed, led Southern forces to dread assaults on Northern positions backed up by artillery. A Southern officer observed, "The combination of Yankee artillery with Rebel infantry would make an army that could be beaten by no one."

Confederate batteries usually consisted of four guns, in contrast to the Union's six. This was a matter of necessity, because guns were always in short supply. And, unlike the Union, batteries frequently consisted of mixed caliber weapons. Confederate batteries were generally organized into battalions (versus the Union brigades) of four batteries each, and the battalions were assigned to the direct support of infantry divisions. Each infantry corps was assigned two battalions as an Artillery Reserve, but there was no such Reserve at the army level. The chief of artillery for Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, had considerable difficulty massing artillery for best effect because of this organization.

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_artillery_in_the_American_Civil_War

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
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RAILWAY GUN



A railway gun used in the Siege of Petersburg


The first railway gun used in combat was a banded 32-pounder Brooke naval rifle mounted on a flat car and shielded by a sloping casemate of railroad iron. On 29 June 1862, Robert E. Lee had the gun pushed by a locomotive over the Richmond and York River line (later part of the Southern Railway) and used at the Battle of Savage's Station to interfere with General George McClellan's plans for siege operations against Richmond during the Union advance up the peninsula. Photographic evidence exists of at least one Union 13-inch siege mortar mounted on a rail car during the Siege of Petersburg. It was nicknamed the Dictator or the Petersburg Express. Another photo exists of a gun mounted on an armored rail car with the caption of "Railway battery used in siege of Petersburg" although no textual evidence survives in support of the caption, which makes the claim that it is a photo of the Confederate gun from 1862 dubious.



The "Dictator", Petersburg (Mathew Brady)

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railway_gun

GATLING GUN



Patent drawing for R.J. Gatling's Battery Gun, 9 May 1865.

The Gatling gun is one of the best known early rapid-fire weapons and a forerunner of the modern machine gun. Invented by Richard Gatling, it is known for its use by the Union forces during the American Civil War in the 1860s, which was the first time it was employed in combat. Later it was used in the assault on San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War.

The Gatling gun's operation centered on a cyclic multi-barrel design which facilitated cooling and synchronized the firing/reloading sequence. Each barrel fired a single shot when it reached a certain point in the cycle, after which it ejected the spent cartridge, loaded a new round, and in the process, cooled down somewhat. This configuration allowed higher rates of fire to be achieved without the barrel overheating.



1876 Gatling gun kept at Fort Laramie National Historic Site

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gatling_gun

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IRONCLADS

The first use of ironclads in action came in the U.S. Civil War. The U.S. Navy at the time the war broke out had no ironclads, its most powerful ships being six steam-powered unarmoured frigates.[20] Since the bulk of the Navy remained loyal to the Union, the Confederacy sought to gain advantage in the naval conflict by acquiring modern armored ships. In May 1861, the Confederate Congress voted that \$2 million be appropriated for the purchase of ironclads from overseas, and in July and August 1861 the Confederacy started work on construction and converting wooden ships.



Officers of a monitor-class warship, probably USS Patapsco, photographed during the American Civil War.

On 12 October 1861, the CSS Manassas became the first ironclad to enter combat, when she fought Union warships on the Mississippi during the Battle of the Head of Passes. She had been converted from a commercial vessel in New Orleans for river and coastal fighting. In February 1862, the larger CSS Virginia (Merrimack) joined the Confederate Navy, having been rebuilt at Norfolk. As USS Merrimack, Virginia originally was a conventional warship made of wood, but she was reconstructed with an iron-covered casemate when she entered the Confederate navy. By this time, the Union had completed seven ironclad gunboats of the City class, and was about to complete the USS Monitor, an innovative design proposed by the Swedish inventor John Ericsson. The Union was also building a large armored frigate, the USS New Ironsides, and the smaller USS Galena.

The first battle between ironclads happened on 9 March 1862, as the armored Monitor was deployed to protect the Union's wooden fleet from the ironclad ram Virginia and other Confederate warships. In this engagement, the second day of the Battle of Hampton Roads, the two ironclads repeatedly tried to ram one another while shells bounced off their armor. The battle attracted attention worldwide, making it clear that the wooden warship was now out of date, with the ironclads destroying them easily.




United States Navy ironclads off Cairo, Illinois, during the American Civil War.

The Civil War saw more ironclads built by both sides, and they played an increasing role in the naval war alongside the unarmored warships, commerce raiders and blockade runners. The Union built a large fleet of fifty monitors modeled on their

namesake. The Confederacy built ships designed as smaller versions of the Virginia, many of which saw action, but their attempts to buy ironclads overseas were frustrated as European nations confiscated ships being built for the Confederacy — especially in Russia, the only country to openly support the Union through the war. Only CSS Stonewall was completed, and she arrived in American waters just in time for the end of the war.

Through the remainder of the war, ironclads saw action in the Union's attacks on Confederate ports. Seven Union monitors, including USS Montauk, as well as two other ironclads, the ironclad frigate New Ironsides and a light-draft Keokuk, participated in the failed attack on Charleston; one was sunk. Two small ironclads, CSS Palmetto State and CSS Chicora participated in the defence of the harbor. For the later attack at Mobile Bay, the Union assembled four monitors as well as 11 wooden ships, facing the CSS Tennessee, the Confederacy's most powerful ironclad and the gunboats CSS Morgan, CSS Gaines, CSS Selma.

On the western front, the Union built a formidable force of river ironclads, beginning with several converted riverboats and then contracting engineer James Eads of St. Louis, Missouri to build the "City" class ironclads. These excellent ships were built with twin engines and a central paddle wheel, all protected by an armored casement. They had a shallow draft, allowing them to journey up smaller tributaries, and were very well suited for river operations. Eads also produced monitors for use on the rivers, the first two of which differed from the ocean going monitors in that they contained a paddle wheel (the USS Neosho (1863) and USS Osage (1863)).



USS Cairo (1861), an example of a City class ironclad gunboat

Arguably Eads vessels were some of the better ironclads of the Western Flotilla, but there were a number of other vessels that served valiantly with the fleet. All were of varying design, some more successful than others, and some were similar to standard riverboats but with armored side-mounted paddle wheels. All were armed with various smoothbore and some rifled guns. If nothing else the experience of the American Civil War and its wild variety of competing ironclad designs, some more successful (or disastrous) than others, confirmed the emerging trade-off or compromises required in applying the latest technological advances in iron armour manufacture, ship construction and gun design—to name a few—also going on in Europe. There was no such thing as a 'perfect' ironclad which could be invincible in every possible encounter; ship duels, standing up to forts, Brown & Blue-water operations.

The Union ironclads played an important role in the Mississippi and tributaries by providing tremendous fire upon Confederate forts, installations and vessels with relative impunity to enemy fire. They were not as heavily armored as the ocean going monitors of the Union, but they were adequate for their intended use. More Western Flotilla Union ironclads were sunk by torpedoes (mines) than by enemy fire, and the most damaging fire for the Union ironclads was from shore installations, not Confederate vessels.



PERSONALITIES



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UNITED STATES



Ulysses S. Grant



George B. McClellan



John Pope



Ambrose Burnside



Joseph Hooker



George G. Meade



Henry W. Halleck



William T. Sherman



Georg H. Thomas



Don Carlos Buell



William Rosecrans

CONFEDERATE STATES



Robert E. Lee



P.G.T. Beauregard



Joseph E. Johnston



James Longstreet



Stonewall Jackson



Jubal A. Early



Albert Sydney Johnston



Braxton Bragg



John Bell Hood




Nathan Bedford Forrest



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ULYSSES S. GRANT



Volunteer recruitment and training

On April 13, 1861, Confederate troops attacked Union Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina forcing surrender. Two days later, on April 15, President Lincoln put out a call for 75,000 volunteers. A mass meeting was called in Galena to initiate recruitment, and recognized as the sole military professional in the area, Grant was asked to lead the meeting and ensuing effort. He proceeded to help recruit a company of volunteers and accompanied it to Springfield, the capital of Illinois. He accepted a position offered by Illinois Gov. Richard Yates to recruit and train volunteer units, but Grant wanted, and expected, a field command in the regular Army. He made multiple efforts with contacts (including General McClellan) to acquire such a position with no success. Meanwhile, he remained efficient and energetic at the training camps and made a positive impression on the volunteer Union recruits. With the aid of his advocate in Washington, DC, Elihu B. Washburne, Grant was promoted to Colonel by Governor Richard Yates on June 14, 1861, and put in charge of the unruly Twenty-first Illinois volunteer regiment. By the end of August 1861, Grant was given charge of the District of Cairo by Maj. Gen John C. Fremont, an outside Lincoln appointment, who viewed Grant as "a man of dogged persistence, and iron will." Grant's own demeanor had changed immediately at the outset of the war; having renewed energies, he began to walk with a confident step. Indeed, he later recalled with apparent satisfaction that after that first recruitment meeting in Galena, "I never went into our leather store again, to put up a package or do other business..." During this time Grant quickly perceived that the war would be fought for the most part by volunteers, and not professional soldiers.

Belmont, Ft. Henry and Ft. Donelson

Grant's first battles during the Civil War were launched from his base at Cairo, Illinois, the strategic point where the Ohio River runs into the Mississippi River and there are easy links to the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. The Confederate Army was stationed in Columbus, Kentucky under General Leonidas Polk. Grant, who was headquartered at Cairo, was given an open order by Union General John C. Frémont to make "demonstrations", not including attack, against the Confederate Army at Belmont. After President Lincoln relieved Frémont from command, Grant attacked Fort Belmont taking 3,114 Union troops by boat on

November 7, 1861, and initially took the fort, but his army was later pushed back to Cairo by the reinforced Confederate General Gideon J. Pillow. Though a defeat logistically, the battle instilled much needed confidence in Grant and his volunteers. Following Belmont, Grant asked Gen. Henry Halleck for permission to move against Ft. Henry; Halleck agreed on condition that the attack be conducted with oversight by Union Navy Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. Grant's troops, in close collaboration with the Union Navy under Foote, successfully captured Fort Henry on the Tennessee River on February 6, 1862 and nearby Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River on February 16. Fort Henry, undermined by Confederates and nearly submerged from flood waters, was taken over with few losses. However, at Fort Donelson, Grant and Foote encountered stiffer resistance from the Confederate forces under General Pillow. Grant's initial 15,000 troop strength was increased by 10,000 reinforcements. With 12,000 Confederate troops at Fort Donelson, Foote's initial approach by Union naval ships were repulsed by Donelson's guns. The Confederates, who were surrounded by Grant's Union Army attempted a break out pushing the Union Army's right flank into disorganized retreat eastward on the Nashville road. Grant, however, rallied his troops, resumed the offensive, retook the Union right and attacked Pillow's left. Pillow ordered Confederate troops back into the fort, relinquished command to General Buckner who surrendered to Grant's Army the following day. Grant's terms were repeated across the North: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender." Grant became a celebrity in the North, now called "Unconditional Surrender" Grant. With these victories, President Abraham Lincoln promoted Grant to major general of volunteers.



Campaigns for Belmont, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson

Shiloh

The Union advances achieved by Maj. Gen. Grant and Adm. Foote at Forts Henry and Donelson caused significant concern in the Confederate government. The Union army, known as the Army of the Tennessee, under Grant had increased to 48,894 men and was encamped on the western side of the Tennessee River. Grant met with his senior General, William T. Sherman, who advised he was prepared to attack the Confederate stronghold of equal numbers at Corinth, Mississippi. The Confederates had the same thing in mind, and moved first at dawn on April 6, 1862, with a full-force attack on the Union Army at the Battle of Shiloh; the objective was to annihilate the western Union offensive in one massive assault. Over 44,699 confederate troops, led by Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard, vigorously attacked five divisions of Grant's army bivouacked nine miles south at Pittsburgh Landing. Aware of the impending Confederate attack, Union troops sounded the alarm and readied for battle, however, no defensive entrenchment works had been made. The Confederates struck hard and repulsed the Union Army towards the Tennessee River. At the end of the day, the Union Army was largely vulnerable, and subject to elimination by Beauregard, had he been able to continue the fight, but for the exhaustion of his troops. Not only did they avoid panic, but Grant and Sherman actually rallied

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their troops for a vicious counterattack the next morning. With reinforcement troops from Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell and Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace's missing division, Grant succeeded in driving the Confederates back to the road from Corinth; though he stopped short of capturing Beauregard's army, he was able to stabilize the Army of the Tennessee.

The battle was the costliest of the Civil War at the time, with aggregate Union and Confederate casualties of 23,746, and minimal strategic advantage gained by either side. Nevertheless, Grant received high praise from many corners. He later remarked that the carnage at Shiloh had made it clear to him that the Confederacy would only be defeated by complete annihilation of its army. Lincoln was also alarmed at the level of casualties, and queried Halleck as to Grant's potential responsibility for them; Grant was criticized for his decision to keep the Union Army bivouacked rather than entrenched. Gen. Halleck transferred command of the Army of the Tennessee to Gen. George H. Thomas and effectively demoted Grant to the hollow position of second-in-command of all the armies of the west. As a result, Grant was again on the verge of resigning until Gen. Sherman paid a visit to his camp. Sherman's experiences in the military had been very similar to Grant's; he had studied at West Point, served in the Mexican War, and later had resigned from the Army only to fail in his civilian career. Sherman succeeded in convincing Grant to remain in Halleck's army. Due to Halleck's sluggardly assault on Corinth—covering 19 miles in 30 days—the entire Confederate force there escaped; the 120,000-man Union Army was then broken up. Charles A. Dana, an investigative agent for Secretary of War Stanton at the time, interviewed Grant; Dana related to Lincoln and Stanton that Grant appeared "self-possessed and eager to make war." Thus, Grant was reinstated to his command of the Army of the Tennessee.

Vicksburg

President Lincoln was determined to take the strategic Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg, located on the Mississippi River. Major General John A. McClernand was authorized to raise an army in his home state of Illinois for the purpose of taking Vicksburg; Grant was very frustrated at the lack of direction he was receiving to move forward from his station in Memphis, and more aggravated to learn of this apparent effort to brush him aside. According to biographer McFeely, this discontent may have been responsible for Grant's ill-considered issuance of General Orders No. 11 on December 17, 1862. This order expelled Jews, as a class, from Grant's military district, in reaction to illicit activities of overly aggressive cotton traders in the Union camps, which Grant believed was interfering with military operations. President Lincoln demanded the order be revoked, and Grant rescinded it 21 days after issuance. Without admitting fault, Grant believed he had only complied with the instructions sent from Washington. According to another Grant biographer, Jean E. Smith, it was "one of the most blatant examples of state-sponsored anti-Semitism in American history." Grant had believed that gold, along with cotton, was being smuggled through enemy lines and that Jews could pass freely into enemy camps. Grant later expressed regret for this order in 1868; his attitude concerning Jews was otherwise undeclared.



The Battle of Jackson, fought on 14 May 1863, in Jackson, Mississippi, was part of the Vicksburg Campaign.

In December 1862, with the approval of Halleck, Grant moved to take Vicksburg by an overland route, aided by Charles Hamilton and James McPherson, in combination with a water expedition on the Mississippi led by Maj. Gen. Sherman. Grant had thus pre-empted his rival McClernand's move. Confederate cavalry raiders Bedford Forrest and Earl Van Dorn stalled Grant's advance by breaking communications, while the Confederate army led by John C. Pemberton concentrated and repulsed Sherman's direct approach at Chickasaw Bayou. McClernand afterwards made an attempt to salvage Sherman's effort to no avail, so at the end of the first day neither Grant nor McClernand had succeeded.

During the second attempt to capture Vicksburg, Grant made a series of unsuccessful and highly criticized movements along bayou and canal water routes. Finally, in April 1863, Grant marched Union troops down the west side of the Mississippi River and crossed east over at Bruinsburg using Adm. David Porter's naval ships. Grant previously had implemented two diversion battles that confused Pemberton and allowed the Union Army to cross the Mississippi River. After a series of battles and having taken a railroad junction near Jackson, Grant went on to defeat Confederate General John C. Pemberton at the Battle of Champion Hill. Grant then made two assaults on the Vicksburg fortress, and suffered gruesome losses. This battle and one other at Cold Harbor were prominent in his memory as the distinctly regrettable ones of the war. After the failed assault, Grant decided to settle for a siege lasting seven weeks. According to biographer McFeely, as the siege began, Grant lapsed into a two day drinking episode. Pemberton, who was in charge of the fortress, surrendered to Grant on July 4, 1863. During the Vicksburg campaign, Grant assumed responsibility for refugee-contraband slaves who were dislodged by the war and vulnerable to Confederate marauders; President Lincoln had also authorized their recruitment into the Union Army. Grant put the refugees under the protection of Chaplain John Eaton who authorized them to work on abandoned Confederate plantations harvesting cotton and cutting wood to fuel Union steamers. The effort was the precursor to the Freedman's Bureau during later Reconstruction.

The Vicksburg Campaign was Grant's greatest achievement up to this time, opening the south to Chattanooga and giving the Union army access to the vital grain supply in Georgia. The fall of Vicksburg in 1863, combined with the Union naval capture of New Orleans in 1862, gave the Union Army and Navy control over the entire Mississippi and logistically fractured the Confederacy. Grant demonstrated that an indirect assault coupled with diversionary tactics was highly effective strategy in defeating an entrenched Confederate Army. Although the success at Vicksburg was a great morale boost for the Union war effort, Grant received much criticism for his decisions and his reported drunkenness. President Lincoln again sent Charles Dana to keep a watchful eye on Grant's alleged intemperance; Dana eventually became Grant's devoted ally, and made light of the drinking. The personal rivalry between McClernand and Grant continued over Vicksburg, but ended when Grant removed McClernand from command after he issued, and arranged the publication of, a military order in contravention of Grant.

Chattanooga

Union troops swarm Missionary Ridge and defeat Bragg's army. President Lincoln put Grant in command of the newly formed Division of the Mississippi in October 1863; Grant was then effectively in charge of the entire western war front for the Union, except for Louisiana. After the Battle of Chickamauga, Confederate General Braxton Bragg forced Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland to retreat into Chattanooga, a central railway hub, surrounded the city and kept the Union army from escaping. Only Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the XIV corps kept the Army of the Cumberland from complete defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga. When informed of the ominous situation at Chattanooga, Grant relieved Maj. Gen. Rosecrans from duty and placed Maj. Gen. Thomas in charge of the besieged Army of the Cumberland. To stop the siege and go on the attack, Grant, injured from a recent horse fall in New Orleans, personally rode out to Chattanooga and took

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charge of the Union Army's desperate situation. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and two divisions of the Army of the Potomac were sent by President Lincoln to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland, however, the Confederates kept the two Armies from meeting. Grant's first action was to open up a supply line to the Army of the Cumberland trapped in Chattanooga. Through an ingenious plan by Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, a "Cracker Line" was formed with Hooker's Army of the Potomac located at Lookout Mountain and supplied the Army of the Cumberland with food and military weapons.



Union troops swarm Missionary Ridge and defeat Bragg's army.

On November 23, 1863 the situation at Chattanooga was urgent. Grant had organized three armies to attack Bragg on Missionary Ridge and Confederate troops on Lookout Mountain. On November 24, Maj. Gen. Sherman and four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee assaulted Bragg's right flank. Thomas and Army of the Cumberland, under order from Grant, overtook Confederate picket trenches at the base of Missionary Ridge. Maj. Gen. Hooker and the Army of the Potomac took Lookout Mountain and captured 1,064 prisoners. On November 25, Sherman continued his attack on Bragg's right flank on the northern section of Missionary Ridge. In response to Sherman's assault Bragg withdrew Confederate troops on the main ridge to reinforce the Confederate right flank. Seeing that Bragg was reinforcing his right flank, Grant ordered Thomas to make a general assault on Missionary Ridge. After a brief delay, the Army of the Cumberland, led by Sheridan and Wood, stormed over and captured the first Confederate rifle entrenchments. Without further orders, the Army of the Cumberland continued up hill and captured the Confederate's secondary entrenchments on top of Missionary Ridge; forcing the defeated Confederates into disorganized retreat. Though Bragg's army had not been captured, the decisive battle opened Georgia and the heartland of the Confederacy to Union invasion by Maj. Gen. Sherman. Grant's fame increased throughout the country, and he was promoted to Lieutenant General, a position that had previously been given to George Washington and given to Winfield Scott as a brevet promotion. Grant was given charge of the entire Union Army. Grant gave the Department of the Mississippi to Maj. Gen. Sherman, and went east to Washington, DC, to make and implement a strategy with President Lincoln to decisively win the Civil War in 1864, when Lincoln was facing re-election. After settling Julia into a house in Georgetown, he then established his headquarters fifty miles away, near Gen. Meade's Army of the Potomac in Culpeper, Virginia.

Overland Campaign

"On to Richmond" – Ulysses S. Grant and George Meade riding horseback at the Battle of the Wilderness. The Union strategy, of a comprehensive effort to bring about a speedy victory for the Union, designed by President Lincoln and Grant, consisted of combined military Union offensives, attacking the Confederacy's armies, railroads, and economic infrastructure, to keep the Confederate armies from mobilizing reinforcements within southern interior lines. Maj. Gen. Sherman would attack Atlanta and Georgia, while the Army of the Potomac, led by Maj. Gen. George Meade with Grant in camp, would attack Robert E. Lee's

Army of Virginia. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was to attack and advance towards Richmond from the south, going up the James River. Depending on Lee's actions, Grant would join forces with Butler's armies and be fed supplies from the James River. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel was to capture the railroad line at Lynchburg, move east, and attack from the Blue Ridge Mountains. Lee's objectives were to prolong the war and discourage the Northern will to fight, keep Grant from crossing south of the James River, and protect Richmond from Union attack. Grant was riding a tide of popularity, and there were discussions in some corners that a Union victory early in the year could open the possibility of his candidacy for the presidency. Grant was aware of it, but had ruled out any self-interest in discussions with Lincoln, and assigned no weight to it; in any case, the possibility would soon vanish with delays on the battlefield.

The efforts of both Sigel and Butler failed and Grant was left alone to fight Lee in a series of bloody battles of attrition known as the Overland Campaign. After taking the month of April 1864 to assemble and ready the Union Army of the Potomac, Grant crossed the Rapidan River on May 4 and attacked Lee in the Wilderness, a hard-fought battle with many casualties, lasting three days. Rather than retreat as his Union predecessors had done, Grant flanked Lee's Army of Virginia to the southeast and attempted to wedge the Union Army between Lee and Richmond at Spotsylvania. Lee's army got to Spotsylvania first and a costly and lengthy battle began that lasted 13 days. During the battle, Grant attempted to break through Lee's line of defense at the Mule Shoe, which resulted in one of the most violent assaults during the Civil War, known as The Battle of the Bloody Angle. Unable to break Lee's line of defense after repeated attempts, Grant flanked Lee to the southeast east again at North Anna, a battle that lasted three days. This time the Confederate Army had a superior defensive advantage on Grant; however, due to sickness, Lee was unable to lead the battle. Grant then maneuvered the Union Army to Cold Harbor, a vital railroad hub that was linked to Richmond, but Lee was able to make strong trenches to defend against a Union assault. During the third day of the 13-day Cold Harbor battle, Grant led a costly fatal assault on Lee's trenches, and as news spread in the North, heavy criticism fell on Grant, who was called "the Butcher", having lost 52,788 casualties in 30 days since crossing the Rapidan. Lee suffered 32,907 Confederate casualties, on troops he could not replace, and was forced to take defensive entrenchment positions to stave off attack on Richmond. When the two armies had fought to a stalemate, the two generals ruthlessly took three days to reach a truce, so that the dead and dying could be removed from the battlefield. The costly June 3 assault at Cold Harbor was the second of two battles in the war which Grant later distinctly regretted. Unknown to Robert E. Lee, Grant pulled out of Cold Harbor and stealthily moved his Army south of the James River, freed Maj. Gen. Butler from the Bermuda Hundred, and attacked Petersburg, Richmond's central railroad hub.



"On to Richmond" – Ulysses S. Grant and George Meade riding horseback at the Battle of the Wilderness.

Petersburg

The Dictator siege mortar used by the Union Army at Petersburg. 1864 After Grant and the Army of the Potomac had

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successfully crossed the James River undetected by Lee and rescued Maj. Gen. Butler from the Bermuda Hundred, Grant advanced the Union army southward to capture Petersburg. Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, in charge of Petersburg, was able to defend the city and Lee's veteran reinforcements arrived. Grant forced Lee into a long nine month siege of Petersburg and the Union war effort stalled. Northern resentment grew as the Copperhead movement led by Clement Vallandigham demanded that the war be settled through peace talks. But an indirect benefit of the Petersburg siege was found in preventing Lee from reinforcing armies to oppose Sherman and Sheridan.[95] During the siege, Sherman was able to take Atlanta, a victory that advanced President Lincoln's reelection. Maj. Gen. Sheridan was given command of the Union Army of the Shenandoah and directed to "follow the enemy to their death".[96] Sheridan defeated Confederate General Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley, saving Washington, DC from capture. Lee had sent Early up the Shenandoah Valley to attack Washington, DC and draw troops away from Grant's Army of the Potomac. Sheridan's cavalry, after Early was defeated, pursuant to Grant's orders, destroyed vital Confederate supply farms in the Shenandoah Valley. When Sheridan reported suffering attacks by irregular Confederate cavalry under John S. Mosby, Grant recommended rounding up their families for imprisonment as hostages at Ft. McHenry.



The Dictator siege mortar used by the Union Army at Petersburg, 1864

Grant attempted to blow up part of Lee's Petersburg trenches from an underground tunnel; however, the explosion created a crater from which Confederates could easily pick off Union troops below. The 3500 Union casualties were over 3 for every 1 of the Confederates; Grant admitted the tactic had been a "stupendous failure". On August 9, 1864 Lieut. Gen. Grant, who had just arrived at his headquarters in City Point, narrowly escaped certain death when Confederate spies blew up an ammunition barge moored below the city's bluffs. The enormous explosion, similar to the Petersburg mine, killed 47 men; 146 injured. As the war slowly progressed, Grant continued to extend Robert E. Lee's entrenchment defenses southwest of Petersburg, in an effort to capture vital railroad links. By August 21, 1864 the Union Army had reached and captured the Weldon Railroad. As Grant continued to push the Union advance westward towards the South Side Railroad, Lee's entrenchment lines became overstretched and undermanned. With the Federal army having rebuilt the City Point Railroad, Grant was able to use mortars to attack Lee's entrenchments; the most famous and largest mortar used during the Civil War, over 17,000 pounds, was called the Dictator. Lee also implemented the use of mortars on the Confederate line.

Once Sherman reached the East Coast and Gen. Thomas finally dispatched Gen. Hood in Tennessee, Union victory appeared certain, and Lincoln resolved to attempt a negotiated end to the war with the Confederates. He enlisted Francis Preston Blair to carry a message to Jefferson Davis; Davis appointed three Commissioners, who were sent to Grant to arrange a peace conference. Meanwhile, Lincoln sent Secretary of State Seward and his emissary Major Thomas T. Eckert to Hampton Roads to facilitate a meeting. Eckert met with the Confederate Commissioners and insisted that they acknowledge that "one

common country" was to be the subject of the conference. This brought matters to a halt; Grant contacted the President directly and Lincoln agreed to personally meet with the Commissioners at Ft. Monroe. Though Grant was pivotal in arranging the peace conference, it ultimately yielded no results; but Grant had demonstrated a remarkable willingness and ability to assume a diplomatic role beyond his normal military posture. Grant's diplomacy failed him, however, when he jokingly suggested to his wife that, perhaps if she met with Mrs. Louise (James) Longstreet, they could restore peace. When Julia took the offer seriously and pleaded for the opportunity, and Grant earnestly objected, she turned silent, indignant and quite disappointed.

Appomattox

In March 1865, while Lincoln met at City Point with Grant, Sherman and Admiral David Dixon Porter, Union forces finally took Petersburg and then captured Richmond in April, after an unsuccessful Confederate assault on Fort Stedman. Lee's Confederate troops began deserting in large numbers to the Army of the Potomac; disease and lack of supplies also weakened Lee's forces. Lee attempted to link up with the remnants of Confederate General Joe Johnson's defeated army; however, Union cavalry forces led by Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan were able to stop the two armies from converging. Lee and the Army of Virginia reluctantly surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. Grant gave generous terms; Confederate troops surrendered their weapons and were allowed to return to their homes, with their mounts, on the condition that they would not take up arms against the United States. Within a few weeks the Civil War was over.


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulysses_S._Grant



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GEORGE B. McCLELLAN



Ohio and strategy

At the start of the Civil War, McClellan's knowledge of what was called "big war science" and his railroad experience suggested he might excel at military logistics. This placed him in great demand as the Union mobilized. The governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, the three largest states of the Union, actively pursued him to command their states' militia. Ohio Governor William Dennison was the most persistent, so McClellan was commissioned a major general of volunteers and took command of the Ohio militia on April 23, 1861. Unlike some of his fellow Union officers who came from abolitionist families, he was opposed to federal interference with slavery. So some of his Southern colleagues approached him informally about siding with the Confederacy, but he could not accept the concept of secession.

On May 3 McClellan re-entered federal service by being named commander of the Department of the Ohio, responsible for the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and, later, western Pennsylvania, western Virginia, and Missouri. On May 14, he was commissioned a major general in the regular army. At age 34 he now outranked everyone in the Army other than Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly because of his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator.

As McClellan scrambled to process the thousands of men who were volunteering for service and to set up training camps, he also set his mind toward grand strategy. He wrote a letter to Gen. Scott on April 27, four days after assuming command in Ohio, that was the first proposal for a unified strategy for the war. It contained two alternatives, both with a prominent role for himself as commander. The first called for 80,000 men to invade Virginia through the Kanawha Valley toward Richmond. The second called for those same men to drive south instead across the Ohio River into Kentucky and Tennessee. Scott dismissed both plans as being logistically infeasible. Although he complimented McClellan and expressed his "great confidence in your intelligence, zeal, science, and energy", he replied by letter that the 80,000 men would be better used on a river-based expedition to control the Mississippi River and split the Confederacy, accompanied by a strong Union blockade of Southern ports. This plan, which would have demanded

considerable patience on the part of the Northern public, was derided in newspapers as the Anaconda Plan, but eventually proved to be the successful outline used to prosecute the war. Relations between the two generals became increasingly strained over the summer and fall.

Western Virginia

McClellan's first military operations were to occupy the area of western Virginia that wanted to remain in the Union and later became the state of West Virginia. He had received intelligence reports on May 26 that the critical Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridges in that portion of the state were being burned. As he quickly implemented plans to invade the region, he triggered his first serious political controversy by proclaiming to the citizens there that his forces had no intentions of interfering with personal property—including slaves. "Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly—not only will we abstain from all such interference but we will on the contrary with an iron hand, crush any attempted insurrection on their part." He quickly realized that he had overstepped his bounds and apologized by letter to President Lincoln. The controversy was not that his proclamation was diametrically opposed to the administration's policy at the time, but that he was so bold in stepping beyond his strictly military role.

His forces moved rapidly into the area through Grafton and were victorious at the tiny skirmish called the Battle of Philippi Races, arguably the first land conflict of the war. His first personal command in battle was at Rich Mountain, which he also won, but only after displaying a strong sense of caution and a reluctance to commit reserve forces that would be his hallmark for the rest of his career. His subordinate commander, William S. Rosecrans, bitterly complained that his attack was not reinforced as McClellan had agreed. Nevertheless, these two minor victories propelled McClellan to the status of national hero. The New York Herald entitled an article about him "Gen. McClellan, the Napoleon of the Present War."

Building an army

Patriotic cover honoring the arrival of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 1861. After the defeat of the Union forces at Bull Run on July 21, 1861, Lincoln summoned McClellan from West Virginia, where McClellan had given the North the only actions thus far having a semblance of military victories. He traveled by special train on the main Pennsylvania line from Wheeling through Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and on to Washington, D.C., and was overwhelmed by enthusiastic crowds that met his train along the way.



Patriotic cover honoring the arrival of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 1861.

Carl Sandburg wrote, "McClellan was the man of the hour, pointed to by events, and chosen by an overwhelming weight of public and private opinion." On July 26, the day he reached the capital, McClellan was appointed commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, the main Union force responsible for the defense of Washington. On August 20, several military units in Virginia were consolidated into his department and he immediately formed the Army of the Potomac, with himself as

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its first commander. He reveled in his newly acquired power and fame:

I find myself in a new and strange position here—Presdt, Cabinet, Genl Scott & all deferring to me—by some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land. ... I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator or anything else that might please me—but nothing of that kind would please me—therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self-denial!

— George B. McClellan, letter to Ellen, July 26, 1861

During the summer and fall, McClellan brought a high degree of organization to his new army, and greatly improved its morale by his frequent trips to review and encourage his units. It was a remarkable achievement, in which he came to personify the Army of the Potomac and reaped the adulation of his men. He created defenses for Washington that were almost impregnable, consisting of 48 forts and strong points, with 480 guns manned by 7,200 artillerists. The Army of the Potomac grew in number from 50,000 in July to 168,000 in November and was considered by far the most colossal military unit the world had seen in modern historical times. But this was also a time of tension in the high command, as he continued to quarrel frequently with the government and the general-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Scott, on matters of strategy. McClellan rejected the tenets of Scott's Anaconda Plan, favoring instead an overwhelming grand battle, in the Napoleonic style. He proposed that his army should be expanded to 273,000 men and 600 guns and "crush the rebels in one campaign." He favored a war that would impose little impact on civilian populations and require no emancipation of slaves.



General George B. McClellan with staff & dignitaries (from left to right): Gen. George W. Morell, Lt. Col. A.V. Colburn, Gen. McClellan, Lt. Col. N.B. Sweitzer, Prince de Joinville (son of King Louis Phillippe of France), and on the very right - the prince's nephew, Count de Paris.

McClellan's antipathy to emancipation added to the pressure on him, as he received bitter criticism from Radical Republicans in the government. He viewed slavery as an institution recognized in the Constitution, and entitled to federal protection wherever it existed (Lincoln held the same public position until August 1862). McClellan's writings after the war were typical of many Northerners: "I confess to a prejudice in favor of my own race, & can't learn to like the odor of either Billy goats or niggers." But in November 1861, he wrote to his wife, "I will, if successful, throw my sword onto the scale to force an improvement in the condition of those poor blacks." He later wrote that had it been his place to arrange the terms of peace, he would have insisted on gradual emancipation, guarding the rights of both slaves and masters, as part of any settlement. But he

made no secret of his opposition to the radical Republicans. He told Ellen, "I will not fight for the abolitionists." This placed him at an obvious handicap because many politicians running the government believed that he was attempting to implement the policies of the opposition party.

The immediate problem with McClellan's war strategy was that he was convinced the Confederates were ready to attack him with overwhelming numbers. On August 8, believing that the Confederates had over 100,000 troops facing him (in contrast to the 35,000 they actually deployed at Bull Run a few weeks earlier), he declared a state of emergency in the capital. By August 19, he estimated 150,000 enemy to his front. McClellan's future campaigns would be strongly influenced by the overblown enemy strength estimates of his secret service chief, detective Allan Pinkerton, but in August 1861, these estimates were entirely McClellan's own. The result was a level of extreme caution that sapped the initiative of McClellan's army and caused great condemnation by his government. Historian and biographer Stephen W. Sears has called McClellan's actions "essentially sound" if he had been as outnumbered as he believed, but McClellan in fact rarely had less than a two-to-one advantage over his opponents in 1861 and 1862. That fall, for example, Confederate forces ranged from 35,000 to 60,000, whereas the Army of the Potomac in September numbered 122,000 men; in early December 170,000; by year end, 192,000.

The dispute with Scott would become very personal. Scott (along with many in the War Department) was outraged that McClellan refused to divulge any details about his strategic planning, or even mundane details such as troop strengths and dispositions. (For his part, McClellan claimed not to trust anyone in the administration to keep his plans secret from the press, and thus the enemy.) During disagreements about defensive forces on the Potomac River, McClellan wrote to his wife on August 10 in a manner that would characterize some of his more private correspondence: "Genl Scott is the great obstacle—he will not comprehend the danger & is either a traitor, or an incompetent. I have to fight my way against him." Scott became so disillusioned over his relationship with the young general that he offered his resignation to President Lincoln, who initially refused to accept it. Rumors traveled through the capital that McClellan might resign, or instigate a military coup, if Scott were not removed. Lincoln's Cabinet met on October 18 and agreed to accept Scott's resignation for "reasons of health."

General-in-chief

On November 1, 1861, Winfield Scott retired and McClellan became general-in-chief of all the Union armies. The president expressed his concern about the "vast labor" involved in the dual role of army commander and general-in-chief, but McClellan responded, "I can do it all."



"Quaker guns" (logs used as ruses to imitate cannons) in former Confederate fortifications at Manassas Junction.

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Lincoln, as well as many other leaders and citizens of the northern states, became increasingly impatient with McClellan's slowness to attack the Confederate forces still massed near Washington. The Union defeat at the minor Battle of Ball's Bluff near Leesburg in October added to the frustration and indirectly damaged McClellan. In December, the Congress formed a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which became a thorn in the side of many generals throughout the war, accusing them of incompetence and, in some cases, treason. McClellan was called as the first witness on December 23, but he contracted typhoid fever and could not attend. Instead, his subordinate officers testified, and their candid admissions that they had no knowledge of specific strategies for advancing against the Confederates raised many calls for McClellan's dismissal.

McClellan further damaged his reputation by his insulting insubordination to his commander-in-chief. He privately referred to Lincoln, whom he had known before the war as a lawyer for the Illinois Central, as "nothing more than a well-meaning baboon", a "gorilla", and "ever unworthy of ... his high position." On November 13, he snubbed the president, visiting at McClellan's house, by making him wait for 30 minutes, only to be told that the general had gone to bed and could not see him.

On January 10, Lincoln met with top generals (McClellan did not attend) and directed them to formulate a plan of attack, expressing his exasperation with General McClellan with the following remark: "If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time." On January 12, 1862, McClellan was summoned to the White House, where the Cabinet demanded to hear his war plans. For the first time, he revealed his intentions to transport the Army of the Potomac by ship to Urbanna, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River, outflanking the Confederate forces near Washington, and proceeding 50 miles (80 km) overland to capture Richmond. He refused to give any specific details of the proposed campaign, even to his friend, newly appointed War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton. On January 27, Lincoln issued an order that required all of his armies to begin offensive operations by February 22, Washington's birthday. On January 31, he issued a supplementary order for the Army of the Potomac to move overland to attack the Confederates at Manassas Junction and Centreville. McClellan immediately replied with a 22-page letter objecting in detail to the president's plan and advocating instead his Urbanna plan, which was the first written instance of the plan's details being presented to the president. Although Lincoln believed his plan was superior, he was relieved that McClellan finally agreed to begin moving, and reluctantly approved. On March 8, doubting McClellan's resolve, Lincoln again interfered with the army commander's prerogatives. He called a council of war at the White House in which McClellan's subordinates were asked about their confidence in the Urbanna plan. They expressed their confidence to varying degrees. After the meeting, Lincoln issued another order, naming specific officers as corps commanders to report to McClellan (who had been reluctant to do so prior to assessing his division commanders' effectiveness in combat, even though this would have meant his direct supervision of twelve divisions in the field).


Two more crises would hit McClellan before he could implement his plans. The Confederate forces under General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew from their positions before Washington, assuming new positions south of the Rappahannock, which completely nullified the Urbanna strategy. McClellan retooled his plan so that his troops would disembark at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and advance up the Virginia Peninsula to Richmond, an operation that would be known as the Peninsula Campaign. However, McClellan came under extreme criticism from the press and the Congress when it was found that Johnston's forces had not only slipped away unnoticed, but had for months fooled the Union Army through the use of logs painted black to appear as cannons, nicknamed Quaker Guns. The Congress's joint committee visited the abandoned Confederate lines and radical Republicans introduced a resolution demanding the dismissal of McClellan, but it was narrowly defeated by a parliamentary maneuver. The second crisis was the emergence of the Confederate ironclad CSS

Virginia, which threw Washington into a panic and made naval support operations on the James River seem problematic.

On March 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief, leaving him in command of only the Army of the Potomac, ostensibly so that McClellan would be free to devote all his attention to the move on Richmond. Lincoln's order was ambiguous as to whether McClellan might be restored following a successful campaign. In fact, his position was not filled by another officer. Lincoln, Stanton, and a group of officers called the "War Board" directed the strategic actions of the Union armies that spring. Although McClellan was assuaged by supportive comments Lincoln made to him, in time he saw the change of command very differently, describing it as a part of an intrigue "to secure the failure of the approaching campaign."

Peninsula Campaign

Seven Days Battles, June 25–July 1, 1862. McClellan's army began to sail from Alexandria on March 17. It was an armada that dwarfed all previous American expeditions, transporting 121,500 men, 44 artillery batteries, 1,150 wagons, over 15,000 horses, and tons of equipment and supplies. An English observer remarked that it was the "stride of a giant." The army's advance from Fort Monroe up the Virginia Peninsula proved to be slow. McClellan's plan for a rapid seizure of Yorktown was foiled when he discovered that the Confederates had fortified a line across the Peninsula, causing him to decide on a siege of the city, which required considerable preparation.



Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. Confederate (red), Union (blue)

McClellan continued to believe intelligence reports that credited the Confederates with two or three times the men they actually had. Early in the campaign, Confederate General John B. "Prince John" Magruder defended the Peninsula against McClellan's advance with a vastly smaller force. He created a false impression of many troops behind the lines and of even more troops arriving. He accomplished this by marching small groups of men repeatedly past places where they could be observed at a distance or were just out of sight, accompanied by great noise and fanfare. During this time, General Johnston was able to provide Magruder with reinforcements, but even then there were far fewer troops than McClellan believed were opposite him.

After a month of preparation, just before he was to assault the Confederate works at Yorktown, McClellan learned that Johnston had withdrawn up the Peninsula towards Williamsburg. McClellan was thus required to give chase without any benefit of the heavy artillery so carefully amassed in front of Yorktown. The Battle of Williamsburg on May 5 is considered a Union victory—McClellan's first—but the Confederate army was not destroyed and a bulk of their troops were successfully moved past Williamsburg to Richmond's outer defenses while it was waged, and over the next several days.

McClellan had also placed hopes on a simultaneous naval approach to Richmond via the James River. That approach failed

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following the Union Navy's defeat at the Battle of Drewry's Bluff, about 7 miles (11 km) downstream from the Confederate capital, on May 15. Basing artillery on a strategic bluff high above a bend in the river, and sinking boats to create an impassable series of obstacles in the river itself, the Confederates had effectively blocked this potential approach to Richmond.

McClellan's army cautiously inched towards Richmond over the next three weeks, coming to within four miles (6 km) of it. He established a supply base on the Pamunkey River (a navigable tributary of the York River) at White House Landing where the Richmond and York River Railroad extending to Richmond crossed, and commandeered the railroad, transporting steam locomotives and rolling stock to the site by barge.

On May 31, as McClellan planned an assault, his army was surprised by a Confederate attack. Johnston saw that the Union army was split in half by the rain-swollen Chickahominy River and hoped to defeat it in detail at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. McClellan was unable to command the army personally because of a recurrence of malarial fever, but his subordinates were able to repel the attacks. Nevertheless, McClellan received criticism from Washington for not counterattacking, which some believed could have opened the city of Richmond to capture. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and General Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan spent the next three weeks repositioning his troops and waiting for promised reinforcements, losing valuable time as Lee continued to strengthen Richmond's defenses.

At the end of June, Lee began a series of attacks that became known as the Seven Days Battles. The first major battle, at Mechanicsville, was poorly coordinated by Lee and his subordinates and caused heavy casualties for little tactical gain. But the battle had significant impact on McClellan's nerve. The surprise appearance of Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's troops in the battle (when they had last been reported to be many miles away in the Shenandoah Valley) convinced McClellan that he was even more significantly outnumbered than he had assumed. (He reported to Washington that he faced 200,000 Confederates, but there were actually 85,000.)



Federal troops under heavy attack at the Battle of Gaines's Mill, sketched by Alfred R. Waud and published in Harper's Weekly, July 26, 1862.

As Lee continued his offensive at Gaines's Mill to the east, McClellan played a passive role, taking no initiative and waiting for events to unfold. He kept two thirds of his army out of action, fooled again by Magruder's theatrical diversionary tactics. That night, he decided to withdraw his army to a safer base, well below Richmond, on a portion of the James River that was under control of the Union Navy. In doing so, he may have unwittingly saved his army. Lee had assumed that the Union army would withdraw to the east toward its existing supply base and McClellan's move to the south delayed Lee's response for at least 24 hours. But McClellan was also tacitly acknowledging that he would no longer be able to invest Richmond, the object of his campaign; the heavy siege artillery required would be almost impossible to transport without the railroad connections

available from his original supply base on the York River. In a telegram to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, reporting on these events, McClellan blamed the Lincoln administration for his reversals. "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." Fortunately for McClellan's immediate career, Lincoln never saw that inflammatory statement (at least at that time) because it was censored by the War Department telegrapher.



Wounded men after the Battle of Savage's Station, one of the Seven Days Battles.

McClellan was also fortunate that the failure of the campaign left his army mostly intact, because he was generally absent from the fighting and neglected to name a second-in-command to control his retreat. Military historian Stephen W. Sears wrote, "When he deserted his army on the Glendale and Malvern Hill battlefields during the Seven Days, he was guilty of dereliction of duty. Had the Army of the Potomac been wrecked on either of these fields (at Glendale the possibility had been real), that charge under the Articles of War would likely have been brought against him." (During Glendale, McClellan was five miles (8 km) away behind Malvern Hill, without telegraph communications and too distant to command the army. During the battle of Malvern Hill, he was on a gunboat, the U.S.S. Galena, which at one point was ten miles (16 km) away down the James River. During both battles, effective command of the army fell to his friend and V Corps commander Brigadier General Fitz John Porter. When the public heard about the Galena, it was yet another enormous embarrassment, comparable to the Quaker Guns at Manassas. Editorial cartoons during the 1864 presidential campaign would lampoon McClellan for preferring the safety of a ship while a battle was fought in the distance.)

McClellan was reunited with his army at Harrison's Landing on the James. Debates were held as to whether the army should be evacuated or attempt to resume an offensive toward Richmond. McClellan maintained his estrangement from Abraham Lincoln by his continuous call for reinforcements and by writing a lengthy letter in which he proposed strategic and political guidance for the war, continuing his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a tactic. He concluded by implying he should be restored as general-in-chief, but Lincoln responded by naming Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to the post without consulting, or even informing, McClellan.[58] Lincoln and Stanton also offered command of the Army of the Potomac to Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, who refused the appointment.

Back in Washington, a reorganization of units created the Army of Virginia under Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was directed to advance towards Richmond from the northeast. McClellan resisted calls to reinforce Pope's army and delayed return of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula enough so that the reinforcements arrived while the Northern Virginia Campaign was already underway. He wrote to his wife before the battle, "Pope will be thrashed ... & be disposed of [by Lee]. ... Such a villain as he is ought to bring defeat upon any cause that employs him." Lee had assessed McClellan's defensive nature

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and gambled on removing significant units from the Peninsula to attack Pope, who was beaten decisively at Second Bull Run in August.

