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SECRET

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# SECRET//NATO R 09 0445Z APR 00

FROM: HQ, III US Corps

TO: HQ, 5th Infantry Division

PRECEDENCE: FLASH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NATO
SUBJECT: OPORD - OPERATION RESET

# I. SITUATION

#### Enemy Forces

(See attached map enclosure for more information on specific enemy unit locations) (S/NATO) The enemy forces in and around LODZ include 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, 35<sup>th</sup> Guards Air Assault Brigade, and 6<sup>th</sup> Independent Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade acting as the operational reserve for 3<sup>rd</sup> Combined Arms Army in WARSAW. These units are understrength and consist mainly of light infantry and special operations with few, if any, serviceable armored fighting vehicles. Nearby units include 3<sup>rd</sup> Combined Arms Army in WARSAW, 8<sup>th</sup> Guards Combined Arms Army in LUBLIN and 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army in KATOWICE. Each of these units will be occupied by other NATO and allied offensive maneuvers as part of OPERATION RESET and none are expected to assist at LODZ.

been strengthened over the winter months. They may also have stockpiled ammunition in preparation for a protracted defensive engagement, particularly artillery ammunition and rockets. They may also have chemical and/or tactical nuclear weapons available at corps level, although it is considered unlikely that they will use them. The enemy's Limitations include understrength units weakened by combat (exacerbated by the desertion of soldiers who are relatively close to home), lack of fuel, limited communications, inadequate supply lines, no air support, and an unwillingness to make decisions without direct orders. This is expected to prevent enemy movement, including counterattack, reinforcement, and organized withdrawal, allowing friendly forces to move freely to their objectives.

(S/NATO) The enemy's most likely Course of Action (EMLCOA) is to hold in place and defend while waiting for orders. It is possible that morale has become so low that enemy units may surrender en masse, but this is considered unlikely. Overdependence on defenses and the unexpected nature of the allied attack are expected to cause paralysis in the enemy's operational chain of command, resulting in a lack of tactical initiative at anything but the local level.

(S/NATO) The enemy's most dangerous Course of Action for the success of this mission would be to maintain their positions and counterattack into the flanks of advancing NATO and allied forces that are overextended or weakly protected on their flanks. This would require the diversion of their Combined Arms Armies in Slovakia and KALININGRAD and reinforcement from Belarus and Ukraine. Higher command does not believe the enemy has sufficient resources available or the agility to effectively pursue this Course of Action.

(S/NATO) Enemy forces in eastern Poland include:

2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army (GDANSK)

20<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army (BIALYSTOK) 3<sup>rd</sup> Combined Arms Army (WARSAW)

6<sup>th</sup> Independent Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade (LODZ)

3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (LODZ)

35th Guards Air Assault Brigade (LODZ)

8<sup>th</sup> Guards Combined Arms Army (LUBLIN)

1st Guards Tank Army (KATOWICE)



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(S/NATO) Enemy forces in the 5th Infantry Division Area of Operations at LODZ include:
        6th Independent Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade
                 133rd Independent Motor-Rifle Battalion (BMP-2)
                 154<sup>th</sup> Independent Motor-Rifle Battalion (BMP-1)
                 178<sup>th</sup> Independent Motor-Rifle Battalion (BMP-1)
                 53rd Independent Tank Battalion (T-80)
                 54<sup>th</sup> Independent Tank Battalion (T-72)
                 65th Independent Tank Battalion (T-72)
        3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
                 330<sup>th</sup> Spetsnaz Detachment
                 501st Spetsnaz Detachment
                 503rd Spetsnaz Detachment
                 509th Spetsnaz Detachment
                 510th Spetsnaz Detachment
                 512th Spetsnaz Detachment
        35th Guards Air Assault Brigade
                 351st VDV Battalion (BMD-2)
                 352nd VDV Battalion (BMD-1)
                 353rd Independent VDV Battalion
                 Howitzer Artillery Battalion (122mm)
                 Rocket Artillery Battery (BM-21)
                 Antiaircraft Missile Battery (SA-14)
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(S/NATO) Note that in Soviet practice an Army correlates to a NATO Corps, and that current end-strengths of the units are generally equivalent to no higher than the next smaller unit size with few or no air assets available. Personnel strength for most units is no more than 50% of nominal end-strength compared to their peacetime unit size.