Maryland Campaign

Maryland Campaign, actions September 3–15, 1862 After the defeat of Pope at Second Bull Run, President Lincoln reluctantly returned to the man who had mended a broken army before. He realized that McClellan was a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, able to recombine the units of Pope's army with the Army of the Potomac faster than anyone. On September 2, 1862, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defense of the capital." The appointment was controversial in the Cabinet, a majority of whom signed a petition declaring to the president "our deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not safe to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of any Army of the United States." The president admitted that it was like "curing the bite with the hair of the dog." But Lincoln told his secretary, John Hay, "We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."



McClellan riding through Frederick, Maryland, September 12, 1862. (From Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper)

Northern fears of a continued offensive by Robert E. Lee were realized when he launched his Maryland Campaign on September 4, hoping to arouse pro-Southern sympathy in the slave state of Maryland. McClellan's pursuit began on September 5. He marched toward Maryland with six of his reorganized corps, about 84,000 men, while leaving two corps behind to defend Washington. McClellan's reception in Frederick, Maryland, as he marched towards Lee's army, was described by the correspondent for Harper's Magazine:

"The General rode through the town on a trot, and the street was filled six or eight deep with his staff and guard riding on behind him. The General had his head uncovered, and received gracefully the salutations of the people. Old ladies and men wept for joy, and scores of beautiful ladies waved flags from the balconies of houses upon the street, and their joyousness seemed to overcome every other emotion. When the General came to the corner of the principal street the ladies thronged around him. Bouquets, beautiful and fragrant, in great numbers were thrown at him, and the ladies crowded around him with the warmest good wishes, and many of them were entirely overcome with emotion. I have never witnessed such a scene. The General took the gentle hands which were offered to him with many a kind and pleasing remark, and heard and answered the many remarks and compliments with which the people accosted him. It was a scene which no one could forget—an event of a lifetime."

Lee divided his forces into multiple columns, spread apart widely as he moved into Maryland and also maneuvered to capture the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. This was a risky move for a smaller army, but Lee was counting on his knowledge of McClellan's temperament. He told one of his generals, "He is an able general but a very cautious one. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—or he will not think it so—for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the

Susquehanna." This was not a completely accurate assessment, but McClellan's army was moving lethargically, averaging only 6 miles (9.7 km) a day.



Maryland Campaign, actions September 3–15, 1862

However, McClellan soon received a miraculous break of fortune. Union soldiers accidentally found a copy of Lee's orders dividing his army, wrapped around a package of cigars in an abandoned camp. They delivered the order to McClellan's headquarters in Frederick on September 13. Upon realizing the intelligence value of this discovery, McClellan threw up his arms and exclaimed, "Now I know what to do!" He waved the order at his old Army friend, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, and said, "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home." He telegraphed President Lincoln: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but I am confident, and no time shall be lost. I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. ... Will send you trophies."

Battle of South Mountain

Battle of South Mountain Despite this show of bravado, McClellan continued his cautious line. After telegraphing to the president at noon on September 13, rather than ordering his units to set out for the South Mountain passes immediately, he ordered them to depart the following morning. The 18 hours of delay allowed Lee time to react, because he received intelligence from a Confederate sympathizer that McClellan knew of his plans. (The delay also doomed the federal garrison at Harpers Ferry because the relief column McClellan sent could not reach them before they surrendered to Stonewall Jackson.) In the Battle of South Mountain, McClellan's army was able to punch through the defended passes that separated them from Lee, but also gave Lee enough time to concentrate many of his men at Sharpsburg, Maryland. The Battle of South Mountain presented McClellan with an opportunity for one of the great theatrical moments of his career, as historian Sears describes:

"The mountain ahead was wreathed in smoke eddies of battle smoke in which the gun flashes shone like brief hot sparks. The opposing battle lines on the heights were marked by heavier layers of smoke, and columns of Federal troops were visible winding their way up the mountainside, each column ... looking like a 'monstrous, crawling, blue-black snake' ... McClellan posed against this spectacular backdrop, sitting motionless astride his warhorse Dan Webster with his arm extended, pointing Hooker's passing troops toward the battle. The men cheered him until they were hoarse ... and some broke ranks to

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swarm around the martial figure and indulge in the 'most extravagant demonstrations'."

The Union army reached Antietam Creek, to the east of Sharpsburg, on the evening of September 15. A planned attack on September 16 was put off because of early morning fog, allowing Lee to prepare his defenses with an army less than half the size of McClellan's.



Battle of South Mountain

Battle of Antietam

The Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862, was the single bloodiest day in American military history. The outnumbered Confederate forces fought desperately and well. Despite significant advantages in manpower, McClellan was unable to concentrate his forces effectively, which meant that Lee was able to shift his defenders to parry each of three Union thrusts, launched separately and sequentially against the Confederate left, center, and finally the right. And McClellan was unwilling to employ his ample reserve forces to capitalize on localized successes. Historian James M. McPherson has pointed out that the two corps McClellan kept in reserve were in fact larger than Lee's entire force. The reason for McClellan's reluctance was that, as in previous battles, he was convinced he was outnumbered.



Lincoln in McClellan's tent after the Battle of Antietam

The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee technically was defeated because he withdrew first from the battlefield and retreated back to Virginia. McClellan wired to Washington, "Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia." Yet there was obvious disappointment that McClellan had not crushed Lee, who was fighting with a smaller army with its back to the Potomac River. Although McClellan's subordinates can claim their share of responsibility for delays (such as Ambrose Burnside's misadventures at Burnside Bridge) and blunders (Edwin V. Sumner's attack without reconnaissance), these were localized problems from which the full army could have recovered. As with the decisive battles in the Seven Days, McClellan's headquarters were too far to the rear to allow his personal control over the battle. He made no use of his cavalry forces for reconnaissance. He did not share his overall battle

plans with his corps commanders, which prevented them from using initiative outside of their sectors. And he was far too willing to accept cautious advice about saving his reserves, such as when a significant breakthrough in the center of the Confederate line could have been exploited, but Fitz John Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic."

Despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of the North) and it allowed President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, taking effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to issue the proclamation earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to wait until a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat. McClellan had no prior knowledge that the plans for emancipation rested on his battle performance.



Lincoln with McClellan and staff after the Battle of Antietam. Notable figures (from left) are 5. Alexander S. Webb, Chief of Staff, V Corps; 6. McClellan; 8. Dr. Jonathan Letterman; 10. Lincoln; 11. Henry J. Hunt; 12. Fitz John Porter; 15. Andrew A. Humphreys; 16. Capt. George Armstrong Custer.

When McClellan failed to pursue Lee aggressively after Antietam, Lincoln ordered that he be removed from command on November 5. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside assumed command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7. McClellan wrote to his wife, "Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly and that it was a masterpiece of art. ... I feel I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country. ... I feel some little pride in having, with a beaten & demoralized army, defeated Lee so utterly. ... Well, one of these days history will I trust do me justice."

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_B._McClellan



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JOHN POPE



Pope was serving on lighthouse duty when Abraham Lincoln was elected and he was one of four officers selected to escort the president-elect to Washington, D.C. He offered to serve Lincoln as an aide, but on June 14, 1861, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers (date of rank effective May 17, 1861) and was ordered to Illinois to recruit volunteers.

In the Department of the West under Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, Pope assumed command of the District of North and Central Missouri in July, with operational control along a portion the Mississippi River. He had an uncomfortable relationship with Frémont and politicked behind the scenes to get him removed from command. Frémont was convinced that Pope had treacherous intentions toward him, demonstrated by his lack of action in following Frémont's offensive plans in Missouri. Historian Allan Nevins wrote, "Actually, incompetence and timidity offer a better explanation of Pope than treachery, though he certainly showed an insubordinate spirit." Pope eventually forced the Confederates under Sterling Price to retreat southward, taking 1,200 prisoners in a minor action at Blackwater, Missouri, on December 18. Pope, who established a reputation as a braggart early in the war, was able to generate significant press interest in his minor victory, which brought him to the attention of Frémont's replacement, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck.

Halleck appointed Pope to command the Army of the Mississippi (and the District of the Mississippi, Department of the Missouri) on February 23, 1862. Given 25,000 men, he was ordered to clear Confederate obstacles on the Mississippi River. He made a surprise march on New Madrid, Missouri, and captured it on March 14. He then orchestrated a campaign to capture Island No. 10, a strongly fortified post garrisoned by 12,000 men and 58 guns. Pope's engineers cut a channel that allowed him to bypass the island, then, assisted by the gunboats of Captain Andrew H. Foote, he landed his men on the opposite shore, which isolated the defenders. The island garrison

surrendered on April 7, 1862, freeing Union navigation of the Mississippi as far south as Memphis.

Pope's outstanding performance on the Mississippi earned him a promotion to major general, dated as of March 21, 1862. During the Siege of Corinth, he commanded the left wing of Halleck's army, but he was soon summoned to the East by Lincoln. After the collapse of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, Pope was appointed to command the Army of Virginia, assembled from scattered forces in the Shenandoah Valley and Northern Virginia. This promotion infuriated Frémont, who resigned his commission.

Pope brought an attitude of self-assurance that was offensive to the eastern soldiers under his command. He issued an astonishing message to his new army on July 14, 1862, that included the following:

Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of "taking strong positions and holding them," of "lines of retreat," and of "bases of supplies." Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever

— John Pope, message to the Army of Virginia

Despite this bravado, and despite receiving units from McClellan's Army of the Potomac that swelled the Army of Virginia to 70,000 men, Pope's aggressiveness exceeded his strategic capabilities, particularly since he was now facing Confederate General Robert E. Lee. Lee, sensing that Pope was indecisive, split his smaller (55,000 man) army, sending Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson with 24,000 men as a diversion to Cedar Mountain, where Jackson defeated Pope's subordinate, Nathaniel Banks. As Lee advanced upon Pope with the remainder of his army, Jackson's swung around to the north and captured Pope's main supply base at Manassas Station. Confused and unable to locate the main Confederate force, Pope walked into a trap in the Second Battle of Bull Run. His men withstood a combined attack by Jackson and Lee on August 29, 1862, but on the following day Maj. Gen. James Longstreet launched a surprise flanking attack and the Union Army was soundly defeated and forced to retreat. Pope compounded his unpopularity with the Army by blaming his defeat on disobedience by Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, who was found guilty by court-martial and disgraced.

Pope himself was relieved of command on September 12, 1862, and his army was merged into the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. He spent the remainder of the war in the Department of the Northwest in Minnesota, dealing with the Dakota War of 1862. His months campaigning in the West paid career dividends because he was assigned to command the Military Division of the Missouri on January 30, 1865, and received a brevet promotion to major general in the regular army on March 13, 1865, for his service at Island No. 10. On June 27, 1865, the War Department issued General Order No. 118 dividing the entire United States, including the states formerly a part of the Confederacy, into five military districts and 19 subordinate

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geographical departments. Major General William T. Sherman was assigned to command the Division of the Missouri. Pope then became commander of its Department of the Missouri, replacing Major General Grenville M. Dodge.

Shortly after Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House, Pope wrote a letter to Edmund Kirby-Smith offering the Confederates in Louisiana the same surrender terms that Grant allowed for Lee. He told Kirby-Smith that further resistance was futile and urged the general to avoid needless bloodshed, devastation, and misery by accepting the surrender terms. Kirby-Smith, however, rejected Pope's overtures and said that his army remained "strong and well equipped and that despite the 'disparity of numbers' his men could outweigh the differences 'by valor and skill.'" Five weeks later Confederate General Simon Bolivar Buckner signed the surrender in New Orleans.

Source:


[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Pope_\(military_officer\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Pope_(military_officer))



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AMBROSE BURNSIDE



First Bull Run

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a brigadier general in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised a regiment, the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry, and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Within a month, he ascended to brigade command in the Department of Northeast Virginia. He commanded the brigade without distinction at the First Battle of Bull Run in July, committing his troops piecemeal, and took over division command temporarily for wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter. After his 90-day regiment was mustered out of service on August 2, he was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers on August 6, and was assigned to train provisional brigades in the nascent Army of the Potomac.



Burnside (seated, center) and officers of the 1st Rhode Island at Camp Sprague, Rhode Island, 1861.

North Carolina

Burnside commanded the Coast Division, or North Carolina Expeditionary Force—three brigades assembled in Annapolis, Maryland, which formed the nucleus for his future IX Corps—and the Department of North Carolina, from September 1861 until July 1862. He conducted a successful amphibious campaign that closed over 80% of the North Carolina sea coast to

Confederate shipping for the remainder of the war. For his successes at the battles of Roanoke Island and New Bern, the first significant Union victories in the Eastern Theater, he was promoted to major general of volunteers on March 18. In July, his forces were transported north to Newport News, Virginia, and became the IX Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

Following Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's failure in the Peninsula Campaign, Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac. Refusing this opportunity—because of his loyalty to McClellan and because he understood his own lack of military experience—he detached part of his corps in support of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia in the Northern Virginia Campaign. Telegrams extremely critical of Pope's abilities as a commander from Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter that he received at this time and forwarded on to his superiors in concurrence would later play a significant role in Porter's court-martial, in which Burnside would appear as a star witness.

Burnside again declined command following Pope's debacle at Second Bull Run.

Antietam

Burnside was given command of the "Right Wing" of the Army of the Potomac (the I Corps and IX Corps) at the start of the Maryland Campaign for the Battle of South Mountain, but McClellan separated the two corps at the Battle of Antietam, placing them on opposite ends of the Union battle line, returning Burnside to command of just the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through them. This cumbersome arrangement contributed to his slowness in attacking and crossing what is now called "Burnside's Bridge" on the southern flank of the Union line.

Burnside did not perform adequate reconnaissance of the area, and instead of taking advantage of several easy fording sites out of range of the enemy, his troops were forced into repeated assaults across the narrow bridge which was dominated by Confederate sharpshooters on high ground. By noon, McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders." The delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended in a tactical stalemate.

Fredericksburg

McClellan was removed after failing to pursue General Robert E. Lee's retreat from Antietam, and Burnside was assigned to command the Army of the Potomac on November 7, 1862. He reluctantly obeyed this order, the third such in his brief career. President Abraham Lincoln pressured Burnside to take aggressive action and on November 14 approved his plan to capture the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia. This plan led to a humiliating and costly Union defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13. His advance upon Fredericksburg was rapid, but planning in marshaling pontoon bridges for crossing the Rappahannock River and his own reluctance to deploy portions of his army across fording points later delayed the attack. This allowed Gen. Lee to concentrate along Marye's Heights just west of town and easily repulse the Union attacks. Assaults south of town, which were supposed to be the main avenue of attack, were also mismanaged, and initial Union breakthroughs went unsupported. Upset by the failure of his plan and by the enormous casualties of his repeated, futile frontal assaults, Burnside declared that he would lead an assault by his old corps. His corps commanders talked him out of it, but relations between the commander and his subordinates were strained. Accepting full blame, he offered to retire from the U.S. Army, but this was refused.

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Union General Ambrose Burnside, 1862.

In January 1863, Burnside launched a second offensive against Lee, but it bogged down in winter rains before it accomplished anything and has been derisively called the Mud March. In its wake, he asked that several officers, who were openly insubordinate, be relieved of duty and court-martialed; he also offered to resign. Lincoln chose the latter option on January 26 and replaced him with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, one of the officers who had conspired against Burnside.

East Tennessee

Lincoln was unwilling to lose Burnside from the Army and assigned him to command the Department of the Ohio and his old IX Corps. In Ohio, Burnside issued his controversial General Order Number 38, making it a crime to express any kind of opposition to the war. Burnside used it to arrest former Ohio congressman and candidate for governor of Ohio Clement Vallandigham, a prominent leader in the copperhead peace movement, and try him in a military court (despite the fact that he was a civilian). Burnside also dealt with Confederate raiders such as John Hunt Morgan.

In the Knoxville Campaign, Burnside advanced to Knoxville, Tennessee, first bypassing the Confederate-held Cumberland Gap. After occupying Knoxville unopposed, he sent troops back to the Cumberland Gap. Brig. Gen. John W. Frazer, the Confederate commander, refused to surrender in the face of two Union brigades and Burnside arrived with a third, forcing the surrender of Frazer and 2,300 Confederates. After Union Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was defeated at the Battle of Chickamauga, Burnside was pursued by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, against whose troops he had battled at Marye's Heights. Burnside skillfully outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and was able to reach his entrenchments and safety in Knoxville, where he was briefly besieged until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. Tying down Longstreet's corps at Knoxville contributed to Gen. Braxton Bragg's defeat by Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga. Troops under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman marched to Burnside's aid, but the siege had already been lifted; Longstreet withdrew, eventually returning to Virginia.

Overland Campaign

Burnside was ordered to take the IX Corps back to the Eastern Theater, where, in Annapolis, Maryland, he built it up to a strength of over 21,000 effectives. The IX Corps fought in the Overland Campaign of May 1864 as an independent command, reporting initially to Grant; his corps was not assigned to the Army of the Potomac because Burnside outranked its commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, who had been a division commander under Burnside at Fredericksburg. This cumbersome arrangement was rectified on May 24 just before

the Battle of North Anna, when Burnside agreed to waive his precedence of rank and was placed under Meade's direct command.

Burnside fought at the battles of Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, where he did not perform in a distinguished manner, attacking piecemeal and appearing reluctant to commit his troops to the frontal assaults that characterized these battles. After North Anna and Cold Harbor, he took his place in the siege lines at Petersburg.

The Crater

the two armies faced the stalemate of trench warfare at Petersburg in July 1864, Burnside agreed to a plan suggested by a regiment of Pennsylvania coal miners in his corps: dig a mine under a fort in the Confederate entrenchments and ignite explosives there to achieve a surprise breakthrough. The fort was destroyed on July 30 in what is known as the Battle of the Crater. Because of interference from Meade, Burnside was ordered, only hours before the infantry attack, not to use his division of black troops, which had been specially trained for this mission. He was forced to use untrained white troops instead. He could not decide which division to choose as a replacement, so he had his three subordinate commanders draw lots. The division chosen by chance was that commanded by Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, who failed to brief the men on what was expected of them and was reported during the battle to be drunk well behind the lines, providing no leadership. Ledlie's men entered the huge crater instead of going around it, becoming trapped, and were subjected to murderous fire from Confederates around the rim, resulting in high casualties.

Burnside was relieved of command on August 14 and sent on leave by Grant; Meade never recalled him to duty. A court of inquiry later placed the blame for the Crater fiasco on Burnside and his subordinates. In December, Burnside met with President Lincoln and General Grant about his future. He was contemplating resignation, but Lincoln and Grant requested that he remain in the Army. At the end of the interview, Burnside wrote, "I was not informed of any duty upon which I am to be placed." He finally resigned his commission on April 15, 1865.

The United States Congress Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War exonerated Burnside, and placed the blame for the Union defeat at the Crater on General Meade for requiring the black troops to be withdrawn.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambrose_Burnside



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JOSEPH HOOKER



At the start of the war, Hooker requested a commission, but his first application was rejected, possibly because of the lingering resentment harbored by Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of the Army. He had to borrow money to make the trip east from California. After he witnessed the Union Army defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run, he wrote a letter to President Abraham Lincoln that complained of military mismanagement, promoted his own qualifications, and again requested a commission. He was appointed, in August 1861, as brigadier general of volunteers to rank from May 17. He commanded a brigade and then division around Washington, D.C., as part of the effort to organize and train the new Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.

1862

In the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, Hooker commanded the 2nd Division of the III Corps and made a good name for himself as a combat leader who handled himself well and aggressively sought out the key points on battlefields. He distinguished himself at the Battle of Williamsburg (as a result of which he was promoted to major general as of May 5, 1862) and throughout the Seven Days Battles. He chafed at the cautious generalship of McClellan and openly criticized his failure to capture Richmond. Of his commander, Hooker said, "He is not only not a soldier, but he does not know what soldiership is." The Peninsula cemented two further reputations of Hooker's: his devotion to the welfare and morale of his men, and his hard drinking social life, even on the battlefield.

As McClellan's army retreated into inactivity, Hooker was transferred to Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia. His division first served in its III Corps under Maj. Gen. Samuel P.

Heintzelman, but Hooker assumed corps command (III Corps of the Army of Virginia) on September 6, after the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run, a severe Union defeat. As Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia moved north into Maryland, Hooker's corps (redesignated the I Corps on September 12) was returned to the Army of the Potomac, and he fought with distinction at South Mountain and Antietam. At Antietam, his corps launched the first assault of the bloodiest day in American history, driving south into the corps of Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson, where they fought each other to a standstill. Hooker, aggressive and inspiring to his men, left the battle early in the morning with a foot wound. He asserted that the battle would have been a decisive Union victory if he had managed to stay on the field, but General McClellan's caution once again failed the Northern troops and Lee's much smaller army eluded destruction. With his patience at an end, President Lincoln replaced McClellan with Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside.

The December 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg was another Union debacle. Upon recovering from his foot wound, Hooker was briefly made commander of V Corps, but was then promoted to "Grand Division" command, with a command that consisted of both III and V Corps. Hooker derided Burnside's plan to assault the fortified heights behind the city, deeming them "preposterous". His Grand Division (particularly V Corps) suffered serious losses in fourteen futile assaults ordered by Burnside over Hooker's protests. Burnside followed up this battle with the humiliating Mud March in January and Hooker's criticism of his commander bordered on formal insubordination. He described Burnside as a "wretch ... of blundering sacrifice." Burnside planned a wholesale purge of his subordinates, including Hooker, and drafted an order for the president's approval. He stated that Hooker was "unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present." But Lincoln's patience had again run out and he removed Burnside instead.

Army of the Potomac

The new commander of the Army of the Potomac, as of January 26, 1863, was Fighting Joe Hooker. Parts of the army saw this move as inevitable, given Hooker's reputation for aggressive fighting, something sorely lacking in his predecessors. During the "Mud March" Hooker was quoted by a New York Times army correspondent as saying that "Nothing would go right until we had a dictator, and the sooner the better." Lincoln wrote a letter to the newly appointed general, part of which stated,

"I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship."

During the spring of 1863, Hooker established a reputation as an outstanding administrator and restored the morale of his soldiers, which had plummeted to a new low under Burnside. Among his changes were fixes to the daily diet of the troops, camp sanitary changes, improvements and accountability of the quartermaster system, addition of and monitoring of company cooks, several hospital reforms, and an improved furlough system (one man per company by turn, 10 days each). Other orders addressed the need to stem rising desertion (one from Lincoln combined with incoming mail review, the ability to shoot deserters, and better camp picket lines), more and better drills, stronger officer training, and for the first time, combining the federal cavalry into a single corps. Hooker said of his revived army:

"I have the finest army on the planet. I have the finest army the sun ever shone on. ... If the enemy does not run, God help them. May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."

Also during this winter Hooker made several high-level command changes, including with his corps commanders. Both "Left Grand Division" commander Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, who vowed that he would not serve under Hooker, and II Corps commander Maj. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner were relieved of command, on Burnside's recommendation, in the

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same order appointing Hooker to command. The IX Corps was a potential source of embarrassment or friction within the army because it was Burnside's old corps, so it was detached as a separate organization and sent to the Virginia Peninsula under the command of Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, former commander of VI Corps. (Both Franklin and Smith were considered suspect by Hooker because of their previous political maneuvering against Burnside and on behalf of McClellan.)



Major General Joseph Hooker

For the important position of chief of staff, Hooker asked the War Department to send him Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, however this was denied. Stone had been relieved, arrested, and imprisoned for his role in the Battle of Ball's Bluff in the fall of 1861, despite the lack of any trial. Upon his release Stone would not receive a command, mostly due to political pressures, which left him militarily exiled and disgraced. Army of the Potomac historian and author Bruce Catton termed this request by Hooker "a strange and seemingly uncharacteristic thing" and "one of the most interesting things he ever did." [10] Hooker never explained why he asked for Stone, but Catton believed:

[Hooker] laid schemes and calculations aside and for one brief moment stood up as a straightforward soldier who would defy politics and politicians. ... It is a point to remember, because to speak up for General Stone took moral courage, a quality which Joe Hooker is rarely accused of possessing.

Despite this, Fighting Joe would set a very bad example for the conduct of generals and their staffs and subordinates. His headquarters in Falmouth, Virginia, was described by cavalry officer Charles F. Adams, Jr., as being a combination of a "bar-room and a brothel". He built a network of loyal political cronies that included Maj. Gen. Dan Butterfield for chief of staff, and the notorious political general, Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, for command of the III Corps.

Chancellorsville

Hooker's plan for the spring and summer campaign was both elegant and promising. He first planned to send his cavalry corps deep into the enemy's rear, disrupting supply lines and distracting him from the main attack. He would pin down Robert E. Lee's much smaller army at Fredericksburg, while taking the large bulk of the Army of the Potomac on a flanking march to strike Lee in his rear. Defeating Lee, he could move on to seize Richmond. Unfortunately for Hooker and the Union, the execution of his plan did not match the elegance of the plan

itself. The cavalry raid was conducted cautiously by its commander, Brig. Gen. George Stoneman, and met none of its objectives. The flanking march went well enough, achieving strategic surprise, but Hooker somehow lost his nerve when the first reports of enemy contact reached him on May 1, 1863. Rather than pushing aggressively into Lee's rear, he pulled his army back around the tiny crossroads town of Chancellorsville and waited for Lee to attack. Lee audaciously split his smaller army in two to deal with both parts of Hooker's army. Then, he split again, sending Stonewall Jackson's corps on its own flanking march, striking Hooker's exposed right flank and routing the Union XI Corps. The Army of the Potomac dropped into a purely defensive mode and eventually was forced to retreat.



General "Fightin' Joe" Hooker

The Battle of Chancellorsville has been called "Lee's perfect battle" because of his ability to vanquish a much larger foe through audacious tactics. Part of Hooker's failure can be attributed to a deadly encounter with a cannonball. While standing on the porch of his headquarters, the missile struck a wooden column the general was leaning against, knocking him senseless and putting him out of action for the rest of the day. Despite his incapacitation, he refused entreaties to turn over temporary command of the army to his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. Several of his subordinate generals, including Couch and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, openly questioned Hooker's command decisions. Couch was so disgusted that he refused to ever serve under Hooker again. Political winds blew strongly in the following weeks as generals maneuvered to overthrow Hooker or to position themselves if Lincoln decided on his own to do so.

Robert E. Lee once again began an invasion of the North, in June 1863, and Lincoln urged Hooker to pursue and defeat him. Hooker's initial plan was to seize Richmond instead, but Lincoln immediately vetoed that idea, so the Army of the Potomac began to march north, attempting to locate Lee's Army of Northern Virginia as it slipped down the Shenandoah Valley into Pennsylvania. Hooker's mission was first to protect Washington, D.C., and Baltimore and second to intercept and defeat Lee. Unfortunately, Lincoln was losing any remaining confidence he had in Hooker. When the general got into a dispute with Army headquarters over the status of defensive forces in Harpers Ferry, he impulsively offered his resignation in protest, which was quickly accepted by Lincoln and General-in-chief Henry W. Halleck. On June 28, three days before the climactic Battle of Gettysburg, Hooker was replaced by Maj. Gen. George Meade.

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Hooker received the Thanks of Congress for his role at the start of the Gettysburg Campaign, but the glory would go to Meade.



Union General Joseph Hooker (seated 2nd to right) and his staff, 1863.

Western Theater

Hooker's military career was not ended by his poor performance in the summer of 1863. He went on to regain a reputation as a solid commander when he was transferred with the XI and XII Corps of the Army of the Potomac westward to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland around Chattanooga, Tennessee. Hooker was in command at the Battle of Lookout Mountain, playing an important role in Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's decisive victory at the Battle of Chattanooga. He was brevetted to major general in the regular army for his success at Chattanooga, but he was disappointed to find that Grant's official report of the battle credited his friend William Tecumseh Sherman's contribution over Hooker's.

Hooker led his corps (now designated the XX Corps) competently in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign under Sherman, but asked to be relieved before the capture of the city because of his dissatisfaction with the promotion of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard to command of the Army of the Tennessee, upon the death of Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson. Not only did Hooker have seniority over Howard, but he also blamed Howard in large part for his defeat at Chancellorsville (Howard had commanded the XI Corps, which had borne the brunt of Jackson's flank attack). Hooker's biographer reports that there were numerous stories indicating that Abraham Lincoln attempted to intercede with Sherman, urging that Hooker be appointed to command the Army of the Tennessee, but Sherman threatened to resign if the president insisted. However, due to "obvious gaps" in the Official Records, the story cannot be verified.

After leaving Georgia, Hooker commanded the Northern Department (comprising the states of Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois), headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, from October 1, 1864, until the end of the war.[5] While in Cincinnati he married Olivia Groesbeck, sister of Congressman William S. Groesbeck.


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Hooker



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GEORGE G. MEADE



Early commands

Meade was promoted from captain to brigadier general of volunteers on August 31, 1861, a few months after the start of the Civil War, based on the strong recommendation of Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin. He was assigned command of the 2nd Brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, recruited early in the war, which he led competently, initially in the construction of defenses around Washington, D.C. His brigade joined Major General George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac for the Peninsula Campaign. At the Battle of Glendale, one of the Seven Days Battles, Meade was severely wounded in the arm, back, and side. He partially recovered his strength in time for the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run, in which he led his brigade, then assigned to Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps of the Army of Virginia. His brigade made a heroic stand on Henry House Hill to protect the rear of the retreating Union Army. At the start of the Maryland Campaign a few days later, he received command of the 3rd Division, I Corps, Army of the Potomac, and distinguished himself during the Battle of South Mountain. When Meade's brigade stormed the heights at South Mountain, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, his corps commander, was heard to exclaim, "Look at Meade! Why, with troops like those, led in that way, I can win anything!" In the Battle of Antietam, Meade replaced the wounded Hooker in command of I Corps, selected personally by McClellan over other generals his superior in rank. He performed well at Antietam, but was wounded in the thigh.

During the Battle of Fredericksburg, Meade's division made the only breakthrough of the Confederate lines, spearheading through a gap in Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps at the southern end of the battlefield. For this action, Meade was promoted to major general of volunteers, to rank from November 29, 1862. However, his attack was not reinforced, resulting in the loss of much of his division. After the battle, he received command of V Corps, which he led in the Battle of Chancellorsville the following spring. General Hooker, then

commanding the Army of the Potomac, had grand, aggressive plans for the campaign, but was too timid in execution, allowing the Confederates to seize the initiative. Meade's corps was left in reserve for most of the battle, contributing to the Union defeat. Afterward, Meade argued strongly with Hooker for resuming the attack against Lee, but to no avail.



General Meade's horse, Old Baldy.

Army of the Potomac and Gettysburg

Hooker resigned from command of the Army of the Potomac while pursuing Lee in the Gettysburg Campaign. In the early morning hours of June 28, 1863, a messenger from President Abraham Lincoln arrived to inform Meade of his appointment as Hooker's replacement. Meade was taken by surprise and later wrote to his wife that when the officer entered his tent to wake him, he assumed that Army politics had caught up with him and he was being arrested. He had not actively sought command and was not the president's first choice. John F. Reynolds, one of four major generals who outranked Meade in the Army of the Potomac, had earlier turned down the president's suggestion that he take over.



Commanders of the Army of the Potomac, Gouverneur K. Warren, William H. French, George G. Meade, Henry J. Hunt, Andrew A. Humphreys, and George Sykes in September 1863.

Meade assumed command at Prospect Hall in Frederick, Maryland. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was invading Pennsylvania and, as a former corps commander, Meade had little knowledge of the disposition of the rest of his new army. Only three days later he confronted Lee in the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1 to July 3, 1863, where he won the battle that is considered a turning point of the war. The battle began almost by accident, as the result of a chance meeting engagement between Confederate infantry and Union cavalry in Gettysburg on July 1. By the end of the first day, two Union infantry corps had been almost destroyed, but had taken up positions on favorable ground. Meade rushed the remainder of his Army to Gettysburg and skillfully deployed his forces for a defensive battle, reacting swiftly to fierce assaults on his line's left, right,

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and center, culminating in Lee's disastrous assault on the center, known as Pickett's Charge.



General Meade's headquarters, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

During the three days, Meade made excellent use of capable subordinates, such as Maj. Gens. John F. Reynolds and Winfield S. Hancock, to whom he delegated great responsibilities. Unfortunately for Meade's reputation, he did not skillfully manage the political manipulators he inherited from Hooker. Maj. Gens. Daniel Sickles, III Corps commander, and Daniel Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff, caused him difficulty later in the war, questioning his command decisions and courage. Sickles had developed a personal vendetta against Meade because of Sickles's allegiance to Joseph Hooker, whom Meade replaced, and because of controversial disagreements at Gettysburg. (Sickles had either mistakenly or deliberately disregarded Meade's orders about placing his corps in the defensive line, which led to that corps' destruction and placed the entire army at risk on the second day of battle.) Radical Republicans in the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War suspected that Meade was a Copperhead and tried in vain to relieve him from command.



Engraving by James E. Kelly of George G. Meade and the Council of War at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.

Following their severe losses at Gettysburg, General Lee's army retreated back to Virginia. Meade was criticized by President Lincoln and others for not aggressively pursuing the Confederates during their retreat. At one point, the Army of Northern Virginia was extremely vulnerable with their backs to the rain-swollen, almost impassable Potomac River, but they were able to erect strong defensive positions before Meade could organize an effective attack. Lincoln believed that this wasted an opportunity to end the war. Nonetheless, Meade received a promotion to brigadier general in the regular army and the Thanks of Congress, which commended Meade "... and the officers and soldiers of [the Army of the Potomac], for the skill and heroic valor which at Gettysburg repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the Rappahannock, the veteran army of the rebellion."

For the remainder of the fall campaigning season in 1863, during both the Bristoe Campaign and the Mine Run Campaign, Meade was outmaneuvered by Lee and withdrew after fighting minor, inconclusive battles, because of his reluctance to attack entrenched positions.

Meade was a competent and outwardly modest man, although correspondence with his wife throughout the war suggests he was disguising his ego and ambition. A London newspaperman described Meade: "He is a very remarkable looking man—tall, spare, of a commanding figure in presence, his manner pleasant and easy but having much dignity. His head is partially bald and is small and compact, but the forehead is high. He has the late Duke of Wellington class of nose, and his eyes, which have a serious and almost sad expression, are rather sunken, or appear so from the prominence of the curve nasal appearance. He has a decidedly patrician and distinguished appearance." Meade's short temper earned him notoriety, and while he was respected by most of his peers, he was not well loved by his army. Some referred to him as "a damned old goggle-eyed snapping turtle."

Meade and Grant

When Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant was appointed commander of all Union armies in March 1864, Meade offered to resign. He stated the task at hand was of such importance that he would not stand in the way of Grant choosing the right man for the job and offered to serve wherever placed. Grant assured Meade he had no intentions of replacing him. Grant later wrote that this incident gave him a more favorable opinion of Meade than the great victory at Gettysburg.



General Meade's headquarters, Culpeper, Virginia.

Grant made his headquarters with Meade for the remainder of the war, which caused Meade to chafe at the close supervision he received. Following an incident in June 1864, in which Meade disciplined reporter Edward Cropsey from *The Philadelphia Inquirer* newspaper for an unfavorable article, all of the press assigned to his army agreed to mention Meade only in conjunction with setbacks. Meade apparently knew nothing of this arrangement, and the reporters giving all of the credit to Grant angered Meade.

Additional differences caused further friction between Grant and Meade. Waging a war of attrition in his Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee, Grant was willing to suffer previously unacceptable losses with the knowledge that the Union Army had replacement soldiers available, whereas the Confederates did not. Meade, despite his aggressive performance in lesser commands in 1862, had become a more cautious general and more concerned about the futility of attacking entrenched positions. Most of the bloody repulses his army suffered in the Overland Campaign were ordered by Grant, although the aggressive maneuvering that eventually cornered Lee in the trenches around Petersburg were Grant's initiative as well. Meade was additionally frustrated by the manner in which Grant sometimes gave preferable treatment to subordinates that he brought with him from the Western Theater. A primary example of this was Grant's interference with Meade's direction of Major General Philip Sheridan's Cavalry Corps. Meade had insisted that Sheridan's troopers perform traditional cavalry functions of reconnaissance, screening, and guarding the army's trains, but Sheridan objected and told Meade that he could "whip Stuart" if

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Meade let him. Meade reported the conversation to Grant, who replied, "Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it." Meade deferred to Grant's judgment and issued orders to Sheridan to "proceed against the enemy's cavalry" and from May 9 through May 24, sent him on a raid toward Richmond, directly challenging the Confederate cavalry.



Horse artillery headquarters in Brandy Station, Virginia, February 1864. Meade stands at the far right with Generals John Sedgwick and Alfred Torbert, along with staff officers.

Generals George G. Meade, Andrew A. Humphreys and staff in Culpeper, Virginia outside Meade's headquarters, 1863. Although Meade generally performed effectively under Grant's supervision in the Overland Campaign and the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, a few instances of bad judgment marred his legacy. During the Battle of Cold Harbor, Meade inadequately supervised his corps commanders and did not insist they perform reconnaissance before their disastrous frontal assault. Inexplicably, Meade wrote to his wife immediately after the attack and expressed pride that it was he who ordered the attack. During the initial assaults on Petersburg, Meade again failed to coordinate the attacks of his corps before General Lee could reinforce the line, resulting in the ten-month stalemate, the Siege of Petersburg. He approved the plan of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside to plant explosives in a mine shaft dug underneath the Confederate line east of Petersburg, but at the last minute he changed Burnside's plan to lead the attack with a well-trained African-American division that was highly drilled just for this action, instructing him to take a politically less risky course and substitute an untrained and poorly led white division. The resulting Battle of the Crater was one of the great fiascos of the war. In all of these cases, Grant bears some of the responsibility for approving Meade's plans, but Meade's performance was not at the same level of competence he displayed on other occasions.



General Meade and other generals of Army of the Potomac in Washington, D.C., June 1865.

After Spotsylvania, Grant requested that Meade be promoted to major general of the regular army. In a telegram to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on May 13, 1864, Grant stated that "Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and [William T.] Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with." Meade felt slighted that his well-deserved promotion was processed after that of Sherman and Philip Sheridan, the latter his subordinate. However, his date of rank meant that he was outranked at the end of the war only by Grant, Halleck, and Sherman. Although he fought during the

Appomattox Campaign, Grant and Sheridan received most of the credit. He was not present when Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court House.



General George G. Meade and staff in Washington, D.C. in June 1865.

Command decisions

Meade's decisions in command of the Army of the Potomac have been the focus of controversy. He has been accused of not being aggressive enough in pursuit of Confederate forces, and being reluctant to attack on occasion. His reputation among the public and 19th century historians suffered as a result of his short temper, his bad relationship with the press, his place in the shadow of the victorious Grant, and particularly the damaging fallout from the controversies with Dan Sickles. Recent historical works have portrayed him in a more positive light. They have acknowledged that Meade displayed and acted upon an understanding of the necessary changes in tactics brought about by improvements in weapons technology, such as his decisions to entrench when practicable and not launch frontal assaults on fortified positions. [


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Meade



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HENRY W. HALLECK



Western Theater

As the Civil War began, Halleck was nominally a Democrat and was sympathetic to the South, but he had a strong belief in the value of the Union. His reputation as a military scholar and an urgent recommendation from Winfield Scott earned him the rank of major general in the regular army, effective August 19, 1861, making him the fourth most senior general in the Army (after Scott, George B. McClellan, and John C. Frémont). He was assigned to command the Department of the Missouri, replacing Frémont in St. Louis on November 9, and his talent for administration quickly sorted out the chaos of fraud and disorder left by his predecessor. He set to work on the "twin goals of expanding his command and making sure that no blame of any sort fell on him."

Historian Kendall Gott described Halleck as a department commander:

"Although he had impressive credentials, Henry Halleck was not an easy man to work for. The nature of his job and his personality often provoked antagonism, hatred, and contempt. Halleck's strengths were organizing, coordinating, planning, and managing. He could also advise and suggest, and he sometimes ordered subordinates where and when to make a move, but he never was comfortable doing it himself. Halleck seldom worked openly, and as a department commander, he was always at headquarters, separated and aloof from the men. His decisions were the result of neither snap judgments nor friendly discussion, but calculated thinking. He was also prone to violent hatred and never cultivated close relationships. Overall, he generated no love, confidence, or respect."

— Kendall D. Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*

Halleck established an uncomfortable relationship with the man who would become his most successful subordinate and future commander, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. The pugnacious Grant had just completed the minor, but bloody, Battle of Belmont and had ambitious plans for amphibious operations on the Tennessee

and Cumberland Rivers. Halleck, by nature a cautious general, but also judging that Grant's reputation for alcoholism in the prewar Army made him unreliable, rejected Grant's plans. However, under pressure from President Lincoln to take offensive action, Halleck reconsidered and Grant conducted operations with naval and land forces against Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, capturing both, along with 14,000 Confederates.

Grant became a national hero, delivering the first significant Union victory of the war. Halleck obtained a promotion for him to major general of volunteers, along with some other generals in his department, and used the victory as an opportunity to request overall command in the Western Theater, which he currently shared with Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, but which was not granted. He briefly relieved Grant of field command of a newly-ordered expedition up the Tennessee River after Grant met Buell in Nashville, citing rumors of renewed alcoholism, but soon restored Grant to field command (pressure by Lincoln and the War Department may have been a factor in this about-face). Explaining the reinstatement to Grant, Halleck portrayed it as his effort to correct an injustice, not revealing to Grant that the injustice had originated with him.[10] When Grant wrote to Halleck suggesting "I must have enemies between you and myself," Halleck replied, "You are mistaken. There is no enemy between you and me."

Halleck's department performed well in early 1862, driving the Confederates from the state of Missouri and advancing into Arkansas. They held all of West Tennessee and half of Middle Tennessee. Grant, as of yet unaware of the political maneuvering behind his back, regarded Halleck as "one of the greatest men of the age" and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman described him as the "directing genius" of the events that had given the Union cause such a "tremendous lift" in the previous months.[12] This performance can be attributed to Halleck's strategy, administrative skills, and his good management of resources, and to the excellent execution by his subordinates—Grant, Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis at Pea Ridge, and Maj. Gen. John Pope at Island Number 10. Military historians disagree about Halleck's personal role in providing these victories. Some offer him the credit based on his overall command of the department; others, particularly those viewing his career through the lens of later events, believe that his subordinates were the primary factor.[13]

On March 11, 1862, Halleck's command was enlarged to include Ohio and Kansas, along with Buell's Army of the Ohio, and was renamed the Department of the Mississippi. Grant's Army of the Tennessee was attacked on April 6 at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, in the Battle of Shiloh. With reinforcements from Buell, on April 7 Grant managed to repulse the Confederate Army under Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard, but at high cost in casualties. Pursuant to an earlier plan, Halleck arrived to take personal command of his massive army in the field for the first time. Grant was under public attack over the slaughter at Shiloh, and Halleck replaced Grant as a wing commander and assigned him instead to serve as second-in-command of the entire 100,000 man force, a job which Grant complained was a censure and akin to an arrest. Halleck proceeded to conduct operations against Beauregard's army in Corinth, Mississippi, called the Siege of Corinth because Halleck's army, twice the size of Beauregard's, moved so cautiously and stopped daily to erect elaborate field fortifications; Beauregard eventually abandoned Corinth without a fight.

General in chief

In the aftermath of the failed Peninsula Campaign in Virginia, President Lincoln summoned Halleck to the East to become General-in-Chief of all the Union armies, as of July 23, 1862. Lincoln hoped that Halleck could prod his subordinate generals into taking more coordinated, aggressive actions across all of the theaters of war, but he was quickly disappointed, and was quoted as regarding him as "little more than a first rate clerk." Grant replaced Halleck in command of most forces in the West, but Buell's Army of the Ohio was separated and Buell reported directly to Halleck, a peer of Grant's. Halleck began transferring

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divisions from Grant to Buell; by September, four divisions had moved, leaving Grant with 46,000 men.



General Henry Wager Halleck

In Washington, Halleck continued to excel at administrative issues and facilitated the training, equipping, and deployment of thousands of Union soldiers over vast areas. He was unsuccessful, however, as a commander of the field armies or as a grand strategist. His cold, abrasive personality alienated his subordinates; one observer described him as a "cold, calculating owl." Historian Steven E. Woodworth wrote, "Beneath the ponderous dome of his high forehead, the General would gaze goggle-eyed at those who spoke to him, reflecting long before answering and simultaneously rubbing both elbows all the while, leading one observer to quip that the great intelligence he was reputed to possess must be located in his elbows." This disposition also made him unpopular with the Union press corps, who criticized him frequently.

Halleck, more a bureaucrat than a soldier, was able to impose little discipline or direction on his field commanders. Strong personalities such as George B. McClellan, John Pope, and Ambrose Burnside routinely ignored his advice and instructions. A telling example of his lack of control was during the Northern Virginia Campaign of 1862, when Halleck was unable to motivate McClellan to reinforce Pope in a timely manner, contributing to the Union defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run. It was from this incident that Halleck fell from grace. Abraham Lincoln said that he had given Halleck full power and responsibility as general in chief. "He ran it on that basis till Pope's defeat; but ever since that event he has shrunk from responsibility whenever it was possible."

In Halleck's defense, his subordinate commanders in the Eastern Theater, whom he did not select, were reluctant to move against General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Many of his generals in the West, other than Grant, also lacked aggressiveness. And despite Lincoln's pledge to give the general

in chief full control, both he and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton micromanaged many aspects of the military strategy of the nation. Halleck wrote to Sherman, "I am simply a military advisor of the Secretary of War and the President, and must obey and carry out what they decide upon, whether I concur in their decisions or not. As a good soldier I obey the orders of my superiors. If I disagree with them I say so, but when they decide, is my duty faithfully to carry out their decision."

Chief of staff

On March 12, 1864, after Ulysses S. Grant, Halleck's former subordinate in the West, was promoted to lieutenant general and general in chief, Halleck was relegated to chief of staff, responsible for the administration of the vast U.S. armies. Grant and the War Department took special care to let Halleck down gently. Their orders stated that Halleck had been relieved as general in chief "at his own request."

Now that there was an aggressive general in the field, Halleck's administrative capabilities complemented Grant nicely and they worked well together. Throughout the arduous Overland Campaign and Richmond-Petersburg Campaign of 1864, Halleck saw to it that Grant was properly supplied, equipped, and reinforced on a scale that wore down the Confederates. He agreed with Grant and Sherman on the implementation of total war toward the Southern economy and endorsed both Sherman's March to the Sea and Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan's destruction of the Shenandoah Valley. Alongside Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, Henry Halleck may be regarded as one of the fathers of modern warfare.


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_W._Halleck



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WILLIAM T. SHERMAN



First commissions and Bull Run

Sherman was first commissioned as colonel of the 13th U.S. Infantry regiment, effective May 14, 1861. This was a new regiment yet to be raised, and Sherman's first command was actually of a brigade of three-month volunteers, at the head of which he became one of the few Union officers to distinguish himself at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, where he was grazed by bullets in the knee and shoulder. The disastrous Union defeat at Bull Run led Sherman to question his own judgment as an officer and the capacities of his volunteer troops. President Lincoln, however, was impressed by Sherman while visiting the troops on July 23 and promoted him to brigadier general of volunteers (effective May 17, 1861, with seniority in rank to Ulysses S. Grant, his future commander). He was assigned to serve under Robert Anderson in the Department of the Cumberland in Louisville, Kentucky, and in October Sherman succeeded Anderson in command of the department. Sherman considered that his new assignment broke a promise from Lincoln that he would not be given such a prominent position.

Breakdown

Having succeeded Anderson at Louisville, Sherman now had principal military responsibility for Kentucky, a border state in which Confederate troops held Columbus and Bowling Green and were present near the Cumberland Gap. He became exceedingly pessimistic about the outlook for his command and he complained frequently to Washington, D.C. about shortages while providing exaggerated estimates of the strength of the rebel forces. Very critical press reports appeared about him after an October visit to Louisville by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, and in early November, Sherman insisted that he be relieved. He was promptly replaced by Don Carlos Buell and transferred to St. Louis, Missouri. In December, he was put on leave by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Department of the Missouri, who considered him unfit for duty. Sherman went to Lancaster, Ohio, to recuperate. Some scholars believe that, in Kentucky and Missouri, Sherman was in the midst of what today would be described as a nervous breakdown. While he was at home, his wife Ellen wrote to his brother, Senator John Sherman, seeking advice. She complained of "that melancholy insanity to which your family is subject." Sherman later wrote that the concerns of command "broke me down," and

he admitted contemplating "suicide." [45] His problems were compounded when the Cincinnati Commercial described him as "insane".

By mid-December, Sherman was sufficiently recovered to return to service under Halleck in the Department of the Missouri. (In March, Halleck's command was redesignated the Department of the Mississippi and enlarged to unify command in the West). Sherman's initial assignments were rear-echelon commands, first of an instructional barracks near St. Louis and then in command of the District of Cairo. Operating from Paducah, Kentucky, he provided logistical support for the operations of Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to capture Fort Donelson. Grant, the previous commander of the District of Cairo, had recently won a major victory at Fort Henry and been given command of the ill-defined District of West Tennessee. Although Sherman was technically the senior officer at this time, he wrote to Grant, "I feel anxious about you as I know the great facilities [the Confederates] have of concentration by means of the River and R Road, but [I] have faith in you — Command me in any way."

Shiloh

After Grant captured Fort Donelson, Sherman got his wish to serve under Grant when he was assigned on March 1, 1862, to the Army of West Tennessee as commander of the 5th Division. His first major test under Grant was at the Battle of Shiloh. The massive Confederate attack on the morning of April 6, 1862, took most of the senior Union commanders by surprise. Sherman had dismissed the intelligence reports received from militia officers, refusing to believe that Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston would leave his base at Corinth. He took no precautions beyond strengthening his picket lines, refusing to entrench, build abatis, or push out reconnaissance patrols. At Shiloh, he may have wished to avoid appearing overly alarmed in order to escape the kind of criticism he had received in Kentucky. He had written to his wife that, if he took more precautions, "they'd call me crazy again".

Despite being caught unprepared by the attack, Sherman rallied his division and conducted an orderly, fighting retreat that helped avert a disastrous Union rout. Finding Grant at the end of the day sitting under an oak tree in the darkness and smoking a cigar, Sherman felt, in his words, "some wise and sudden instinct not to mention retreat". In what would become one of the most notable conversations of the war, Sherman said simply: "Well, Grant, we've had the devil's own day, haven't we?" After a puff of his cigar, Grant replied calmly: "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though." Sherman proved instrumental to the successful Union counterattack of April 7, 1862. At Shiloh, Sherman was wounded twice—in the hand and shoulder—and had three horses shot out from under him. His performance was praised by Grant and Halleck and after the battle, he was promoted to major general of volunteers, effective May 1, 1862.

Beginning in late April, a Union force of 100,000 moved slowly against Corinth, under Halleck's command with Grant relegated to second-in-command; Sherman commanded the division on the extreme right of the Union's right wing (under George H. Thomas). Shortly after the Union forces occupied Corinth on May 30, Sherman persuaded Grant not to leave his command, despite the serious difficulties he was having with Halleck. Sherman offered Grant an example from his own life, "Before the battle of Shiloh, I was cast down by a mere newspaper assertion of 'crazy', but that single battle gave me new life, and I'm now in high feather." He told Grant that, if he remained in the army, "some happy accident might restore you to favor and your true place." In July, Grant's situation improved when Halleck left for the East to become general-in-chief, and Sherman became the military governor of occupied Memphis.

Vicksburg

The careers of both officers ascended considerably after that time. In Sherman's case, this was in part because he developed close personal ties to Grant during the two years they served together in the West. During the long and complicated campaign against Vicksburg, one newspaper complained that the "army was being ruined in mud-turtle expeditions, under the leadership

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of a drunkard [Grant], whose confidential adviser [Sherman] was a lunatic."


Sherman's military record in 1862–63 was mixed. In December 1862, forces under his command suffered a severe repulse at the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou, just north of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Soon after, his XV Corps was ordered to join Maj. Gen. John A. McClelland in his successful assault on Arkansas Post, generally regarded as a politically motivated distraction from the effort to capture Vicksburg. Before the Vicksburg Campaign in the spring of 1863, Sherman expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of Grant's unorthodox strategy, but he went on to perform well in that campaign under Grant's supervision.

The historian John D. Winters in *The Civil War in Louisiana* (1963) describes Sherman:

"... He had yet [before Vicksburg] to display any marked talents for leadership. Sherman, beset by hallucinations and unreasonable fears, and finally contemplating suicide, had been relieved from command in Kentucky. He later began a new climb to success at Shiloh and Corinth under Grant. Still, if he muffed his Vicksburg assignment, which had begun unfavorably, he would rise no higher. As a man, Sherman was an eccentric mixture of strength and weakness. Although he was impatient, often irritable and depressed, petulant, headstrong, and unreasonably gruff, he had solid soldierly qualities. His men swore by him, and most of his fellow officers admired him."

Chattanooga

After the surrender of Vicksburg to the Union forces under Grant on July 4, 1863, Sherman was given the rank of brigadier general in the regular army, in addition to his rank as a major general of volunteers. Sherman's family came from Ohio to visit his camp near Vicksburg; his nine-year-old son, Willie, the Little Sergeant, died from typhoid fever contracted during the trip.



Map of the Battles for Chattanooga, 1863

While traveling to Chattanooga, Sherman departed Memphis on a train that arrived at the Battle of Collierville, Tenn., while the Union garrison there was under attack on October 11, 1863. General Sherman took command of the 550 men and successfully defended against an attack of 3,500 Confederate cavalry.

Command in the West was unified under Grant (Military Division of the Mississippi), and Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Army of the Tennessee. During the Battle of Chattanooga in November, under Grant's overall command, Sherman quickly took his assigned target of Billy Goat Hill at the north end of Missionary Ridge, only to discover that it was not part of the ridge at all, but rather a detached spur separated from the main spine by a rock-strewn ravine. When he attempted to attack the main spine at Tunnel Hill, his troops were repeatedly repulsed by Patrick Cleburne's heavy division, the best unit in Braxton Bragg's army. Sherman's effort was

overshadowed by George Henry Thomas's army's successful assault on the center of the Confederate line, a movement originally intended as a diversion. Subsequently, Sherman led a column to relieve Union forces under Ambrose Burnside thought to be in peril at Knoxville. In February 1864, he led an expedition to Meridian, Mississippi, to disrupt Confederate infrastructure.

Atlanta

Despite this mixed record, Sherman enjoyed Grant's confidence and friendship. When Lincoln called Grant east in the spring of 1864 to take command of all the Union armies, Grant appointed Sherman (by then known to his soldiers as "Uncle Billy") to succeed him as head of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which entailed command of Union troops in the Western Theater of the war. As Grant took overall command of the armies of the United States, Sherman wrote to him outlining his strategy to bring the war to an end concluding that "if you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic I think of Uncle Abe will give us twenty days leave to see the young folks."



Map of Sherman's campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas, 1864–1865

Sherman proceeded to invade the state of Georgia with three armies: the 60,000-strong Army of the Cumberland under George Henry Thomas, the 25,000-strong Army of the Tennessee under James B. McPherson, and the 13,000-strong Army of the Ohio under John M. Schofield. He fought a lengthy campaign of maneuver through mountainous terrain against Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee, attempting a direct assault only at the disastrous Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. In July, the cautious Johnston was replaced by the more aggressive John Bell Hood, who played to Sherman's strength by challenging him to direct battles on open ground. Meanwhile, in August, Sherman "learned that I had been commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of Atlanta."

Sherman's Atlanta Campaign concluded successfully on September 2, 1864, with the capture of the city, which Hood had been forced to abandon. This success made Sherman a household name and helped ensure Lincoln's presidential reelection in November. In August, the Democratic Party had nominated as its candidate George B. McClellan, the popular former Union army commander, and it had seemed likely that Lincoln would lose to McClellan. Lincoln's defeat could well have meant the victory of the Confederacy, as the Democratic Party platform called for peace negotiations based on the acknowledgment of the Confederacy's independence. Thus the capture of Atlanta, coming when it did, may have been Sherman's greatest contribution to the Union cause.

After ordering almost all civilians to leave the city in September, Sherman gave instructions that all military and government buildings in Atlanta be burned, although many private homes and shops were burned as well. This was to set a precedent for future behavior by his armies.

March to the Sea

During September and October, Sherman and Hood played cat-and-mouse in north Georgia (and Alabama) as Hood threatened Sherman's communications to the north. Eventually, Sherman won approval from his superiors for a plan to cut loose from his

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communications and march south, having advised Grant that he could "make Georgia howl".[68] This created the threat that Hood would move north into Tennessee. Trivializing that threat, Sherman reportedly said that he would "give [Hood] his rations" to go in that direction as "my business is down south." However, Sherman left forces under Maj. Gens. George H. Thomas and John M. Schofield to deal with Hood; their forces eventually smashed Hood's army in the battles of Franklin (November 30) and Nashville (December 15–16). Meanwhile, after the November elections, Sherman began a march with 62,000 men to the port of Savannah, Georgia, living off the land and causing, by his own estimate, more than \$100 million in property damage. Sherman called this harsh tactic of material war "hard war", often seen as a species of total war. At the end of this campaign, known as Sherman's March to the Sea, his troops captured Savannah on December 21, 1864. Sherman then dispatched a famous message to Lincoln, offering him the city as a Christmas present.

Sherman's success in Georgia received ample coverage in the Northern press at a time when Grant seemed to be making little progress in his fight against Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. A bill was introduced in Congress to promote Sherman to Grant's rank of lieutenant general, probably with a view towards having him replace Grant as commander of the Union Army. Sherman wrote both to his brother, Senator John Sherman, and to General Grant vehemently repudiating any such promotion. According to a war-time account, it was around this time that Sherman made his memorable declaration of loyalty to Grant:

"General Grant is a great general. I know him well. He stood by me when I was crazy, and I stood by him when he was drunk; and now, sir, we stand by each other always."

While in Savannah, Sherman learned from a newspaper that his infant son Charles Celestine had died during the Savannah Campaign; the general had never seen the child.



General Sherman with Generals Howard, Logan, Hazen, Davis, Slocum, and Mower, photographed by Mathew Brady, May 1865

Final campaigns in the Carolinas

Grant then ordered Sherman to embark his army on steamers and join the Union forces confronting Lee in Virginia, but Sherman instead persuaded Grant to allow him to march north through the Carolinas, destroying everything of military value along the way, as he had done in Georgia. He was particularly interested in targeting South Carolina, the first state to secede from the Union, because of the effect that it would have on Southern morale. His army proceeded north through South Carolina against light resistance from the troops of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Upon hearing that Sherman's men were advancing on corduroy roads through the Salkehatchie swamps at a rate of a dozen miles per day, Johnston "made up his mind that there had been no such army in existence since the days of Julius Caesar."

Sherman captured the state capital of Columbia, South Carolina, on February 17, 1865. Fires began that night and by next morning most of the central city was destroyed. The burning of

Columbia has engendered controversy ever since, with some claiming the fires were accidental, others a deliberate act of vengeance, and still others that the retreating Confederates burned bales of cotton on their way out of town. Sherman made a statement afterwards saying "I did not order the burning of the city, but I am not sorry that it happened."

Local Native American Lumbee guides helped Sherman's army cross the Lumber River, which was flooded by torrential rains, into North Carolina. According to Sherman, the trek across the Lumber River, and through the swamps, pocosins, and creeks of Robeson County was "the damndest marching I ever saw." [81] Thereafter, his troops did little damage to the civilian infrastructure, as North Carolina, unlike its southern neighbor, was regarded by his men as a reluctant Confederate state, having been the last to secede from the Union. Sherman's final significant military engagement was a victory over Johnston's troops at the Battle of Bentonville, March 19–21. He soon rendezvoused at Goldsborough, North Carolina, with Union troops awaiting him there after the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington.

In late March, Sherman briefly left his forces and traveled to City Point, Virginia, to consult with Grant. Lincoln happened to be at City Point at the same time, allowing the only three-way meetings of Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman during the war.[82]

Confederate surrender

Following Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House and the assassination of President Lincoln, Sherman met with Johnston at Bennett Place in Durham, North Carolina, to negotiate a Confederate surrender. At the insistence of Johnston and of Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Sherman conditionally agreed to generous terms that dealt with both political and military issues. Sherman thought that those terms were consistent with the views Lincoln had expressed at City Point, but the general had not been given the authority, by General Grant, the newly installed President Andrew Johnson, or the Cabinet, to offer those terms.

The government in Washington, D.C., refused to approve Sherman's terms and the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, denounced Sherman publicly, precipitating a long-lasting feud between the two men. Confusion over this issue lasted until April 26, 1865, when Johnston, ignoring instructions from President Davis, agreed to purely military terms and formally surrendered his army and all the Confederate forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, in what was the largest single capitulation of the war.[83] Sherman proceeded with 60,000 of his troops to Washington, D.C., where they marched in the Grand Review of the Armies, on May 24, 1865, and were then disbanded. Having become the second most important general in the Union army, he thus had come full circle to the city where he started his war-time service as colonel of a non-existent infantry regiment.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_T._Sherman



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GEORG H. THOMAS



Remaining with the Union

At the outbreak of the Civil War, 19 of the 36 officers in the 2nd U.S. Cavalry resigned, including three of Thomas's superiors—Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and William J. Hardee. Many Southern-born officers were torn between loyalty to their states and loyalty to their country. Thomas struggled with the decision but opted to remain with the United States. His Northern-born wife probably helped influence his decision. In response, his family turned his picture against the wall, destroyed his letters, and never spoke to him again. (During the economic hard times in the South after the war, Thomas sent some money to his sisters, who angrily refused to accept it, declaring they had no brother.)

Nevertheless, Thomas stayed in the Union Army with some degree of suspicion surrounding him. On January 18, 1861, a few months before Fort Sumter, he had applied for a job as the commandant of cadets at the Virginia Military Institute. Any real tendency to the secessionist cause, however, could be refuted when he turned down Virginia Governor John Letcher's offer to become chief of ordnance for the Virginia Provisional Army. On June 18, his former student and fellow Virginian, Confederate Col. J.E.B. Stuart, wrote to his wife, "Old George H. Thomas is in command of the cavalry of the enemy. I would like to hang, hang him as a traitor to his native state."

Kentucky

Thomas was promoted in rapid succession to be lieutenant colonel (on April 25, 1861, replacing Robert E. Lee) and colonel (May 3, replacing Albert Sidney Johnston) in the regular army, and brigadier general of volunteers (August 17). In the First Bull Run Campaign, he commanded a brigade under Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley, but all of his subsequent assignments were in the Western Theater. Reporting to Maj. Gen. Robert Anderson in Kentucky, Thomas was assigned to training recruits and to command an independent force in the eastern half of the state. On January 18, 1862, he defeated Confederate Brig. Gens. George B. Crittenden and Felix Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, gaining the first important Union victory in the war, breaking Confederate strength in eastern Kentucky, and lifting Union morale.

Shiloh and Corinth

On December 2, 1861, Brig. Gen. Thomas was assigned to command the 1st Division of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio. He was present at the second day of the Battle of Shiloh (April 7, 1862), but arrived after the fighting had ceased. The victor at Shiloh, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, came under severe criticism for the bloody battle and his superior, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, reorganized his Department of the Mississippi to ease Grant out of direct field command. The three armies in the department were divided and recombined into three "wings". Thomas, promoted to major general effective April 25, 1862, was given command of the Right Wing, consisting of four divisions from Grant's former Army of the Tennessee and one from the Army of the Ohio. Thomas successfully led this putative army in the siege of Corinth. On June 10, Grant returned to command of the original Army of the Tennessee.

Perryville, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga

Defense of Horseshoe Ridge and Union retreat at the Battle of Chickamauga, afternoon and evening of September 20, 1863. Thomas resumed service under Don Carlos Buell. During Confederate General Braxton Bragg's invasion of Kentucky in the fall of 1862, the Union high command became nervous about Buell's cautious tendencies and offered command of the Army of the Ohio to Thomas, who refused. Thomas served as Buell's second-in-command at the Battle of Perryville; although tactically inconclusive, the battle halted Bragg's invasion of Kentucky as he voluntarily withdrew to Tennessee. Again frustrated with Buell's ineffective pursuit of Bragg, the Union replaced him with Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans.

Fighting under Rosecrans, commanding the "Center" wing of the newly renamed Army of the Cumberland, Thomas gave an impressive performance at the Battle of Stones River, holding the center of the retreating Union line and once again preventing a victory by Bragg. He was in charge of the most important part of the maneuvering from Decherd to Chattanooga during the Tullahoma Campaign (June 22 – July 3, 1863) and the crossing of the Tennessee River. At the Battle of Chickamauga on September 19, 1863, now commanding the XIV Corps, he once again held a desperate position against Bragg's onslaught while the Union line on his right collapsed. Thomas rallied broken and scattered units together on Horseshoe Ridge to prevent a significant Union defeat from becoming a hopeless rout. Future president James Garfield, a field officer for the Army of the Cumberland, visited Thomas during the battle, carrying orders from Rosecrans to retreat; when Thomas said he would have to stay behind to ensure the Army's safety, Garfield told Rosecrans that Thomas was "standing like a rock." After the battle he became widely known by the nickname "The Rock of Chickamauga", representing his determination to hold a vital position against strong odds.



Battles for Chattanooga, November 24–25, 1863

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Thomas succeeded Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland shortly before the Battles for Chattanooga (November 23 – November 25, 1863), a stunning Union victory that was highlighted by Thomas's troops storming the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge. As the Army of the Cumberland advanced further than ordered, General Grant, on Orchard Knob asked Thomas, "Who ordered the advance?" Thomas replied, "I don't know. I did not."

Atlanta and Franklin/Nashville

During Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman's advance through Georgia in the spring of 1864, the Army of the Cumberland numbered over 60,000 men, and Thomas's staff did the logistics and engineering for Sherman's entire army group, including developing a novel series of Cumberland pontoons. At the Battle of Peachtree Creek (July 20, 1864), Thomas's defense severely damaged Lt. Gen. John B. Hood's army in its first attempt to break the siege of Atlanta.

When Hood broke away from Atlanta in the autumn of 1864, menaced Sherman's long line of communications, and endeavored to force Sherman to follow him, Sherman abandoned his communications and embarked on the March to the Sea. Thomas stayed behind to fight Hood in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign. Thomas, with a smaller force, raced with Hood to reach Nashville, where he was to receive reinforcements.

At the Battle of Franklin on November 30, 1864, a large part of Thomas's force, under command of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, dealt Hood a strong defeat and held him in check long enough to cover the concentration of Union forces in Nashville. At Nashville, Thomas had to organize his forces, which had been drawn from all parts of the West and which included many young troops and even quartermaster employees. He declined to attack until his army was ready and the ice covering the ground had melted enough for his men to move. The North, including General Grant himself (now general-in-chief of all Union armies), grew impatient at the delay. Maj. Gen. John A. Logan was sent with an order to replace Thomas, and soon afterwards Grant started a journey west from City Point, Virginia to take command in person.

Thomas attacked on December 15, 1864, in the Battle of Nashville and effectively destroyed Hood's command in two days of fighting. Thomas sent his wife, Frances Lucretia Kellogg Thomas, the following telegram, the only communication surviving of the Thomases' correspondence: "We have whipped the enemy, taken many prisoners and considerable artillery."

Thomas was appointed a major general in the regular army, with date of rank of his Nashville victory, and received the Thanks of Congress:

"... to Major-General George H. Thomas and the officers and soldiers under his command for their skill and dauntless courage, by which the rebel army under General Hood was signally defeated and driven from the state of Tennessee."

Thomas also received another nickname from his victory: "The Sledge of Nashville".


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Henry_Thomas



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DON CARLOS BUELL



Early commands

At the start of the Civil War, Buell was an early organizer of the Army of the Potomac and briefly commanded one of its divisions. He was promoted to brigadier general, with seniority dating from May 17, 1861. In November 1861, he succeeded Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman in command at Louisville, Kentucky. Buell's command was designated the Department of the Ohio and his troops the Army of the Ohio (later the Army of the Cumberland). Buell's superiors wanted him to operate in eastern Tennessee, an area with Union sympathies and considered important to the political efforts in the war. However, Buell essentially disregarded his orders and moved against Nashville instead, which he captured on February 25, 1862, against little opposition. (Confederate attentions were elsewhere at this time, as Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was capturing Forts Henry and Donelson.) On March 21, he was promoted to major general of volunteers, but Buell lost his independent status when his command was incorporated within the new Department of the Mississippi, under the command of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck.

Shiloh

At the Battle of Shiloh, Buell reinforced Grant with three of the five divisions of the Army of the Ohio, about 20,000 men, helping him defeat the Confederates on April 7, 1862. Buell considered that his arrival was the primary reason that Grant avoided a major defeat. Halleck had to continually prod Buell to get his army to Pittsburg Landing in order to reinforce Grant, concentrating for a planned attack on the Confederate stronghold at Corinth. Although Buell's army was only 90 miles east at Columbia, it took one month to reach Pittsburg Landing, just in time for Grant to launch a counterattack on the Confederate Army of Mississippi. Buell made excuses that the Army of the Ohio's march overland toward Pittsburg Landing was hindered by "swollen rivers" and rain. While acknowledging these delays with criticism, many newspapers and some Federal soldiers credited Buell with "saving" Grant in the battle. Buell considered himself the victor of the battle and denigrated Grant's contribution, writing after the war that he had no "marked influence that he exerted upon the fortune of the day." Contemporary historians, such as Larry Daniels and Kenneth W. Noe, consider that Grant actually saved himself by the conclusion of the first day of battle and that the rivalry between

Grant and Buell hampered the conduct of battle on the second day. The commanders operated almost completely independently of each other and Buell "proved slow and hesitant to commit himself."

After Grant's successful counterattack at Shiloh, Buell continued under Halleck's command in the Siege of Corinth. In June and July, Buell started a leisurely movement of four divisions towards Chattanooga, but his supply lines were disrupted by Confederate cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest and his offensive ground to a halt.

Buell got himself into more political difficulties during this period. Some Northerners suspected that Buell was a Southern sympathizer because he was one of the few Federal officers who was a slaveholder (he inherited the slaves from his wife's family). Suspicions continued as Buell enforced a strict policy of non-interference with Southern civilians during his operations in Tennessee and Alabama. A serious incident occurred on May 2, 1862 when the town of Athens, Alabama, was pillaged by Union soldiers. Buell, noted for his iron discipline, was infuriated and brought charges against his subordinate on the scene, John B. Turchin. President Abraham Lincoln succumbed to pressure from Tennessee politicians and ordered Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to replace Buell on September 30, 1862. However, Thomas refused the command and Lincoln relented, leaving Buell in command. Turchin was court-martialled but not cashiered from service as Buell wanted, and was in fact promoted to brigadier general.

Kentucky

In the fall of 1862, Confederate General Braxton Bragg invaded Kentucky and Buell was forced to pursue him to defend Louisville, Kentucky, and the Ohio River. A single corps of Buell's army was attacked by Bragg at the Battle of Perryville on October 8, 1862, while Buell, a couple of miles behind the action, was not aware that a battle was taking place until late in the day and thus did not effectively engage the full strength of his army to defeat the smaller enemy force. Although Perryville was tactically indecisive, it halted the Confederate invasion of Kentucky and forced their withdrawal back into Tennessee. When he failed to pursue Bragg's withdrawal, Buell was relieved of command on October 24, replaced by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. Buell spent the next year and a half in Indianapolis, in military limbo, hoping that a military commission would exonerate him of blame; he claimed he had not pursued Bragg because he lacked supplies. Exoneration never came, and he left military service on May 23, 1864. Although he had been offered a command at the express recommendation of Grant, Buell declined it, saying that it would be degradation to serve under either Sherman or Edward Canby because he outranked them both. In his memoirs, Grant called this "the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service."


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don_Carlos_Buell



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WILLIAM ROSECRANS



Just days after Fort Sumter surrendered, Rosecrans offered his services to Ohio Governor William Dennison, who assigned him as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the general commanding all Ohio volunteer forces at the beginning of the war. Promoted to the rank of colonel, Rosecrans briefly commanded the 23rd Ohio Infantry regiment, whose members included Rutherford B. Hayes and William McKinley, both future presidents. He was promoted to brigadier general in the regular army, ranking from May 16, 1861.

[Robert E. Lee's Western Virginia campaign], after its plain failure, was virtually abandoned by the Government. Rosecrans was esteemed in the South as one of the best generals the North had in the field. He was declared by military critics, who could not be accused of partiality, to have clearly outgeneraled Lee, who made the entire object of his campaign to "surround the Dutch General."

Edward A. Pollard, *Southern History of the War* (1865)

His plans and decisions proved extremely effective in the West Virginia Campaign. His victories at Rich Mountain and Corrick's Ford in July 1861 were among the very first Union victories of the war, but his superior, Maj. Gen. McClellan, received the credit. Rosecrans then prevented, by "much maneuvering but little fighting," Confederate Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd and his superior, Gen. Robert E. Lee, from recapturing the area that became the state of West Virginia. When McClellan was summoned to Washington after the defeat suffered by Federal forces at the First Battle of Bull Run, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott suggested that McClellan turn over the West Virginia command to Rosecrans. McClellan agreed and Rosecrans assumed command of what was to become the Department of Western Virginia.

In late 1861 Rosecrans planned for a winter campaign that would capture the strategic town of Winchester, Virginia, turning the Confederate flank at Manassas, and he traveled to Washington to obtain McClellan's approval. McClellan disapproved, however, telling Rosecrans that putting 20,000 Union men into Winchester

would be countered by Confederates moving an equal number into the vicinity. He also transferred 20,000 of Rosecrans's 22,000 men to serve under Brig. Gen. Frederick W. Lander, leaving Rosecrans with insufficient resources to do any campaigning. In March 1862 Rosecrans's department was converted to the Mountain Department, which was given to political general John C. Frémont, leaving Rosecrans without a command. He served briefly in Washington, where his opinions clashed with newly appointed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton on tactics and Union command organization for the Shenandoah Valley campaign against Stonewall Jackson, and Stanton became one of Rosecrans's most vocal critics. One of Stanton's assignments for Rosecrans was to act as a guide for Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker's division (Frémont's department) in the Valley, and Rosecrans became intimately involved in the political and command confusion in the campaign against Jackson in the Valley.

Western Theater

Rosecrans was transferred in May 1862 to the Western Theater and received the command of two divisions (the Right Wing) of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi. He took an active part in the siege of Corinth under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck. He received command of the entire army on June 26, and in July added the responsibility of commanding the District of Corinth. In these roles, he was the subordinate of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who commanded the District of Western Tennessee and the Army of the Tennessee, from whom he received direction in the Iuka-Corinth campaign in September and October 1862.

Iuka

Confederate Maj. Gen. Sterling Price had been ordered by Gen. Braxton Bragg to move his army from Tupelo toward Nashville, Tennessee, in conjunction with Bragg's Kentucky offensive. Price's army settled in Iuka and awaited the arrival of Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's army. The two generals intended to unite and attack Grant's lines of communication in western Tennessee, which would prevent Buell's reinforcement if Grant reacted the way they expected, or might allow them to follow Bragg and support his Northern invasion if Grant acted more passively.

Grant did not wait to be attacked, approving a plan proposed by Rosecrans to converge on Price with two columns before Van Dorn could reinforce him. Grant sent Brig. Gen. Edward Ord with three Army of the Tennessee divisions (about 8,000 men) along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to move upon Iuka from the northwest. Rosecrans's army would march in concert along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, swinging into Iuka from the southwest, closing the escape route for Price's army. Grant moved with Ord's headquarters and had little tactical control over Rosecrans during the battle.

While Ord advanced toward Iuka on the night of September 18, Rosecrans was late, having farther to march over roads mired in mud; furthermore, one of his divisions took a wrong turn and had to countermarch to the correct road. That night he notified Grant that he was 20 miles away, but planned to start marching again at 4:30 a.m. and should reach Iuka by midafternoon on September 19. Considering this delay, Grant ordered Ord to move within 4 miles of the town, but to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates. Rosecrans's army marched early on September 19, but instead of using two roads as originally planned, it followed only one of them. Rosecrans was concerned that if he used both roads, the halves of his divided force could not realistically support each other if the Confederates attacked.

"I cannot speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Rosecrans in the attack, and of the endurance of the troops under him. General Ord's command showed untiring zeal, but the direction taken by the enemy prevented them from taking the active part they desired."

Grant's first report of the battle, September 20, 1862.

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If it was the object of the enemy to make their way into Kentucky, they were defeated in that; if to hold their position until Van Dorn could come up on the southwest of Corinth and make a simultaneous attack, they were defeated in that. Our only defeat was in not capturing the enemy army or destroying it as I had hoped to do. It was a part of General Hamilton's command that did the fighting, directed entirely by that cool and deserving officer.

Grant's second report of the battle, October 22, 1862.[19] Rosecrans was within two miles (3 km) of the town on September 19, pushing back Confederate pickets, when his lead element was struck suddenly by a Confederate division. Fighting, which Price later stated he had "never seen surpassed," continued from 4:30 p.m. until after dark. A fresh north wind, blowing from Ord's position in the direction of Iuka, caused an acoustic shadow that prevented the sound of the guns from reaching him, and he and Grant knew nothing of the engagement until after it was over. Ord's troops stood idly while the fighting raged only a few miles away.

During the night both Rosecrans and Ord deployed their forces in the expectation of a renewal of the engagement at daylight, but the Confederate forces had withdrawn. Price had been planning this move since September 18 and Rosecrans's attack merely delayed his departure. The Confederates used the road that the Union army had not blocked, meeting up with Van Dorn's army five days later. Rosecrans's cavalry and some infantry pursued Price for 15 miles, but owing to the exhausted condition of his troops, his column was outrun and he gave up the pursuit. Grant had partially accomplished his objective—Price was not able to link up with Bragg in Kentucky, but Rosecrans had not been able to destroy the Confederate army or prevent it from linking up with Van Dorn and threatening the critical railroad junction at Corinth.

The Battle of Iuka marked the beginning of a long professional enmity between Rosecrans and Grant. The Northern press gave accounts very favorable to Rosecrans at Grant's expense. Some rumors circulated that the reason Ord's column did not attack in conjunction with Rosecrans was not that the battle was inaudible, but that Grant was drunk and incompetent. Grant's first report of the battle was highly complimentary to Rosecrans, but his second, written after Rosecrans had published his own report, took a markedly negative turn. His third statement was in his Personal Memoir, where he wrote "I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka—but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans but I found no fault at the time."

Corinth

Price's army joined Van Dorn on September 28. Van Dorn was the senior officer and took command of the combined force. Grant became certain that Corinth was their next target. The Confederates hoped to seize Corinth from an unexpected direction, isolating Rosecrans from reinforcements, and then sweep into Middle Tennessee. Grant sent word to Rosecrans to be prepared for an attack, but despite the warning from Grant, Rosecrans was not convinced that Corinth was necessarily the target of Van Dorn's advance. He believed that the Confederate commander would not be foolhardy enough to attack the fortified town and might well instead choose to strike the mobile and Ohio railroad and maneuver the Federals out of their position.

On the morning of October 3, three of Rosecrans's divisions advanced into old Confederate rifle pits north and northwest of town. Van Dorn began his assault at 10 a.m. as a planned double envelopment, in which he would open the fight on Rosecrans's left, in the hope that Rosecrans would weaken his right to reinforce his left, at which time Price would make the main assault against the Federal right and enter the works. The Confederates forced their way through a temporary gap in the line about 1:30 p.m., and the whole Union line fell back to within half a mile of the redoubts.

So far the advantage had been with the Confederates. Rosecrans had been driven back at all points, and night found his entire

army except pickets inside the redoubts. Both sides had been exhausted from the fighting. The weather had been hot (high of 94°F) and water was scarce, causing many men to nearly faint from their exertions. Rosecrans's biographer, William M. Lamers, reported that Rosecrans was confident at the end of the first day of battle, saying "We've got them where we want them" and that some of the general's associates claimed that he was in "magnificent humor." Peter Cozzens, however, suggested that Rosecrans was "tired and bewildered, certain only he was badly outnumbered—at least three to one by his reckoning." Army of the Tennessee historian Steven E. Woodworth portrayed Rosecrans's conduct in a negative light:

"Rosecrans ... had not done well. He had failed to anticipate the enemy's action, put little more than half his troops into the battle, and called on his men to fight on ground they could not possibly hold. He had sent a series of confusing and unrealistic orders to his division commanders and had done nothing to coordinate their activities, while he personally remained safely back in Corinth. The movements of the army that day had had nothing to do with any plan of his to develop the enemy or make a fighting withdrawal. The troops and their officers had simply held on as best as they could."

On the second day of battle, the Confederates moved forward at 9 a.m. to meet heavy Union artillery fire, storming Battery Powell and Battery Robinett, where desperate hand-to-hand fighting occurred. A brief incursion into the town of Corinth was repulsed. After a Federal counterattack recaptured Battery Powell, Van Dorn ordered a general retreat. At 4 p.m., reinforcements from Grant under the command of Brig. Gen. James B. McPherson arrived from Jackson. But the battle of Corinth had effectively been over since 1 p.m. and the Confederates were in full retreat.

"It lives in the memory of every soldier who fought that day how his General plunged into the thickest of the conflict, fought like a private soldier, dealt sturdy blows with the flat of his sword on the runaways, and fairly drove them to stand. Then came a quick rally which his magnificent bearing inspired, a storm of grape from the batteries tore its way through the Rebel ranks, reinforcements which Rosecrans sent flying gave impetus to the National advance, and the charging column was speedily swept back outside the entrenchments."

Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War

Once again, Rosecrans's performance during the second day of the battle has been the subject of dispute among historians. His biographer, Lamers, paints a romantic picture:

"One of Davies' men, David Henderson, watched Rosecrans as he dashed in front of the Union lines. Bullets carried his hat away. His hair flew in the wind. As he rode along he shouted: 'Soldiers! Stand by your country.' "He was the only general I ever knew," Henderson said later, "who was closer to the enemy than we were who fought at the front." Henderson (after the war, a Congressman from Ohio and Speaker of the House of Representatives) wrote that Rosecrans was the "Central leading and victorious spirit. ... By his splendid example in the thickest of the fight he succeeded in restoring the line before it was completely demoralized; and the men, brave when bravely led, fought again."

Peter Cozzens, author of a recent book-length study of Iuka and Corinth, came to the opposite conclusion:

"Rosecrans was in the thick of battle, but his presence was hardly inspiring. The Ohioan had lost all control of his infamous temper, and he cursed as cowards everyone who pushed past him until he, too lost hope. ... Rosecrans's histrionics nearly cost him his life. "On the second day I was everywhere on the line of battle," he wrote with disingenuous pride. "Temple Clark of my staff was shot through the breast. My saber-tache strap was caught by a bullet, and my gloves were stained with the blood of a staff officer wounded at my side. An alarm spread that I was killed, but it was soon stopped by my appearance on the field."

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Rosecrans's performance immediately after the battle was lackluster. Grant had given him specific orders to pursue Van Dorn without delay, but he did not begin his march until the morning of October 5, explaining that his troops needed rest and the thicketed country made progress difficult by day and impossible by night. At 1 p.m. on October 4, when pursuit would have been most effective, Rosecrans rode along his line to deny in person a rumor that he had been slain. At Battery Robinett he dismounted, bared his head, and told his soldiers, "I stand in the presence of brave men, and I take my hat off to you."

Army of the Cumberland

Rosecrans once again found that he was a hero in the Northern press. On October 24 he was given command of the XIV Corps (which, because he was also given command of the Department of the Cumberland, would soon be renamed the Army of the Cumberland), replacing the ineffectual Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, who had just fought the inconclusive Battle of Perryville, Kentucky, against Gen. Braxton Bragg, but was accused of moving too cautiously. Rosecrans was promoted to the rank of major general (of volunteers, as opposed to his brigadier rank in the regular army). The promotion was applied retroactively from March 21, 1862, so that he would outrank fellow Maj. Gen. Thomas; Thomas had earlier been offered Buell's command, but turned down the opportunity out of a sense of personal loyalty. Grant was not unhappy that Rosecrans was leaving his command.

In his role as an army commander, Rosecrans became one of the most well-liked generals in the Union Army. He was known to his men as "Old Rosy", not only because of his last name (the source for that nickname at West Point), but because of his large red nose, which was described as "intensified Roman". As a devout Catholic, he carried a crucifix on his watch chain and a rosary in his pocket, and he delighted in keeping his staff up half the night debating religious doctrine. He could swing swiftly from bristling anger to good-natured amusement, which endeared him to his men.

Stones River



A romantic image of Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, January 2, 1863

Rosecrans's predecessor, Buell, had been relieved because of his desultory pursuit of Confederate General Braxton Bragg following the Battle of Perryville. And yet Rosecrans displayed similar caution, remaining in Nashville while he reprovisioned his army and improved the training of his cavalry forces. By early December 1862, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck had lost his patience. He wrote to Rosecrans, "If you remain one more week in Nashville, I cannot prevent your removal." Rosecrans replied, "I need no other stimulus to make me do my duty than the knowledge of what it is. To threats of removal or the like I must be permitted to say that I am insensible."

"When disaster had enveloped half the army, and from that time to the end, Rosecrans was magnificent. Rising superior to the disaster that in a single moment had annihilated his carefully prepared plans, he grasped in his single hands the fortunes of the day. He stemmed the tide of retreat, hurried brigades and divisions to the point of danger, massed artillery, infused into them his own dauntless spirit, and out of defeat itself, fashioned the weapons of victory. As at Rich Mountain, Iuka and Corinth, it was his personal presence that magnetized his plans into success."

Whitelaw Reid, *Ohio in the War*, Volume I

In late December, Rosecrans began his march against Bragg's Army of Tennessee, encamped outside Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The Battle of Stones River was the bloodiest battle of the war, in terms of percentages of casualties. Both Rosecrans and Bragg planned to attack the other's right flank, but Bragg moved first, early in the morning of December 31, driving the Union army back into a small defensive perimeter. As he realized the severity of the surprise attack, Rosecrans demonstrated the nervous hyperactivity for which he was known in battle. He personally rallied his men along the line, and gave direct orders to any brigades, regiments, or companies he encountered. Disregarding his own safety, he rode back and forth at the very front of his line and sometimes between his men and the enemy. As Rosecrans raced across the battlefield directing units, seeming ubiquitous to his men, his uniform was covered with blood from his friend and chief of staff, Col. Julius Garesché, beheaded by a cannonball while riding alongside.

The armies paused on January 1, but the following day Bragg attacked again, this time against a strong position on Rosecrans's left flank. The Union defense was formidable and the attack was repulsed with heavy losses. Bragg withdrew his army to Tullahoma, effectively ceding control of Middle Tennessee to the Union. The battle was important to Union morale following its defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg a few weeks earlier, and President Abraham Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans: "You gave us a hard-earned victory, which had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over."

Tullahoma

Rosecrans's XIV Corps was soon redesignated the Army of the Cumberland, which he kept in place occupying Murfreesboro for almost six months, spending the time resupplying and training, but also because he was reluctant to advance on the muddy winter roads. He received numerous entreaties from President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton, and General-in-Chief Halleck to resume campaigning against Bragg, but rebuffed them through the winter and spring. A primary concern of the government was that if Rosecrans continued to sit idly, the Confederates might move units from Bragg's army in an attempt to relieve the pressure that Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was applying to Vicksburg, Mississippi. Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans, "I would not push you to any rashness, but I am very anxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Bragg from getting lost to help Johnston against Grant." Rosecrans offered an excuse that if he started to move against Bragg, Bragg would likely relocate his entire army to Mississippi and threaten Grant's Vicksburg Campaign even more; thus, by not attacking Bragg, he was helping Grant. Frustration with Rosecrans's excuses led Halleck to threaten to relieve him if he did not move, but in the end he

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merely protested "against the expense to which [Rosecrans] put the government for telegrams."

On June 2, Halleck telegraphed that if Rosecrans was unwilling to move, some of his troops would be sent to Mississippi to reinforce Grant. Rosecrans sent a questionnaire to his corps and division commanders in the hopes of documenting support for his position—that Bragg had so far detached no significant forces to Mississippi, that advancing the Army of the Cumberland would do nothing to prevent any such transfer, and that any immediate advance was not a good idea. Fifteen of the seventeen senior generals supported most of Rosecrans's positions and the counsel against advancing was unanimous. The only dissenter was the newly assigned chief of staff, Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield, who recommended an immediate advance, but historian Steven E. Woodworth opines that he may have been "most concerned with the [political] impression his statement would make in Washington." [42] On June 16, Halleck wired a blunt message: "Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite answer, yes or no, is required." Rosecrans responded to this ultimatum: "If immediate means tonight or tomorrow, no. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes." Seven days later, early in the morning of June 24, Rosecrans reported that the Army of the Cumberland began to move against Bragg.

The Tullahoma Campaign (June 24 – July 3, 1863) was characterized by flawless maneuvers and very low casualties, as Rosecrans forced Bragg to retreat back to Chattanooga. Tullahoma is considered a "brilliant" campaign by many historians. [44] Abraham Lincoln wrote, "The flanking of Bragg at Shelbyville, Tullahoma and Chattanooga is the most splendid piece of strategy I know of." Union Cavalry Corps commander David S. Stanley wrote, "If any student of the military art desires to make a study of a model campaign, let him take his maps and General Rosecrans's orders for the daily movements of his campaign. No better example of successful strategy was carried out during the war than in the Tullahoma campaign."

Rosecrans did not receive all of the public acclaim his campaign might have under different circumstances. The day it ended was the day Gen. Robert E. Lee launched the ill-fated Pickett's Charge and lost the Battle of Gettysburg. The following day, Vicksburg surrendered to Grant. Secretary Stanton telegraphed Rosecrans, "Lee's Army overthrown; Grant victorious. You and your noble army now have a chance to give the finishing blow to the rebellion. Will you neglect the chance?" Rosecrans was infuriated by this attitude and responded, "Just received your cheering telegram announcing the fall of Vicksburg and confirming the defeat of Lee. You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from middle Tennessee. ... I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood."

Chickamauga

Rosecrans did not immediately pursue Bragg and "give the finishing blow to the rebellion" as Stanton had urged. He paused to regroup and study the logistically difficult choices of pursuit into the mountainous regions to the west and south of Chattanooga. When he was ready to move, he once again maneuvered in a way to disadvantage Bragg. The Confederates abandoned Chattanooga and withdrew into the mountains of northwestern Georgia. Rosecrans threw aside his previous caution under the assumption that Bragg would continue to retreat and began to pursue with his army over three routes that left his corps commanders dangerously far apart. At the Battle of Davis's Cross Roads on September 11, Bragg came close to ambushing and destroying one of Rosecrans's isolated corps. Realizing the threat at last, Rosecrans issued urgent orders to concentrate his army and the two opponents faced each other across West Chickamauga Creek.

The Battle of Chickamauga began on September 19 with Bragg attacking the not fully concentrated Union army, but he was unable to break through Rosecrans's defensive positions. On the

second day of battle, however, disaster befell Rosecrans in the form of his poorly worded order in response to a poorly understood situation. The order was directed to Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, "to close up and support [General Joseph J.] Reynolds's [division]," planning to fill an assumed gap in the line. However, Wood's subsequent movement actually opened up a new, division-sized gap in the line. By coincidence, a massive assault by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet had been planned to strike that very area and the Confederates exploited the gap to full effect, shattering Rosecrans's right flank.

"Whether he did or did not know that Thomas still held the field, it was a catastrophe that Rosecrans did not himself ride to Thomas, and send Garfield to Chattanooga. Had he gone to the front in person and shown himself to his men, as at Stone River, he might by his personal presence have plucked victory from disaster, although it is doubtful whether he could have done more than Thomas did. Rosecrans, however, rode to Chattanooga instead."

The Edge of Glory, Rosecrans biographer William M. Lamers

The majority of units on the Union right fell back in disorder toward Chattanooga. Rosecrans, Garfield, and two of the corps commanders, although attempting to rally retreating units, soon joined them in the rush to safety. Rosecrans decided to proceed in haste to Chattanooga in order to organize his returning men and the city defenses. He sent Garfield to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas with orders to take command of the forces remaining at Chickamauga and withdraw.

The Union army managed to escape complete disaster because of the stout defense organized by Thomas on Horseshoe Ridge, heroism that earned him the nickname "Rock of Chickamauga." The army withdrew that night to fortified positions in Chattanooga. Bragg had not succeeded in his objective to destroy the Army of the Cumberland, but the Battle of Chickamauga was nonetheless the worst Union defeat in the Western Theater. Thomas urged Rosecrans to rejoin the army and lead it, but Rosecrans, physically exhausted and psychologically a beaten man, remained in Chattanooga. President Lincoln attempted to prop up the morale of his general, telegraphing "Be of good cheer. ... We have unabated confidence in you and your soldiers and officers. In the main, you must be the judge as to what is to be done. If I was to suggest, I would say save your army by taking strong positions until Burnside joins you." Privately, Lincoln told John Hay that Rosecrans seemed "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head."

"On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out."

Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs

Although Rosecrans's men were protected by strong defensive positions, the supply lines into Chattanooga were tenuous and subject to Confederate cavalry raids. Bragg's army occupied the heights surrounding the city and laid siege upon the Union forces. Rosecrans, demoralized by his defeat, proved unable to break the siege without reinforcements. Only hours after the defeat at Chickamauga, Secretary Stanton ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker to travel to Chattanooga with 15,000 men in two corps from the Army of the Potomac in Virginia. Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was ordered to send 20,000 men under his chief subordinate Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, from Vicksburg, Mississippi. On September 29, Stanton ordered Grant to go to Chattanooga himself, as commander of the newly created Military Division of the Mississippi. Grant was given the option of replacing the demoralized Rosecrans with Thomas. Although Grant did not have good personal relations with either general, he selected Thomas to command the Army of the Cumberland. Grant traveled over the treacherous mountain supply line roads

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and arrived in Chattanooga on October 23. On his journey he encountered Rosecrans in Stevenson, Alabama, and received a briefing on the state of the Chattanooga forces, but gave no hint to Rosecrans that he had made the decision to relieve him. Grant executed a plan originally devised by Rosecrans and Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith to open the "Cracker Line" and resupply the army and, in a series of battles for Chattanooga (November 23–25, 1863), routed Bragg's army and sent it retreating into Georgia.

Missouri and resignation

Rosecrans was sent to Cincinnati to await further orders, but ultimately he would play no further large part in the fighting. He was given command of the Department of Missouri from January to December 1864, where he was active in opposing Sterling Price's Missouri raid. During the 1864 Republican National Convention, his former chief of staff, James Garfield, head of the Ohio delegation, telegraphed Rosecrans to ask if he would consider running to be Abraham Lincoln's vice president. The Republicans that year were seeking a War Democrat to run with Lincoln under the temporary name of "National Union Party." Rosecrans replied in a cryptically positive manner, but Garfield never received the return telegram. Friends of Rosecrans speculated that Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, intercepted and suppressed it.

Rosecrans was mustered out of the U.S. volunteer service on January 15, 1866. On June 30, 1866, President Andrew Johnson nominated Rosecrans for appointment as a brevet major general in the regular army, to rank from March 13, 1865, in gratitude for his actions at Stones River, and the U.S. Senate confirmed the appointment on July 25, 1866. Rosecrans resigned from the regular army on March 28, 1867. On February 27, 1889, by act of Congress he was re-appointed a brigadier general in the regular army and was placed on the retired list on March 1, 1889

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Rosecrans






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ROBERT E. LEE



Lee privately ridiculed the Confederacy in letters in early 1861, denouncing secession as "revolution" and a betrayal of the efforts of the founders. Writing to his son William Fitzhugh, Lee stated, "I can anticipate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union." While he was not opposed in principle to secession, Lee wanted all peaceful ways of resolving the differences between North and South—such as the Crittenden Compromise—to be tried first, and was one of the few to foresee a long and difficult war.

The commanding general of the Union Army, Winfield Scott, told Lincoln he wanted Lee for a top command. Lee accepted a promotion to colonel on March 28. He had earlier been asked by one of his lieutenants if he intended to fight for the Confederacy or the Union, to which Lee replied, "I shall never bear arms against the Union, but it may be necessary for me to carry a musket in the defense of my native state, Virginia, in which case I shall not prove recreant to my duty." Meanwhile, Lee ignored an offer of command from the CSA. After Lincoln's call for troops to put down the rebellion, it was obvious that Virginia would quickly secede. Lee turned down an April 18 offer by presidential aide Francis P. Blair to command the defense of Washington D.C. as a major general, as he feared that the job might require him to invade the South. When Lee asked Scott, who was also a Virginian, if he could stay home and not participate in the war, the general replied "I have no place in my army for equivocal men."

Lee resigned from the Army on April 20 and took up command of the Virginia state forces on April 23. While historians have usually called his decision inevitable ("the answer he was born to make", wrote one; another called it a "no-brainer") given the ties to family and state, recent research shows that the choice was a difficult one that Lee made alone, without pressure from friends or family. His daughter Mary Custis was the only one among those close to Lee who favored secession, and wife Mary Anna especially favored the Union, so his decision astounded them. While Lee's immediate family followed him to the Confederacy others, such as cousins and fellow officers Samuel Phillips and

John Fitzgerald, remained loyal to the Union, as did 40% of all Virginian officers.

Early role

At the outbreak of war, Lee was appointed to command all of Virginia's forces, but upon the formation of the Confederate States Army, he was named one of its first five full generals. Lee did not wear the insignia of a Confederate general, but only the three stars of a Confederate colonel, equivalent to his last U.S. Army rank. He did not intend to wear a general's insignia until the Civil War had been won and he could be promoted, in peacetime, to general in the Confederate Army.

Lee's first field assignment was commanding Confederate forces in western Virginia, where he was defeated at the Battle of Cheat Mountain and was widely blamed for Confederate setbacks. He was then sent to organize the coastal defenses along the Carolina and Georgia seaboard, appointed commander, "Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida" on November 5, 1861. Between then and the fall of Fort Pulaski, April 11, 1862, he put in place a defense of Savannah that proved successful in blocking Federal advance on Savannah. Confederate fort and naval gunnery dictated night time movement and construction by the besiegers. Federal preparations required four months. In those four months, Lee developed a defense in depth. Behind Fort Pulaski on the Savannah River, Fort Jackson was improved, and two additional batteries covered river approaches.[65] In the face of the Union superiority in naval, artillery and infantry deployment, Lee was able to block any Federal advance on Savannah, and at the same time, well-trained Georgia troops were released in time to meet McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. The City of Savannah would not fall until Sherman's approach from the interior at the end of 1864.



At first, the press spoke to the disappointment of losing Fort Pulaski. Surprised by the effectiveness of large caliber Parrott Rifles in their first deployment, it was widely speculated that only betrayal could have brought overnight surrender to a Third System Fort. Lee was said to have failed to get effective support in the Savannah River from the three sidewheeler gunboats of

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the Georgia Navy. Although again blamed by the press for Confederate reverses, he was appointed military adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, the former U.S. Secretary of War. While in Richmond, Lee was ridiculed as the 'King of Spades' for his excessive digging of trenches around the capitol. These trenches would later play a pivotal role in battles near the end of the war.

Commander, Army of Northern Virginia

Following the wounding of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines, on June 1, 1862, Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia, his first opportunity to lead an army in the field. Early in the war, his men called him "Granny Lee" because of his allegedly timid style of command.[67] Confederate newspaper editorials of the day objected to his appointment due to concerns that Lee would not be aggressive and would wait for the Union army to come to him. He oversaw substantial strengthening of Richmond's defenses during the first three weeks of June. In the spring of 1862, as part of the Peninsula Campaign, the Union Army of the Potomac under General George B. McClellan advanced upon Richmond from Fort Monroe, eventually reaching the eastern edges of the Confederate capital along the Chickahominy River. Lee then launched a series of attacks, the Seven Days Battles, against McClellan's forces. Lee's assaults resulted in heavy Confederate casualties. They were marred by clumsy tactical performances by his division commanders, but his aggressive actions unnerved McClellan, who retreated to a point on the James River and abandoned the Peninsula Campaign. These successes led to a rapid turnaround of Confederate public opinion, and the newspaper editorials quickly changed their tune on Lee's aggressiveness. After the Seven Days Battles until the end of the war his men called him simply "Marse Robert", a term of respect and affection.



Lee mounted on Traveller (September 1866)

This stunning Unionist setback – followed by an alarming drop in Northern morale – impelled Lincoln to adopt a new policy of relentless, committed warfare. Three weeks after the Seven Days Battles, Lincoln informed his cabinet that he intended to issue an executive order to free slaves as a military necessity.

After McClellan's retreat, Lee defeated another Union army at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Within 90 days of taking command, Lee had run McClellan off the Peninsula, defeated John Pope at Second Manassas, and the battle lines had moved from 6 miles outside Richmond, to 20 miles outside Washington. Instead of a quick end to the war that McClellan's Peninsula Campaign had promised, the war would go on for almost another 3 years and claim a half million more lives, and end with liberation of four million slaves and the devastation of the Southern slave-based society. Lee then invaded Maryland, hoping to replenish his supplies and possibly influence the Northern elections to fall in favor of ending the war. McClellan's men recovered a lost order that revealed Lee's plans. McClellan always exaggerated Lee's numerical strength, but now he knew the Confederate army was divided and could be destroyed by an all-out attack at Antietam. McClellan, however, was too slow in

moving, not realizing Lee had been informed by a spy that McClellan had the plans. Lee urgently recalled Stonewall Jackson, concentrating his forces west of Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, Maryland. In the bloodiest day of the war, with both sides suffering enormous losses, Lee withstood the Union assaults. He withdrew his battered army back to Virginia while President Abraham Lincoln used the Confederate reversal as an opportunity to announce the Emancipation Proclamation which put the Confederacy on the diplomatic and moral defensive, and would ultimately devastate the Confederacy's slave-based economy.

Disappointed by McClellan's failure to destroy Lee's army, Lincoln named Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside ordered an attack across the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg. Delays in building bridges across the river allowed Lee's army ample time to organize strong defenses, and the frontal assault on December 13, 1862, was a disaster for the Union. There were 12,600 Union casualties to 5,000 Confederate; one of the most "one-sided battles" in the Civil War. Lee reportedly stated after the Confederate victory, "It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it". At Fredericksburg, according to historian Michael Fellman, Lee had completely entered into the "spirit of war, where destructiveness took on its own beauty." [73] After the bitter Union defeat at Fredericksburg, President Lincoln named Joseph Hooker commander of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker's advance to attack Lee in May, 1863, near Chancellorsville, Virginia, was defeated by Lee and Stonewall Jackson's daring plan to divide the army and attack Hooker's flank. It was a victory over a larger force, but it also came with high casualties. It was particularly costly in one respect: Lee's finest corps commander, Stonewall Jackson, was accidentally fired upon by his own troops. Weakened by his wounds, he succumbed to pneumonia.

Battle of Gettysburg

The critical decisions came in May–June 1863, after Lee's smashing victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The western front was crumbling, as multiple uncoordinated Confederate armies were unable to handle General Ulysses S. Grant's campaign against Vicksburg. The top military advisers wanted to save Vicksburg, but Lee persuaded Davis to overrule them and authorize yet another invasion of the North. The immediate goal was to acquire urgently needed supplies from the rich farming districts of Pennsylvania; a long-term goal was to stimulate peace activity in the North by demonstrating the power of the South to invade. Lee's decision proved a significant strategic blunder and cost the Confederacy control of its western regions, and nearly cost Lee his own army as Union forces cut him off from the South. Lee had to fight his way out at Gettysburg.



Battle of Gettysburg, by Currier and Ives

In the summer of 1863, Lee invaded the North again, marching through western Maryland and into south central Pennsylvania. He encountered Union forces under George G. Meade at the three-day Battle of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania in July; the battle would produce the largest number of casualties in the American Civil War. With some of his subordinates being new and inexperienced in their commands, J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry being out of the area, and Lee being slightly ill, he was less than

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comfortable with how events were unfolding. While the first day of battle was controlled by the Confederates, key terrain that should have been taken by General Ewell was not. The second day ended with the Confederates unable to break the Union position, and the Union being more solidified. Lee's decision on the third day, against the sound judgment of his best corps commander General Longstreet, to launch a massive frontal assault on the center of the Union line was disastrous. The assault known as Pickett's Charge was repulsed and resulted in heavy Confederate losses. The general rode out to meet his retreating army and proclaimed, "All this has been my fault." Lee was compelled to retreat. Despite flooded rivers that blocked his retreat, he escaped Meade's ineffective pursuit. Following his defeat at Gettysburg, Lee sent a letter of resignation to President Davis on August 8, 1863, but Davis refused Lee's request. That fall, Lee and Meade met again in two minor campaigns that did little to change the strategic standoff. The Confederate Army never fully recovered from the substantial losses incurred during the 3-day battle in southern Pennsylvania. The historian Shelby Foote stated, "Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Robert E. Lee as commander."

Ulysses S. Grant and the Union offensive

In 1864 the new Union general-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, sought to use his large advantages in manpower and material resources to destroy Lee's army by attrition, pinning Lee against his capital of Richmond. Lee successfully stopped each attack, but Grant with his superior numbers kept pushing each time a bit farther to the southeast. These battles in the Overland Campaign included the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor.

Grant eventually was able to stealthily move his army across the James River. After stopping a Union attempt to capture Petersburg, Virginia, a vital railroad link supplying Richmond, Lee's men built elaborate trenches and were besieged in Petersburg, a development which presaged the trench warfare of World War I. He attempted to break the stalemate by sending Jubal A. Early on a raid through the Shenandoah Valley to Washington, D.C., but was defeated early on by the superior forces of Philip Sheridan. The Siege of Petersburg lasted from June 1864 until March 1865, with Lee's outnumbered and poorly supplied army shrinking daily because of desertions by disheartened Confederates.

General-in-chief



Lee with son Custis (left) and aide Walter H. Taylor (right) by Brady, April 16, 1865.



Lee photographed in 1865 On January 31, 1865, Lee was promoted to general-in-chief of Confederate forces.

As the South ran out of manpower the issue of arming the slaves became paramount. By late 1864, the army so dominated the Confederacy that civilian leaders were unable to block the military's proposal, strongly endorsed by Lee, to arm and train slaves in Confederate uniform for combat. In return for this service, slave soldiers and their families would be emancipated. Lee explained, "We should employ them without delay ... [along with] gradual and general emancipation." The first units were in training as the war ended. As the Confederate army was devastated by casualties, disease and desertion, the Union attack on Petersburg succeeded on April 2, 1865. Lee abandoned Richmond and retreated west. Lee then made an attempt to escape to the southwest and join up with Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee in North Carolina. However, his forces were soon surrounded and he surrendered them to Grant on April 9, 1865, at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.[78] Other Confederate armies followed suit and the war ended. The day after his surrender, Lee issued his Farewell Address to his army.

Lee resisted calls by some officers to reject surrender and allow small units to melt away into the mountains, setting up a lengthy guerrilla war. He insisted the war was over and energetically campaigned for inter-sectional reconciliation. "So far from engaging in a war to perpetuate slavery, I am rejoiced that slavery is abolished. I believe it will be greatly for the interests of the South."

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_E._Lee



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P.G.T. BEAUREGARD



Charleston

Beauregard traveled by steamship from New York to New Orleans and immediately began giving military advice to the local authorities, which included further strengthening Forts St. Philip and Jackson, which guarded the Mississippi approaches to New Orleans. He hoped to be named commander of the state army, but was disappointed that the state legislature appointed Braxton Bragg. Aware that Beauregard might resent him, Bragg offered the officer the rank of colonel. Instead Beauregard enrolled as a private in the "Orleans Guards", a battalion of French Creole aristocrats. At the same time, he communicated with Slidell and the newly chosen President Davis, angling for a senior position in the new Confederate States Army. Rumors that Beauregard would be placed in charge of the entire Army infuriated Bragg. Concerned about the political situation regarding the Federal presence at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Davis selected Beauregard to take command of Charleston's defenses. Beauregard seemed the perfect combination of military engineer and charismatic Southern leader needed at that time and place.

On first meeting, most people were struck by [Beauregard's] "foreign" appearance. His skin was smooth and olive-complexioned. His eyes, half-lidded, were dark, with a trace of Gallic melancholy about them. His hair was black (though by 1860 he maintained this hue with dye). He was strikingly handsome and enjoyed the attentions of women, but probably not excessively or illicitly. He sported a dark mustache and goatee, and he rather resembled Napoleon III, then ruler of France—although he often saw himself in the mold of the more celebrated Napoleon Bonaparte.

David Detzer, *Allegiance*.

Beauregard became the first Confederate general officer, appointed a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on March 1, 1861. (He was promoted on July 21 to be one of the eventual seven full generals in the Confederate Army; his date of rank made him the fifth most

senior general, behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston.)[15]



Bombardment of Fort Sumter, 1861.

George Edward Perine (1837-1885), engraver. Arriving in Charleston on March 3, 1861, Beauregard met with Governor Pickens and inspected the defenses of the harbor, which he found to be in disarray. He was said to display "a great deal in the way of zeal and energy ... but little professional knowledge and experience." Major Robert Anderson at Fort Sumter wrote to Washington, D.C., that Beauregard, who had been his student at West Point in 1837, would guarantee that South Carolina's actions be exercised with "skill and sound judgment." Beauregard wrote to the first Confederate capital of Montgomery, Alabama, that Anderson was a "most gallant officer". Beauregard did not relish firing on his old friend and former instructor. He sent several cases of fine brandy and whiskey and boxes of cigars to Anderson and his officers at Sumter, but Anderson ordered that the gifts be returned.

Political tensions mounted by early April and Beauregard demanded that Sumter surrender before a planned Union expedition to re-provision the fort could arrive. Early in the morning of April 12, negotiations with Anderson had failed and aides of Beauregard, sent to deal personally with Anderson, ordered the first shots of the American Civil War to be fired from nearby Fort Johnson. The bombardment of Fort Sumter lasted for 34 hours. Subjected to thousands of rounds fired from batteries ringing the harbor, Anderson surrendered Fort Sumter on April 14. Biographer T. Harry Williams described the extravagant praise from throughout the Confederacy that "The Hero of Fort Sumter" received for his victory: "He was the South's first paladin."

First Bull Run (First Manassas)

Summoned to the new Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, Beauregard received a hero's welcome at the railroad stations along the route. He was given command of the "Alexandria Line" of defenses against an impending Federal offensive that was being organized by Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell (one of Beauregard's West Point classmates) against the Confederate railroad junction at Manassas. Beauregard devised strategies to concentrate the forces of (full) General Joseph E. Johnston from the Shenandoah Valley with his own, aiming not only to defend his position, but to initiate an offensive against McDowell and Washington. Despite his seniority in rank, Johnston lacked familiarity with the terrain and ceded tactical planning of the impending battle to Beauregard as a professional courtesy. President Davis considered many of Beauregard's plans to be impractical for an army as inexperienced as the Confederates could field in 1861; throughout the war, Davis and Beauregard would argue about Beauregard's tendencies to devise grand strategies based on formal military principles. Davis believed he lacked a pragmatic grasp of logistics, intelligence, relative military strengths, and politics.

Start of the First Battle of Bull Run.

The First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) began early on July 21, 1861, with an element of surprise for both armies—both McDowell and Beauregard planned to envelop their opponent with an attack from their right flank. McDowell struck

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first, crossing Bull Run and threatening Beauregard's left flank. For a while, Beauregard persisted in moving his troops for an attack on his right flank (McDowell's left, toward Centreville), but Johnston urged him to travel with him to the threatened flank at Henry House Hill, which was weakly defended. Seeing the strength of the Union attack at that point, Beauregard insisted that Johnston leave the area of immediate action and coordinate the overall battle from a position 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to the rear. Beauregard rallied the troops, riding among the men, brandishing regimental colors, and giving inspirational speeches. The Confederate line held.

As Johnston's final troops arrived from the Shenandoah Valley, the Confederates launched a counterattack that routed the Union Army, sending it streaming in disorder back toward Washington. William C. Davis credits Johnston with the majority of the tactical decisions that led to the victory, judging that "Beauregard acted chiefly as a dime novel general, leading the charge of an individual regiment, riding along the line to cheer the troops, accepting the huzzas of the soldiers and complementing them in turn. The closest he came to a major tactical decision was his fleeting intention to withdraw from the Henry Hill line when he briefly mistook [the advance of Johnston's reinforcements for the arrival of fresh Union troops]."[24] Nonetheless, Beauregard received the bulk of the acclaim from the press and general public. On July 23, Johnston recommended to President Davis that Beauregard be promoted to full general. Davis approved, and Beauregard's date of rank was established as the date of his victory, July 21.




Beauregard's Battle Flag

After Bull Run, Beauregard advocated the use of a standardized battle flag other than the "Stars and Bars" Confederate national flag to avoid visual confusion with the U.S. flag. He worked with Johnston and William Porcher Miles to create the Confederate Battle Flag. Confederate ladies visiting Beauregard's army contributed silk material from their dresses to create the first three flags, for Beauregard, Johnston, and Earl Van Dorn; thus, the first flags contained more feminine pink than martial red. Throughout his career, Beauregard worked to have the flag adopted, and he helped to make it the most popular symbol of the Confederacy.

As the Army went into winter quarters, Beauregard caused considerable friction with the Confederate high command. He strongly advocated an invasion of Maryland to threaten the flank and rear of Washington. With his plan rebuffed as impractical, he requested reassignment to New Orleans, which he assumed would be under Union attack in the near future, but his request was denied. He quarreled with Commissary General Lucius B. Northrop (a personal friend of Davis) about the inadequate supplies available to his army. He issued public statements challenging the ability of the Confederate Secretary of War to

give commands to a full general. And he enraged President Davis when his report about Bull Run was printed in the newspaper, which suggested that Davis's interference with Beauregard's plans prevented the pursuit and full destruction of McDowell's army and the capture of Washington.

Shiloh and Corinth



Map of the Battle of Shiloh, afternoon of April 6, 1862, after Beauregard took command.

Having become a political liability in Virginia, Beauregard was transferred to Tennessee to become second-in-command to General Albert Sidney Johnston (no relation to Joseph E. Johnston) in his Army of Mississippi, effective March 14, 1862. The two generals planned the concentration of Confederate forces to oppose the advance of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant before he could combine his army with that of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell in a thrust up the Tennessee River toward Corinth, Mississippi. In the Battle of Shiloh, which began April 6, 1862, the Confederates launched a surprise attack against Grant's Army of the Tennessee and nearly defeated it. Once again a more senior general named Johnston deferred to the junior Beauregard in planning the attack. The massive frontal assault was marred by Beauregard's improper organization of forces—successive attacks by corps in lines 3 miles (4.8 km) long, rather than assigning each corps a discrete portion of the line for a side-by-side assault. This arrangement caused intermingling of units and confusion of command; it failed to concentrate mass at the appropriate place on the line to affect the overall objectives of the attack. In midafternoon, Johnston, who was near the front of the battle action, was mortally wounded. Beauregard, positioned in the rear of the army to send reinforcements forward, assumed command of the army and Johnston's overall Western department (officially designated "Department Number Two"). As darkness fell, he chose to call off the attack against Grant's final defensive line, which had contracted into a tight semicircle backed up to the Tennessee River at Pittsburg Landing.

Beauregard's decision was one of the most controversial of the Civil War. Numerous veterans and historians have wondered what might have happened if the assault had gone forward into the night. Beauregard believed that the battle was essentially won and his men could finish off Grant in the morning. He knew the terrain to be crossed (a steep ravine containing a creek named Dill Branch) was extremely difficult and Grant's defensive line was heavy with massed artillery. Unbeknownst to Beauregard,

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Buell's Army of the Ohio began arriving that afternoon, and he and Grant launched a massive counterattack on April 7. Overwhelmed, the Confederates retreated to Corinth.

Grant was temporarily disgraced by the surprise attack and near defeat, causing his superior, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, to assume field command of the combined armies. Halleck cautiously and slowly approached Beauregard's fortifications at Corinth; his action became derisively called the Siege of Corinth. Beauregard withdrew from Corinth on May 29 to Tupelo, Mississippi. He was able to deceive Halleck into thinking the Confederates were about to attack; he ran empty trains back and forth through the town while whistles blew and troops cheered as if massive reinforcements were arriving. Beauregard retreated because of the overwhelming Union force and because of contaminated water supplies in Corinth. In April and May, the Confederates lost almost as many men to death by disease in Corinth as had been killed in battle at Shiloh. Nevertheless, his leaving the critical rail junction at Corinth without a fight was another controversial decision. When Beauregard went on medical leave without requesting permission in advance, President Davis relieved him of command and replaced him with Gen. Braxton Bragg.

Return to Charleston

At Beauregard's request, his allies in the Confederate Congress petitioned Davis to restore his command in the West. Davis remained angry at Beauregard's absence and told him he should have stayed at his post even if he had to be carried around in a litter. He wrote, "If the whole world were to ask me to restore General Beauregard to the command which I have already given to General Bragg, I would refuse it." Beauregard was ordered to Charleston and took command of coastal defenses in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, replacing Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton. The latter was promoted to lieutenant general and transferred to command the defenses of Vicksburg, Mississippi.

Beauregard was unhappy with his new assignment, believing that he deserved command of one of the great Confederate field armies. He performed successfully, however, preventing the capture of Charleston by Union naval and land attacks in 1863. On April 7, 1863, Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, led an ironclad attack against Fort Sumter that was repulsed by highly accurate artillery fire from Beauregard's forces. In July through September 1863, land forces under Brig. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore launched a series of attacks on Fort Wagner on Morris Island and other fortifications at the mouth of the harbor, while Rear Adm. John A. Dahlgren attempted to destroy Fort Sumter. Because the latter operation failed, the successful seizure of Morris Island was not effective in threatening Charleston.

During this period, Beauregard promoted innovative naval defense strategies, such as early experimentation with submarines, naval mines (called "torpedoes" in the Civil War), and with a small vessel called a torpedo-ram. A swift boat fitted with a torpedo on a pole projecting from its bow under water, it could be used to surprise an enemy vessel and impale it underneath the water line. He was also busy devising strategies for other generals in the Confederacy. He proposed that some of the state governors meet with Union governors of the Western states (what are called the Midwest states today) for a peace conference. The Davis administration rejected the idea, but it caused considerable political maneuvering by Davis's enemies in the Congress. Beauregard also proposed a grand strategy—submitted anonymously through his political allies so that it was not tainted by his reputation—to reinforce the Western armies at the expense of Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia, destroy the Federal army in Tennessee, which would induce Ulysses S. Grant to relieve pressure on Vicksburg and maneuver his army into a place where it could be destroyed. The Confederate Army would continue to Ohio, and induce the Western states to ally with the Confederacy. Meanwhile, a fleet of torpedo-rams built in England could be used to recapture New Orleans, ending the war. There is no record that his plan was ever officially presented to the government.

While visiting his forces in Florida, which had just repelled a Union advance at Jacksonville, Beauregard received a telegram that his wife had died on March 2, 1864. Living in Union-occupied New Orleans, she had been seriously ill for two years. A Northern-leaning local newspaper printed an opinion that her condition had been exacerbated by the actions of her husband. This so fanned negative popular opinion that 6,000 people attended her funeral. Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks provided a steamer to carry her body upriver for burial in her native parish. Beauregard wrote that he would like to rescue "her hallowed grave" at the head of an army.

Richmond

In April 1864, Beauregard saw little opportunity for military glory because he foresaw that there would be no more significant assaults against Charleston, and prospects for a major field command were unlikely. He requested a leave to recover from fatigue and a chronic throat ailment, but he instead received an order to report to Weldon, North Carolina, near the Virginia border, to play a key role in the defense of Virginia. His new assignment, the Department of North Carolina and Cape Fear, also included Virginia south of the James River. When he took command on April 18, he renamed it, on his own initiative, the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. The Confederates were preparing for the spring offensive of Union Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and were concerned that attacks south of Richmond could interrupt the critical supply lines to Richmond and the army of Robert E. Lee.

Nothing illustrates better the fundamental weakness of the Confederate command system than the weary series of telegrams exchanged in May and early June between Davis, Bragg, Beauregard, and Lee. Beauregard evaded his responsibility for determining what help he could give Lee; Davis and Bragg shirked their responsibility to decide, when he refused. The strangest feature of the whole affair was that, in the face of Lee's repeated requests, nobody in the high command thought to order Beauregard to join Lee.

T. Harry Williams, *Napoleon in Gray*

As Grant moved south against Lee in the Overland Campaign, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler launched the surprise Bermuda Hundred Campaign with landings up the James River. Beauregard successfully lobbied with Jefferson Davis's military adviser, Braxton Bragg, to prevent significant units of his small force from being transferred north of Richmond to the aid of Lee. His timely action, coupled with the military incompetence of Butler, bottled up the Union army, nullifying its threat to Petersburg and Lee's supply line. Now that this sector was stable, pressure began to rise to transfer troops from Beauregard's front to Lee's. Beauregard did send a division (Maj. Gen. Robert Hoke's) to Lee for the Battle of Cold Harbor, but Lee urgently wanted more and took the step of offering Beauregard command of the right wing of the Army of Northern Virginia for his cooperation. Beauregard replied in a passive-aggressive manner, "I am willing to do anything for our success, but cannot leave my Department without orders of War Department."

After Cold Harbor, Lee and the Confederate high command were unable to anticipate Grant's next move, but Beauregard's strategic sense allowed him to make a prophetic prediction: Grant would cross the James River and attempt to seize Petersburg, which was lightly defended, but contained critical rail junctions supporting Richmond and Lee. Despite persistent pleas to reinforce this sector, Beauregard could not convince his colleagues of the danger. On June 15, his weak 5,400-man force—including boys, old men, and patients from military hospitals—resisted an assault by 16,000 Federals, known as the Second Battle of Petersburg. He gambled by withdrawing his Bermuda Hundred defenses to reinforce the city, assuming correctly that Butler would not capitalize on the opening. His gamble succeeded, and he held Petersburg long enough for Lee's army to arrive. It was arguably his finest combat performance of the war.

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His urgent dispatches to Richmond were treated with disbelief—Davis and Robert E. Lee (now the general in chief of all the Confederate armies) could not believe that Sherman was advancing without a supply line as quickly as Beauregard was observing him do. Also concerned about what he considered Beauregard's "feeble health," Lee recommended to Davis that he be replaced by Joseph E. Johnston. The change of command came on February 22 and Beauregard, although outwardly cooperative and courteous to Johnston, was bitterly disappointed at his replacement. For the remainder of the war, Beauregard was Johnston's subordinate, assigned to routine matters without combat responsibilities. Johnston and Beauregard met with President Davis on April 13 and their assessment of the Confederate situation helped convince Davis that Johnston should meet with Sherman to negotiate a surrender of his army. The two surrendered to Sherman near Durham, North Carolina, on April 26, 1865, and were paroled in Greensboro on May 2. Beauregard traveled to Mobile and then took a U.S. naval transport to his hometown of New Orleans.

After the fall of Atlanta in September 1864, President Davis considered replacing John Bell Hood in command of the Army of Tennessee and he asked Robert E. Lee to find out if Beauregard would be interested. Beauregard was indeed interested, but it is unclear whether Davis seriously considered the appointment, and in the end decided to retain Hood. Davis met with Beauregard in Augusta, Georgia, on October 2 and offered him command of the newly created Department of the West, responsible for the five Southern states from Georgia to the Mississippi River, with the armies of Hood and Richard Taylor under his ostensible command. However, it was a thankless job that was limited to logistical and advisory responsibilities, without true operational control of the armies unless he should join them in person during an emergency. Nevertheless, anxious to return to the field, he accepted the assignment.

Beauregard attempted to concentrate his small forces before Sherman could reach Columbia, South Carolina, the state capital.

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JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON



Manassas and first friction with President Davis

When his native state, Virginia seceded from the Union in 1861, Johnston resigned his commission as a brigadier general in the regular army, the highest-ranking U.S. Army officer to do so. He was initially commissioned as a major general in the Virginia militia on May 4, but the Virginia Convention decided two weeks later that only one major general was required in the state army and Robert E. Lee was their choice. Johnston was then offered a state brigadier general commission, which he declined, accepting instead a brigadier general commission in the Confederate Army on May 14. Johnston relieved Col. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson of command at Harpers Ferry in May and organized the Army of the Shenandoah in July.

In the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas), July 21, 1861, Johnston rapidly moved his small army from the Shenandoah Valley to reinforce that of Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, but he lacked familiarity with the terrain and ceded tactical planning of the battle to the more junior Beauregard as a professional courtesy. At midday, while Beauregard was still unclear about the direction his Union opponent was taking in the battle, Johnston decided that the critical point was to the north of his headquarters (the Lewis house, "Portici"), at Henry House Hill. He abruptly announced "The battle is there. I am going." Beauregard and the staffs of both generals followed his lead and rode off. Johnston encountered a scattered unit, the 4th Alabama, all of whose field grade officers had been killed, and personally rallied the men to reinforce the Confederate line. He consoled the despairing Brig. Gen. Barnard Bee and urged him to lead his men back into the fight. (General Bee's exhortation to his men was the inspiration for Stonewall Jackson's nickname.) Beauregard then convinced Johnston that he would be more valuable organizing the arrival of reinforcements for the remainder of the battle than providing at-the-front tactical leadership. Although Beauregard managed to claim the majority of public credit, Johnston's behind-the-scenes role was a critical factor in the Southern victory. After Bull Run, Johnston assisted Beauregard and William Porcher Miles in the design and production of the Confederate Battle Flag. It was Johnston's idea to make the flag square.

It [the ranking of senior generals] seeks to tarnish my fair fame as a soldier and a man, earned by more than thirty years of laborious and perilous service. I had but this, the scars of many wounds, all honestly taken in my front and in the front of battle, and my father's Revolutionary sword. It was delivered to me from his venerated hand, without a stain of dishonor. Its blade is still unblemished as when it passed from his hand to mine. I drew it in the war, not for rank or fame, but to defend the sacred soil, the homes and hearths, the women and children; aye, and the men of my mother Virginia, my native South.

Johnston's letter to Jefferson Davis, September 12, 1861

In August, Johnston was promoted to full general—what is called a four-star general in the modern U.S. Army—but was not pleased that three other men he had outranked in the "old Army" now outranked him, even though Davis backdated his promotion to July 4. Johnston felt that since he was the senior officer to leave the U.S. Army and join the Confederacy he should not be ranked behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Robert E. Lee. Only Beauregard was placed behind Johnston on the list of five new generals. This led to much bad blood between Johnston and Jefferson Davis, which would last throughout the war. The crux of Davis's counterargument was that Johnston's U.S. commission as a brigadier general was as a staff officer and that his highest line commission was as a lieutenant colonel; both Sidney Johnston and Lee had been full colonels. Johnston sent an intemperately worded letter to Davis, who was offended enough to discuss its tone with his cabinet.


Johnston was placed in command of the Department of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of the Potomac on July 21, 1861, and the Department of Northern Virginia on October 22. The winter of 1861–62 was relatively quiet for Johnston in his Centreville headquarters, concerned primarily with organization and equipment issues, as the principal Northern army, also named Army of the Potomac, was being organized by George B. McClellan. McClellan perceived Johnston's army as overwhelmingly strong in its fortifications, which prompted the Union general to plan an amphibious movement around Johnston's flank. In early March, learning of Union offensive preparations, Johnston withdrew his army to Culpeper Court House. This movement had repercussions on both sides. President Davis was surprised and disappointed by the unannounced move, which he considered a "precipitate retreat." At about this time, Davis moved to restrict Johnston's authority by bringing Robert E. Lee to Richmond as his military adviser and began issuing direct orders to some of the forces under Johnston's ostensible command. On the Northern side, McClellan was publicly embarrassed when it was revealed that the Confederate position had not been nearly as strong as he had portrayed. But more importantly, it required him to replan his spring offensive, and instead of an amphibious landing at his preferred target of Urbanna, he chose the Virginia Peninsula, between the James and York Rivers, as his avenue of approach toward Richmond.

Peninsula Campaign

In early April 1862, McClellan, having landed his troops at Fort Monroe at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula, began to move slowly toward Yorktown. Johnston's plan for the defense of the Confederate capital was controversial. Knowing that his army was half the size of McClellan's and that the Union Navy could provide direct support to McClellan from either river, Johnston attempted to convince Davis and Lee that the best course would be to concentrate in fortifications around Richmond. He was unsuccessful in persuading them and deployed most of his force on the Peninsula. Following lengthy siege preparations by McClellan at Yorktown, Johnston withdrew and fought a sharp defensive fight at Williamsburg (May 5) and turned back an attempt at an amphibious turning movement at Eltham's Landing (May 7). By late May the Union army was within six miles of Richmond.

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
Map of the Peninsula Campaign up to the Battle of Seven Pines
Confederate (red), Union (blue)

Realizing that he could not defend Richmond forever from the Union's overwhelming numbers and heavy siege artillery and that McClellan's army was divided by the rain-swollen Chickahominy River, Johnston attacked south of the river on May 31 in the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. His plan was aggressive, but too complicated for his subordinates to execute correctly, and he failed to ensure they understood his orders in detail or to supervise them closely. The battle was tactically inconclusive, but it stopped McClellan's advance on the city and would turn out to be the high-water mark of his invasion. More significant, however, was that Johnston was wounded by an artillery shell on the second day of the battle, hit in his right shoulder and chest. This led to Davis turning over command to the more aggressive Robert E. Lee, who would lead the Army of Northern Virginia for the rest of the war. Lee began by driving McClellan from the Peninsula during the Seven Days Battles of late June.

Western Theater

After recovering from his wounds, on November 24, 1862, Johnston was appointed to command the Department of the West, the principal command of the Western Theater, which gave him titular control of Gen. Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton's Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. (The other major force in this area was the Trans-Mississippi Department, commanded by Lt. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes, stationed principally in Arkansas. Johnston argued throughout his tenure that Holmes's command should be combined with Pemberton's under Johnston's control, or at least to reinforce Pemberton with troops from Holmes's command, but he was unable to convince the government to take either of these steps.)

The first issue facing Johnston in the West was the fate of Braxton Bragg. The Confederate government was displeased with Bragg's performance at the Battle of Stones River, as were many of Bragg's senior subordinates. Jefferson Davis ordered Johnston to visit Bragg and determine whether he should be replaced. Johnston realized that if he recommended Bragg's replacement, he would be the logical choice to succeed him, and he considered that a field army command was more desirable than his current, mostly administrative post, but his sense of honor prevented him from achieving this personal gain at Bragg's expense. After interviewing Bragg and a number of his subordinates, he produced a generally positive report and refused to relieve the army commander. Davis ordered Bragg to a meeting in Richmond and designated Johnston to take command in the field, but Bragg's wife was ill and he was unable to travel. Furthermore, in early April Johnston was forced to bed with lingering problems from his Peninsula wound, and the attention of the Confederates shifted from Tennessee to Mississippi, leaving Bragg in place.



Vicksburg Campaign

The major crisis facing Johnston was defending Confederate control of Vicksburg, Mississippi, which was threatened by Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, first in a series of unsuccessful maneuvers during the winter of 1862–63 to the north of the fortress city, but followed in April 1863 with an ambitious campaign that began with Grant's Union army crossing the Mississippi River southwest of Vicksburg. Catching Lt. Gen. Pemberton by surprise, the Union army waged a series of successful battles as it moved northeast toward the state capital of Jackson. On May 9, the Confederate Secretary of War directed Johnston to "proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces in the field." Johnston informed Richmond that he was still medically unfit, but would obey the order. When he arrived in Jackson on May 13 from Middle Tennessee, he learned that two Union army corps were advancing on the city and that there were only about 6,000 troops available to defend it. Johnston ordered a fighting evacuation (the Battle of Jackson, May 14) and retreated with his force to the north. Grant captured the city and then faced to the west to approach Vicksburg.

Johnston began to move his force west to join Pemberton when he heard of that general's defeat at Champion Hill (May 16) and Big Black River Bridge (May 17). The survivors retreated to the fortifications of Vicksburg. Johnston urged Pemberton to avoid being surrounded by abandoning the city and to join forces with Johnston's troops, outnumbering Grant, but Davis had ordered Pemberton to defend the city as his highest priority. Grant launched two unsuccessful assaults against the fortifications and then settled in for a siege. The soldiers and civilians in the surrounded city waited in vain for Johnston's small force to come to their rescue. By late May Johnston had accumulated about 24,000 men but wanted additional reinforcements before moving forward. He considered ordering Bragg to send these reinforcements, but was concerned that this could result in the loss of Tennessee. He also bickered with President Davis about whether the order sending him to Mississippi could be construed as removing him from theater command; Steven E. Woodworth judges that Johnston "willfully misconstrued" his orders out of resentment of Davis's interference. Pemberton's army surrendered on July 4, 1863. Along with the capture of Port Hudson a week later, the loss of Vicksburg gave the Union complete control of the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in two. President Davis wryly ascribed the strategic defeat to a "want of provisions inside and a general outside [Johnston] who would not fight."

The relationship between Johnston and Davis, difficult since the early days of the war, became bitter as recriminations were traded publicly about who was to blame for Vicksburg. Davis considered firing Johnston, but he remained a popular officer and had many political allies in Richmond, most notably Sen. Louis Wigfall. Instead, Bragg's army was removed from Johnston's command, leaving him in control of only Alabama and Mississippi.

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
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The President detests Joe Johnston for all the trouble he has given him, and General Joe returns the compliment with compound interest. His hatred of Jeff Davis amounts to a religion. With him it colors all things.

Diarist Mary Chesnut

While Vicksburg was falling, Union Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was advancing against Bragg in Tennessee, forcing him to evacuate Chattanooga. Bragg achieved a significant victory against Rosecrans in the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20), but he was defeated by Ulysses S. Grant in the Battles for Chattanooga in November. Bragg resigned from his command of the Army of Tennessee and returned to Richmond in the role as military adviser to the president. Davis offered the position to William J. Hardee, the senior corps commander, who refused it. He considered P.G.T. Beauregard, another general with whom he had poor personal relations, and also Robert E. Lee. Lee, who was reluctant to leave Virginia, first recommended Beauregard, but sensing Davis's discomfort, changed his recommendation to Johnston. After much agonizing, Davis appointed Johnston to command the Army of Tennessee in Dalton, Georgia, on December 27, 1863.

Atlanta Campaign



The Atlanta Campaign from Dalton to Kennesaw Mountain

Faced with Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta in the spring of 1864, Johnston conducted a series of withdrawals that appeared similar to his Peninsula Campaign strategy. He repeatedly prepared strong defensive positions, only to see Sherman maneuver around them in expert turning movements, causing him to fall back in the general direction of Atlanta. Johnston saw the preservation of his army as the most important consideration, and hence conducted

a very cautious campaign. He handled his army well, slowing the Union advance and inflicting heavier losses than he sustained.

Sherman began his Atlanta Campaign on May 4. Johnston's Army of Tennessee fought defensive battles against the Federals at the approaches to Dalton, which was evacuated on May 13, then retreated 12 miles south to Resaca, and constructed defensive positions. However, after a brief battle, Johnston again yielded to Sherman, and retreated from Resaca on May 15. Johnston assembled the Confederate forces for an attack at Cassville, but one of his corps commanders, Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, failed to attack as ordered and the opportunity was lost. On May 20 they again retreated 8 miles further south to Cartersville. The month of May 1864 ended with Sherman's forces attempting to move away from their railroad supply line with another turning movement, but became bogged down by the Confederates' fierce defenses at the Battle of New Hope Church on May 25, the Battle of Pickett's Mill on May 27, and the Battle of Dallas on May 28.

In June Sherman's forces continued maneuvers around the northern approaches to Atlanta, and a battle ensued at Kolb's Farm on June 22, followed by Sherman's first (and only) attempt at a massive frontal assault in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain on June 27, which Johnston strongly repulsed. However, by this time Federal forces were within 17 miles of Atlanta, threatening the city from the west and north. Johnston had yielded over 110 miles of mountainous, and thus more easily defensible, territory in just two months, while the Confederate government became increasingly more frustrated and alarmed. Letters to Richmond by Johnston's subordinates, particularly Lt. Gen. Hood, complaining of his lack of aggressiveness, did not help his situation. When Johnston retreated across the Chattahoochee River, the final major barrier before Atlanta, President Davis lost his patience.

In early July Davis sent Gen. Braxton Bragg to Atlanta to assess the situation. After several meetings with local civilian leaders and Johnston's subordinates, Bragg returned to Richmond and urged President Davis to replace Johnston. Davis removed Johnston from command on July 17, 1864, just outside of Atlanta. (His replacement, Lt. Gen. Hood, was overly aggressive, but ineffective, losing Atlanta in September and a large portion of his army in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign that winter.) Davis's decision to remove Johnston was one of the most controversial of the war.

North Carolina and surrender at Bennett Place

Johnston traveled to Columbia, South Carolina, to begin a virtual retirement. However, as the Confederacy became increasingly concerned about Sherman's March to the Sea across Georgia and then north through the Carolinas, the public clamored for Johnston's return. The general in charge of the Western Theater, P.G.T. Beauregard, was making little progress against the advancing Union force. Political opponents of Jefferson Davis, such as Sen. Louis Wigfall, added to the pressure in Congress. Diarist Mary Chestnut wrote, "We thought this was a struggle for independence. Now it seems it is only a fight between Joe Johnston and Jeff Davis." In January 1865, the Congress passed a law authorizing Robert E. Lee the powers of general in chief, and recommending that Johnston be reinstated as the commander of the Army of Tennessee. Davis immediately appointed Lee to the position, but refused to restore Johnston. In a lengthy unpublished memo, Davis wrote, "My opinion of General Johnston's unfitness for command has ripened slowly and against my inclinations into a conviction so settled that it would be impossible for me again to feel confidence in him as the commander of an army in the field." Vice President Alexander H. Stephens and 17 senators petitioned Lee to use his new authority to appoint Johnston, bypassing Davis, but the general in chief declined. Instead, he recommended the appointment to Davis.

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Carolinas Campaign

Despite his serious misgivings, Davis restored Johnston to active duty on February 25, 1865. His new command comprised two military departments: the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia; he assumed command of the latter department on March 6. These commands included three Confederate field armies, including the remnants of the once formidable Army of Tennessee, but they were armies in name only. The Tennessee army had been severely depleted at Franklin and Nashville, lacked sufficient supplies and ammunition, and the men had not been paid for months; only about 6,600 traveled to South Carolina. Johnston also had available 12,000 men under William J. Hardee, who had been unsuccessfully attempting to resist Sherman's advance, Braxton Bragg's force in Wilmington, North Carolina, and 6,000 cavalrymen under Wade Hampton.

Johnston, severely outnumbered, hoped to combine his force with a detachment of Robert E. Lee's army from Virginia, jointly defeat Sherman, and then return to Virginia for an attack on Ulysses S. Grant. Lee initially refused to cooperate with this plan. (Following the fall of Richmond in April, Lee attempted to escape to North Carolina to join Johnston, but it was too late.) Recognizing that Sherman was moving quickly, Johnston then planned to consolidate his own small armies so that he could land a blow against an isolated portion of Sherman's army, which was advancing in two separated columns. On March 19, 1865, Johnston was able to catch the left wing of Sherman's army by surprise at the Battle of Bentonville and briefly gained some tactical successes before superior numbers forced him to retreat to Raleigh, North Carolina. Unable to secure the capital, Johnston's army withdrew to Greensboro.

After learning of Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, Johnston agreed to meet with General Sherman between the lines at a small farm known as Bennett Place near present day Durham, North Carolina. After three separate days (April 17, 18 and 26, 1865) of negotiations, Johnston surrendered the Army of Tennessee and all remaining Confederate forces still active in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. It was the largest surrender of the war, totaling 89,270 soldiers. President Davis considered that Johnston, surrendering so many troops that had not been explicitly defeated in battle, had committed an act of treachery. Johnston was paroled on May 2 at Greensboro.

After the surrender, Sherman issued ten days' rations to the hungry Confederate soldiers, as well as horses and mules for them to "insure a crop." He also ordered distribution of corn, meal, and flour to civilians throughout the South. This was an act of generosity that Johnston would never forget; he wrote to Sherman that his attitude "reconciles me to what I have previously regarded as the misfortune of my life, that of having you to encounter in the field."


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_E._Johnston



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JAMES LONGSTREET



First Bull Run and the Peninsula

Longstreet arrived in Richmond, Virginia with a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the Confederate States Army. He met with Confederate President Jefferson Davis at the executive mansion on June 22, 1861, where he was informed that he had been appointed a brigadier general with date of rank on June 17, a commission he accepted on June 25. He was ordered to report to Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas, where he was given command of a brigade of three Virginia regiments—the 1st, 11th, and 17th Virginia Infantry regiments.

Longstreet assembled his staff and trained his brigade incessantly. They saw their first action at Blackburn's Ford on July 18, resisting a Union Army reconnaissance in force that preceded the First Battle of Bull Run. When the main attack came at the opposite end of the line on July 21, the brigade played a relatively minor role, although it endured artillery fire for nine hours. Longstreet was infuriated that his commanders would not allow a vigorous pursuit of the defeated Union Army. His trusted staff officer, Moxley Sorrel, recorded that he was "in a fine rage. He dashed his hat furiously to the ground, stamped, and bitter words escaped him." He quoted Longstreet as saying, "Retreat! Hell, the Federal army has broken to pieces." On October 7, Longstreet was promoted to major general and assumed command of a division in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia—four infantry brigades and Hampton's Legion.

Tragedy struck the Longstreet family in January 1862. A scarlet fever epidemic in Richmond claimed the lives of his one-year-old daughter Mary Anne, his four-year-old son James, and six-year-old Augustus ("Gus"), all within a week. His 13-year-old son Garland almost succumbed. The losses were devastating for Longstreet and he became withdrawn, both personally and socially. In 1861 his headquarters were noted for parties, drinking, and poker games. After he returned from the funeral

the headquarters social life became more somber, he rarely drank, and he became a devout Episcopalian.

Longstreet turned in a mixed performance in the Peninsula Campaign that spring. He executed well as a rear guard commander at Yorktown and Williamsburg, delaying the advance of Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's army toward Richmond. During the Battle of Seven Pines he marched his men in the wrong direction down the wrong road, causing congestion and confusion with other Confederate units, diluting the effect of the massive Confederate counterattack against McClellan. His report unfairly blamed fellow Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger for the mishaps.[16] Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was wounded during the battle and he was replaced in command of the Army of Northern Virginia by Gen. Robert E. Lee.

During the Seven Days Battles that followed in late June, Longstreet had operational command of nearly half of Lee's army—15 brigades—as it drove McClellan back down the Peninsula. Longstreet performed aggressively and well in his new, larger command, particularly at Gaines' Mill and Glendale. Lee's army in general suffered from weak performances by Longstreet's peers, including, uncharacteristically, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and was unable to destroy the Union Army. Moxley Sorrel wrote of Longstreet's confidence and calmness in battle: "He was like a rock in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed flying to pieces." Gen. Lee said, "Longstreet was the staff in my right hand." He had been established as Lee's principal lieutenant.



Longstreet circa 1862

Second Bull Run, Maryland, and Fredericksburg

The military reputations of Lee's corps commanders are often characterized as Stonewall Jackson representing the audacious, offensive component of Lee's army, whereas Longstreet more typically advocated and executed defensive strategies and tactics. Jackson has been described as the army's hammer, Longstreet its anvil. In the Northern Virginia Campaign of August 1862, this stereotype did not hold true. Longstreet commanded the Right Wing (later to become known as the First Corps) and Jackson commanded the Left Wing. Jackson started the campaign under Lee's orders with a sweeping flanking

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
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maneuver that placed his corps into the rear of Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia, but he then took up a defensive position and effectively invited Pope to assault him. On August 28 and August 29, the start of the Second Battle of Bull Run, Pope pounded Jackson as Longstreet and the remainder of the army marched north to reach the battlefield. Postwar criticism of Longstreet claimed that he marched his men too slowly, leaving Jackson to bear the brunt of the fighting for two days, but they covered roughly 30 miles (50 km) in a little over 24 hours and Gen. Lee did not attempt to get his army concentrated any faster.

When Longstreet's men arrived around midday on August 29, Lee planned a flanking attack on the Union Army, which was concentrating its attention on Jackson. Longstreet demurred against three suggestions from Lee, urging him to attack, recommending instead that a reconnaissance in force be conducted to survey the ground in front of him. By 6:30 p.m. the division of Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood moved forward against the troops of the Union V Corps, and Longstreet withdrew them at 8:30 p.m., having a better idea of the terrain and enemy soldiers in the area. On the next day, Longstreet's preparations paid dividends, as his artillery was a major factor in helping Jackson resist the V Corps attack, and he capitalized on Federal confusion by launching an attack of his own, anticipating an order from Lee that had not yet arrived. Despite the smashing victory that followed, Longstreet's performance at the battle was criticized by postbellum advocates of the Lost Cause, claiming that his slowness, reluctance to attack, and disobedience to Gen. Lee were a harbinger of his controversial performance to come on July 2, 1863, at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lee's biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, wrote: "The seeds of much of the disaster at Gettysburg were sown in that instant—when Lee yielded to Longstreet and Longstreet discovered that he would."

Despite this criticism, the following day, August 30, was one of Longstreet's finest performances of the war. Pope came to believe that Jackson was starting to retreat and Longstreet took advantage of this by launching a massive assault on the Union army's left flank with over 25,000 men. For over four hours they "pounded like a giant hammer" with Longstreet actively directing artillery fire and sending brigades into the fray. Longstreet and Lee were together during the assault and both of them came under Union artillery fire. Although the Union troops put up a furious defense, Pope's army was forced to retreat in a manner similar to the embarrassing Union defeat at First Bull Run, fought on roughly the same battleground. Longstreet gave all of the credit for the victory to Lee, describing the campaign as "clever and brilliant." It established a strategic model he believed to be ideal—the use of defensive tactics within a strategic offensive.

Longstreet's actions in the final two major Confederate defensive battles of 1862 would be the proving grounds for his development of dominant defensive tactics. In the Maryland Campaign of September, at the Battle of Antietam, Longstreet held his part of the Confederate defensive line against Union forces twice as numerous. After the delaying action Longstreet's corps fought at South Mountain, he retired to Sharpsburg to join Stonewall Jackson, and prepared to fight a defensive battle. Using terrain to his advantage, Longstreet validated his idea that the tactical defense was now vastly superior to the exposed offense. While the offense dominated in the time of Napoleon, the technological advancements had overturned this. Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen claims that Longstreet was one of the few Civil War officers truly aware of this. At the end of that bloodiest day of the Civil War, Lee greeted his subordinate by saying, "Ah! Here is Longstreet; here's my old war-horse!" On October 9, a few weeks after Antietam, Longstreet was promoted to lieutenant general. Lee arranged for Longstreet's promotion to be dated one day earlier than Jackson's, making the Old War-Horse the senior lieutenant general in the entire Confederate Army. In an army reorganization in November Longstreet's command, now designated the First Corps, consisted of five divisions, approximately 41,000 men.



Fredericksburg.

In December, Longstreet's First Corps played the decisive role in the Battle of Fredericksburg. Since Lee moved Longstreet to Fredericksburg early, it allowed Longstreet to take the time to dig in portions of his line, methodically site artillery, and set up a kill zone over the axis of advance he thought the Union attack would come. Remembering the slaughter at Antietam, in which the Confederates did not construct defensive works, Longstreet ordered trenches, abatis, and fieldworks to be constructed, which would set a precedent for future defensive battles of the Army of Northern Virginia. Additionally, Longstreet positioned his men behind a stone wall at the foot of Marye's Heights and held off fourteen assaults by Union forces. The Union army suffered almost 8,000 casualties at Marye's Heights, Longstreet only 1,000. His great defensive success was not based entirely on the advantage of terrain; this time it was the combination of terrain, defensive works, and a centralized coordination of artillery.

Suffolk

In the early spring of 1863, Longstreet suggested to Lee that his corps be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia and sent to reinforce the Army of Tennessee, where Gen. Braxton Bragg was being challenged in Middle Tennessee by Union Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Longstreet's roommate at West Point. It is possible that Longstreet believed that an independent command in the West offered better opportunities for advancement than a corps under Lee's shadow. Lee did detach two divisions from the First Corps, but ordered them to Richmond, not Tennessee. Seaborne movements of the Union IX Corps potentially threatened vital ports on the mid-Atlantic coast. The division of George Pickett started for the capital in mid-February, was followed by John Hood's, and then Longstreet himself was ordered to take command of the detached divisions and the Departments of North Carolina and Southern Virginia.

In April, Longstreet besieged Union forces in the city of Suffolk, Virginia, a minor operation, but one that was very important to Lee's army, still stationed in war-devastated central Virginia. It enabled Confederate authorities to collect huge amounts of provisions that had been under Union control. However, this operation caused Longstreet and 15,000 men of the First Corps to be absent from the Battle of Chancellorsville in May. Despite Lee's brilliant victory at Chancellorsville, Longstreet once again came under criticism, claiming that he could have marched his men back from Suffolk in time to join Lee. However, from the

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Chancellorsville and Suffolk scenario, Longstreet brought forward the beginnings of a new Confederate strategy. These events proved that the Army of Northern Virginia could manage with fewer troops for periods of time, and units could be shifted to create windows of opportunity in other theaters. Longstreet advocated the first strategic movements to utilize rail, interior lines, and create temporary numerical advantages in Mississippi or Tennessee prior to Gettysburg.

Gettysburg

Campaign plans

Following Chancellorsville and the death of Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet and Lee met in mid-May to discuss options for the army's summer campaign. Longstreet advocated, once again, detachment of all or part of his corps to be sent to Tennessee. The justification for this course of action was becoming more urgent as Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was advancing on the critical Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, Vicksburg. Longstreet argued that a reinforced army under Bragg could defeat Rosecrans and drive toward the Ohio River, which would compel Grant to break his hold on Vicksburg. Lee was opposed to a division of his army and instead advocated a large-scale offensive or raid into Pennsylvania. In his memoirs, Longstreet described his reaction to Lee's proposal:

His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in our own country, so well adapted to that purpose—which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan.

This was written years after the campaign and is affected by hindsight, both of the results of the battle and of the postbellum criticism of the Lost Cause authors. In letters of the time Longstreet made no reference to such a bargain with Lee. In April 1868, Lee said that he "had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing." Yet in his post-battle report, Lee wrote, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy."


The Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized after Jackson's death. Two division commanders, Richard S. Ewell and A.P. Hill, were promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Second and the newly created Third Corps respectively. Longstreet's First Corps gave up the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson during the reorganization, leaving him with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws, George Pickett, and John Hood.

In the initial movements of the campaign, Longstreet's corps followed Ewell's through the Shenandoah Valley. A spy he had hired, Henry Thomas Harrison who went by just "Harrison", was instrumental in warning the Confederates that the Union Army of the Potomac was advancing north to meet them more quickly than they had anticipated, prompting Lee to order the immediate concentration of his army near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Battle of Gettysburg

Longstreet's actions at the Battle of Gettysburg would be the centerpiece of the controversy that surrounded him for over a century. Ahead of his troops he arrived on the battlefield late in the afternoon of the first day, July 1, 1863. By then, two Union corps had been driven by Ewell and Hill back through the town into defensive positions on Cemetery Hill. Lee had not intended to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and questionable decisions by A.P. Hill brought on the battle, which was an impressive Confederate victory on the first day. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the Union defensive position and advocated a strategic movement

around the left flank of the enemy, to "secure good ground between him and his capital," which would presumably compel the Union commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates. Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him."



Gettysburg, July 2.

Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left flank, which would be followed up by Hill's attack on Cemetery Ridge near the center, while Ewell demonstrated on the Union right. Longstreet was not ready to attack as early as Lee envisioned. He received permission from Lee to wait for Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade (Hood's division) to reach the field before he advanced any of his other brigades; Law marched his men quickly, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march column, and some distance from the attack positions they would need to reach. All of Longstreet's divisions were forced to take a long detour while approaching the enemy position, misled by inadequate reconnaissance that failed to identify a completely concealed route.

Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle. However, Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his formal order for the attack until 11 a.m. Although Longstreet's motivations have long been clouded by the vitriol of the Lost Cause partisans (see Legacy), many historians agree that Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders to launch an attack as early as possible. Biographer Jeffry D. Wert wrote, "Longstreet deserves censure for his performance on the morning of July 2. He allowed his disagreement with Lee's decision to affect his conduct. Once the commanding general determined to assail the enemy, duty required Longstreet to comply with the vigor and thoroughness that had previously characterized his generalship. The concern for detail, the regard for timely information, and the need for preparation were absent." Military historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote, "Unenthusiastic about the attack, Longstreet consumed so much time in properly assembling and aligning the corps that the assault did not commence until 4 p.m. During all the time that

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passed, Meade continued to move in troops to bring about a more and more complete concentration; by 6 p.m. he had achieved numerical superiority and had his left well covered." Campaign historian Edwin Coddington presents a lengthy description of the approach march, which he described as "a comedy of errors such as one might expect of inexperienced commanders and raw militia, but not of Lee's "War Horse" and his veteran troops." He called the episode "a dark moment in Longstreet's career as a general." Gettysburg historian Harry Pfanz concluded that "Longstreet's angry dissidence had resulted in further wasted time and delay." David L. Callihan, in a 2002 reassessment of Longstreet's legacy, wrote, "It is appalling that a field commander of Longstreet's experience and caliber would so cavalierly and ineptly march and prepare his men for battle." An alternative view has been expressed by John Lott, "General Longstreet did all that could be expected on the 2nd day and any allegations of failing to exercise his duty by ordering a morning can be repudiated. It would have been impossible to have commenced an attack much earlier than it occurred, and it is doubtful that the Confederacy could have placed the attack in any more secure hands than General Longstreet." But Longstreet's command of the operation had for the most part, been reasonable, since taking the route he should have would have alerted the whole Union army of his assault. Regardless of the controversy regarding the preparations, however, once the assault began around 4 p.m., Longstreet pressed the assault by McLaws and Hood (Pickett's division had not yet arrived) competently against fierce Union resistance, but it was largely unsuccessful, with significant casualties.


On the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Gen. Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued to make the ride. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. (Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union VI Corps was in position to block this move.) Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him. Lee wrote with some restraint in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected."

Since his plans for an early-morning coordinated attack were now infeasible, Lee instead ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union line, employing the division of George Pickett and brigades from A.P. Hill's corps. Longstreet knew this assault had little chance of success. The Union Army was in a position reminiscent of the one Longstreet had harnessed at Fredericksburg to defeat Burnside's assault. The Confederates would have to cover almost a mile of open ground and spend time negotiating sturdy fences under fire. The lessons of Fredericksburg and Malvern Hill were lost to Lee on this day. In his memoirs, Longstreet claims to have told Lee:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.

During the artillery barrage that preceded the infantry assault, Longstreet began to agonize over an assault that was going to cost dearly. He attempted to pass the responsibility for launching Pickett's division to his artillery chief, Col. Edward Porter Alexander. When the time came to actually order Pickett

forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, unable to verbalize the order. The assault, known as Pickett's Charge, suffered the heavy casualties that Longstreet anticipated. It was the decisive point in the Confederate loss at Gettysburg and Lee ordered a retreat back to Virginia the following day.



Pickett's Charge, July 3.

Criticism of Longstreet after the war was based not only on his reputed conduct at the Battle of Gettysburg, but also intemperate remarks he made about Robert E. Lee and his strategies, such as:

That he [Lee] was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him.

Tennessee

In mid-August 1863, Longstreet resumed his attempts to be transferred to the Western Theater. He wrote a private letter to Secretary of War James Seddon, requesting that he be transferred to serve under his old friend Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. He followed this up in conversations with his congressional ally, Senator Louis Wigfall, who had long considered Longstreet a suitable replacement for Braxton Bragg. Since Bragg's army was under increasing pressure from Rosecrans outside of Chattanooga, Lee and President Davis agreed to the request on September 5. In one of the most daunting logistical efforts of the Confederacy, Longstreet, with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws and John Hood, a brigade from George Pickett's division, and Porter Alexander's 26-gun artillery battalion, traveled over 16 railroads on a 775-mile (1,247 km) route through the Carolinas to reach Bragg in northern Georgia. Although the entire operation would take over three weeks, Longstreet and lead elements of his corps arrived on September 17.

The First Corps veterans arrived in the early stages of the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg had already begun an unsuccessful attempt to interpose his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga before the arrival of Longstreet's corps. When the two met at Bragg's headquarters in the evening, Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army; Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk commanded the Right. On September 20, 1863, Longstreet lined up eight brigades in a deep column against a narrow front, an attack very similar to future German tank tactics in World War II. By chance, a mistaken order from General

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Rosecrans caused a gap to appear in the Union line and Longstreet took additional advantage of it to increase his chances of success. The organization of the attack was well suited to the terrain and would have penetrated the Union line regardless. The Union right collapsed and Rosecrans fled the field, as units began to retreat in panic. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas managed to rally the retreating units and solidify a defensive position on Snodgrass Hill. He held that position against repeated afternoon attacks by Longstreet, who was not adequately supported by the Confederate right wing. Once night fell, the battle was over, and Thomas was able to extricate the units under his control to Chattanooga. Bragg's failure to coordinate the right wing and cavalry to further envelope Thomas prevented a total rout of the Union Army. Bragg also neglected to pursue the retreating Federals aggressively, resulting in the futile siege of Chattanooga. Nevertheless, Chickamauga was the greatest Confederate victory in the Western Theater and Longstreet deserved a good portion of the credit.

Longstreet soon clashed with the much maligned Bragg and became leader of the group of senior commanders of the army who conspired to have him removed. Bragg's subordinates had long been dissatisfied with his leadership and abrasive personality; the arrival of Longstreet (the senior lieutenant general in the Army) and his officers, added credibility to the earlier claims, and was a catalyst toward action. Longstreet wrote to Seddon, "I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander." The situation became so grave that President Davis was forced to intercede in person. What followed was one of the most bizarre scenes of the war, with Bragg sitting red faced as a procession of his commanders condemned him. Longstreet stated that Bragg "was incompetent to manage an army or put men into a fight" and that he "knew nothing of the business." Davis sided with Bragg and did nothing to resolve the conflict.

Bragg retained his position, relieving or reassigning the generals who had testified against him, and retaliated against Longstreet by reducing his command to only those units that he brought with him from Virginia. Despite the dysfunctional command climate under Bragg, and the lack of support from the War Department and President Davis concerning Bragg's removal, Longstreet did the best he could to continue to seek options in the Chattanooga Campaign. While Bragg resigned himself and his army to the siege of the Union Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga, Longstreet devised a strategy to prevent reinforcement and a lifting of the siege by Grant. He knew this Union reaction was underway, and that the nearest railhead was Bridgeport, Alabama, where portions of two Union corps would soon arrive. After sending his artillery commander, Porter Alexander, to reconnoiter the Union-occupied town, he devised a plan to shift most of the Army of Tennessee away from the siege, setting up logistical support in Rome, Georgia, go after Bridgeport to take the railhead, possibly catching Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and arriving Union troops from the Eastern Theater in a disadvantageous position. The plan was well received and approved by President Davis, but it was disapproved by Bragg, who objected to the significant logistical challenges it posed. Longstreet accepted Bragg's arguments[57] and agreed to a plan in which he and his men were dispatched to East Tennessee to deal with an advance by Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside. Longstreet was selected for this assignment partially due to enmity on Bragg's part, but also because the War Department intended for Longstreet's men to return to Lee's army and this movement was in the correct direction.

Longstreet was criticized for the slow pace of his advance toward Knoxville in November and some of his troops began using the nickname "Peter the Slow" to describe him. Burnside evaded him at the Battle of Campbell's Station and settled into entrenchments around the city, which Longstreet besieged unsuccessfully. The Battle of Fort Sanders failed to bring a Confederate breakthrough. When Bragg was defeated by Grant at Chattanooga on November 25, Longstreet was ordered to join forces with the Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia. He demurred and began to move back to Virginia, soon pursued by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in early December. The armies

went into winter quarters and the First Corps rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia in the spring. The only real effect of the minor campaign was to deprive Bragg of troops he sorely needed in Chattanooga. Longstreet's second independent command (after Suffolk) was a failure and his self-confidence was damaged. He reacted to the failure of the campaign by blaming others, as he had done at Seven Pines. He relieved Lafayette McLaws from command and requested the court martial of Brig. Gens. Jerome B. Robertson and Evander M. Law. He also submitted a letter of resignation to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper on December 30, 1863, but his request to be relieved was denied.

As his corps suffered through a severe winter in Eastern Tennessee with inadequate shelter and provisions, Longstreet again developed strategic plans. He called for an offensive through Tennessee into Kentucky in which his command would be bolstered by P.G.T. Beauregard and 20,000 men. Although he had the concurrence of Gen. Lee, Longstreet was unable to convince President Davis or his newly appointed military advisor, Braxton Bragg.

Wilderness to Appomattox



Longstreet's attack in the Battle of the Wilderness, May 6, 1864, shortly before he was wounded.

Finding out that his old friend Ulysses Grant was in command of the Union Army, he told his fellow officers that "he will fight us every day and every hour until the end of the war." Longstreet helped save the Confederate Army from defeat in his first battle back with Lee's army, the Battle of the Wilderness in May 1864, where he launched a powerful flanking attack along the Orange Plank Road against the Union II Corps and nearly drove it from the field. Once again he developed innovative tactics to deal with difficult terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades by heavy skirmish lines, which allowed his men to deliver a continuous fire into the enemy, while proving to be elusive targets themselves. Wilderness historian Edward Steere attributed much of the success of the Army to "the display of tactical genius by Longstreet which more than redressed his disparity in numerical strength." After the war, the Union II Corps commander that day, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, said to Longstreet of this flanking maneuver: "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."

Longstreet was wounded during the assault—accidentally shot by his own men only about 4 miles (6.4 km) away from the place where Jackson suffered the same fate a year earlier. A bullet passed through his shoulder, severing nerves, and tearing a gash in his throat. The momentum of the attack subsided without Longstreet's active leadership and Gen. Lee delayed further movement until units could be realigned. This gave the Union defenders adequate time to reorganize and the subsequent attack was a failure. E.P. Alexander called the removal of Longstreet the critical juncture of the battle: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan."

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Longstreet missed the rest of the 1864 spring and summer campaign, where Lee sorely missed his skill in handling the army. He was treated in Lynchburg, Virginia, and recuperated in Augusta, Georgia, with his niece, Emma Eve Longstreet Sibley, the daughter of his brother Gilbert. While in Augusta, he participated in the funeral service for Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk at Saint Paul's Church, joining the Bishops of Mississippi and Arkansas in casting earth onto the coffin.[67] He rejoined Lee in October 1864, with his right arm paralyzed and in a sling, initially unable to ride a horse. He had taught himself to write with his left hand; by periodically pulling on his arm, as advised by doctors, he was able to regain use of his right hand in later years. For the remainder of the Siege of Petersburg he commanded the defenses in front of the capital of Richmond, including all forces north of the James River and Pickett's Division at Bermuda Hundred. He retreated with Lee in the Appomattox Campaign, commanding both the First and Third Corps, following the death of A.P. Hill on April 2. As Lee considered surrender, Longstreet advised him of his belief that Grant would treat them fairly, but as Lee rode toward Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865, Longstreet said, "General, if he does not give us good terms, come back and let us fight it out."


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet



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STONEWALL JACKSON



In 1861, as the American Civil War broke out, Jackson became a drill master for some of the many new recruits in the Confederate Army. On April 27, 1861, Virginia Governor John Letcher ordered Colonel Jackson to take command at Harpers Ferry, where he would assemble and command the famous "Stonewall Brigade", consisting of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Virginia Infantry regiments. All of these units were from the Shenandoah Valley region of Virginia, where Jackson located his headquarters throughout the first two years of the war. Jackson became known for his relentless drilling of his troops; he believed discipline was vital to success on the battlefield. Following raids on the B&O Railroad on May 24, he was promoted to brigadier general on June 17.

First Bull Run

Jackson rose to prominence and earned his most famous nickname at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) on July 21, 1861. As the Confederate lines began to crumble under heavy Union assault, Jackson's brigade provided crucial reinforcements on Henry House Hill, demonstrating the discipline he instilled in his men. Brig. Gen. Barnard Elliott Bee, Jr., exhorted his own troops to re-form by shouting, "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Rally behind the Virginians!" There is some controversy over Bee's statement and intent, which could not be clarified because he was killed almost immediately after speaking and none of his subordinate officers wrote reports of the battle. Major Burnett Rhett, chief of staff to General Joseph E. Johnston, claimed that Bee was angry at Jackson's failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee's and Bartow's brigades while they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe that Bee's statement was meant to be pejorative: "Look at Jackson standing there like a damned stone wall!" Regardless of the controversy and the delay in relieving Bee, Jackson's brigade, which would thenceforth be known as the Stonewall Brigade, stopped the Union assault and suffered more casualties than any other Southern brigade that day; Jackson has since then been generally known as Stonewall Jackson. During the battle, Jackson displayed a gesture common

to him and held his left arm skyward with the palm facing forward—interpreted by his soldiers variously as an eccentricity or an entreaty to God for success in combat. His hand was struck by a bullet or a piece of shrapnel and he suffered a small loss of bone in his middle finger. He refused medical advice to have the finger amputated. After the battle, Jackson was promoted to major general (October 7, 1861) and given command of the Valley District, with headquarters in Winchester.

Valley Campaign



Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson photographed at Winchester, Virginia 1862.

In the spring of 1862, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac approached Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps were poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army threatened the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson was ordered by Richmond to operate in the Valley to defeat Banks' threat and prevent McDowell's troops from reinforcing McClellan.

Jackson possessed the attributes to succeed against his poorly coordinated and sometimes timid opponents: a combination of great audacity, excellent knowledge and shrewd use of the terrain, and the ability to inspire his troops to great feats of marching and fighting.

The campaign started with a tactical defeat at Kernstown on March 23, 1862, when faulty intelligence led him to believe he was attacking a small detachment. But it became a strategic victory for the Confederacy, because his aggressiveness suggested that he possessed a much larger force, convincing President Abraham Lincoln to keep Banks' troops in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's invasion force. As it transpired, it was Jackson's only defeat in the Valley.

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Historical marker marking the end of Gen. Stonewall Jackson's pursuit of the Federals after the Battle of McDowell, May 12, 1862

By adding Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's large division and Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's small division, Jackson increased his army to 17,000 men. He was still significantly outnumbered, but attacked portions of his divided enemy individually at McDowell, defeating both Brig. Gens. Robert H. Milroy and Robert C. Schenck. He defeated Banks at Front Royal and Winchester, ejecting him from the Valley. Lincoln decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). He ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut.

After a series of maneuvers, Jackson defeated Frémont's command at Cross Keys and Brig. Gen. James Shields at Port Republic on June 8–9. Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley.

It was a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver. Jackson pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against a combined force of 60,000. Stonewall Jackson's reputation for moving his troops so rapidly earned them the oxymoronic nickname "foot cavalry". He became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the Southern public.


Peninsula

McClellan's Peninsula Campaign toward Richmond stalled at the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1. After the Valley Campaign ended in mid-June, Jackson and his troops were called to join Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in defense of the capital. By utilizing a railroad tunnel under the Blue Ridge Mountains and then transporting troops to Hanover County on the Virginia Central Railroad, Jackson and his forces made a surprise appearance in front of McClellan at Mechanicsville. Reports had last placed Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah Valley; their presence near Richmond added greatly to the Union commander's overestimation of the strength and numbers of the forces before him. This proved a crucial factor in McClellan's decision to re-establish his base at a point many miles downstream from Richmond on the James River at Harrison's Landing, essentially a retreat that ended the Peninsula Campaign and prolonged the war almost three more years.

Jackson's troops served well under Lee in the series of battles known as the Seven Days Battles, but Jackson's own

performance in those battles is generally considered to be poor.[29] He arrived late at Mechanicsville and inexplicably ordered his men to bivouac for the night within clear earshot of the battle. He was late and disoriented at Gaines' Mill. He was late again at Savage's Station and at White Oak Swamp he failed to employ fording places to cross White Oak Swamp Creek, attempting for hours to rebuild a bridge, which limited his involvement to an ineffectual artillery duel and a missed opportunity. At Malvern Hill Jackson participated in the futile, piecemeal frontal assaults against entrenched Union infantry and massed artillery, and suffered heavy casualties (but this was a problem for all of Lee's army in that ill-considered battle). The reasons for Jackson's sluggish and poorly-coordinated actions during the Seven Days are disputed, although a severe lack of sleep after the grueling march and railroad trip from the Shenandoah Valley was probably a significant factor. Both Jackson and his troops were completely exhausted. It has also been said by Longstreet that, "General Jackson never showed his genius when under the immediate command of General Lee."

Second Bull Run to Fredericksburg



Jackson and Sorrel, painting by David Bendann.

The military reputations of Lee's corps commanders are often characterized as Stonewall Jackson representing the audacious, offensive component of Lee's army, whereas his counterpart, James Longstreet, more typically advocated and executed defensive strategies and tactics. Jackson has been described as the army's hammer, Longstreet its anvil. In the Northern Virginia Campaign of August 1862 this stereotype did not hold true. Longstreet commanded the Right Wing (later to become known as the First Corps) and Jackson commanded the Left Wing. Jackson started the campaign under Lee's orders with a sweeping flanking maneuver that placed his corps into the rear of Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia. At Manassas Junction Jackson was able to capture all of the supplies of the Union Army depot. Then he had his troops destroy all of it, for it was the main depot for the Union Army. Jackson then retreated and then took up a defensive position and effectively invited Pope to assault him. On August 28–29, the start of the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas), Pope launched repeated assaults against Jackson as Longstreet and the remainder of the army marched north to reach the battlefield.

On August 30, Pope came to believe that Jackson was starting to retreat, and Longstreet took advantage of this by launching a massive assault on the Union army's left with over 25,000 men. Although the Union troops put up a furious defense, Pope's army was forced to retreat in a manner similar to the embarrassing Union defeat at First Bull Run, fought on roughly the same battleground.

When Lee decided to invade the North in the Maryland Campaign, Jackson took Harpers Ferry, then hastened to join the rest of the army at Sharpsburg, Maryland, where they fought McClellan in the Battle of Antietam. Antietam was primarily a defensive battle against superior odds, although McClellan failed to exploit his advantage. Jackson's men bore the brunt of the

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initial attacks on the northern end of the battlefield and, at the end of the day, successfully resisted a breakthrough on the southern end when Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry. The Confederate forces held their position, but the battle was extremely bloody for both sides, and Lee withdrew the Army of Northern Virginia back across the Potomac River, ending the invasion. Jackson was promoted to lieutenant general. On October 10 his command was redesignated the Second Corps.

Before the armies camped for winter, Jackson's Second Corps held off a strong Union assault against the right flank of the Confederate line at the Battle of Fredericksburg, in what became a decisive Confederate victory. Just before the battle, Jackson was delighted to receive a letter about the birth of his daughter, Julia Laura Jackson, on November 23.[31] Also before the battle, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Lee's dashing and well-dressed cavalry commander, presented to Jackson a fine general's frock that he had ordered from one of the best tailors in Richmond. Jackson's previous coat was threadbare and colorless from exposure to the elements, its buttons removed by admiring ladies. Jackson asked his staff to thank Stuart, saying that although the coat was too handsome for him, he would cherish it as a souvenir. His staff insisted that he wear it to dinner, which caused scores of soldiers to rush to see him in uncharacteristic garb. So embarrassed was Jackson with the attention that he did not wear the new uniform for months.

Chancellorsville

At the Battle of Chancellorsville, the Army of Northern Virginia was faced with a serious threat by the Army of the Potomac and its new commanding general, Major General Joseph Hooker. General Lee decided to employ a risky tactic to take the initiative and offensive away from Hooker's new southern thrust—he decided to divide his forces. Jackson and his entire corps were sent on an aggressive flanking maneuver to the right of the Union lines. This flanking movement would be one of the most successful and dramatic of the war. While riding with his infantry in a wide berth well south and west of the Federal line of battle, Jackson employed Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry to provide for better reconnaissance in regards to the exact location of the Union right and rear. The results were far better than even Jackson could have hoped. Lee found the entire right side of the Federal lines in the middle of open field, guarded merely by two guns that faced westward, as well as the supplies and rear encampments. The men were eating and playing games in carefree fashion, completely unaware that an entire Confederate corps was less than a mile away. What happened next is given in Lee's own words:

So impressed was I with my discovery, that I rode rapidly back to the point on the Plank road where I had left my cavalry, and back down the road Jackson was moving, until I met "Stonewall" himself. "General," said I, "if you will ride with me, halting your column here, out of sight, I will show you the enemy's right, and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the Old turnpike instead of the Plank road, the enemy's lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill." Jackson assented, and I rapidly conducted him to the point of observation. There had been no change in the picture. I only knew Jackson slightly. I watched him closely as he gazed upon Howard's troops. It was then about 2 P.M. His eyes burned with a brilliant glow, lighting up a sad face. His expression was one of intense interest, his face was colored slightly with the paint of approaching battle, and radiant at the success of his flank movement. To the remarks made to him while the unconscious line of blue was pointed out, he did not reply once during the five minutes he was on the hill, and yet his lips were moving. From what I have read and heard of Jackson since that day, I know now what he was doing then. Oh! "beware of rashness," General Hooker. Stonewall Jackson is praying in full view and in rear of your right flank!

While talking to the Great God of Battles, how could he hear what a poor cavalryman was saying. "Tell General Rodes," said he, suddenly whirling his horse towards the courier, "to move across the Old plank road; halt when he gets to the Old turnpike, and I will join him there." One more look upon the Federal lines, and then he rode rapidly down the hill, his arms flapping to the motion of his horse, over whose head it seemed, good rider as he was, he would certainly go. I expected to be told I had made a valuable personal reconnaissance—saving the lives of many soldiers, and that Jackson was indebted to me to that amount at least. Perhaps I might have been a little chagrined at Jackson's silence, and hence commented inwardly and adversely upon his horsemanship. Alas! I had looked upon him for the last time.

— Fitzhugh Lee, address to the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, 1879

Jackson immediately returned to his corps and arranged his divisions into a line of battle to charge directly into the oblivious Federal right. The Confederates marched silently until they were merely several hundred feet from the Union position, then released a bloodthirsty cry and full charge. Many of the Federals were captured without a shot fired, the rest were driven into a full rout. Jackson pursued relentlessly back toward the center of the Federal line until dusk.



The plantation office building where Stonewall Jackson died in Guinea Station, Virginia.

Darkness ended the assault. As Jackson and his staff were returning to camp on May 2, they were mistaken for a Union

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cavalry force by the 18th North Carolina Infantry regiment who shouted, "Halt, who goes there?", but fired before evaluating the reply. Frantic shouts by Jackson's staff identifying the party were replied to by Major John D. Barry with the retort, "It's a damned Yankee trick! Fire!" A second volley was fired in response; in all, Jackson was hit by three bullets, two in the left arm and one in the right hand. Several other men in his staff were killed, in addition to many horses. Darkness and confusion prevented Jackson from getting immediate care. He was dropped from his stretcher while being evacuated because of incoming artillery rounds. Because of his injuries, Jackson's left arm had to be amputated by Dr. Hunter McGuire. Jackson was moved to Thomas C. Chandler's 740 acres (3.0 km²) plantation named Fairfield. He was offered Chandler's home for recovery, but Jackson refused and suggested using Chandler's plantation office building instead. He was thought to be out of harm's way; but unknown to the doctors, he already had classic symptoms of pneumonia, complaining of a sore chest. This soreness was mistakenly thought to be the result of his rough handling in the battlefield evacuation.



Death

Jackson equestrian monument in downtown Charlottesville, Virginia Lee wrote to Jackson after learning of his injuries, stating "Could I have directed events, I would have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead." Jackson died of complications from pneumonia on May 10, 1863. On his death bed, though he became weaker, he remained spiritually strong, saying towards the end "It is the Lord's Day; my wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday." Dr. McGuire wrote an account of his final hours and his last words:

A few moments before he died he cried out in his delirium, "Order A.P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the front rapidly! Tell Major Hawks"—then stopped, leaving the sentence unfinished. Presently a smile of ineffable sweetness spread itself over his pale face, and he said quietly, and with an expression, as if of relief, "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees."

His body was moved to the Governor's Mansion in Richmond for the public to mourn, and he was then moved to be buried in the Stonewall Jackson Memorial Cemetery, Lexington, Virginia. However, the arm that was amputated on May 2 was buried separately by Jackson's chaplain, at the J. Horace Lacy house, "Ellwood", in the Wilderness of Orange County, near the field hospital.

Upon hearing of Jackson's death, Robert E. Lee mourned the loss of both a friend and a trusted commander. As Jackson lay dying, Lee sent a message through Chaplain Lacy, saying "Give General Jackson my affectionate regards, and say to him: he has lost his left arm but I my right." [38] The night Lee learned of Jackson's death, he told his cook, "William, I have lost my right arm" and "I'm bleeding at the heart."

Harpers Weekly reported Jackson's death on May 23, 1863, as follows:

DEATH OF STONEWALL JACKSON.


General "Stonewall" Jackson was badly wounded in the arm at the battles of Chancellorsville, and had his arm amputated. The operation did not succeed, and pneumonia setting in, he died on the 10th inst., near Richmond, Virginia.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stonewall_Jackson

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JUBAL A. EARLY



Early was a Whig and strongly opposed secession at the April 1861 Virginia convention for that purpose. However, he was soon aroused by the actions of the Federal government when President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion. He accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the Virginia Militia. He was sent to Lynchburg, Virginia, to raise three regiments and then commanded one of them, the 24th Virginia Infantry, as a colonel in the Confederate States Army.

Early was promoted to brigadier general after the First Battle of Bull Run (or First Manassas) in July 1861. In that battle, he displayed valor at Blackburn's Ford and impressed General P.G.T. Beauregard. He fought in most of the major battles in the Eastern Theater, including the Seven Days Battles, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and numerous battles in the Shenandoah Valley. During the Gettysburg Campaign, Early's Division occupied York, Pennsylvania, the largest Northern town to fall to the Rebels during the war.

Early was trusted and supported by Robert E. Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee affectionately called Early his "Bad Old Man," because of his short temper. He appreciated Early's aggressive fighting and ability to command units independently. Most of Early's soldiers referred to him as "Old Jube" or "Old Jubilee" with enthusiasm and affection. His subordinate generals often felt little affection. Early was an inveterate fault-finder and offered biting criticism of his subordinates at the least opportunity. He was generally blind to his own mistakes and reacted fiercely to criticism or suggestions from below.

Early was wounded at Williamsburg in 1862, while leading a charge against staggering odds.

Serving under Stonewall Jackson

He convalesced at his home in Rocky Mount, Virginia. In two months, he returned to the war, under the command of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, in time for the Battle of Malvern Hill. There, Early demonstrated his career-long lack of aptitude for battlefield navigation and his brigade was lost in the woods; it suffered 33 casualties without any significant action. In the Northern Virginia Campaign, Early was noted for his performance at the Battle of Cedar Mountain and arrived in the nick of time to reinforce Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill on Jackson's left on Stony Ridge in the Second Battle of Bull Run.

At Antietam, Early ascended to division command when his commander, Alexander Lawton, was wounded. Lee was

impressed with his performance and retained him at that level. At Fredericksburg, Early saved the day by counterattacking the division of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, which penetrated a gap in Jackson's lines. He was promoted to major general on January 17, 1863.

At Chancellorsville, Lee gave him a force of 5,000 men to defend Fredericksburg at Marye's Heights against superior forces (4 divisions) under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick. Early was able to delay the Union forces and pin down Sedgwick while Lee and Jackson attacked the remainder of the Union troops to the west. Sedgwick's eventual attack on Early up Marye's Heights is sometimes known as the Second Battle of Fredericksburg.

Gettysburg and the Overland Campaign

During the Gettysburg Campaign, Early commanded a division in the corps of Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell. His troops were instrumental in defeating Union defenders at Winchester, capturing a number of prisoners, and opening up the Shenandoah Valley for Lee's oncoming forces. Early's division, augmented with cavalry, eventually marched eastward across the South Mountain range in Pennsylvania, seizing vital supplies and horses along the way. He captured Gettysburg on June 26 and demanded a ransom, which was never paid. Two days later, he entered York County and seized York. Here, his ransom demands were partially met, including a payment of \$28,000 in cash. Elements of Early's command on June 28 reached the Susquehanna River, the farthest east in Pennsylvania that any organized Confederate force would penetrate. On June 30, Early was recalled as Lee concentrated his army to meet the oncoming Federals.

Approaching Gettysburg from the northeast on July 1, 1863, Early's division was on the leftmost flank of the Confederate line. He soundly defeated Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow's division (part of the Union XI Corps), inflicting three times the casualties to the defenders as he suffered, and drove the Union troops back through the streets of town, capturing many of them. In the second day at Gettysburg, he assaulted East Cemetery Hill as part of Ewell's efforts on the Union right flank. Despite initial success, Union reinforcements arrived to repulse Early's two brigades. On the third day, Early detached one brigade to assist Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division in an unsuccessful assault on Culp's Hill. Elements of Early's division covered the rear of Lee's army during its retreat from Gettysburg on July 4 and July 5.

Early served in the Shenandoah Valley over the winter of 1863–64. During this period, he occasionally filled in as corps commander during Ewell's absences for illness. On May 31, 1864, Lee expressed his confidence in Early's initiative and abilities at higher command levels, promoting him to the temporary rank of lieutenant general.

Upon his return from the Valley, Early fought in the Battle of the Wilderness and assumed command of the ailing A.P. Hill's Third Corps during the march to intercept Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Spotsylvania Court House. At Spotsylvania, Early occupied the relatively quiet right flank of the Mule Shoe. At the Battle of Cold Harbor, Lee replaced the ineffectual Ewell with Early as commander of the Second Corps.

The Valley, 1864

Early's most important service was that summer and fall, in the Valley Campaigns of 1864, when he commanded the Confederacy's last invasion of the North. As Confederate territory was rapidly being captured by the Union armies of Grant and Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, Lee sent Early's corps to sweep Union forces from the Shenandoah Valley and to menace Washington, D.C., hoping to compel Grant to dilute his forces against Lee around Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia.

Early delayed his march for several days in a futile attempt to capture a small force under Franz Sigel at Maryland Heights near Harpers Ferry.[5] He rested his men from July 4 through July 6. Although elements of his army would eventually reach

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the outskirts of Washington at a time when it was largely undefended, his delay at Maryland Heights prevented him from being able to attack the capital.



Confederate General Jubal A. Early

During the time of Early's Maryland Heights campaign, Grant sent two VI Corps divisions from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Union Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace. With 5,800 men, he delayed Early for an entire day at the Battle of Monocacy, allowing more Union troops to arrive in Washington and strengthen its defenses. Early's invasion caused considerable panic in Washington and Baltimore, and he was able to get to the outskirts of Washington. He sent some cavalry under Brig. Gen. John McCausland to the west side of Washington.

Knowing that he did not have sufficient strength to capture the city, Early led skirmishes at Fort Stevens and Fort DeRussy. The opposing forces also had artillery duels on July 11 and July 12. Abraham Lincoln watched the fighting on both days from the parapet at Fort Stevens, his lanky frame a clear target for hostile military fire. After Early withdrew, he said to one of his officers, "Major, we haven't taken Washington, but we scared Abe Lincoln like hell."

Early crossed the Potomac into Leesburg, Virginia, on July 13 and then withdrew to the Valley. He defeated the Union army under Brig. Gen. George Crook at Kernstown on July 24, 1864. Six days later, he ordered his cavalry to burn the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in retaliation for Maj. Gen. David Hunter's burning of the homes of several prominent Southern sympathizers in Jefferson County, West Virginia earlier that month. Through early August, Early's cavalry and guerrilla forces attacked the B&O Railroad in various places.

Realizing Early could easily attack Washington, Grant sent out an army under Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan to subdue his forces. At times outnumbering the Confederates three to one, Sheridan defeated Early in three battles, starting in early August, and laid waste to much of the agricultural properties in the Valley. He ensured they could not supply Lee's army. In a brilliant surprise attack, Early initially routed two thirds of the Union army at the Battle of Cedar Creek on October 19, 1864. In his post-battle dispatch to Lee, Early claimed that his troops were hungry and exhausted and fell out of their ranks to pillage the Union camp. This allowed Sheridan critical time to rally his demoralized

troops and turn their morning defeat into victory over the Confederate Army that afternoon. One of Early's key subordinates, Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, in his 1904 memoirs, attested that it was Early's decision to halt the attack for six hours in the early afternoon, and not disorganization in the ranks, that led to the rout that took place in the afternoon.[8]

Most of the men of Early's corps rejoined Lee at Petersburg in December, while Early remained in the Valley to command a skeleton force. When his force was nearly destroyed at Waynesboro in March 1865, Early barely escaped capture with a few members of his staff. Lee relieved Early of his command soon after the encounter, because he doubted Early's ability to inspire confidence in the men he would have to recruit to continue operations. He wrote to Early of the difficulty of this decision:

While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion to the cause is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander who would be more likely to develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the soldiers with confidence. ... [Thank you] for the fidelity and energy with which you have always supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you have ever manifested in the service ...

— Robert E. Lee, letter to Early


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubal_A._Early



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ALBERT S. JOHNSTON



At the outbreak of the Civil War, Johnston was the commander of the U.S. Army Department of the Pacific in California. Like many regular army officers from the South he was opposed to secession, but resigned his commission soon after he heard of the secession of his adopted state Texas. It was accepted by the War Department on May 6, 1861, effective May 3. On April 28 he moved to Los Angeles where he had family and remained there until May when, suspected by local Union authorities, he evaded arrest and joined the Los Angeles Mounted Rifles as a private, leaving Warner's Ranch May 27. He participated in their trek across the southwestern deserts to Texas, crossing the Colorado River into the Confederate Territory of Arizona on July 4, 1861.

Early in the Civil War, Confederate President Jefferson Davis decided that the Confederacy would attempt to hold as much of its territory as possible and he distributed its military forces around its borders and coasts. In the summer of 1861, Davis appointed several generals to defend Confederate lines from the Mississippi River east to the Allegheny Mountains.[8] The most sensitive, and in many ways the most crucial areas, along the Mississippi River and in western Tennessee along the Tennessee River and the Cumberland River were placed under the command of Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk and Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, who had been initially in command in Tennessee as that State's top general. Their impolitic occupation of Columbus, Kentucky on September 3, 1861, two days before Johnston arrived in the Confederacy's capital, Richmond, Virginia, after his cross-country journey, drove Kentucky from its stated neutrality and the majority of Kentuckians into the Union camp. Their action gave Union Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant an excuse to take control of the even more important and strategically located town of Paducah, Kentucky without raising the ire of most Kentuckians and the pro-Union majority in the State legislature.

Confederate command in Western Theater

On September 10, 1861, Johnston was assigned to command the huge area of the Confederacy west of the Allegheny Mountains, except for coastal areas. He became commander of the Confederacy's western armies in the area often called the Western Department or Western Military Department. After his appointment, Johnston immediately headed for his new territory. He was permitted to call on governors of Arkansas, Tennessee

and Mississippi for new troops, although this authority was largely stifled by politics, especially with respect to Mississippi. On September 13, 1861, in view of the decision of the Kentucky legislature to side with the Union after the occupation of Columbus by Polk, Johnston ordered Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer with 4,000 men to occupy Cumberland Gap in Kentucky in order to block Union troops from coming into eastern Tennessee. By September 18, Johnston had Brig. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner with another 4,000 men blocking the railroad route to Tennessee at Bowling Green, Kentucky.

Johnston had less than 40,000 men spread throughout Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas and Missouri. Of these, 10,000 were in Missouri under Missouri State Guard Maj. Gen. Sterling Price. Johnston's initial call upon the governors for more men did not result in many immediate recruits but Johnston had another, even bigger, problem since his force was seriously short of arms and ammunition even for the troops he had. As the Confederate government concentrated efforts on the units in the East, they gave Johnston only small numbers of reinforcements and minimal amounts of arms and material. Johnston could only keep up his defense by raids and other measures to make it appear he had larger forces than he did, a strategy that worked for several months. Johnston's tactics had so annoyed and confused Union Brig. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman that he became somewhat unnerved, overestimated Johnston's forces, and had to be relieved by Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell on November 9, 1861.

Battle of Mill Springs

Eastern Tennessee was held for the Confederacy by two unimpressive brigadier generals appointed by Jefferson Davis, Felix Zollicoffer, a brave but untrained and inexperienced officer, and soon to be Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, a former U.S. Army officer with apparent alcohol problems. While Crittenden was away in Richmond, Zollicoffer moved his forces to the north bank of the upper Cumberland River near Mill Springs (now Nancy, Kentucky), putting the river to his back and his forces into a trap. Zollicoffer decided it was impossible to obey orders to return to the other side of the river because of scarcity of transport and proximity of Union troops. When Union Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas moved against the Confederates, Crittenden decided to attack one of the two parts of Thomas's command at Logan's Cross Roads near Mill Springs before the Union forces could unite. On January 19, 1862, the ill-prepared Confederates, after a night march in the rain, attacked the Union force with some initial success. As the battle progressed, Zollicoffer was killed, Crittenden was unable to lead the Confederate force since he was probably intoxicated and the Confederates were turned back and routed by a Union bayonet charge, suffering 533 casualties from their force of 4,000. The Confederate troops who escaped were assigned to other units as Crittenden faced an investigation of his conduct.

After this Confederate defeat at the Battle of Mill Springs, Davis sent Johnston a brigade and a few other scattered reinforcements, and he sent Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, who was supposed to attract recruits because of his victories early in the war and give Johnston a competent subordinate. The brigade, however, came with the incompetent Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, who was to take command at Fort Donelson as the senior general present just before Brig. Gen. Grant attacked the fort. Beauregard's move to the west contributed to the movement of the Union commanders into action against the forts so they could act before, in their view, Beauregard could make a difference in the theater. They had heard that he was bringing 15 regiments with him, but this actually was not true.

Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Nashville

Based on the assumption that Kentucky neutrality would act as a shield against a direct invasion from the north, Tennessee initially had sent men to Virginia and concentrated defenses in the Mississippi Valley, circumstances that no longer applied in September 1861. Even before Johnston arrived in Tennessee, two forts had been started to defend the Tennessee River and the Cumberland River which provided avenues into the State from the north. Both had been sited in Tennessee, however, in order to

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respect Kentucky neutrality and were not in ideal locations. Fort Henry on the Tennessee River was in an especially unfavorable low-lying location commanded by hills on the Kentucky side of the river. Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, although in a better location, also was not well-sited, had a vulnerable land side and did not have enough heavy artillery for its defense against gunboats.

Maj. Gen. Polk ignored the problems of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson when he took command and, after Johnston took command, at first refused to comply with Johnston's order to send an engineer, Lt. Joseph K. Dixon, to inspect the forts. After Johnston asserted his authority, Polk ultimately had to allow Dixon to proceed. Dixon recommended that the forts be maintained and strengthened, even though they were not in ideal locations, because much work had been done on them and the Confederates might not have time to build new ones. Johnston accepted the recommendations. Johnston wanted Major, later Lt. Gen., Alexander P. Stewart to command the forts but President Davis appointed Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman as commander. Then, in order to prevent Polk from dissipating his forces by implementing his proposal to allow some men to join a partisan group, Johnston ordered him to send Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow and 5,000 men to Fort Donelson. Pillow took up a position at nearby Clarksville, Tennessee and did not move into the fort itself until February 7, 1862. Alerted by a Union reconnaissance on January 14, 1862, Johnston ordered Tilghman to fortify the high ground opposite Fort Henry, which Polk had failed to do despite Johnston's orders. Tilghman also failed to act decisively on these orders, which in any event were now too late to be adequately carried out.

Gen. Beauregard arrived at Johnston's headquarters at Bowling Green on February 4, 1862 and was given overall command of Polk's force at the western end of Johnston's line at Columbus, Kentucky. On February 6, 1862, Union Navy gunboats quickly reduced the defenses of ill-sited Fort Henry, inflicting 21 casualties on the small remaining Confederate force. Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman surrendered the 94 remaining officers and men of his approximately 3,000-man force which had not been sent to Fort Donelson before U.S. Grant's force could even take up their positions. Johnston knew he could be trapped at Bowling Green if Fort Donelson fell, so he moved his force to Nashville, the capital of Tennessee and an increasingly important Confederate industrial center, beginning on February 11, 1862.

Johnston also reinforced Fort Donelson with 12,000 more men, including those under Floyd and Pillow, a curious decision in view of his thought that the Union gunboats alone might be able to take the fort. He did order the commanders of the fort to evacuate the troops if the fort could not be held. The senior generals sent to the fort to command the enlarged garrison, Gideon J. Pillow and John B. Floyd, squandered their chance to avoid having to surrender most of the garrison and on February 16, 1862, Brig. Gen. Simon Buckner, having been abandoned by Floyd and Pillow, surrendered Fort Donelson. Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest escaped with his cavalry force of about 700 men before the surrender. The Confederates suffered about 1,500 casualties with an estimated 12,000 to 14,000 taken prisoner. Union casualties were 500 killed, 2,108 wounded, 224 missing.

Johnston, who had little choice in allowing Floyd and Pillow to take charge at Fort Donelson on the basis of seniority after he ordered them to add their forces to the garrison, took the blame and suffered calls for his removal because a full explanation to the press and public would have exposed the weakness of the Confederate position. His passive defensive performance while positioning himself in a forward position at Bowling Green, spreading his forces too thinly, not concentrating his forces in the face of Union advances, and appointing or relying upon inadequate or incompetent subordinates subjected him to criticism at the time and by later historians. The fall of the forts exposed Nashville to imminent attack, and it fell without resistance to Union forces under Brig. Gen. Buell on February 25, 1862, two days after Johnston had to pull his forces out in order to avoid having them captured as well.

Concentration at Corinth

Johnston had various remaining military units scattered throughout his territory and retreating to the south to avoid being cut off. Johnston himself retreated with the force under his personal command, the Army of Central Kentucky, from the vicinity of Nashville. With Beauregard's help, Johnston decided to concentrate forces with those formerly under Polk and now already under Beauregard's command at the strategically located railroad crossroads of Corinth, Mississippi, which he reached by a circuitous route. Johnston kept the Union forces, now under the overall command of the ponderous Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, confused and hesitant to move, allowing Johnston to reach his objective undetected. This delay allowed Jefferson Davis finally to send reinforcements from the garrisons of coastal cities and another highly rated but prickly general, Braxton Bragg, to help organize the western forces. Bragg at least calmed the nerves of Beauregard and Polk who had become agitated by their apparent dire situation in the face of numerically superior forces before the arrival of Johnston on March 24, 1862.

Johnston's army of 17,000 men gave the Confederates a combined force of about 40,000 to 44,669 men at Corinth. On March 29, 1862, Johnston officially took command of this combined force, which continued to use the Army of the Mississippi name under which it had been organized by Beauregard on March 5.

Johnston now planned to defeat the Union forces piecemeal before the various Union units in Kentucky and Tennessee under Grant with 40,000 men at nearby Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, and the now Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell on his way from Nashville with 35,000 men, could unite against him. Johnston started his army in motion on April 3, 1862, intent on surprising Grant's force as soon as the next day, but they moved slowly due to their inexperience, bad roads and lack of adequate staff planning. Johnston's army was finally in position within a mile or two of Grant's force, and undetected, by the evening of April 5, 1862.

Battle of Shiloh and death



Monument to Johnston at Shiloh National Military Park.

Johnston launched a massive surprise attack with his concentrated forces against Grant at the Battle of Shiloh on April 6, 1862. As the Confederate forces overran the Union camps, Johnston seemed to be everywhere, personally leading and rallying troops up and down the line on his horse. At about 2:30 p.m., while leading one of those charges against a Union camp near the "Peach Orchard", he was wounded, taking a bullet behind his right knee. He apparently did not think the wound was serious at the time, and so he sent his personal physician to attend to some wounded captured Union soldiers instead. It is possible that Johnston's duel in 1837 had caused nerve damage or numbness to his right leg and that he did not feel the wound to his leg as a result. The bullet had in fact clipped a part of his popliteal artery and his boot was filling up with blood. Within a few minutes, Johnston was observed by his staff to be nearly fainting off his horse. Among his staff was Isham G. Harris, the Governor of Tennessee, who had ceased to make any real effort to function as governor after learning that Abraham Lincoln had

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appointed Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee. Seeing Johnston slumping in his saddle and his face turning deathly pale, Harris asked: "General, are you wounded?" Johnston glanced down at his leg wound, then faced Harris and replied with his last words: "Yes, and I fear seriously." Harris and other staff officers removed Johnston from his horse and carried him to a small ravine near the "Hornets Nest" and desperately tried to aid the general by trying to make a tourniquet for his leg wound, but little could be done by this point since he had already lost so much blood. He soon lost consciousness and bled to death a few minutes later. Harris and the other officers wrapped General Johnston's body in a blanket so as not to damage the troops' morale with the sight of the dead general. Johnston and his wounded horse, named Fire Eater, were taken to his field headquarters on the Corinth road, where his body remained in his tent until the Confederate Army withdrew to Corinth the next day, April 7, 1862. From there, his body was taken to the home of Colonel William Inge, which had been his headquarters in Corinth. It was covered in the Confederate flag and laid in state for several hours.


It is probable that a Confederate soldier fired the fatal round. No Union soldiers were observed to have ever gotten behind Johnston during the fatal charge, while it is known that many Confederates were firing at the Union lines while Johnston charged well in advance of his soldiers.

Johnston was the highest-ranking casualty of the war on either side, and his death was a strong blow to the morale of the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis considered him the best general in the country; this was two months before the emergence of Robert E. Lee as the pre-eminent general of the Confederacy.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Sydney_Johnston




BRAXTON BRAGG



Before the start of the Civil War, Bragg was a colonel in the Louisiana Militia. On December 12, 1860, Governor Thomas O. Moore appointed him to the state military board, an organization charged with creating a 5,000-man army. He took the assignment, even though he'd been opposed to secession. On January 11, 1861, Bragg led a group of 500 volunteers to Baton Rouge, where they persuaded the commander of the federal arsenal there to surrender. The state convention on secession also established a state army and Moore appointed Bragg its commander, with the rank of major general, on February 20, 1861. He commanded the forces around New Orleans until April 16, but his commission was transferred to be a brigadier general of the Confederate States Army on March 7, 1861. He commanded forces in Pensacola, Florida, Alabama, and the Department of West Florida and was promoted to major general on September 12, 1861. His tenure was successful and he trained his men to be some of the best disciplined troops in the Confederate Army.

In December, President Davis asked Bragg to take command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, but Bragg declined. He was concerned for the prospects of victory west of the Mississippi River and about the poorly supplied and ill-disciplined troops there. He was also experiencing one of his periodic episodes of ill health that would plague him throughout the war. For years he had suffered from rheumatism, dyspepsia, nerves, and severe migraine headaches, ailments that undoubtedly contributed to his disagreeable personal style. The command went to Edmund Kirby Smith. Bragg proposed to Davis that he change his strategy of attempting to defend every square mile of Confederate territory, recommending that his troops were of less value on the Gulf Coast than they would be farther to the north, concentrated with other forces for an attack against the Union Army in Tennessee. Bragg transported about 10,000 men to Corinth, Mississippi, in February 1862 and was charged with improving the poor discipline of the Confederate troops already assembled under General Albert Sidney Johnston.



Map of the Battle of Shiloh, morning of April 6, 1862
Confederate (red), Union (blue)

Bragg commanded a corps (and was also chief of staff) under Johnston at the Battle of Shiloh, April 6–7, 1862. In the initial surprise Confederate advance, Bragg's corps was ordered to attack in a line that was almost 3 miles (4.8 km) long, but he soon began directing activities of the units that found themselves around the center of the battlefield. His men became bogged down against a Union salient called the Hornet's Nest, which he attacked for hours with piecemeal frontal assaults. After Johnston was killed in the battle, General P.G.T. Beauregard assumed command, and appointed Bragg his second in command. Bragg was dismayed when Beauregard called off a late afternoon assault against the Union's final position, which was strongly defended, calling it their last opportunity for victory. On the second day of battle, the Union army counterattacked and the Confederates retreated back to Corinth.

Bragg received public praise for his conduct in the battle and on April 12, 1862, Jefferson Davis appointed Bragg a full general, the sixth man to achieve that rank and one of only seven in the history of the Confederacy. His date of rank was April 6, 1862, coinciding with the first day at Shiloh. After the Siege of Corinth, Beauregard departed on sick leave, leaving Bragg in temporary command of the army in Tupelo, Mississippi, but he failed to inform President Davis of his departure and spent two weeks absent without leave. Davis was looking for someone to replace Beauregard because of his perceived poor performance at Corinth, and the opportunity presented itself when Beauregard left without permission. Bragg was then appointed his successor as commander of the Western Department (known formally as Department Number Two), including the Army of Mississippi, on June 17, 1862.

Army of Tennessee


Perryville

In August 1862, Confederate Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith decided to invade Kentucky from Eastern Tennessee, hoping that he could arouse supporters of the Confederate cause in the border state and draw the Union forces under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, beyond the Ohio River. Bragg considered various options, including an attempt to retake Corinth, or to advance against Buell's army through Middle Tennessee. He eventually

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heeded Kirby Smith's calls for reinforcement and decided to relocate his Army of Mississippi to join with him. He moved 30,000 infantrymen in a tortuous railroad journey from Tupelo through Mobile and Montgomery to Chattanooga, while his cavalry and artillery moved by road. Although Bragg was the senior general in the theater, President Davis had established Kirby Smith's Department of East Tennessee as an independent command, reporting directly to Richmond. This decision caused Bragg difficulty during the campaign.



Western Theater operations from the Siege of Corinth through the Kentucky Campaign

Smith and Bragg met in Chattanooga on July 31, 1862, and devised a plan for the campaign: Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky would first march into Kentucky to dispose of the Union defenders of Cumberland Gap. (Bragg's army was too exhausted from its long journey to begin immediate offensive operations.) Smith would return to join Bragg, and their combined forces would attempt to maneuver into Buell's rear and force a battle to protect his supply lines. Once the armies were combined, Bragg's seniority would apply and Smith would be under his direct command. Assuming that Buell's army could be destroyed, Bragg and Smith would march farther north into Kentucky, a movement they assumed would be welcomed by the local populace. Any remaining Federal force would be defeated in a grand battle in Kentucky, establishing the Confederate frontier at the Ohio River.

On August 9, Smith informed Bragg that he was breaking the agreement and intended to bypass Cumberland Gap, leaving a small holding force to neutralize the Union garrison, and to move north. Unable to command Smith to honor their plan, Bragg focused on a movement to Lexington instead of Nashville. He cautioned Smith that Buell could pursue and defeat his smaller army before Bragg's army could join up with them.

Bragg departed from Chattanooga on August 27, just before Smith reached Lexington. On the way, he was distracted by the capture of a Union fort at Munfordville. He had to decide whether to continue toward a fight with Buell (over Louisville) or rejoin Smith, who had gained control of the center of the state by capturing Richmond and Lexington, and threatened to move on Cincinnati. Bragg chose to rejoin Smith. He left his army and met Smith in Frankfort, where they attended the inauguration of Confederate Governor Richard Hawes on October 4. The inauguration ceremony was disrupted by the sound of approaching Union cannon fire and the organizers canceled the inaugural ball scheduled for that evening.

On October 8, the armies met unexpectedly at the Battle of Perryville; they had skirmished the previous day as they were searching for water sources in the vicinity. Bragg ordered the wing of his army under Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk to attack what he thought was an isolated portion of Buell's command, but had difficulty motivating Polk to begin the fight until Bragg arrived in person. Eventually Polk attacked the corps of Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook on the Union army's left flank and forced it to fall back. By the end of the day, McCook had been driven back about a mile, but reinforcements had arrived to stabilize the

line, and Bragg only then began to realize that his limited tactical victory in the bloody battle had been against less than half of Buell's army and the remainder was arriving quickly.

Kirby Smith pleaded with Bragg to follow up on his success: "For God's sake, General, let us fight Buell here." Bragg replied, "I will do it, sir," but then displaying what one observer called "a perplexity and vacillation which had now become simply appalling to Smith, to Hardee, and to Polk," he ordered his army to retreat through the Cumberland Gap to Knoxville. Bragg referred to his retreat as a withdrawal, the successful culmination of a giant raid. He had multiple reasons for withdrawing. Disheartening news had arrived from northern Mississippi that Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price had been defeated at Corinth, just as Robert E. Lee had failed in his Maryland Campaign. He saw that his army had not much to gain from a further, isolated victory, whereas a defeat might cost not only the bountiful food and supplies yet collected, but also his army. He wrote to his wife, "With the whole southwest thus in the enemy's possession, my crime would have been unpardonable had I kept my noble little army to be ice-bound in the northern clime, without tents or shoes, and obliged to forage daily for bread, etc." He was quickly called to Richmond to explain to Jefferson Davis the charges brought by his officers about how he had conducted his campaign, demanding that he be replaced as head of the army. Although Davis decided to leave the general in command, Bragg's relationship with his subordinates would be severely damaged. Upon rejoining the army, he ordered a movement to Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

Stones River

After Perryville Don Carlos Buell was replaced in command of the Union Army of the Cumberland by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. In late December, Rosecrans advanced from Nashville against Bragg's position at Murfreesboro. Before Rosecrans could attack, Bragg launched a strong, surprise attack against Rosecrans's right flank on December 31, 1862, the start of the Battle of Stones River. The Confederates succeeded in driving the Union army back to a small defensive position, but could not destroy it, nor could they break its supply line to Nashville, as Bragg intended. Despite this, Bragg considered the first day of battle to be a victory and assumed that Rosecrans would soon retreat. By January 2, 1863, however, the Union troops remained in place and the battle resumed as Bragg launched an unsuccessful attack by the troops of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge against the well defended Union left flank. Recognizing his lack of progress, the severe winter weather, the arrival of supplies and reinforcements for Rosecrans, and heeding the recommendations of corps commanders Hardee and Polk, Bragg withdrew his army from the field to Tullahoma, Tennessee.

While Washington breathed a sigh of relief after Stones River, dissension came to a head in the Army of Tennessee. All of Bragg's corps and division commanders expressed a lack of confidence in their chief. Senior Generals William J. Hardee and Leonidas Polk asked Davis to put Johnston in command of the army. Division commander B. Franklin Cheatham vowed he would never again serve under Bragg. Breckinridge wanted to challenge Bragg to a duel. Bragg struck back, court-martialing one division commander for disobeying orders, accusing another (Cheatham) of drunkenness during the battle, and blaming Breckinridge for inept leadership. This internecine donnybrook threatened to do more damage to the army than the Yankees had done. Disheartened, Bragg told a friend that it might "be better for the President to send someone to relieve me," and wrote Davis to the same effect.

James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*

Bragg's subordinate generals were vocal in their dissatisfaction of his command during the Kentucky campaign and Stones River. He reacted to the rumors of criticism by circulating a

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letter to his corps and division commanders that asked them to confirm in writing that they had recommended withdrawing after the latter battle, stating that if he had misunderstood them and withdrawn mistakenly, he would willingly step down. Unfortunately, he wrote the letter at a time that a number of his most faithful supporters were on leave for illness or wounds.[29] Bragg's critics, including William J. Hardee, interpreted the letter as having an implied secondary question—had Bragg lost the confidence of his senior commanders? Leonidas Polk did not reply to the implied question, but he wrote directly to his friend, Jefferson Davis, recommending that Bragg be replaced.

Davis responded to the complaints by dispatching Gen. Joseph E. Johnston to investigate the condition of the army. Davis assumed that Johnston, Bragg's superior, would find the situation wanting and take command of the army in the field, easing Bragg aside. However, Johnston arrived on the scene and found the men of the Army of Tennessee in relatively good condition. He told Bragg that he had "the best organized, armed, equipped, and disciplined army in the Confederacy." Johnston explicitly refused any suggestion that he take command, concerned that people would think he had taken advantage of the situation for his own personal gain. When Davis ordered Johnston to send Bragg to Richmond, Johnston delayed because of Elise Bragg's illness; when her health improved Johnston was unable to assume command because of lingering medical problems from his wound at the Battle of Seven Pines in 1862.

Tullahoma and the evacuation of Chattanooga



Tullahoma Campaign

As Bragg's army fortified Tullahoma, Rosecrans spent the next six months in Murfreesboro, resupplying and retraining his army to resume its advance. Rosecrans's initial movements on June 23 took Bragg by surprise—while keeping Polk's corps occupied with small actions in the center of the Confederate line, Rosecrans sent the majority of his army around Bragg's right flank. Bragg was slow to react and his subordinates were typically uncooperative; the mistrust among the general officers of the Army of Tennessee for the past months led to little direct communication about strategy and neither Polk nor Hardee had a firm understanding of Bragg's plans. As the Union army outmaneuvered the Confederates, Bragg was forced to abandon Tullahoma and on July 4 retreated behind the Tennessee River. Tullahoma is recognized as a "brilliant" campaign for Rosecrans, achieving with minimal losses his goal of driving Bragg from Middle Tennessee. Judith Hallock wrote that Bragg was "outfoxed" and that his ill health may have been partially to blame for his performance, but her overall assessment was that he performed credibly during the retreat from Tullahoma, keeping his army intact under difficult circumstances.

Although the Army of Tennessee had about 52,000 men at the end of July, the Confederate government merged the Department of East Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, into Bragg's Department of Tennessee, which added 17,800 men to Bragg's army, but also extended his command responsibilities northward to the Knoxville area. This brought a third subordinate into Bragg's command who had little or no respect for him. Buckner's attitude was colored by Bragg's unsuccessful invasion of Buckner's native Kentucky in 1862, as well as by the


loss of his command through the merger.[35] A positive aspect for Bragg was Hardee's request to be transferred to Mississippi in July, but he was replaced by Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, a general who did not get along with Robert E. Lee in Virginia.

The Confederate War Department asked Bragg in early August if he could assume the offensive against Rosecrans if he were given reinforcements from Mississippi. He demurred, concerned about the daunting geographical obstacles and logistical challenges, preferring to wait for Rosecrans to solve those same problems and attack him. An opposed crossing of the Tennessee River was not feasible, so Rosecrans devised a deception to distract Bragg above Chattanooga while the army crossed downstream. Bragg was rightfully concerned about a sizable Union force under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside that was threatening Knoxville to the northeast, and Rosecrans reinforced this concern by feinting to his left and shelling the city of Chattanooga from the heights north of the river. The bulk of the Union army crossed the Tennessee southeast of Chattanooga by September 4 and Bragg realized that his position there was no longer tenable. He evacuated the city on September 8.

Chickamauga



Initial movements in the Chickamauga Campaign, August 15 – September 8, 1863.



Longstreet's breakthrough at the Battle of Chickamauga, mid-day September 20.

After Rosecrans had consolidated his gains and secured his hold on Chattanooga, he began moving his army into northern Georgia in pursuit of Bragg. Bragg continued to suffer from the conduct of his subordinates, who were not attentive to his orders.

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On September 10, Maj. Gens. Thomas C. Hindman and D.H. Hill refused to attack, as ordered, an outnumbered Federal column at McLemore's Cove (the Battle of Davis's Cross Roads). On September 13, Bragg ordered Leonidas Polk to attack Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's corps, but Polk ignored the orders and demanded more troops, insisting that it was he who was about to be attacked. Rosecrans used the time lost in these delays to concentrate his scattered forces. Finally, on September 19–20, 1863, Bragg, reinforced by two divisions from Mississippi, one division and several brigades from the Department of East Tennessee, and two divisions under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet from Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, turned on the pursuing Rosecrans in northeastern Georgia and at high cost defeated him at the Battle of Chickamauga, the greatest Confederate victory in the Western Theater during the war. It was not a complete victory, however. Bragg's objective was to cut off Rosecrans from Chattanooga and destroy his army. Instead, following a partial rout of the Union army by Longstreet's wing, a stout defense by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas allowed Rosecrans and almost all of his army to escape.

After the battle, Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland retreated to Chattanooga, where Bragg laid siege to the city. He began to wage a battle against the subordinates he resented for failing him in the campaign—Hindman for his lack of action in McLemore's Cove, and Polk for delaying the morning attack Bragg ordered on September 20. On September 29, Bragg suspended both officers from their commands. In early October, an attempted mutiny of Bragg's subordinates resulted in D.H. Hill being relieved from his command. Longstreet was dispatched with his corps to the Knoxville Campaign against Ambrose Burnside, seriously weakening Bragg's army at Chattanooga.

Some of Bragg's subordinate generals were frustrated at what they perceived to be his lack of willingness to exploit the victory by pursuing the Union army toward Chattanooga and destroying it. Polk in particular was outraged at being relieved of command. The dissidents, including many of the division and corps commanders, met in secret and prepared a petition to the president. Although the author of the petition is not known, historians suspect it was Simon Buckner, whose signature was first on the list. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet wrote to the Secretary of War with the prediction that "nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander." Cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest, dissatisfied after a long association with Bragg, and bitter about his failure to pursue the defeated Union forces after Chickamauga, refused to serve under him again. He told Bragg to his face, "You have played the part of a damned scoundrel. ... If you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path it will be at the peril of your life." With the Army of Tennessee literally on the verge of mutiny, Jefferson Davis reluctantly traveled to Chattanooga to personally assess the situation and to try to stem the tide of dissent in the army. Although Bragg offered to resign to resolve the crisis, Davis eventually decided to leave Bragg in command, denounced the other generals, and termed their complaints "shafts of malice".

Chattanooga

Battles of Chattanooga, November 24–25, 1863. While Bragg fought with his subordinates and reduced his force by dispatching Longstreet to Knoxville, the besieged Union army received a new commander—Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant—and significant reinforcements from Mississippi and Virginia. The Battles for Chattanooga marked Bragg's final days as an army commander. His weakened left flank (previously manned by Longstreet's troops) fell on November 24 during the Battle of Lookout Mountain. The following day in the Battle of Missionary Ridge, his primary defensive line successfully resisted an attack on its right flank, but the center was overwhelmed in a frontal assault by George Thomas's army. The Army of Tennessee was routed and retreated to Dalton, Georgia. Bragg offered his resignation on November 29 and was chagrined when Pres. Davis accepted it immediately. He turned over temporary command to Hardee on December 2 and was replaced with Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded the army in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign against William T. Sherman.

Military adviser and the Carolinas

Davis relied heavily upon Bragg's understanding of military affairs and institutions. Although he did not always agree with Bragg, Davis consistently sought his expertise and opinion on a variety of matters. By untiringly assuming many of the duties and much of the criticism that had burdened and perplexed Davis, Bragg eased some of the president's vexations. In the process he maintained old enmities and created many new ones.

Judith Lee Hallock, *Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat*, Volume II

In February 1864, Bragg was summoned to Richmond for consultation with Davis. The orders for his new assignment on February 24 read that he was "charged with the conduct of military operations of the Confederate States", but he was essentially Davis's military adviser or chief of staff without a direct command, a post once held by Robert E. Lee. Bragg used his organizational abilities to reduce corruption and improve the supply system. He took over responsibility for administration of the military prison system and its hospitals. He reshaped the Confederacy's conscription process by streamlining the chain of command and reducing conscripts' avenues of appeal. During his tenure in Richmond, he had numerous quarrels with significant figures, including the Secretary of War, the Commissary General, members of Congress, the press, and many of his fellow generals; the exception to the latter was Robert E. Lee, who treated Bragg politely and with deference and who had, Bragg knew, an exceptionally close relationship with the president.



Carolinas Campaign

In May, while Robert E. Lee was occupied defending against Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign in Virginia, Bragg focused on the defense of areas south and west of Richmond. He convinced Jefferson Davis to appoint P.G.T. Beauregard to an important role in the defense of Richmond and Petersburg. Meanwhile, Davis was concerned that Joseph E. Johnston, Bragg's successor at the Army of Tennessee, was defending too timidly against William T. Sherman's Atlanta Campaign. He sent Bragg to Georgia on July 9, charged with investigating the tactical situation, but also evaluating the replacement of Johnston in command. Bragg harbored the hope that he might be chosen to return to command of the army, but was willing to support Davis's choice. Davis had hinted to Bragg that he thought William J. Hardee would be an appropriate successor, but Bragg

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was reluctant to promote an old enemy and reported back that Hardee would provide no change in strategy from Johnston's. Bragg had extensive conversations with a more junior corps commander, Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, and was impressed with his plans for taking offensive action, about which Hood had also been confidentially corresponding to Richmond for weeks behind Johnston's back. Davis chose Hood to replace Johnston.

In October 1864, President Davis sent Bragg to assume temporary command of the defenses of Wilmington, North Carolina, and his responsibility was soon increased at the recommendation of Robert E. Lee to include all of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. In November, with William T. Sherman's March to the Sea under way, Davis ordered him to the defenses of Augusta, Georgia, and then to Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, and in January 1865, the defenses of Wilmington again. The Confederates were able to successfully repulse the first Union attempt to capture Fort Fisher, which dominated the seaborne supply line to Wilmington. However, when the Union returned in January, Bragg's performance in the Second Battle of Fort Fisher was poor. He assumed that the first failed siege meant that the fort was invulnerable, when in fact bad weather played a large role. Thus, he did not come to the fort's assistance in a timely fashion after it was attacked the second time. The Confederates were forced to evacuate Wilmington, their last remaining seaport on the Atlantic coast.

Bragg's now-fragile military career began to crumble around him. To his disgust, Joseph E. Johnston was returned to service to command the remnants of the Army of Tennessee and other forces defending against Sherman in North Carolina. At about the same time, Bragg lost his position as military adviser to Davis when Robert E. Lee was promoted to be general in chief of all the Confederate armies in February. And John C. Breckinridge, who had hated Bragg since the debacle at Perryville, was named Secretary of War. Davis was sympathetic to Bragg's discomfort and discussed transferring him to command the Trans-Mississippi Department, replacing Edmund Kirby Smith, but the politicians from that region were strongly opposed. Bragg became in effect a corps commander (although his command was less than a division in size) under Johnston for the remainder of the Carolinas Campaign. His men were able to win a minor victory at the Second Battle of Kinston, March 7–10, and fought unsuccessfully at the Battle of Bentonville, March 19–21. After the fall of Richmond on April 2, Jefferson Davis and remnants of the Confederate government fled to the southwest. Bragg, who had been headquartered at Raleigh, North Carolina, caught up with the Davis near Abbeville, South Carolina, on May 1. He attended the final cabinet meeting and was instrumental in convincing Davis that the cause was lost. Bragg and a small party of his staff rode to the west and were captured and paroled in Monticello, Georgia, on May 9.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Braxton_Bragg



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JOHN BELL HOOD



Brigade and division command

Hood resigned from the United States Army immediately after the Battle of Fort Sumter and, dissatisfied with the neutrality of his native Kentucky, decided to serve his adopted state of Texas. He joined the Confederate army as a cavalry captain, but by September 30, 1861, was promoted to be colonel of the 4th Texas Infantry.

Hood became the brigade commander of the unit that was henceforth known as Hood's Texas Brigade on February 20, 1862, part of the Confederate Army of the Potomac, and was promoted to brigadier general on March 3, 1862. Leading the Texas Brigade as part of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Peninsula Campaign, he established his reputation as an aggressive commander, eager to lead his troops personally into battle, and the Texans quickly gained a reputation as one of the army's elite combat units. At the Battle of Eltham's Landing, his men were instrumental in nullifying an amphibious landing by a Union division. When commanding general Joseph E. Johnston reflected upon the success Hood's men enjoyed in executing his order "to feel the enemy gently and fall back," he humorously asked, "What would your Texans have done, sir, if I had ordered them to charge and drive back the enemy?" Hood replied, "I suppose, General, they would have driven them into the river, and tried to swim out and capture the gunboats." [13] The Texas Brigade was held in reserve at Seven Pines.

At the Battle of Gaines's Mill on June 27, Hood distinguished himself by leading his brigade in a charge that broke the Union line, which was the most successful Confederate performance in the Seven Days Battles. While Hood escaped the battle without an injury, every other field officer in his brigade was killed or wounded.

When Maj. Gen. William H.C. Whiting left the army on medical furlough July 26, Hood was the senior brigade commander and replaced Whiting as a division commander in Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. He led the division in the Northern Virginia Campaign and added to his reputation as the premier leader of shock troops during Longstreet's massive assault on John Pope's left flank at the Second Battle of Bull Run, which nearly destroyed the Union army.

In the pursuit of Union forces, Hood was involved in a dispute over captured ambulances with a superior officer, Brig. Gen. Nathan "Shanks" Evans. Evans arrested Hood, but Gen. Lee intervened and retained him in service. During the Maryland Campaign, just before the Battle of South Mountain, Hood was in the rear, still in virtual arrest. His Texas troops shouted to General Lee, "Give us Hood!" Lee restored Hood to command, despite Hood's refusal to apologize for his conduct.

It could scarcely be said that any [of the officers in Longstreet's corps] ... save one had by this date displayed qualities that would dispose anyone to expect a career of eminence. The exception was Hood. ... Anyone who had followed the operations of the Army after Gaines's Mill would have said that of all the officers under Longstreet, the most likely to be a great soldier was Hood.

Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants

During the Battle of Antietam, Hood's division came to the relief of Stonewall Jackson's corps on the Confederate left flank, turning back an assault by the Union I Corps in the West Woods. Afterward, they became engaged with the Union XII Corps. In the evening after the battle, Gen. Lee asked Hood where his division was. He responded, "They are lying on the field where you sent them. My division has been almost wiped out." Of his 2,000 men, almost 1,000 were casualties. Jackson was impressed with Hood's performance and recommended his promotion to major general, which occurred effective October 10, 1862.

In the Battle of Fredericksburg in December, Hood's division saw little action, placed in the center, between Longstreet's lines on Marye's Heights, and Jackson's lines. And in the spring of 1863, he missed the great victory of the Battle of Chancellorsville because most of Longstreet's First Corps was on detached duty in Suffolk, Virginia, involving Longstreet himself and Hood's and George Pickett's divisions. When he heard news of Stonewall Jackson's death after Chancellorsville, he expressed grief for the man he most deeply admired, personally and militarily.

Gettysburg

At the Battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet's Corps arrived late on the first day, July 1, 1863. General Lee planned an assault for the second day that would feature Longstreet's Corps attacking northeast up the Emmitsburg Road into the Union left flank. Hood was dissatisfied with his assignment in the assault because it would face difficult terrain in the boulder-strewn area known as the Devil's Den. He requested permission from Longstreet to move around the left flank of the Union army, beyond the mountain known as [Big] Round Top, to strike the Union in their rear area. Longstreet refused permission, citing Lee's orders, despite repeated protests from Hood. Yielding to the inevitable, Hood finally gave in and his division stepped off around 4 p.m. on July 2, but a variety of factors caused it to veer to the east, away from its intended direction, where it would eventually meet with Union forces at Little Round Top. Just as the attack started, however, Hood was the victim of an artillery shell exploding overhead, severely damaging his left arm, which incapacitated him. (Although the arm was not amputated, he was unable to make use of it for the rest of his life.) His ranking brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, assumed command of the division, but confusion as to orders and command status dissipated the direction and strength of the Confederate attack, significantly affecting the outcome of the battle.

Hood recuperated in Richmond, Virginia, where he made a social impression on the ladies of the Confederacy. In August 1863, famous diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut wrote of Hood:

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When Hood came with his sad Quixote face, the face of an old Crusader, who believed in his cause, his cross, and his crown, we were not prepared for such a man as a beau-ideal of the wild Texans. He is tall, thin, and shy; has blue eyes and light hair; a tawny beard, and a vast amount of it, covering the lower part of his face, the whole appearance that of awkward strength. Some one said that his great reserve of manner he carried only into the society of ladies. Major [Charles S.] Venable added that he had often heard of the light of battle shining in a man's eyes. He had seen it once — when he carried to Hood orders from Lee, and found in the hottest of the fight that the man was transfigured. The fierce light of Hood's eyes I can never forget.

As he recuperated, Hood began a campaign to win the heart of the young, prominent South Carolina socialite, Sally Buchanan Preston, known as "Buck" to her friends, whom he had first met while traveling through Richmond in March 1863. Hood later confessed that the flirtatious Southern belle had caused him to "surrender at first sight." As he prepared to return to duty in September, Hood proposed marriage to Buck, but received only a noncommittal response.

Chickamauga

Meanwhile, in the Western Theater, the Confederate army under General Braxton Bragg was faring poorly. Lee dispatched two divisions of Longstreet's Corps to Tennessee, and Hood was able to rejoin his men on September 18. At the Battle of Chickamauga, Hood led Longstreet's assault that exploited a gap in the Federal line, which led to the defeat of Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans's Union Army of the Cumberland. However, Hood was once again wounded severely, and his right leg was amputated four inches (100 mm) below the hip. Hood's condition was so grave that the surgeon sent the severed leg along with him in the ambulance, assuming that they would be buried together. Because of Hood's bravery at Chickamauga, Longstreet recommended that he be promoted to lieutenant general as of that date, September 20, 1863; the confirmation by the Confederate Senate occurred on February 11, 1864, as Hood was preparing to return to duty.

During Hood's second recuperation in Richmond that fall, he befriended Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who would subsequently promote him to a more important role. He also resumed his courtship of Buck Preston, who, despite giving him some ambiguously positive signals, dashed his hopes on Christmas Eve. Hood confided to Mary Chesnut that the courtship, "was the hardest battle he had ever fought in his life." In February Hood proposed again to Buck and this time demanded a specific response, which was a reluctant, embarrassed agreement. However, the Preston family did not approve of Hood, who left for the field unmarried.

Atlanta Campaign and the Army of Tennessee

In the spring of 1864, the Confederate Army of Tennessee, under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, was engaged in a campaign of maneuver against William T. Sherman, who was driving from Chattanooga toward Atlanta. Hood had accepted the position as a corps commander offered by President Davis, a somewhat controversial appointment because of the Texan's relative youth and inexperience, plus his physical disabilities. Despite his two damaged limbs, Hood performed well in the field, riding as much as 20 miles a day without apparent difficulty, strapped to his horse with his artificial leg hanging stiffly, and an orderly following closely behind with crutches. The leg, made of cork, was donated (along with a couple of spares) by members of his Texas Brigade, who had collected \$3,100 in a single day for that purpose; it had been imported from Europe through the Union blockade.

During the Atlanta Campaign, Hood urged the normally cautious Johnston to act aggressively, but Johnston usually reacted to flanking maneuvers by Sherman with timely withdrawals, rather

similar to his strategy in the Peninsula Campaign. One attempt by Johnston to act decisively in the offensive, during the Battle of Adairsville, ironically was foiled by Hood, who had been ordered to attack the flank of one column of Sherman's army, but instead pulled back and entrenched when confronted by the unexpected arrival of a small detachment of that column.



Confederate General John Bell Hood

The Army of Tennessee continued withdrawing until it had crossed the last major water barrier before Atlanta, the Chattahoochee River. During this time, Hood had been sending the government in Richmond letters very critical of Johnston's conduct, bypassing official communication channels. The issue came to a head when Gen. Braxton Bragg was ordered by President Davis to travel to Atlanta to personally interview Johnston. After meeting with Johnston, he interviewed Hood and another subordinate, Joseph Wheeler, who told him that they had repeatedly urged Johnston to attack. Hood presented a letter that branded Johnston as being both ineffective and weak-willed. He told Bragg, "I have, General, so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be regarded reckless by the officers high in rank in this army [meaning Johnston and senior corps commander William J. Hardee], since their views have been so directly opposite." Johnston's biographer, Craig L. Symonds, judges that Hood's letter "stepped over the line from unprofessional to outright subversive." Steven E. Woodworth wrote that Hood was "letting his ambition get the better of his honesty" because "the truth was that Hood, more often than Hardee, had counseled Johnston to retreat."

On July 17, 1864, Jefferson Davis relieved Johnston. He considered replacing him with the more senior Hardee, but Bragg strongly recommended Hood. Bragg had not only been impressed by his interview with Hood, but he retained lingering resentments against Hardee from bitter disagreements in previous campaigns. Hood was promoted to the temporary rank of full general on July 18, and given command of the army just outside the gates of Atlanta. (Hood's temporary appointment as a full general was never confirmed by the Senate. His commission as a lieutenant general resumed on January 23, 1865.) At 33, Hood was the youngest man on either side to be given command of an army. Robert E. Lee gave an ambiguous reply to Davis's request for his opinion about the promotion, calling Hood "a bold fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off," but

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he could not say whether Hood possessed all of the qualities necessary to command an army in the field.

The change of command in the Army of Tennessee did not go unnoticed by Sherman. His subordinates, James B. McPherson and John M. Schofield, shared their knowledge of Hood from their time together at West Point. Upon learning of his new adversary's reckless and gambling tendencies, Sherman planned to use that to his advantage.

Hood conducted the remainder of the Atlanta Campaign with the strong aggressive actions for which he had become famous. He launched four major attacks that summer in an attempt to break Sherman's siege of Atlanta, starting almost immediately with an attack along Peachtree Creek. After hearing that McPherson was mortally wounded in the Battle of Atlanta, Hood deeply regretted his loss.[31] All of the offensives failed, with significant Confederate casualties. Finally, on September 2, 1864, Hood evacuated the city of Atlanta, burning as many military supplies and installations as possible.[32]

Franklin–Nashville Campaign



Map of the Franklin-Nashville Campaign
Confederate (red), Union (blue)

As Sherman regrouped in Atlanta, preparing for his March to the Sea, Hood and Jefferson Davis met to devise a strategy to defeat him. Their plan was to attack Sherman's lines of communications between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and to move north through Alabama and into central Tennessee, assuming that Sherman would be threatened and follow. Hood's ambitious hope was that he could maneuver Sherman into a decisive battle, defeat him, recruit additional forces in Tennessee and Kentucky, and pass through the Cumberland Gap to come to the aid of Robert E. Lee, who was besieged at Petersburg. Sherman did not cooperate, however. Instead of pursuing Hood with his army, he sent Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to take control of the Union forces in Tennessee and coordinate the defense against Hood, while the bulk of Sherman's forces prepared to march toward Savannah.

During their conference, Davis expressed his disappointment in Hood's performance in defending Atlanta, losing almost 20,000 men in ill-advised frontal assaults for no significant gains, and implied that he was considering replacing Hood in command of the army. After the president's departure for Montgomery, Alabama, he telegraphed Hood that he had decided to retain him in command and, acceding to Hood's request, transferred Hardee out of the Army of Tennessee. He also established a new theater commander to supervise Hood and the department of Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor, although the officer selected for the assignment, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, was not expected to exert any real operational control of the armies in the field.

Hood's Tennessee Campaign lasted from September to December 1864, comprising seven battles and hundreds of miles of marching. He attempted to trap a large part of the Union Army of the Ohio under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield at Spring Hill, Tennessee, before it could link up with Thomas in Nashville, but command failures and misunderstandings allowed

Schofield's men to safely pass by Hood's army in the night. The next day at the Battle of Franklin, Hood sent his men across nearly two miles of open ground without the support of artillery in a last gasp effort to destroy Schofield's forces before they could withdraw across the Harpeth River and reach the safety of Nashville, which was only a night's march from Franklin. His troops were unsuccessful in their attempt to breach the Union breastworks, suffering severe casualties in an assault that is sometimes called the "Pickett's Charge of the West". Hood's exhausted army was unable to interfere as the Union force withdrew into Nashville. He later wrote that "Never did troops fight more gallantly" than at Franklin. Some popular histories assert that Hood acted rashly in a fit of rage, resentful that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill and that he wanted to discipline his army by ordering them to assault against strong odds. Recent scholarship by Eric Jacobson discounts this as unlikely, as it was not only militarily foolish, but Hood was observed to be determined, not angry, by the time he arrived in Franklin.

Never had there been such an overwhelming victory during the Civil War—indeed, never in American military history.

Wiley Sword, describing the Franklin–Nashville Campaign

Unwilling to abandon his original plan, Hood stumbled toward the heavily fortified capital of Tennessee, and laid siege with inferior forces, which endured the beginning of a severe winter. Two weeks later, George Thomas attacked and defeated Hood at the Battle of Nashville. During the battle and the subsequent relentless pursuit to the south, the Army of Tennessee ceased to be an effective fighting force; the campaign cost the army about 23,500 of its initial strength of 38,000. Hood and the remnants of the army retreated as far as Tupelo, Mississippi. Some of the survivors eventually joined Joseph E. Johnston the Carolinas Campaign against Sherman. P.G.T. Beauregard sought permission to replace Hood with Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor and the change of command occurred January 23, 1865. In a speech to his men, Hood expressed the hope that they would give their support to Taylor and avenge their comrades "whose bones lay bleaching upon the fields of Middle Tennessee." He returned to Richmond on February 8.

[edit] Final days of the warIn March 1865, Hood requested assignment to the Trans-Mississippi Theater to report on the situation there and to assess the possibility of moving troops across the Mississippi River to reinforce the East. He met with Richard Taylor in Mississippi in late April and agreed with Taylor's proposal that his force should surrender. He departed to take this recommendation to the commanders remaining in the field, but before he arrived in Texas, General Edmund Kirby Smith surrendered his forces, and Hood surrendered himself in Natchez, Mississippi, where he was paroled on May 31, 1865.


Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Bell_Hood



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NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST



Forrest returned to Tennessee after the war broke out, enlisted in the Confederate States Army (CSA) and trained at Fort Wright in Randolph, Tennessee. On July 14, 1861, he joined Captain Josiah White's Company "E", Tennessee Mounted Rifles as a private along with his youngest brother and fifteen-year-old son. Upon seeing how badly equipped the CSA was, Forrest offered to buy horses and equipment with his own money for a regiment of Tennessee volunteer soldiers.

His superior officers and the state Governor Isham G. Harris were surprised that someone of Forrest's wealth and prominence had enlisted as a soldier, especially since major planters were exempted from service. They commissioned him as a Lieutenant Colonel and authorized him to recruit and train a battalion of Confederate Mounted Rangers. In October 1861 he was given command of a regiment, "Forrest's Cavalry Corps". Though Forrest had no prior formal military training or experience, he had exhibited leadership qualities and soon exhibited a gift for successful tactics.

Public debate surrounded Tennessee's decision to join the Confederacy. Both the CSA and the Union armies recruited soldiers from the state. More than 100,000 men from Tennessee served with the Confederacy (more per capita than any other state), and 50,000 served with the Union.[14] Forrest posted ads to join his regiment for "men with good horse and good gun" adding "if you wanna have some fun and to kill some Yankees".

At six feet, two inches (1.88 m) tall and 210 pounds (95 kg; 15 stone), Forrest was physically imposing and intimidating, especially compared to the average height of men at the time. He used his skills as a hard rider and fierce swordsman to great effect. (He was known to sharpen both the top and bottom edges of his heavy saber.)

Historians have evaluated contemporary records to conclude that Forrest may have killed more than thirty enemy soldiers[16] with saber, pistol and shotgun. Not all of Forrest's feats of individual combat involved enemy troops. Lt. A. Wills Gould, an artillery officer in Forrest's command, was being transferred presumably because cannons under his command were spiked by the enemy during the Battle of Day's Gap. On June 14, 1863, Gould confronted Forrest about his transfer, which escalated into a violent exchange. Forrest was shot in the hip while Gould was mortally stabbed.

Forrest's command included his Escort Company (his "Special Forces"), for which he selected the best soldiers available. This

unit, which varied in size from 40-90 men, was the elite of the cavalry.

Cavalry command

Forrest distinguished himself first at the Battle of Fort Donelson in February 1862. His cavalry captured a Union artillery battery and then he broke out of a Union Army siege headed by Major General Ulysses S. Grant. Forrest rallied nearly 4,000 troops and led them across the river.

A few days after Fort Donelson, with the fall of Nashville imminent, Forrest took command of the city. Local industries had several millions of dollars worth of heavy ordnance machinery. Forrest arranged for transport of the machinery and several important government officials to safe locations.

A month later, Forrest was back in action at the Battle of Shiloh (April 6 to April 7, 1862). He commanded a Confederate rear guard after the Union victory. In the battle of Fallen Timbers, he drove through the Union skirmish line. Not realizing that the rest of his men had halted their charge when reaching the full Union brigade, Forrest charged the brigade single-handedly, and soon found himself surrounded. He emptied his Colt Army revolvers into the swirling mass of Union soldiers and pulled out his saber, hacking and slashing. A Union infantryman fired a musket ball into Forrest's spine with a point-blank musket shot, nearly knocking him out of the saddle. Forrest grabbed an unsuspecting Union soldier, hauled him onto his horse to use as a shield, dumped the man once he had broken clear and was out of range, then galloped back to his incredulous troopers.[19] A surgeon removed the musket ball a week later, without anesthesia, which was unavailable. Forrest would have been likely given a generous dose of alcohol to muffle the pain of the surgery.

By early summer, Forrest commanded a new brigade of "green" cavalry regiments. In July, he led them into Middle Tennessee under orders to launch a cavalry raid. On July 13, 1862, he led them into the First Battle of Murfreesboro, which Forrest is said to have won.

According to a report by a Union commander:

"The forces attacking my camp were the First Regiment Texas Rangers [8th Texas Cavalry, Terry's Texas Rangers, ed.], Colonel Wharton, and a battalion of the First Georgia Rangers, Colonel Morrison, and a large number of citizens of Rutherford County, many of whom had recently taken the oath of allegiance to the United States Government. There were also quite a number of negroes attached to the Texas and Georgia troops, who were armed and equipped, and took part in the several engagements with my forces during the day."

Promoted in July 1862 to brigadier general, Forrest was given command of a Confederate cavalry brigade. In December 1862, Forrest's veteran troopers were reassigned by Gen. Braxton Bragg to another officer, against his protest. Forrest had to recruit a new brigade, composed of about 2,000 inexperienced recruits, most of whom lacked weapons. Again, Bragg ordered a raid, this one into west Tennessee to disrupt the communications of the Union forces under Grant, threatening the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Forrest protested that to send such untrained men behind enemy lines was suicidal, but Bragg insisted, and Forrest obeyed his orders. On the ensuing raid, he showed his brilliance, leading thousands of Union soldiers in west Tennessee on a "wild goose chase" to try to locate his fast-moving forces. Never staying in one place long enough to be attacked, Forrest led his troops in raids as far north as the banks of the Ohio River in southwest Kentucky. He returned to his base in Mississippi with more men than he had started with. By then all were fully armed with captured Union weapons. As a result, Union general Ulysses S. Grant was forced to revise and delay the strategy of his Vicksburg Campaign. "He [Forrest] was

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the only Confederate cavalryman of whom Grant stood in much dread," a friend of Grant's was quoted as saying.[24]



Confederate Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest

Forrest continued to lead his men in small-scale operations until April 1863. The Confederate army dispatched him into the backcountry of northern Alabama and west Georgia to defend against an attack of 3,000 Union cavalrymen commanded by Colonel Abel Streight, with a force far smaller in number. Streight had orders to cut the Confederate railroad south of Chattanooga, Tennessee, to cut off Bragg's supply line and force him to retreat into Georgia. Forrest chased Streight's men for 16 days, harassing them all the way. Streight's goal changed to escape the pursuit. On May 3, Forrest caught up with Streight's unit east of Cedar Bluff, Alabama. Forrest had fewer men than the Union side, but he repeatedly paraded some of them around a hilltop to appear a larger force, and convinced Streight to surrender his 1,500 exhausted troops.

Forrest served with the main army at the Battle of Chickamauga (September 18 to September 20, 1863). He pursued the retreating Union army and took hundreds of prisoners. Like several others under Bragg's command, he urged an immediate follow-up attack to recapture Chattanooga, which had fallen a few weeks before. Bragg failed to do so, upon which Forrest was quoted as saying, "What does he fight battles for?" After Forrest made death threats against Bragg during a confrontation,[28] Bragg reassigned him to an independent command in Mississippi. On December 4, 1863, Forrest was promoted to the rank of major general.

Fort Pillow

On April 12, 1864, General Forrest led his forces in the attack and capture of Fort Pillow on the Mississippi River in Henning, Tennessee. Many African-American Union troops were killed in the battle. A controversy arose about whether Forrest conducted or condoned a massacre of African Americans who had surrendered there.

Forrest's men insisted that the Federals, although fleeing, kept their weapons and frequently turned to shoot, forcing the Confederates to keep firing in self defense. Confederates said the Union flag was still flying over the fort, which indicated that the force had not formally surrendered. A contemporary newspaper

account from Jackson, Tennessee, stated that "General Forrest begged them to surrender," but "not the first sign of surrender was ever given." Similar accounts were reported in many Southern newspapers at the time.

These statements, however, were contradicted by Union survivors, as well as the letter of a Confederate soldier who recounted a massacre. Achilles Clark, a soldier with the 20th Tennessee cavalry, wrote to his sister immediately after the battle: "The slaughter was awful. Words cannot describe the scene. The poor, deluded, negroes would run up to our men, fall upon their knees, and with uplifted hands scream for mercy but they were ordered to their feet and then shot down. I, with several others, tried to stop the butchery, and at one time had partially succeeded, but General Forrest ordered them shot down like dogs and the carnage continued. Finally our men became sick of blood and the firing ceased."

Ulysses S. Grant, in his *Personal Memoirs*, says of the incident: "These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. 'The river was dyed,' he says, 'with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.' Subsequently Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read."

Historians have differed on interpretation of events. Richard Fuchs, author of *An Unerring Fire*, concludes, "The affair at Fort Pillow was simply an orgy of death, a mass lynching to satisfy the basest of conduct – intentional murder – for the vilest of reasons – racism and personal enmity." Andrew Ward downplays the controversy, "Whether the massacre was premeditated or spontaneous does not address the more fundamental question of whether a massacre took place... it certainly did, in every dictionary sense of the word." John Cimprich states, "The new paradigm in social attitudes and the fuller use of available evidence has favored a massacre interpretation... Debate over the memory of this incident formed a part of sectional and racial conflicts for many years after the war, but the reinterpretation of the event during the last thirty years offers some hope that society can move beyond past intolerance."

Brice's Crossroads

Forrest's greatest victory came on June 10, 1864, when his 3,500-man force clashed with 8,500 men commanded by Union Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis at the Battle of Brice's Crossroads. Here, his mobility of force and superior tactics led to victory. He swept the Union forces from a large expanse of southwest Tennessee and northern Mississippi. Forrest set up a position for an attack to repulse a pursuing force commanded by Sturgis, who had been sent to impede Forrest from destroying Union supplies and fortifications. When Sturgis's Federal army came upon the crossroad, they collided with Forrest's cavalry. Sturgis ordered his infantry to advance to the front line to counteract the cavalry. The infantry, tired and weary and suffering under the heat, were quickly broken and sent into mass retreat. Forrest sent a full charge after the retreating army and captured 16 artillery pieces, 176 wagons and 1,500 stands of small arms. In all, the maneuver cost Forrest 96 men killed and 396 wounded. The day was worse for Union troops, which suffered 223 killed, 394 wounded and 1,623 men missing. The losses were a deep blow to the black regiment under Sturgis's command. In the hasty retreat, they stripped off commemorative badges that read "Remember Fort Pillow", to avoid goading the Confederate force pursuing them.

Conclusion of the war

One month later, while serving under General Stephen D. Lee, Forrest experienced tactical defeat at the Battle of Tupelo in 1864. Concerned about Union supply lines, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman sent a force under the command of Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith to deal with Forrest. The Union forces drove the Confederates from the field and Forrest was wounded in the

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foot, but his forces were not wholly destroyed. He continued to oppose Union efforts in the West for the remainder of the war.



Forrest's raid into Memphis

Forrest led other raids that summer and fall, including a famous one into Union-held downtown Memphis in August 1864 (the Second Battle of Memphis), and another on a Union supply depot at Johnsonville, Tennessee, on October 3, 1864 (the Battle of Johnsonville), causing millions of dollars in damage. In December, during the disastrous Franklin-Nashville Campaign, he fought alongside General John Bell Hood, the newest (and last) commander of the Confederate Army of Tennessee in the Second Battle of Franklin. Forrest argued bitterly with Hood (his superior officer) demanding permission to cross the river and cut off the escape route of Union Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's army. He made the attempt but was defeated.

After his bloody defeat at Franklin, Hood continued to Nashville. Hood ordered Forrest to conduct an independent raid against the Murfreesboro garrison. After success in achieving the objectives specified by Gen. Hood, Forrest engaged Union forces near Murfreesboro on December 5, 1864. In what would be known as the Third Battle of Murfreesboro, a portion of Forrest's command broke and ran. After Hood's Army of Tennessee was all but destroyed at the Battle of Nashville, Forrest distinguished himself by commanding the Confederate rear guard in a series of actions that allowed what was left of the army to escape. For this, he earned promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. A portion of his command, now dismounted, was surprised and captured in their camp at Verona, Mississippi, on December 25, 1864, during a raid of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad by a brigade of Brig. Gen. Benjamin Grierson's cavalry division.

In 1865, Forrest attempted, without success, to defend the state of Alabama against Wilson's Raid. His opponent, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, defeated Forrest in battle. When he received news of Lee's surrender, Forrest also chose to surrender. On May 9, 1865, at Gainesville, Forrest read his farewell address.

Forrest's farewell address to his troops, May 9, 1865

Cannon in front of the Nature Center & Veteran's Memorial in Covington. Marker in the background cites Nathan Bedford Forrest's last speech. (2007)The following text is excerpted from Forrest's farewell address to his troops:

"Civil war, such as you have just passed through naturally engenders feelings of animosity, hatred, and revenge. It is our duty to divest ourselves of all such feelings; and as far as it is in our power to do so, to cultivate friendly feelings towards those with whom we have so long contended, and heretofore so widely, but honestly, differed. Neighborhood feuds, personal animosities, and private differences should be blotted out; and, when you return home, a manly, straightforward course of conduct will secure the respect of your enemies. Whatever your responsibilities may be to Government, to society, or to individuals meet them like men.

The attempt made to establish a separate and independent Confederation has failed; but the consciousness of having done your duty faithfully, and to the end, will, in some measure, repay for the hardships you have undergone. In bidding you farewell, rest assured that you carry with you my best wishes for your future welfare and happiness. Without, in any way, referring to

the merits of the Cause in which we have been engaged, your courage and determination, as exhibited on many hard-fought fields, has elicited the respect and admiration of friend and foe. And I now cheerfully and gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the officers and men of my command whose zeal, fidelity and unflinching bravery have been the great source of my past success in arms.

I have never, on the field of battle, sent you where I was unwilling to go myself; nor would I now advise you to a course which I felt myself unwilling to pursue. You have been good soldiers, you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the Government to which you have surrendered can afford to be, and will be, magnanimous."

—N.B. Forrest, Lieut.-General
Headquarters, Forrest's Cavalry Corps
Gainesville, Alabama
May 9, 1865

Impact of Forrest's doctrines

Forrest was one of the first men to grasp the doctrines of "mobile warfare" that became prevalent in the 20th century. Paramount in his strategy was fast movement, even if it meant pushing his horses at a killing pace, which he did more than once. Noted Civil War scholar Bruce Catton writes:

"Forrest ... used his horsemen as a modern general would use motorized infantry. He liked horses because he liked fast movement, and his mounted men could get from here to there much faster than any infantry could; but when they reached the field they usually tied their horses to trees and fought on foot, and they were as good as the very best infantry. Not for nothing did Forrest say the essence of strategy was 'to git thar fust with the most men'."

Forrest is often erroneously quoted as saying his strategy was to "git thar fustest with the mostest." Now often recast as "Getting there firstest with the mostest,"[42] this misquote first appeared in print in a New York Tribune article written to provide colorful comments in reaction to European interest in Civil War generals. The aphorism was addressed and corrected by a New York Times story in 1918 to be: "Ma'am, I got there first with the most men." Though a novel and succinct condensation of the military's Principles of mass and maneuver, Bruce Catton writes:


"Do not, under any circumstances whatever, quote Forrest as saying 'fustest' and 'mostest'. He did not say it that way, and nobody who knows anything about him imagines that he did."

Forrest became well-known for his early use of "maneuver" tactics as applied to a mobile horse cavalry deployment. He sought to constantly harass the enemy in fast-moving raids, and to disrupt supply trains and enemy communications by destroying railroad track and cutting telegraph lines, as he wheeled around the Union Army's flank.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Bedford_Forrest



ARMY LISTS



WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION 1861 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: not pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-1 INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	2	2	3	6	13	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Regular	2	2	3	7	8	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

"90 days": Every second unit of Regulars is *Unmotivated* (-1)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	2	3	3	7	11	S
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Battery of Horse Artillery (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

CONFEDERATE 1861 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-1 DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	8	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled* and 0-1 per two units of Regular.

0-1 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

0-2 units may have *Redoubt* (+50)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	3	4	3	7	12	S
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Sharpshooters are 0-1.

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Quaker Guns (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION 1862 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-1 INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	2	2	3	6	13	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	2	3	3	7	9	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled* and 0-1 per two units of Regular.

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	2	3	3	7	11	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

ARTILLERY

0-3 Battery of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Horse Artillery (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

CONFEDERATE 1862 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-2 DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	8	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-1 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

0-2 units may have *Redoubt* (+50)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	3	4	3	7	12	S
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Sharpshooters are 0-1.

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-2 Battery of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Horse Artillery (2-4)

0-1 Quaker Guns (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION 1862 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: not pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-1 INFERIOR DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	2	2	3	6	13	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	2	3	3	7	9	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled* and 0-1 per two units of Regular.

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	2	3	3	7	11	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

ARTILLERY

0-3 Batteries of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Iron Clad Support (optional)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

CONFEDERATE 1862 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50%

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	4	3	7	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

0-1 PARTISAN RANGERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	12	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

0-1 INDIAN MOUNTED RIFLES

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	12	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, rifle **AV: 1**

0-1 INDIAN MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	10	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, musket **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-1 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

0-2 units may have *Redoubt* (+50)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	3	4	3	7	12	S
Scout/Ranger	3	3	3	7	10	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Indian	3	2	3	6	8	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Sharpshooters are 0-1.

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave and Indians have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-1 Battery of Guns (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION 1863-1865 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50% (up to 10% Colored Troops)

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

0-2 DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	7	16	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
 May have repeating rifles (+2) and SA4 (+2)

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	2	3	3	7	11	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

COLORED TROOPS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	11	L
Volunteer	2	3	3	7	8	L
"Contraband"	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-1 ENTRENCHMENT

ARTILLERY

0-3 Batteries of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Horse Artillery (2-4)

0-1 Iron Clad Support (optional)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

CONFEDERATE 1863-1865 WEST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%
SIP: not pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

- 1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP
- 2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP
- 3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP
- 4 = Mo9, 2 SIP
- 5 = Mo9, 3 SIP
- 6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	8	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	4	3	7	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

0-1 PARTISAN RANGERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	12	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

0-1 INDIAN MOUNTED RIFLES

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	12	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, rifle **AV: 1**

0-1 INDIAN MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	6	10	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, musket **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Foreign Legion	2	3	3	6	6	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-1 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

0-2 may have *Redoubt* (+50)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	3	4	3	7	12	S
Scout/Ranger	3	3	3	7	10	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Indian	3	2	3	6	8	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Sharpshooters are 0-1.

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave and Indians have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

0-2 ENTRENCHMENTS

ARTILLERY

0-2 Batteries of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Horse Artillery (2-4)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION 1863-1865 EAST

CHARACTERS: Up to 25%

CAVALRY: Up to 25%

INFANTRY: At least 50% (up to 10% Colored Troops)

ARTILLERY: Up to 25%

SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	7	16	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
 May have repeating rifles (+2) and SA4 (+2)

COLORED LIGHT CAVALRY

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	3	3	7	16	S

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**

INFANTRY

REGULARS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-2 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

"3-Years": from 1864 on every second unit is *Unmotivated*, (-1)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	2	3	3	7	11	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	6	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

COLORED TROOPS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Veteran	3	3	3	7	11	L
Volunteer	2	3	3	7	8	L
"Contraband "	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-1 ENTRENCHMENTS

ARTILLERY

0-3 Batteries of Guns (2-4)

0-2 Horse Artillery (2-4)

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CONFEDERATE 1863-1865 EAST
CHARACTERS: Up to 25%
CAVALRY: Up to 25%
INFANTRY: At least 50%
ARTILLERY: Up to 25%
SIP: automatically pooled

CHARACTERS	CA	SA	KA	Mo	L	S	Pts
Brigade General	-	-	-	9	2	+1	160
Political General	-	-	-	7-9	2	+1	50
Officer	-	-	-	8	1	+1	70
Aide de Camp	-	-	-	8	1	-	60

Equipment and Armor Value: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: Zone of Command 10". In games with 4000pts and more the Army General can be upgraded to Division General with Mo10 and Zone of Command 15" (50pts). May ride a horse. One officer per 1000pts allowed. Aide de Camp counts as Battle Standard.

In case of a Political General roll D6 prior the battle:

1 = Mo7, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

2 = Mo8, no +1 bonus in 10", 0 SIP

3 = Mo9, no +1 bonus in 10", 1 SIP

4 = Mo9, 2 SIP

5 = Mo9, 3 SIP

6 = Mo9, 4 SIP

Brigade General 2 SIP (3 if upgraded), may add up 2 SIP, 20pts each. Officer 1 SIP, may add up to one SIP for 20 points.

CAVALRY

DRAGOONS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Dragoon	3	3	3	8	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

0-1 LIGHT HORSE

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Light	3	4	3	7	20	L

Equipment: Hand weapon, pistols **AV: 1**
Special Rules: *May Skirmish*

INFANTRY	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
REGULARS						
Veteran	3	3	3	7	12	L
Regular	3	3	3	7	10	L
Foreign Legion	2	3	3	6	6	L
Recruit	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Veterans are *Drilled*.

0-2 unit may have *Ambush* (+10)

0-2 units may have *Redoubt* (+50)

VOLUNTEERS

	CA	SA	KA	Mo	Pts	F
Sharpshooter	3	4	3	7	12	S
Zuave	3	3	3	7	10	L
Volunteer	2	2	3	6	5	L

Equipment: Rifle, bayonet

Sharpshooters are 0-1.

0-1 unit of Volunteers per two units of Regulars

Zuave have *May Skirmish*.

Special Rules: *Undisciplined*

0-2 ENTRENCHMENTS


ARTILLERY

0-2 Batteries of Guns (2-4)

0-1 Horse Artillery (2-4)



BATTLES



WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

GETTYSBURG

The **Battle of Gettysburg** was fought July 1–3, 1863, in and around the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The battle with the largest number of casualties in the American Civil War,^[7] it is often described as the war's turning point. Union Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade's Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, ending Lee's invasion of the North.

After his success at Chancellorsville in Virginia in May 1863, Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley to begin his second invasion of the North—the Gettysburg Campaign. With his army in high spirits, Lee intended to shift the focus of the summer campaign from war-ravaged northern Virginia and hoped to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war by penetrating as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or even Philadelphia. Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit, but was relieved just three days before the battle and replaced by Meade.

Elements of the two armies initially collided at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there, his objective being to engage the Union army and destroy it. Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division under Brig. Gen. John Buford, and soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of town to the hills just to the south.

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a fishhook. In the late afternoon of July 2, Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the Union right, demonstrations escalated into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. All across the battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held their lines.


On the third day of battle, July 3, fighting resumed on Culp's Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by 12,500 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, known as Pickett's Charge. The charge was repulsed by Union rifle and artillery fire, at great losses to the Confederate army. Lee led his army on a torturous retreat back to Virginia. Between 46,000 and 51,000 soldiers from both armies were casualties in the three-day battle. That November, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.

Background and movement to battle

Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 30 – May 6, 1863), Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland Campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam). Such a move would upset Federal plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much-needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army^[3] could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and possibly strengthen the growing peace movement in the North.^[9]

Thus, on June 3, Lee's army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg, Virginia. To attain more efficiency in his command, Lee had reorganized his two large corps into three new corps. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet retained command of his First Corps. The old corps of deceased Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was divided in two, with the Second Corps going to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and the new Third Corps to Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill. The Cavalry Division was commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.^[10]

The Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an Artillery Reserve, for a combined strength of about 94,000 men.^[2] However, President Lincoln replaced Hooker with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, a Pennsylvanian, because of Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville and his timid response to Lee's second invasion north of the Potomac River.



Gettysburg Campaign (through July 3); cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.

*Red - Confederate
Blue - Union*

The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between opposing cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper, Virginia. The 9,500 Confederate cavalymen under Stuart were surprised by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force of two cavalry divisions (8,000 troopers) and 3,000 infantry, but Stuart eventually repulsed the Union attack. The inconclusive battle, the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war, proved for the first time that the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart.^[11]

By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Federal garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's corps followed on June 24 and June 25. Hooker's army pursued, keeping between the U.S. capital and Lee's army. The Federals crossed the Potomac from June 25 to June 27.^[12]

Lee gave strict orders for his army to minimize any negative impacts on the civilian population.^[13] Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright, although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants with Confederate money were not well received. Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction. During the invasion, the Confederates seized some 40 northern African Americans, a few of whom were escaped fugitive slaves but most were freemen. They were sent south into slavery under guard.^[14]

On June 26, elements of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's division of Ewell's Corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early laid the borough under tribute but did not

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
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

collect any significant supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge, and destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.^[15]

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed Jeb Stuart to take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry, as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 miles (45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 miles (48 km) north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River.

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to get rid of him, immediately accepted. They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, then commander of the V Corps.^[17]

On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River, he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight miles (13 km) west of Gettysburg.^[18] On June 30, while part of Hill's Corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades, North Carolinians under Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured toward Gettysburg. In his memoirs, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town—especially shoes.^[19]




This 1863 oval-shaped map depicts Gettysburg Battlefield during July 1–3, 1863, showing troop and artillery positions and movements, relief hachures, drainage, roads, railroads, and houses with the names of residents at the time of the Battle of Gettysburg.

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the

following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.

First day of battle



Overview map of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863

Anticipating that the Confederates would march on Gettysburg from the west on the morning of July 1, Buford laid out his defenses on three ridges west of the town: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary Ridge. These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small cavalry division against superior Confederate infantry forces, meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town at Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Culp's Hill. Buford understood that if the Confederates could gain control of these heights, Meade's army would have difficulty dislodging them.

Heth's division advanced with two brigades forward, commanded by Brig. Gens. James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis. They proceeded easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike. Three miles (5 km) west of town, about 7:30 a.m. on July 1, the two brigades met light resistance from vedettes of Union cavalry, and deployed into line. According to lore, the Union soldier to fire the first shot of the battle was Lt. Marcellus Jones.^[22] In 1886 Lt. Jones returned to Gettysburg to mark the spot where he fired the first shot with a monument. Eventually, Heth's men reached dismounted troopers of Col. William Gamble's cavalry brigade, who raised determined resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence posts with fire from their breechloading carbines. Still, by 10:20 a.m., the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I Corps (Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds) finally arrived.

North of the pike, Davis gained a temporary success against Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade but was repulsed with heavy losses in an action around an unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge. South of the pike, Archer's brigade assaulted through Herbst (also known as McPherson's) Woods. The Federal Iron Brigade under Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith

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enjoyed initial success against Archer, capturing several hundred men, including Archer himself.

General Reynolds was shot and killed early in the fighting while directing troop and artillery placements just to the east of the woods. Shelby Foote wrote that the Union cause lost a man considered by many to be "the best general in the army." Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday assumed command. Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike area lasted until about 12:30 p.m. It resumed around 2:30 p.m., when Heth's entire division engaged, adding the brigades of Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough.^[28]

As Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade came on line, they flanked the 19th Indiana and drove the Iron Brigade back. The 26th North Carolina (the largest regiment in the army with 839 men) lost heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212 men. By the end of the three-day battle, they had about 152 men standing, the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any regiment, North or South. Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward Seminary Ridge. Hill added Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's division to the assault, and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds of the Lutheran Seminary and Gettysburg streets.

As the fighting to the west proceeded, two divisions of Ewell's Second Corps, marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with Lee's order for the army to concentrate in that vicinity, turned south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads toward Gettysburg, while the Union XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) raced north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. By early afternoon, the Federal line ran in a semicircle west, north, and northeast of Gettysburg.

However, the Federals did not have enough troops; Cutler, who was deployed north of the Chambersburg Pike, had his right flank in the air. The leftmost division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy in time to strengthen the line, so Doubleday was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage his line.

Around 2 p.m., the Confederate Second Corps divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal Early assaulted and out-flanked the Union I and XI Corps positions north and northwest of town. The Confederate brigades of Col. Edward A. O'Neal and Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses assaulting the I Corps division of Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson south of Oak Hill. Early's division profited from a blunder by Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, when he advanced his XI Corps division to Blocher's Knoll (directly north of town and now known as Barlow's Knoll); this represented a salient^[33] in the corps line, susceptible to attack from multiple sides, and Early's troops overran Barlow's division, which constituted the right flank of the Union Army's position. Barlow was wounded and captured in the attack.

As Federal positions collapsed both north and west of town, Gen. Howard ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town at Cemetery Hill, where he had left the division of Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr in reserve.^[35] Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock assumed command of the battlefield, sent by Meade when he heard that Reynolds had been killed. Hancock, commander of the II Corps and Meade's most trusted subordinate, was ordered to take command of the field and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a major battle.^[36] Hancock told Howard, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." When Howard agreed, Hancock concluded the discussion: "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Hancock's determination had a morale-boosting effect on the retreating Union soldiers, but he played no direct tactical role on the first day.

General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable." Ewell, who had previously served under Stonewall Jackson, a general well known for issuing peremptory orders, determined such an assault was not practicable and, thus, did not attempt it; this decision is considered by historians to be a great missed opportunity.^[38]


The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days, ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.

Second day of battle

Plans and movement to battle

Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Longstreet's third division, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Pickett, had begun the march from Chambersburg early in the morning; it did not arrive until late on July 2.^[40]

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly two miles (3 km) along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top. Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation. The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about a mile (1,600 m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Federal army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five miles (8 km) long.



Robert E. Lee's plan for July 2, 1863

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for Longstreet's First Corps to position itself stealthily to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road, and to roll up the Federal line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed by Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill's Third Corps. The progressive *en echelon* sequence of this attack would prevent Meade from shifting troops from his center to bolster his left. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's and Jubal Early's Second Corps divisions were to make a demonstration against Culp's and Cemetery Hills (again, to prevent the shifting of Federal troops), and to turn the demonstration into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Instead of moving beyond the Federals' left and attacking their flank, Longstreet's left division, under McLaws, would face Maj.


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Gen. Daniel Sickles's III Corps directly in their path. Sickles had been dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Seeing higher ground more favorable to artillery positions a half mile (800 m) to the west, he advanced his corps—without orders—to the slightly higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to the Sherfy farm's Peach Orchard, then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm. This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road) and Maj. Gen. David B. Birney's division (to the south) were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could defend effectively.

Longstreet's attack was to be made as early as practicable; however, Longstreet got permission from Lee to await the arrival of one of his brigades, and while marching to the assigned position, his men came within sight of a Union signal station on Little Round Top. Countermarching to avoid detection wasted much time, and Hood's and McLaws's divisions did not launch their attacks until just after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.

Attacks on the Union left flank



Overview map of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863

As Longstreet's divisions slammed into the Union III Corps, Meade was forced to send 20,000 reinforcements^[45] in the form of the entire V Corps, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and small portions of the newly arrived VI Corps. The Confederate assault deviated from Lee's plan since Hood's division moved more easterly than intended, losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg Road,^[46] attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws, coming in on Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps in the Wheatfield and overwhelmed them in Sherfy's Peach Orchard. McLaws's attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of Death") before being beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, moving down from Little Round Top. The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle, and Sickles's leg was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball. Caldwell's division was

destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield. Anderson's division, coming from McLaws's left and starting forward around 6 p.m., reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, but it could not hold the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps, including an almost suicidal bayonet charge by the small 1st Minnesota regiment against a Confederate brigade, ordered in desperation by Hancock to buy time for reinforcements to arrive. As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Col. Strong Vincent of V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important hill at the extreme left of the Union line. His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade of Hood's division. Meade's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, had realized the importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade, an artillery battery, and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood's troops arrived. The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the 20th Maine was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain into prominence after the war.

Attacks on the Union right flank

About 7:00 p.m., the Second Corps' attack by Johnson's division on Culp's Hill got off to a late start. Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, and the only portion of the corps remaining on the hill was a brigade of New Yorkers under Brig. Gen. George S. Greene. Because of Greene's insistence on constructing strong defensive works, and with reinforcements from the I and XI Corps, Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, although the Southerners did capture a portion of the abandoned Federal works on the lower part of Culp's Hill.

Just at dark, two of Jubal Early's brigades attacked the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill where Col. Andrew L. Harris of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, came under a withering attack, losing half his men; however, Early failed to support his brigades in their attack, and Ewell's remaining division, that of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, failed to aid Early's attack by moving against Cemetery Hill from the west. The Union army's interior lines enabled its commanders to shift troops quickly to critical areas, and with reinforcements from II Corps, the Federal troops retained possession of East Cemetery Hill, and Early's brigades were forced to withdraw.



Union breastworks on Culp's Hill

Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day's battle. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton's brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23-year-old Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer's Michigan cavalry near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg.


Third day of battle

General Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the Federal left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill. However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops started a

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dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m., after some seven hours of bitter combat. Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the Federal II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the Federal positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's line.



Overview map of the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863

Around 1 p.m., from 150 to 170 Confederate guns began an artillery bombardment that was probably the largest of the war. In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew would follow, the Army of the Potomac's artillery, under the command of Brig. Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, at first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15 minutes, about 80 Federal cannons added to the din. The Army of Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position. Around 3 p.m., the cannon fire subsided, and 12,500 Southern soldiers stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three-quarters of a mile (1,200 m) to Cemetery Ridge in what is known to history as "Pickett's Charge". As the Confederates approached, there was fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top, and musket and canister fire from Hancock's II Corps. In the Union center, the commander of artillery had held fire during the Confederate bombardment, leading Southern commanders to believe the Northern cannon batteries had been knocked out. However, they opened fire on the Confederate infantry during their approach with devastating results. Nearly one half of the attackers did not return to their own lines. Although the Federal line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog called the "Angle" in a low stone fence, just north of a patch of vegetation called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach, and the Confederate attack was repulsed. The farthest advance of Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead's brigade of Maj. Gen. George Pickett's division at the Angle is referred to as the "High-water

mark of the Confederacy", arguably representing the closest the South ever came to its goal of achieving independence from the Union via military victory.^[56]

There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. Stuart was sent to guard the Confederate left flank and was to be prepared to exploit any success the infantry might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Federal right and hitting their trains and lines of communications. Three miles (5 km) east of Gettysburg, in what is now called "East Cavalry Field" (not shown on the accompanying map, but between the York and Hanover Roads), Stuart's forces collided with Federal cavalry: Brig. Gen. David McMurtre Gregg's division and Brig. Gen. Custer's brigade. A lengthy mounted battle, including hand-to-hand sabre combat, ensued. Custer's charge, leading the 1st Michigan Cavalry, blunted the attack by Wade Hampton's brigade, blocking Stuart from achieving his objectives in the Federal rear. Meanwhile, after hearing news of the day's victory, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick launched a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move but obeyed orders. Farnsworth was killed in the attack, and his brigade suffered significant losses.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gettysburg



ORDERS OF BATTLE



WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

CONFEDERATES

Army of Northern Virginia, Gettysburg, July 1-3 1863

General Robert E. Lee, Commanding

General Staff

Chief of Staff and Inspector General: Col Robert H. Chilton
Chief of Artillery: BG William N. Pendleton
Medical Director: Dr. Lafayette Guild
Chief of Ordnance: Ltc Briscoe G. Baldwin
Chief of Commissary: Ltc Robert G. Cole
Chief Quartermaster: Ltc James L. Corley
Judge Advocate General: Maj Henry E. Young
Military Secretary and Acting Asst. Chief of Artillery: Col Armistead L. Long
Asst. Inspector General: Col Henry L. Peyton
Asst. Inspector General and Asst. Adjutant General: Maj Henry E. Young
Asst. Inspector General and Asst. Adjutant General: Maj Giles B. Cook
Aide de Camp and Asst. Adjutant General: Maj Walter H. Taylor
Aide de Camp and Asst. Military Secretary: Maj Charles Marshall
Aide de Camp and Asst. Inspector General: Maj Charles S. Venable
Aide de Camp: Maj Thomas M. R. Talcott
Aide de Camp: Lt George W. Peterkin
Engineer: Col William P. Smith
Engineer: Cpt Samuel R. Johnson

General Headquarters

Escort: 39th Virginia Cavalry Battalion (companies A & C)

First Corps

LTG James Longstreet, Commanding

General Staff:

Chief of Staff: Maj Moxley Sorrel (w)
Signal Officer: Cpt Jacob H. Manning
Quartermaster: Maj Samuel P. Mitchell
Commissary and subsistence: Maj Raphael J. Moses
Asst. Adjutant General & Asst. Inspector General: Maj Osmun Latrobe
Engineer: Maj John J. Clarke
Aide de Camp: Cpt Thomas J. Goree
Medical Director: Dr. John S. D. Cullen
Division Brigade Regiments and Others

McLaws' Division

MG Lafayette McLaws
Kershaw's Brigade:

BG Joseph B. Kershaw
2nd South Carolina: Col John D. Kennedy (w), Ltc Franklin Gaillard, Maj William Wallace
3rd South Carolina: Ltc David Langston (k), Maj Robert C. Maffett, Col James D. Nance[1]
7th South Carolina: Col David W. Aiken, Ltc Elbert Bland (w)
8th South Carolina: Col John W. Henagan, Maj D. M. McCleod (mw)
15th South Carolina: Col William D. de Saussure (mw), Maj William M. Gist
3rd South Carolina Battalion: Ltc William G. Rice, Maj D. B. Miller (w)

Barksdale's Brigade

BG William Barksdale (mw)
Col Benjamin G. Humphreys
13th Mississippi: Col James W. Carter (k), Ltc Kennon McElroy (k), Maj John M. Bradley (mw)

17th Mississippi: Col William D. Holder (w), Ltc John C. Fiser (w), Acting Maj Andrew J. Pulliam (w), Acting Maj Richard E. Jones (k), Cpt Gwen R. Cherry
18th Mississippi: Col Thomas M. Griffin (w), Ltc William H. Luse (c), Maj George B. Gerald
21st Mississippi: Col Benjamin G. Humphreys

Semmes' Brigade

BG Paul J. Semmes (mw)
Col Goode Bryan
10th Georgia: Col John B. Weems (w)
50th Georgia: Col William R. Manning
51st Georgia: Col Edward Ball
53rd Georgia: Col James P. Simms

Wofford's Brigade

BG William T. Wofford
16th Georgia: Col Goode Bryan
18th Georgia: Ltc Solon Z. Ruff
24th Georgia: Col Robert McMillan
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion: Ltc Luther J. Glenn
Phillips' (Georgia) Legion: Col William Phillips
3rd Georgia Sharpshooter Battalion: Ltc Nathan Hutchins

Cabell's Artillery Battalion

Col Henry C. Cabell
Maj Samuel P. Hamilton
1st North Carolina Artillery, Battery A: Cpt Basil C. Manly
Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery: Cpt John C. Fraser (mw), Lt William J. Furlong
1st Richmond Howitzers: Cpt Edward S. McCarthy (w), Lt Robert M. Anderson
Troup (Georgia) Artillery: Cpt Henry H. Carlton (w), Lt C. W. Motes

Pickett's Division

MG George E. Pickett

Garnett's Brigade

BG Richard B. Garnett (k)
Maj Charles S. Peyton
8th Virginia: Col Eppa Hunton (w), Ltc Norborne Berkeley (w&c), Maj Edmund Berkeley (w)
18th Virginia: Ltc Henry A. Carrington (w&c)
19th Virginia: Col Henry Gantt (w), Ltc John T. Ellis (mw), Maj Charles S. Peyton
28th Virginia: Col Robert C. Allen (k), Ltc William Watts, Maj Nathaniel C. Wilson (mw)
56th Virginia: Col William D. Stuart (mw), Ltc P. P. Slaughter

Kemper's Brigade

BG James L. Kemper (w&c)
Col Joseph Mayo, Jr
1st Virginia: Col Lewis B. Williams, Jr (mw), Ltc F. G. Skinner, Maj Francis H. Langley (w)
3rd Virginia: Col Joseph Mayo Jr, Ltc Alexander D. Callcote (k), Maj William H. Pryor
7th Virginia: Col Waller T. Patton (mw&c), Ltc Charles C. Flowerree
11th Virginia: Maj Kirkwood Otey (w), Cpt James R. Hutter (w&c), Cpt John Holmes Smith (w), Cpt Albert W. Douthat
24th Virginia: Col William R. Terry (w), Maj Joseph A. Hambrick (w), Cpt William N. Bentley

Armistead's Brigade

BG Lewis A. Armistead (mw&c)
Ltc William White (w)
Maj Joseph R. Cabell
Col William R. Aylett [3]
9th Virginia: Maj John C. Owens (mw), Cpt James J. Phillips

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

14th Virginia: Col James G. Hodges (k), Ltc William White (w),
Maj Robert H. Poore (mw)
38th Virginia: Col Edward C. Edmonds (k), Ltc Powhatan B.
Whittle (mw), Maj Joseph R. Cabell
53rd Virginia: Col William R. Aylett (w), Ltc Rawley W. Martin
(w&c), Maj John C. Timberlake (c), Cpt Henry Edmunds
57th Virginia: Col John B. Magruder (mw&c), Ltc Benjamin H.
Wade (mw), Maj Clement R. Fontaine

Dearing's Artillery Battalion

Maj James Dearing
Maj John P. W. Read (w)
Fauquier (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Robert M. Stribling
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt William H. Caskie
Richmond Fayette (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Miles C. Macon
Blount's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Joseph G. Blount

Hood's Division

MG John Bell Hood (w)
BG Evander M. Law

Law's Brigade

BG Evander M. Law
Col James L. Sheffield
4th Alabama: Ltc Laurence H. Scruggs
15th Alabama: Col William C. Oates, Cpt Blanton A. Hill
44th Alabama: Col William F. Perry (w), Ltc John H. Jones, Maj
George W. Cary
47th Alabama: Ltc Michael J. Bulger (w&c), Maj James M.
Campbell
48th Alabama: Col James L. Sheffield, Ltc W. M. Hardwick (w),
Maj C. B. St. John (w), Cpt T. J. Eubanks (w)

Robertson's Brigade

BG Jerome B. Robertson (w)
Ltc Philip A. Work
3rd Arkansas: Col Van H. Manning (w), Ltc Robert S. Taylor,
Maj John W. Reedy
1st Texas: Ltc Philip A. Work, Maj Frederick S. Bass
4th Texas: Col John C. G. Key (w), Ltc Benjamin F. Carter
(mw), Maj John P. Bane
5th Texas: Col Robert M. Powell (w&c), Ltc King Bryan (w),
Maj Jefferson C. Rogers

Anderson's Brigade

BG George T. Anderson (w)
Ltc William Luffman (w)
7th Georgia: Col William W. White
8th Georgia: Col John R. Towers
9th Georgia: Ltc John C. Mounger (k), Maj William M. Jones
(w), Cpt George Hillyer
11th Georgia: Col Francis H. Little, Ltc William Luffman, Maj
Henry D. McDaniel
59th Georgia: Col William A. Jackson Brown (w), Maj Bolivar
H. Gee (w), Cpt M. G. Bass

Benning's Brigade

BG Henry L. Benning
2nd Georgia: Ltc William T. Harris (k), Maj William S.
Shepherd
15th Georgia: Col Dudley M. Du Bose, Ltc Stephen Z.
Hearnsberger
17th Georgia: Col Wesley C. Hodges
20th Georgia: Col John A. Jones (k), Ltc James D. Waddell

Henry's Artillery Battalion

Maj Mathias W. Henry
Maj John C. Haskell
Branch (North Carolina) Battery: Cpt Alexander C. Latham

Charleston German (South Carolina) Artillery: Cpt William K.
Bachman
Palmetto (South Carolina) Light Artillery: Cpt Hugh R. Garden
Rowan North Carolina Artillery: Cpt James Reilly

Artillery Reserve

Col James B. Walton
Alexander's Artillery Battalion

Col Edward P. Alexander (w)
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr (w), Lt
James Woolfolk
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Tyler C. Jordan
Brooks (South Carolina) Artillery: Cpt William W. Fickling
Madison (Louisiana) Light Artillery: Cpt George V. Moody
Richmond (Virginia) Battery: Cpt William W. Parker
Bath (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Osmond B. Taylor

Washington (Louisiana) Artillery Battalion

Maj Benjamin F. Eshleman
First Company: Cpt Charles W. Squires
Second Company: Cpt John B. Richardson
Third Company: Cpt Merritt B. Miller
Fourth Company: Cpt Joseph Norcom (w), Lt H. A. Battles

Second Corps

LTG Richard S. Ewell, Commanding

General Staff:
Aide de Camp: MG Isaac R. Trimble
Chief of Staff: Col Charles J. Faulkner
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj Alexander S. Pendleton
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj George C. Brown
Aide de Camp: Cpt James P. Smith
Aide de Camp: Lt Thomas T. Turner
Asst. Adjutant General & Asst. Inspector General: Col Abner
Smead
Asst. Inspector General: Maj Benjamin H. Green
Asst. Quartermaster: Maj John A. Harman
Commissaries and subsistence: Maj Wells J. Hawks
Engineer: Cpt Henry B. Richardson (w&c)
Topographical engineer: Cpt Jedediah Hotchkiss
Ordnance: Maj William Allen
Signal Officer: Cpt Richard E. Wilbourn
Medical Director: Dr. Hunter H. McGuire
Escort: Randolph's Company Virginia Cavalry, Cpt William F.
Randolph
Provost Guard: 1st North Carolina Battalion Sharpshooters
Division Brigade Regiments and Others

Early's Division

MG Jubal A. Early

Hays' Brigade

BG Harry T. Hays
5th Louisiana: Maj Alexander Hart (w), Cpt T. H. Biscoe
6th Louisiana: Ltc Joseph Hanlon
7th Louisiana: Col David B. Penn
8th Louisiana: Col Trevanian D. Lewis (k), Ltc Alcibiades de
Blanc (w), Maj German A. Lester
9th Louisiana: Col Leroy A. Stafford

Smith's Brigade

BG William Smith
31st Virginia: Col John S. Hoffman
49th Virginia: Ltc Jonathan C. Gibson
52nd Virginia: Ltc James H. Skinner (w)

Hoke's Brigade

Col Isaac E. Avery (mw)
Col Archibald C. Godwin
6th North Carolina: Maj Samuel McD. Tate
21st North Carolina: Col William W. Kirkland, Maj James Beall

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

57th North Carolina: Col Archibald C. Godwin, Ltc Hamilton C. Jones

Gordon's Brigade

BG John B. Gordon
13th Georgia: Col James M. Smith
26th Georgia: Col Edmund N. Atkinson
31st Georgia: Col Clement A. Evans (w)
38th Georgia: Ltc William L. McLeod (k), Lt. John Oglesby (k), Lt. W.F. Goodwin (k)
60th Georgia: Cpt Walters B. Jones
61st Georgia: Col John H. Lamar, Maj Peter Brenan (k)

Jones' Artillery Battalion

Ltc Hilary P. Jones
Charlottesville (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt James McD. Carrington
Courtney (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt William A. Tanner
Louisiana Guard Artillery: Cpt Charles A. Green
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Asher W. Garber

Cavalry

35th Virginia Battalion: Ltc Elijah V. White

Johnson's Division

MG Edward Johnson

Steuart's Brigade

BG George H. Steuart
1st Maryland Battalion: Ltc James R. Herbert (w), Maj William W. Goldsborough (w&c), Cpt James P. Crane
1st North Carolina: Ltc Hamilton A. Brown
3rd North Carolina: Maj William M. Parsley
10th Virginia: Col Edward T. H. Warren
23rd Virginia: Ltc Simeon T. Walton
37th Virginia: Maj Henry C. Wood

Stonewall Brigade

BG James A. Walker
2nd Virginia: Col John Q. A. Nadenbousch
4th Virginia: Maj William Terry
5th Virginia: Col John H. S. Funk, Maj James W. Newton
27th Virginia: Ltc Daniel M. Shriver
33rd Virginia: Cpt Jacob B. Golladay

Nicholls' Brigade

Col Jesse M. Williams
1st Louisiana: Ltc Michael Nolan (k), Cpt Edward D. Willett
2nd Louisiana: Ltc Ross E. Burke (w&c)
10th Louisiana: Maj Thomas N. Powell
14th Louisiana: Ltc David Zable
15th Louisiana: Maj Andrew Brady

Jones' Brigade

BG John M. Jones (w)
Ltc Robert H. Dungan
21st Virginia: Cpt William P. Moseley
25th Virginia: Col John C. Higginbotham (w), Ltc J. A. Robinson, Maj Robert D. Lilley
42nd Virginia: Ltc Robert W. Withers (w), Cpt Samuel H. Saunders
44th Virginia: Maj Norval Cobb (w), Cpt Thomas R. Buckner
48th Virginia: Ltc Robert H. Dungan, Maj Oscar White
50th Virginia: Ltc Logan H. N. Salyer, Maj L. J. Perkins

Andrews' Artillery Battalion

Maj Joseph W. Latimer (mw)
Cpt Charles I. Raine
1st Maryland Battery: Cpt William F. Dement
Alleghany (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt John C. Carpenter
Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery: Cpt William D. Brown (mw)

Lee (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Charles I. Raine, Lt William W. Hardwicke

Rodes' Division

MG Robert E. Rodes

Daniel's Brigade

BG Junius Daniel
32nd North Carolina: Col Edmund C. Brabble, Ltc David G. Coward, Maj Henry G. Lewis (w&c)
43rd North Carolina: Col Thomas S. Kenan (w&c), Ltc William G. Lewis
45th North Carolina: Ltc Samuel H. Boyd (w&c), Maj John R. Winston (w&c), Cpt A. H. Gallaway (w), Cpt James A. Hopkins
53rd North Carolina: Col William A. Owens, Ltc James T. Morehead, Jr. (w&c), Maj James J. Iredell
2nd North Carolina Battalion: Ltc Hezekiah L. Andrews (k), Maj John M. Hancock (w&c), Cpt Van Brown

Doles' Brigade

BG George P. Doles
4th Georgia: Ltc David R. E. Winn (k), Maj William H. Willis
12th Georgia: Col Edward S. Willis, Maj Isaac Hardeman (w)
21st Georgia: Col John T. Mercer, Ltc Thomas W. Hooper, Maj Thomas C. Glover
44th Georgia: Col Samuel P. Lumpkin (w&c), Maj William H. Peebles

Iverson's Brigade

BG Alfred Iverson, Jr.
5th North Carolina: Cpt Speight B. West (w), Cpt Benjamin Robinson (w)
12th North Carolina: Ltc William Davis, Maj Robert W. Alston
20th North Carolina: Ltc Nelson Slough (w), Maj John S. Brooks (w), Cpt Lewis T. Hicks
23rd North Carolina: Col Daniel H. Christie (mw), Ltc Robert D. Johnston (w), Maj Charles C. Blacknall (w&c), Cpt Abner D. Peace (w), Cpt William H. Johnston (w), Cpt Vines E. Turner

Ramseur's Brigade

BG Stephen D. Ramseur
2nd North Carolina: Maj Daniel W. Hurtt (w), Cpt James T. Scales
4th North Carolina: Col Bryan Grimes, Ltc James M. Wood, Maj Edwin A. Osborne
14th North Carolina: Col Risden T. Bennett (w), Maj Joseph H. Lambeth
30th North Carolina: Col Francis M. Parker (w), Maj William W. Sellers

Rodes' (old) Brigade

Col Edward A. O'Neal
3rd Alabama: Col Cullen A. Battle, Ltc Charles M. Forsyth, Maj Robert M. Sands
5th Alabama: Col Josephus M. Hall, Maj Eugene Blackford
6th Alabama: Col James N. Lightfoot (w), Maj Isaac F. Culver (w), Cpt Milledge L. Bowie
12th Alabama: Col Samuel B. Pickens, Maj J. A. Proskamer
26th Alabama: Ltc John C. Goodgame

Carter's Artillery Battalion

Ltc Thomas H. Carter
Jefferson Davis (Alabama) Artillery: Cpt William J. Reese
King William (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt William P. P. Carter
Morris (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Richard C. M. Page (w), Lt Samuel H. Pendleton
Orange (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Charles W. Fry

Artillery Reserve

Col J. Thompson Brown
First Virginia Artillery Battalion

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

Cpt Willis J. Dance
2nd Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers: Cpt David Watson
3rd Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers: Cpt Benjamin H. Smith, Jr.
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery: Lt John M. Cunningham
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Archibald Graham
Salem (Virginia) Artillery: Lt Charles B. Griffin

Nelson's Artillery Battalion
Ltc William Nelson
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Thomas J. Kirkpatrick
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt John L. Massie
Milledge's Georgia Battery: Cpt John Milledge, Jr.

Third Corps **LTG Ambrose P. Hill, Commanding**

General Staff:
Chief of Staff: Maj William H. Palmer
Signal Officer: Cpt Richard H. T. Adams
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
Anderson's Division
MG Richard H. Anderson

Wilcox's Brigade

BG Cadmus M. Wilcox
8th Alabama: Ltc Hilary A. Herbert
9th Alabama: Cpt Joseph H. King (w)
10th Alabama: Col William H. Forney (w&c), Ltc James E. Shelley
11th Alabama: Col John C. C. Sanders (w), Ltc George E. Tayloe, Maj Richard J. Fletcher (w)
14th Alabama: Col Lucius Pinckard (w&c), Ltc James A. Broome

Mahone's Brigade

BG William Mahone
6th Virginia: Col George T. Rogers
12th Virginia: Col David A. Weisiger
16th Virginia: Col Joseph H. Ham
41st Virginia: Col William A. Parham
61st Virginia: Col Virginius D. Groner

Wright's Brigade

BG Ambrose R. Wright
Col William Gibson
BG Ambrose R. Wright
3rd Georgia: Col Edward J. Walker
22nd Georgia: Col Joseph Wasden (k), Capt Benjamin C. McCurry
48th Georgia: Col William Gibson (w&c), Capt Matthew R. Hall
2nd Georgia Battalion: Maj George W. Ross (mw&c), Cpt Charles J. Moffett

Perry's Brigade

Col David Lang
2nd Florida: Maj Walter R. Moore (w&c)
5th Florida: Cpt Richmond N. Gardner (w)
8th Florida: Ltc William Baya

Posey's Brigade

BG Carnot Posey (w), Colonel Nathaniel Harris
12th Mississippi: Col William H. Taylor
16th Mississippi: Col Samuel E. Baker (w)
19th Mississippi: Maj Thomas J. Hardin
48th Mississippi: Col Joseph M. Jayne

Cutt's Artillery Battalion

Maj John Lane
Company A: Cpt Hugh M. Ross
Company B: Cpt George M. Patterson

Company C: Cpt John T. Wingfield (w)

Heth's Division

MG Henry Heth (w)
BG James J. Pettigrew (w)
Pettigrew's Brigade[8]

BG James J. Pettigrew
Col James K. Marshall (k)
Maj John T. Jones (w)
11th North Carolina: Col Collett Leventhorpe (w&c), Maj Egbert A. Ross (k), Cpt Francis W. Bird
26th North Carolina: Col Henry K. Burgwyn, Jr (k), Ltc John R. Lane (w), Maj John T. Jones, Cpt H. C. Albright
47th North Carolina: Col George H. Faribault (w), Ltc John A. Graves (c), Ltc J. Owens Rogers
52nd North Carolina: Col James K. Marshall, Ltc Marcus A. Parks (w&c), Maj John Q. Richardson (mw&c)

Heth's (old) Brigade

Col John M. Brockenbrough
Col Robert M. Mayo [9]
40th Virginia: Cpt Thomas E. Betts, Cpt R. B. Davis
47th Virginia: Col Robert M. Mayo, Ltc John W. Lyell
55th Virginia: Col William S. Christian, Maj Charles N. Lawson
22nd Virginia Battalion: Maj John S. Bowles

Archer's Brigade

BG James J. Archer (w&c)
Col Birkett D. Fry (w&c)
Ltc Samuel G. Shepard
13th Alabama: Col Birkett D. Fry
5th Alabama Battalion: Maj Albert S. Van de Graaff
1st Tennessee (Provisional Army): Ltc Newton J. George (c), Maj Felix G. Buchanan (w), Cpt J. B. Turney
7th Tennessee: Col John A. Fite (c), Ltc Samuel G. Shepard
14th Tennessee: Cpt Bruce L. Phillips

Davis' Brigade

BG Joseph R. Davis (w)
2nd Mississippi: Col John M. Stone (w), Maj John A. Blair (c), Ltc David W. Humphries [9] (k)
11th Mississippi: Acting Col Francis M. Green (w), Maj Reuben D. Reynolds (w)
42nd Mississippi: Col Hugh R. Miller (mw&c), Cpt Andrew M. Nelson
55th North Carolina: Col John K. Connally (w), Ltc Maurice T. Smith (mw), Maj Alfred H. Belo (w), Cpt George A. Gilreath (k), Cpt E. Fletcher Satterfield

Garnett's Artillery Battalion

Ltc John J. Garnett
Donaldsonville (Louisiana) Artillery: Cpt Victor Maurin
Huger (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Joseph D. Moore
Lewis (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt John W. Lewis
Norfolk (Virginia) Blues Artillery: Cpt Charles R. Grandy

Pender's Division

MG William D. Pender (mw)
BG James H. Lane
MG Isaac R. Trimble (w&c)
BG James H. Lane

McGowan's Brigade

Col Abner M. Perrin
1st South Carolina (Provisional Army): Maj Charles W. McCreary
1st South Carolina Rifles: Cpt William M. Hadden
12th South Carolina: Col John L. Miller, Maj E. F. Bookter
13th South Carolina: Ltc Benjamin T. Brockman, Maj Isaac F. Hunt

WAR & CONQUEST

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14th South Carolina: Ltc Joseph N. Brown (w), Maj Edward Croft (w), Cpt James Boatwright

Lane's Brigade

BG James H. Lane
Col Clark M. Avery
7th North Carolina: Cpt J. McLeod Turner (w&c), Cpt James G. Harris
18th North Carolina: Col John D. Barry
28th North Carolina: Col Samuel D. Lowe (w), Ltc W. H. A. Speer
33rd North Carolina: Col Clark M. Avery, Maj Joseph H. Saunders (w&c)
37th North Carolina: Col William M. Barbour, Ltc William G. Morris, Maj O. N. Brown

Thomas' Brigade

BG Edward L. Thomas
14th Georgia: Col Robert W. Fulsom
35th Georgia: Col Bolling H. Holt, Ltc William H. McCulloch
45th Georgia: Col Thomas J. Simmons, Ltc Washington L. Grice
49th Georgia: Col Samuel T. Player

Scales' Brigade

BG Alfred M. Scales (w)
Ltc George T. Gordon
Col William L. J. Lowrance
13th North Carolina: Col Joseph H. Hyman (w), Ltc Henry A. Rogers, Maj Elijah B. Withers
16th North Carolina: Cpt Leroy W. Stowe
22nd North Carolina: Col James Conner
34th North Carolina: Col William Lee J. Lowrance (w), Ltc George T. Gordon (w)
38th North Carolina: Col William J. Hoke (w), Ltc John Ashford (w)

Poague's Artillery Battalion

Maj William T. Poague
Albemarle (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt James W. Wyatt
Charlotte (North Carolina) Artillery: Cpt Joseph Graham
Madison (Mississippi) Artillery: Cpt George Ward
Brooke's Virginia Battery: Cpt James V. Brooke

Artillery Reserve

Col Reuben L. Walker
McIntosh's Artillery Battalion

Maj David G. McIntosh
Danville (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Robert S. Rice
Hardaway (Alabama) Artillery: Cpt William B. Hurt
2nd Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery: Lt Samuel Wallace
Johnson's Virginia Battery: Cpt Marmaduke Johnson

Pegram's Artillery Battalion

Maj William R. J. Pegram
Cpt Ervin B. Brunson
Crenshaw (Virginia) Battery: Cpt William G. Crenshaw
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Edward A. Marye
Letcher (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Thomas A. Brander
Pee Dee (South Carolina) Artillery: Lt William E. Zimmerman
Purcell (Virginia) Artillery: Cpt Joseph McGraw

Stuart's Division

MG J. E. B. Stuart

Hampton's Brigade

BG Wade Hampton (w)

1st North Carolina: Col Laurence S. Baker (w), Ltc James B. Gordon
1st South Carolina: Col John L. Black

2nd South Carolina: Maj T. J. Lipscomb
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion: Col Pierce M. B. Young, Ltc W. G. Delony

Jeff Davis (Mississippi) Legion: Col Joseph F. Waring, Maj William G. Conner (k)

Phillips (Georgia) Legion: Ltc Jefferson C. Phillips

Robertson's Brigade

BG Beverly H. Robertson
4th North Carolina: Col Dennis D. Ferebee
5th North Carolina

Fitzhugh Lee's Brigade

BG Fitzhugh Lee
1st Maryland Battalion[12]: Maj Harry Gilmor, Maj Ridgely Brown
1st Virginia: Maj William A. Morgan
2nd Virginia: Col Thomas T. Munford, Maj Cary Breckinridge
3rd Virginia: Col Thomas H. Owen
4th Virginia: Col Williams C. Wickham
5th Virginia: Col Thomas L. Rosser

Jenkins' Brigade

BG Albert G. Jenkins (w)
Col Milton J. Ferguson
14th Virginia: Maj Benjamin F. Eakle
16th Virginia: Col Milton J. Ferguson
17th Virginia: Col William H. French
34th Virginia Battalion: Ltc Vincent A. Witcher
36th Virginia Battalion: Cpt Cornelius T. Smith
Jackson's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Thomas E. Jackson

William H. F. Lee's Brigade

Col John R. Chambliss, Jr.
2nd North Carolina Cavalry: Captain William A. Graham
9th Virginia: Col Richard L. T. Beale
10th Virginia: Col James L. Davis (w&c)
13th Virginia: Capt. Benjamin F. Winfield

Jones' Brigade

BG William E. Jones
6th Virginia: Maj Cabel E. Flournoy
7th Virginia: Ltc Thomas Marshall
11th Virginia: Col Lunsford L. Lomax

Stuart's Horse Artillery

Maj Robert F. Beckham
Breathed's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt James Breathed
Chew's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Roger P. Chew
Griffin's (Maryland) Battery: Cpt William H. Griffin
Hart's (South Carolina) Battery: Cpt James F. Hart
McGregor's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt William M. McGregor
Moorman's (Virginia) Battery: Cpt Marcellus N. Moorman

Imboden's Command

BG John D. Imboden
18th Virginia: Col George W. Imboden
62nd Virginia: Col George H. Smith
McNeill's Company (Virginia) Partisan Rangers: Cpt John H. McNeill
Staunton (Virginia) Battery: Cpt John H. McClanahan

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_Confederate_order_of_battle

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

UNION

Army of the Potomac, Gettysburg, July 1-3 1863

MG George G. Meade, Commanding

General Staff

Chief of Staff: MG Daniel Butterfield
Assistant Adjutant General: BG Seth Williams
Assistant Inspector General: Col Edmund Schriver
Chief Quartermaster: BG Rufus Ingalls
Commissaries and subsistence: Col Henry F. Clarke
Chief of Artillery: BG Henry J. Hunt
Chief Ordnance Officer: Cpt Daniel W. Flagler
Chief Signal Officer: Cpt Lemuel B. Norton
Medical Director: Maj Jonathan Letterman
Chief of Engineers: BG Gouverneur K. Warren
Bureau of Military Information: Col George H. Sharpe

General Headquarters

Command of the Provost Marshal General: BG Marsena R. Patrick
93rd New York: Col John S. Crocker
8th United States (8 companies): Cpt Edwin W. H. Read
2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry: Col R. Butler Price
6th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Companies E&I): Cpt James Starr
Regular cavalry

Guards and Orderlies

Oneida (New York) Cavalry: Cpt Daniel P. Mann

Engineer Brigade

BG Henry W. Benham
15th New York (3 companies): Maj Walter L. Cassin
50th New York: Col William H. Pettes
U.S. Battalion: Cpt George H. Mendell

I Corps

MG John F. Reynolds (k)

MG Abner Doubleday

MG John Newton

General Headquarters:

1st Maine cavalry, Company L: Cpt Constantine Taylor

First Division

BG James S. Wadsworth
1st Brigade

BG Solomon Meredith (w)
Col William W. Robinson
19th Indiana: Col Samuel J. Williams (w), Ltc William W. Dudley (w), Maj John M. Lindley (w)
24th Michigan: Col Henry A. Morrow (w), Ltc Mark Flanigan (w), Maj Edwin B. Wight (w), Cpt Albert M. Edwards
2nd Wisconsin: Col Lucius Fairchild (w&c), Ltc George H. Stevens (mw), Maj John Mansfield (w), Cpt George H. Otis
6th Wisconsin: Ltc Rufus R. Dawes, Maj John F. Hauser
7th Wisconsin: Col William W. Robinson, Ltc John B. Callis (w&c), Maj Mark Finnicum (w)

2nd Brigade

BG Lysander Cutler
7th Indiana: Col Ira G. Grover
76th New York: Maj Andrew J. Grover (k), Cpt John E. Cook
84th New York (14th Militia): Col Edward B. Fowler
95th New York: Col George H. Biddle (w), Ltc James B. Post, Maj Edward Pye
147th New York: Ltc Francis C. Miller (w), Maj George Harney
56th Pennsylvania (9 companies): Col John W. Hofmann

Second Division

BG John C. Robinson

1st Brigade

BG Gabriel R. Paul (w)
Col Samuel H. Leonard (w)
Col Adrian R. Root (w&c)
Col Richard Coulter (w)
Col Peter Lyle
Col Richard Coulter
16th Maine: Col Charles W. Tilden (c), Ltc Augustus B. Farnham
13th Massachusetts: Col Samuel H. Leonard, Ltc Nathaniel W. Batchelder, Maj Jacob P. Gould
94th New York: Col Adrian R. Root, Maj Samuel A. Moffett
104th New York: Col Gilbert G. Prey
107th Pennsylvania: Ltc James M. Thomson (w), Cpt Emanuel D. Roath

2nd Brigade

BG Henry Baxter
12th Massachusetts: Col James L. Bates (w), Ltc David Allen, Jr.
83rd New York (9th Militia): Ltc Joseph A. Moesch
97th New York: Col Charles Wheelock, Ltc John P. Spofford (c), Maj Charles Northrup
11th Pennsylvania: Col Richard Coulter, Cpt Benjamin F. Haines, Cpt John B. Overmyer
88th Pennsylvania: Maj Benezet F. Foust (w), Cpt Henry Whiteside
90th Pennsylvania: Col Peter Lyle, Maj Alfred J. Sellers

Third Division

MG Abner Doubleday
BG Thomas A. Rowley
MG Abner Doubleday

1st Brigade

Col Chapman Biddle
BG Thomas A. Rowley
Col Chapman Biddle
80th New York (20th Militia): Col Theodore B. Gates
121st Pennsylvania: Col Chapman Biddle, Maj Alexander Biddle
142nd Pennsylvania: Col Robert P. Cummins (mw), Ltc Alfred B. McCalmont, Maj Horatio N. Warren
151st Pennsylvania: Ltc George F. McFarland (w), Cpt Walter L. Owens, Col Harrison Allen

2nd Brigade

Col Roy Stone (w)
Col Langhorne Wister (w)
Col Edmund L. Dana
143rd Pennsylvania: Col Edmund L. Dana, Ltc John D. Musser (w)
149th Pennsylvania: Ltc Walton Dwight (w), Cpt James Glenn
150th Pennsylvania: Col Langhorne Wister, Ltc Henry S. Huidekoper (w), Cpt Cornelius C. Widdis

3rd Brigade

BG George J. Stannard (w)
Col Francis V. Randall
13th Vermont: Col Francis V. Randall, Ltc William D. Munson (w), Maj Joseph J. Boynton
14th Vermont: Col William T. Nichols, Ltc Charles W. Rose
16th Vermont: Col Wheelock G. Veazey, Maj William Rounds

Artillery Brigade

Col Charles S. Wainwright
Maine Light, 2nd Battery (B): Cpt James A. Hall
Maine Light, 5th Battery (E): Cpt Greenleaf T. Stevens (w), Lt Edward N. Whittier
1st New York Light, Batteries E&L: Cpt Gilbert H. Reynolds (w), Lt George Breck
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B: Cpt James H. Cooper

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

4th United States, Battery B: Lt James Stewart (w), Lt James Davison (w)

II Corps

MG Winfield S. Hancock(w)

BG John Gibbon

BG William Hays

General Headquarters:

6th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K: Cpt Riley Johnson (Escort)

53rd Pennsylvania, Companies A, B and K: Maj Octavus Bull (Provost Marshal 2nd Corps)

First Division

BG John C. Caldwell

1st Brigade

Col Edward E. Cross (mw)

Col H. Boyd McKeen

5th New Hampshire: Ltc Charles E. Hapgood, Maj Richard E. Cross

61st New York: Ltc K. Oscar Broady

81st Pennsylvania: Col H. Boyd McKeen, Ltc Amos Stroh

148th Pennsylvania: Ltc Robert McFarlane, Maj Robert H. Foster

2nd Brigade

Col Patrick Kelly

28th Massachusetts: Col Richard Byrnes

63rd New York (2 companies): Ltc Richard C. Bentley (w), Cpt Thomas Touhy

69th New York (2 companies): Cpt Richard Moroney (w), Lt James J. Smith

88th New York (2 companies): Cpt Denis F. Burke

116th Pennsylvania (4 companies): Maj St. Clair A. Mulholland

3rd Brigade

BG Samuel K. Zook (mw)

Ltc Charles G. Freudenberg (w)

Col Richard P. Roberts (k)

Ltc John Fraser

52nd New York: Ltc Charles G. Freudenberg, Maj Edward Venuti (k), Cpt William Scherrer

57th New York: Ltc Alford B. Chapman

66th New York: Col Orlando H. Morris (w), Ltc John S. Hammell (w), Maj Peter Nelson

140th Pennsylvania: Col Richard P. Roberts, Ltc John Fraser, Maj Thomas Rodgers

4th Brigade

Col John R. Brooke (w)

27th Connecticut (2 companies): Ltc Henry C. Merwin (k), Maj James H. Coburn

2nd Delaware: Col William P. Baily, Cpt Charles H. Christman

64th New York: Col Daniel G. Bingham (w), Maj Leman W. Bradley

53rd Pennsylvania: Ltc Richards McMichael

145th Pennsylvania (7 companies): Col Hiram L. Brown (w),

Cpt John W. Reynolds (w), Cpt Moses W. Oliver

Second Division

BG John Gibbon (w)

BG William Harrow

1st Brigade

BG William Harrow

Col Francis E. Heath

19th Maine: Col Francis E. Heath, Ltc Henry W. Cunningham

15th Massachusetts: Col George H. Ward (mw), Ltc George C. Joslin, Maj Isaac H. Hooper

1st Minnesota: Col William Colvill, Jr. (w), Cpt Nathan S.

Messick (k), Cpt Henry C. Coates

82nd New York (2nd Militia): Ltc James Huston (mw), Cpt John Darrow

2nd Brigade

BG Alexander S. Webb (w)

69th Pennsylvania: Col Dennis O'Kane (mw), Ltc Martin

Tschudy (k), Maj James M. Duffy (w), Cpt William Davis

71st Pennsylvania: Col Richard P. Smith, Ltc Charles K.

Kochersperger

72nd Pennsylvania: Col De Witt C. Baxter (w), Ltc Theodore

Hesser, Maj Samuel Roberts

106th Pennsylvania: Ltc William L. Curry, Maj John H. Stover

3rd Brigade

Col Norman J. Hall

19th Massachusetts: Col Arthur F. Devereux, Ltc Ansel D.

Wass (w), Maj Edmund Rice (w)

20th Massachusetts: Col Paul J. Revere (mw), Ltc George N.

Macy (w), Cpt Henry L. Abbott

7th Michigan: Ltc Amos E. Steele (k), Jr, Maj Sylvanus W. Curtis

42nd New York: Col James E. Mallon

59th New York (4 companies): Ltc Max A. Thoman (mw), Cpt William McFadden

unattached Massachusetts Sharpshooters, 1st Company: Cpt William Plumer, Lt Emerson L. Bicknell

Third Division

BG Alexander Hays

1st Brigade

Col Samuel S. Carroll

14th Indiana: Col John Coons, Ltc Elijah H. C. Cavins, Maj William Houghton

4th Ohio: Ltc Leonard W. Carpenter, Maj Gordon A. Stewart

8th Ohio: Ltc Franklin Sawyer (w)

7th West Virginia: Ltc Jonathan H. Lockwood (w)

2nd Brigade

Col Thomas A. Smyth (w)

Ltc Francis E. Pierce

14th Connecticut: Maj Theodore G. Ellis

1st Delaware: Ltc Edward P. Harris, Cpt Thomas B. Hizar, Lt

William Smith, Lt John T. Dent

12th New Jersey: Maj John T. Hill

10th New York (battalion): Maj George F. Hopper

108th New York: Ltc Francis E. Pierce

3rd Brigade

Col George L. Willard (k)

Col Eliakim Sherrill

Ltc James M. Bull

Col Clinton D. MacDougall (w)

Col Eliakim Sherrill (mw)

39th New York (4 companies): Maj Hugo Hildebrandt

111th New York: Col Clinton D. MacDougall, Ltc Isaac M.

Lusk (w), Cpt Aaron P. Seeley

125th New York: Ltc Levin Crandell

126th New York: Col Eliakim Sherrill, Ltc James M. Bull

Artillery Brigade

Cpt John G. Hazard

1st New York Light, Battery B: Cpt James M. Rorty (k), Lt Albert S. Sheldon (w), Lt Robert E. Rogers

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A: Cpt William A. Arnold

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B: Lt Thomas F. Brown (w), Lt William S. Perrin

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

1st United States, Battery I: Lt George A. Woodruff (w), Lt Tully McCrea
4th United States, Battery A: Lt Alonzo H. Cushing (k), Lt Samuel Canby (w), Lt Joseph S. Milne (k), Sgt Frederick Fuger

III Corps

MG Daniel E. Sickles (w)

MG David B. Birney

First Division

MG David B. Birney

BG J. H. Hobart Ward (w)

1st Brigade

BG Charles K. Graham (w&c)

Col Andrew H. Tippin

Col Henry J. Madill

57th Pennsylvania (8 companies): Col Peter Sides (w), Maj William B. Nepper (w&c), Cpt Alanson H. Nelson (w)

63rd Pennsylvania: Maj John A. Danks

68th Pennsylvania: Col Andrew H. Tippin, Ltc Anthony H.

Reynolds (w), Maj Robert E. Winslow (w), Cpt Milton S. Davis

105th Pennsylvania: Col Calvin A. Craig

114th Pennsylvania: Ltc Frederick F. Cavada (c), Cpt Edward R. Bowen

141st Pennsylvania: Col Henry J. Madill, Maj Israel P.

Spaulding (mw&c)

2nd Brigade

BG J. H. Hobart Ward

Col Hiram Berdan

20th Indiana: Col John Wheeler (k), Ltc William C. L. Taylor (w)

3rd Maine: Col Moses B. Lakeman, Maj Samuel P. Lee (w)

4th Maine: Col Elijah Walker (w), Maj Ebenezer Whitcomb

(mw), Cpt Edwin Libby

86th New York: Ltc Benjamin L. Higgins (w), Maj Jacob A. Lansing

124th New York: Col Augustus van H. Ellis (k), Ltc Francis M. Cummins (w), Maj James Cromwell (k)

99th Pennsylvania: Maj John W. Moore

1st United States Sharpshooters: Col Hiram Berdan, Ltc Casper Trepp

2nd United States Sharpshooters (8 companies): Maj Homer R. Stoughton

3rd Brigade

Col P. Régis de Trobriand

17th Maine: Ltc Charles B. Merrill, Maj George W. West

3rd Michigan: Col Byron R. Pierce (w), Ltc Edwin S. Pierce,

Maj Moses B. Houghton

5th Michigan: Ltc John Pulford (w), Maj Salmon S. Matthews (w)

40th New York: Col Thomas W. Egan, Ltc Augustus J. Warner (w)

110th Pennsylvania (6 companies): Ltc David M. Jones (w), Maj Isaac Rogers

Second Division

BG Andrew A. Humphreys

1st Brigade

BG Joseph B. Carr (w)

1st Massachusetts: Ltc Clark B. Baldwin (w), Maj Gardner Walker (w)

11th Massachusetts: Ltc Porter D. Tripp, Maj Andrew N. McDonald (w)

16th Massachusetts: Ltc Waldo Merriam (w), Cpt Matthew Donovan

12th New Hampshire: Cpt John F. Langley (w), Cpt Thomas E. Barker

11th New Jersey: Col Robert McAllister (w), Maj Philip J. Kearny (mw), Cpt Luther Martin (k), Lt John Schoonover (w),

Cpt William H. Lloyd (w), Cpt Samuel T. Sleeper, Lt John Schoonover

26th Pennsylvania: Maj Robert L. Bodine (w)

2nd Brigade

Col William R. Brewster

70th New York: Col John E. Farnum

71st New York: Col Henry L. Potter (w)

72nd New York: Col John S. Austin (w), Ltc John Leonard, Maj

Caspar K. Abell

73rd New York: Maj Michael W. Burns

74th New York: Ltc Thomas Holt

120th New York: Ltc Cornelius D. Westbrook (w), Maj John R. Tappen

3rd Brigade

Col George C. Burling

2nd New Hampshire: Col Edward L. Bailey (w), Ltc James W. Carr (w)

5th New Jersey: Col William J. Sewell (w), Cpt Thomas C.

Godfrey, Cpt Henry H. Woolsey (w)

6th New Jersey: Ltc Stephen R. Gilkyson

7th New Jersey: Col Louis R. Francine (mw), Ltc Francis Price

(w), Maj Frederick Cooper

8th New Jersey: Col John Ramsey (w), Cpt John G. Langston

115th Pennsylvania: Maj John P. Dunne

Artillery Brigade

Cpt George E. Randolph (w)

Cpt A. Judson Clark

1st New Jersey Light, Battery B: Cpt A. Judson Clark, Lt Robert Sims

1st New York Light, Battery D: Cpt George B. Winslow

New York Light, 4th Battery: Cpt James E. Smith

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E: Lt John K. Bucklyn (w), Lt

Benjamin Freeborn (w)

4th United States, Battery K: Lt Francis W. Seeley (w), Lt Robert James

V Corps

MG George Sykes

General Headquarters:

12th New York Infantry, Companies D and E: Cpt Henry W. Rider

17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies D and H: Cpt William Thompson

First Division

BG James Barnes (w)

1st Brigade

Col William S. Tilton

18th Massachusetts: Col Joseph Hayes (w)

22nd Massachusetts: Ltc Thomas Sherwin, Jr

1st Michigan: Col Ira C. Abbott (w), Ltc William A. Throop (w)

118th Pennsylvania: Ltc James Gwyn, Maj Charles P. Herring

2nd Brigade

Col Jacob B. Sweitzer

9th Massachusetts [19]: Col Patrick R. Guiney

32nd Massachusetts: Col George L. Prescott (w), Ltc Luther

Stephenson, Jr. (w), Maj James A. Cunningham

4th Michigan: Col Harrison H. Jeffords (mw), Ltc George W. Lumbard

62nd Pennsylvania: Ltc James C. Hull, Maj William G. Lowry (k)

3rd Brigade

Col Strong Vincent (mw)

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

Col James C. Rice
20th Maine: Col Joshua L. Chamberlain (w)
16th Michigan [20]: Ltc Norval E. Welch
44th New York: Col James C. Rice, Ltc Freeman Conner, Maj Edward B. Knox
83rd Pennsylvania: Cpt Orpheus S. Woodward

Second Division

BG Romeyn B. Ayres

1st Brigade

Col Hannibal Day
3rd United States (Companies B, C, E, G, I and K): Cpt Henry W. Freedley (w), Cpt Richard G. Lay
4th United States (Companies C, F, H and K): Cpt Julius W. Adams, Jr
6th United States (Companies D, F, G, H and I): Cpt Levi C. Bootes
12th United States (Companies A, B, C, D and G, 1st Battalion and Companies A, C and D, 2nd Battalion): Cpt Thomas S. Dunn
14th United States (Companies A, B, D, E, F and G, 1st Battalion and Companies F and G, 2nd Battalion): Maj Grotius R. Giddings

2nd Brigade

Col Sidney Burbank
2nd United States (Companies B, C, F, H, I and K): Maj Arthur T. Lee (w), Cpt Samuel A. McKee
7th United States (Companies A, B, E and I): Cpt David P. Hancock
10th United States (Companies D, G and H): Cpt William Clinton
11th United States (Companies B, C, D, E, F and G): Maj DeLancey Floyd-Jones
17th United States (Companies A, C, D, G and H, 1st Battalion and Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion): Ltc James D. Greene

3rd Brigade

BG Stephen H. Weed (k)
Col Kenner Garrard
140th New York: Col Patrick O'Rorke (k), Ltc Louis Ernst, Maj Isaiah Force
146th New York: Col Kenner Garrard, Ltc David T. Jenkins
91st Pennsylvania: Ltc Joseph H. Sinex
155th Pennsylvania: Ltc John H. Cain

Third Division

BG Samuel W. Crawford

1st Brigade

Col William McCandless
1st Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies): Col William C. Talley
2nd Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc George A. Woodward
6th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc Wellington H. Ent
13th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Charles F. Taylor (k), Maj William R. Hartshorne

3rd Brigade

Col Joseph W. Fisher
5th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc George Dare, Maj James H. Larrimer
9th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc James McK. Snodgrass
10th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Adoniram J. Warner, Ltc James B. Knox
11th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Samuel M. Jackson
12th Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies): Col Martin D. Hardin

Artillery Brigade

Cpt Augustus P. Martin
Massachusetts Light, 3rd Battery (C): Lt Aaron F. Walcott
1st New York Light, Battery C: Cpt Almont Barnes
1st Ohio Light, Battery L: Cpt Frank C. Gibbs
5th United States, Battery D: Lt Charles E. Hazlett (k), Lt Benjamin F. Rittenhouse
5th United States, Battery I: Lt Malbone F. Watson (w), Lt Charles C. MacConnell

VI Corps

MG John Sedgwick

General Headquarters:

1st New Jersey Cavalry, Company L and 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company H: Cpt William S. Craft
Division Brigade Regiments and Others

First Division

BG Horatio G. Wright

1st Brigade

BG Alfred T. A. Torbert
1st New Jersey: Ltc William Henry, Jr.
2nd New Jersey: Ltc Charles Wiebecke
3rd New Jersey: Col Henry W. Brown, Ltc Edward L. Campbell
15th New Jersey: Col William H. Penrose

2nd Brigade

BG Joseph J. Bartlett [22]
Col Emory Upton [23]
5th Maine: Col Clark S. Edwards
121st New York: Col Emory Upton
95th Pennsylvania: Ltc Edward Carroll
96th Pennsylvania: Maj William H. Lessig

3rd Brigade

BG David A. Russell
6th Maine: Col Hiram Burnham
49th Pennsylvania (4 companies): Ltc Thomas M. Hulings
119th Pennsylvania: Col Peter C. Ellmaker
5th Wisconsin: Col Thomas S. Allen

Provost Guard 4th New Jersey (3 companies): Cpt William R. Maxwell

Second Division

BG Albion P. Howe

2nd Brigade

Col Lewis A. Grant
2nd Vermont: Col James H. Walbridge
3rd Vermont: Col Thomas O. Seaver
4th Vermont: Col Charles B. Stoughton
5th Vermont: Ltc John R. Lewis
6th Vermont: Col Elisha L. Barney

3rd Brigade

BG Thomas H. Neill
7th Maine (6 companies): Ltc Seldon Connor
33rd New York (detachment): Cpt Henry J. Gifford
43rd New York: Ltc John Wilson
49th New York: Col Daniel D. Bidwell
77th New York: Ltc Winsor B. French
61st Pennsylvania: Ltc George F. Smith

Third Division

MG John Newton
BG Frank Wheaton

1st Brigade

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

BG Alexander Shaler
65th New York: Col Joseph E. Hamblin
67th New York: Col Nelson Cross
122nd New York: Col Silas Titus
23rd Pennsylvania: Ltc John F. Glenn
82nd Pennsylvania: Col Isaac C. Bassett

2nd Brigade

Col Henry L. Eustis
7th Massachusetts: Ltc Franklin P. Harlow
10th Massachusetts: Ltc Joseph B. Parsons
37th Massachusetts: Col Oliver Edwards
2nd Rhode Island: Col Horatio Rogers, Jr.

3rd Brigade

BG Frank Wheaton
Col David J. Nevin
62nd New York: Col David J. Nevin, Ltc Theodore B. Hamilton
93rd Pennsylvania: Maj John I. Nevin
98th Pennsylvania: Maj John B. Kohler
139th Pennsylvania: Col Frederick H. Collier (w), Ltc William H. Moody

Artillery Brigade

Col Charles H. Tompkins
Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A): Cpt William H. McCartney
New York Light, 1st Battery: Cpt Andrew Cowan
New York Light, 3rd Battery: Cpt William A. Harn
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C: Cpt Richard Waterman
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G: Cpt George W. Adams
2nd United States, Battery D: Lt Edward B. Williston
2nd United States, Battery G: Lt John H. Butler
5th United States, Battery F: Lt Leonard Martin

XI Corps

MG Oliver O. Howard

MG Carl Schurz

General Headquarters:
1st Indiana Cavalry, Companies I and K: Cpt Abram Sharra
8th New York Infantry (1 company): Lt Hermann Foerster

First Division

BG Francis C. Barlow (w)
BG Adelbert Ames

1st Brigade

Col Leopold von Gilsa

41st New York (9 companies): Ltc Detlev von Einsiedel
54th New York: Maj Stephen Kovacs (c), Lt Ernst Both
68th New York: Col Gotthilf Bourry
153rd Pennsylvania: Maj John F. Frueauff

2nd Brigade

BG Adelbert Ames
Col Andrew L. Harris
17th Connecticut: Ltc Douglas Fowler (k), Maj Allen G. Brady
25th Ohio: Ltc Jeremiah Williams (c), Cpt Nathaniel J. Manning (w), Lt William Maloney (w), Lt Israel White
75th Ohio: Col Andrew L. Harris, Cpt George B. Fox
107th Ohio: Col Seraphim Meyer, Cpt John M. Lutz

Second Division

BG Adolph von Steinwehr

1st Brigade

Col Charles R. Coster
134th New York: Ltc Allan H. Jackson, Maj George W. B. Seeley

154th New York: Ltc Daniel B. Allen, Maj Lewis D. Warner
27th Pennsylvania: Ltc Lorenz Cantador
73rd Pennsylvania: Cpt Daniel F. Kelley

2nd Brigade

Col Orland Smith
33rd Massachusetts: Col Adin B. Underwood
136th New York: Col James Wood
55th Ohio: Col Charles B. Gambee
73rd Ohio: Ltc Richard Long

Third Division

MG Carl Schurz
BG Alexander Schimmelfennig
MG Carl Schurz

1st Brigade

BG Alexander Schimmelfennig
Col George von Amsberg
82nd Illinois: Ltc Edward S. Salomon
45th New York: Col George von Amsberg, Ltc Adolphus Dobke (w)
157th New York: Col Philip P. Brown, Jr., Ltc George Arrowsmith
61st Ohio: Col Stephen J. McGroarty, Ltc William H. H. Bown
74th Pennsylvania: Col Adolph von Hartung (w), Ltc Alexander von Mitzel, Cpt Gustav Schleiter, Cpt Henry Krauseneck

2nd Brigade

Col Wladimir Krzyzanowski
58th New York: Ltc August Otto, Cpt Emil Koenig
119th New York: Col John T. Lockman (w), Ltc Edward F. Lloyd, Maj Benjamin A. Willis
82nd Ohio: Col James S. Robinson (w), Ltc David Thomson
75th Pennsylvania: Col Francis Mahler (mw), Maj August Ledig
26th Wisconsin: Ltc Hans Boebel (w), Maj Henry Baetz (w), Cpt John W. Fuchs

Artillery Brigade

Maj Thomas W. Osborn
1st New York Light, Battery I: Cpt Michael Wiedrich
New York Light, 13th Battery: Lt William Wheeler
1st Ohio Light, Battery I: Cpt Hubert Dilger
1st Ohio Light, Battery K: Cpt Lewis Heckman
4th United States, Battery G: Lt Bayard Wilkeson (mw), Lt Eugene A. Bancroft

XII Corps

MG Henry W. Slocum

BG Alpheus S. Williams

Provost Guard:

10th Maine (4 companies): Cpt John D. Beardsley

First Division

BG Alpheus S. Williams
BG Thomas H. Ruger

1st Brigade

Col Archibald L. McDougall
5th Connecticut: Col Warren W. Packer
20th Connecticut: Ltc William B. Wooster, Maj Philo B. Buckingham
3rd Maryland: Col Joseph M. Sudsbury, Ltc Gilbert P. Robinson
123rd New York: Ltc James C. Rogers, Cpt Adolphus H. Tanner
145th New York: Col Edward L. Price
46th Pennsylvania: Col James L. Selfridge

3rd Brigade

BG Thomas H. Ruger

WAR & CONQUEST

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-1865

Col Silas Colgrove
27th Indiana: Col Silas Colgrove, Ltc John R. Fesler, Maj T. F. Colgrove
2nd Massachusetts: Ltc Charles R. Mudge (k), Maj Charles F. Morse
13th New Jersey: Col Ezra A. Carman
107th New York: Col Nirom M. Crane
3rd Wisconsin: Col William Hawley, Ltc Martin Flood

Second Division

BG John W. Geary

1st Brigade

Col Charles Candy
5th Ohio: Col John H. Patrick
7th Ohio: Col William R. Creighton, Ltc O. J. Crane
29th Ohio: Cpt Wilbur F. Stevens (w), Cpt Edward Hayes
66th Ohio: Ltc Eugene Powell, Maj Joshua G. Palmer (mw)
28th Pennsylvania: Cpt John Flynn
147th Pennsylvania (8 companies): Ltc Ario Pardee, Jr., Maj George Harney

2nd Brigade

Col George A. Cobham, Jr.
BG Thomas L. Kane

29th Pennsylvania: Col William Rickards, Jr., Ltc Samuel M. Zulick
109th Pennsylvania: Cpt Frederick L. Gimber
111th Pennsylvania: Ltc Thomas M. Walker, Col George A. Cobham, Jr. Ltc Thomas M. Walker

3rd Brigade

BG George S. Greene (w)
60th New York: Col Abel Godard, Ltc John C. O. Redington
78th New York: Ltc Herbert von Hammerstein, Maj William H. Randall (w)
102nd New York: Col James C. Lane (w), Cpt Lewis R. Stegman
137th New York: Col David Ireland, Ltc Robert S. Van Vorhees
149th New York: Col Henry A. Barnum (w), Ltc Charles B. Randall (w)

Reporting directly Lockwood's Brigade

BG Henry H. Lockwood
1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade: Col William P. Maulsby
1st Maryland, Eastern Shore: Col James Wallace
150th New York: Col John H. Ketcham, Ltc Charles G. Bartlett, Maj Alfred B. Smith

Artillery Brigade

Lt Edward D. Muhlenberg
1st New York Light, Battery M: Lt Charles E. Winegar
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E: Lt Charles A. Atwell
4th United States, Battery F: Lt Sylvanus T. Rugg
5th United States, Battery K: Lt David H. Kinzie

Cavalry Corps

MG Alfred Pleasonton

Headquarter Guards:
1st Ohio, Company A: Cpt Noah Jones (Second Division)
1st Ohio, Company C: Cpt Samuel N. Stanford (Third Division)

First Division

BG John Buford

1st Brigade

Col William Gamble
8th Illinois: Maj John L. Beveridge

12th Illinois (4 companies) and 3rd Indiana (6 companies): Col George H. Chapman
8th New York: Ltc William L. Markell

2nd Brigade

Col Thomas Devin
6th New York (6 companies): Maj William E. Beardsley
9th New York: Col William Sackett
17th Pennsylvania: Col Josiah H. Kellogg
3rd West Virginia, Companies A and C: Cpt Seymour B. Conger

Reserve Brigade

BG Wesley Merritt
6th Pennsylvania: Maj James H. Haseltine
1st United States: Cpt Richard S. C. Lord
2nd United States: Cpt Theophilus F. Rodenbough
5th United States: Cpt Julius W. Mason
6th United States: Maj Samuel H. Starr (w), Lt Louis H. Carpenter, Lt Nicholas M. Nolan, Cpt Ira W. Claflin (w)

Second Division

BG David McM. Gregg

1st Brigade

Col John B. McIntosh
1st Maryland (11 companies): Ltc James M. Deems
Purnell (Maryland) Legion, Company A: Cpt Robert E. Duvall
1st Massachusetts: Ltc Greely S. Curtis
1st New Jersey: Maj Myron H. Beaumont
1st Pennsylvania: Col John P. Taylor
3rd Pennsylvania: Ltc Edward S. Jones
3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Section, Battery H: Cpt William D. Rank

3rd Brigade

Col John I. Gregg
1st Maine (10 companies): Ltc Charles H. Smith
10th New York: Maj M. Henry Avery
4th Pennsylvania: Ltc William E. Doster
16th Pennsylvania: Col John K. Robison

Third Division

BG Judson Kilpatrick

1st Brigade

BG Elon J. Farnsworth (k)
Col Nathaniel P. Richmond
5th New York: Maj John Hammond
18th Pennsylvania, Lieut: Col William P. Brinton
1st Vermont: Col Addison W. Preston
1st West Virginia (10 companies): Col Nathaniel P. Richmond, Maj Charles E. Capehart

2nd Brigade

BG George A. Custer
1st Michigan: Col Charles H. Town
5th Michigan: Col Russell A. Alger
6th Michigan: Col George Gray
7th Michigan: (10 companies): Col William D. Mann

Horse Artillery

1st Brigade

Cpt James M. Robertson
9th Michigan Battery: Cpt Jabez J. Daniels
6th New York Battery: Cpt Joseph W. Martin
2nd United States, Batteries B and L: Lt Edward Heaton
2nd United States, Battery M: Lt Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr.
4th United States, Battery E: Lt Samuel S. Elder

WAR & CONQUEST

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2nd Brigade

Cpt John C. Tidball
1st United States, Batteries E and G: Cpt Alanson M. Randol
1st United States, Battery K: Cpt William M. Graham, Jr.
2nd United States, Battery A: Lt John H. Calef

Artillery Reserve

BG Robert O. Tyler

Cpt James M. Robertson

Headquarter Guard:
32nd Massachusetts Infantry, Company C: Cpt Josiah C. Fuller

1st Regular Brigade

Cpt Dunbar R. Ransom
1st United States, Battery H: Lt Chandler P. Eakin (w), Lt Philip D. Mason
3rd United States, Batteries F and K: Lt John G. Turnbull
4th United States, Battery C: Lt Evan Thomas
5th United States, Battery C: Lt Gulian V. Weir (w)

1st Volunteer Brigade

Ltc Freeman McGilvery
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E): Cpt Charles A. Phillips
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery: Cpt John Bigelow (w), Lt Richard S. Milton
New York Light, 15th Battery: Cpt Patrick Hart (w), Lt Andrew R. McMahon
Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F: Cpt James Thompson (w)

2nd Volunteer Brigade

Cpt Elijah D. Taft
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B: Cpt Albert F. Brooker
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M: Cpt Franklin A. Pratt
Connecticut Light, 2nd Battery: Cpt John W. Sterling
New York Light, 5th Battery: Cpt Elijah D. Taft

3rd Volunteer Brigade

Cpt James F. Huntington
New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery: Cpt Frederick M. Edgell
1st Ohio Light, Battery H: Lt George W. Norton
1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G: Cpt R. Bruce Ricketts
West Virginia Light, Battery C: Cpt Wallace Hill

4th Volunteer Brigade

Cpt Robert H. Fitzhugh
Maine Light, 6th Battery (F): Lt Edwin B. Dow
Maryland Light, Battery A: Cpt James H. Rigby
New Jersey Light, 1st Battery: Lt Augustin N. Parsons
1st New York Light, Battery G: Cpt Nelson Ames
1st New York Light, Battery K: Cpt Robert H. Fitzhugh

Train Guard 4th New Jersey Infantry (7 companies): Maj Charles Ewing

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_Union_order_of_battle

Abbreviations used:

Military rank

MG = Major General
BG = Brigadier General
Col = Colonel
Ltc = Lieutenant Colonel
Maj = Major
Cpt = Captain
Lt = Lieutenant
Sgt = Sergeant

Other

(w) = wounded
(mw) = mortally wounded
(k) = killed in action
(c) = captured



MISCELLANEOUS



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<http://www.civilwarphotos.net/>

SPECIAL THANKS


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