Antitank Guided Missile Battery (AT-4/5)

### Friendly Forces

(See attached map enclosure for more information on specific friendly unit locations) (S/NATO) The primary mission of OPERATION RESET is to push Soviet forces back to their original start positions inside Russia and establish a demarcation line that can be used for negotiation for a peace settlement that resembles the original national boundaries and populations of the invaded nations as closely as possible.

(S/NATO) 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's avenue of advance from LESZNO to LODZ along route RED is bounded on the right (south) flank by the III US Corps main elements, including  $2^{nd}$  Armored Division and  $1^{st}$  Cavalry Division (main body of III US Corps advance to LUBLIN) and the Polish Silesian Corps ( $2^{nd}$ ,  $4^{th}$ ,  $5^{th}$ ,  $10^{th}$ , and  $11^{th}$  Divisions) with  $3^{rd}$  ACR in reserve.  $29^{th}$  and  $34^{th}$  infantry divisions are advancing further south on their right flank, along the Czech and Slovak borders, toward KRAKOW.

(S/NATO) 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's avenue of advance from LESZNO to LODZ is bounded on the left (north) flank by elements of I German Corps (1<sup>st</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Panzer Divisions, 11<sup>th</sup> Panzergrenadier Division, and 27<sup>th</sup> Fallschirmjaeger Brigade) and the Polish Warsaw Corps advancing from POZNAN to WARSAW. They are supported by I Netherlands Corps in reserve. On their left (north), I UK Corps and the Polish Pomeranian Corps are to move from SZCZECIN to surround and bypass GDANSK and then move to occupy BIALYSTOK with I Belgian Corps in reserve holding the perimeter around GDANSK.

(S/NATO) Note that current end-strength of the units designated as divisions is approximately equivalent to one brigade of vehicles and heavy equipment (including artillery) and few or no air assets. Personnel strength for most units is about 50% of nominal end-strength for the peacetime unit size. Corps strengths are similarly reduced to the approximate strength of a full-strength division. All units under OPERATION RESET have been reinforced and resupplied to the maximum amount available by EUCOM/LANDCENT.



(S/NATO) Friendly forces assigned to OPERATION RESET include:

I UK Corps (SZCZECIN)
Polish Pomeranian Corps (SZCZECIN)
I Belgian Corps (SZCZECIN)
I German Corps (POZNAN)
Polish Warsaw Corps (POZNAN)
I Netherlands Corps (POZNAN)
III US Corps (WROCLAW)

Polish Silesian Corps (WROCLAW)

### Attachments/Detachment

(S/NATO) The 6th Polish Security Regiment from WROCLAW is attached to 5th Infantry Division as an enabler for maintaining order within liberated areas, managing prisoners, and providing route guidance and translation services.

(S/NATO) No Corps-level artillery or air support is available. Divisional assets will be used.

#### Civil/Terrain considerations

(FOUO) Poland is an allied nation occupied by enemy (Soviet) forces. Its citizens are our friends; however, organized partisan elements and individual resistors may be encountered. It is imperative that we maintain good relations with the civilian population at all times while discouraging communist sympathizers.

(FOUO) The terrain between LESZNO and LODZ is mainly flat, open farmland with some areas of thick deciduous and pine forest. The area has few hills and many small villages connected by farm roads.

(S/NATO) Observation and Fields of Fire: Due to the flat, open terrain and the scarcity of cover and concealment, observation ranges are long, so units must be dispersed to avoid massed enemy artillery fire.

(S/NATO) Cover and Concealment: There is little to no cover or concealment along the advancement route. Advance reconnaissance is a requirement to avoid detection and/or ambush. Movement of units should be made between areas that provide cover or concealment, such as villages and wooded areas.

(S/NATO) Obstacles: There are no known man-made obstacles or minefields along the planned axis of advance.

(S/NATO) Key Terrain: The main road, any areas of cover and concealment, and road junctions should be considered key terrain. The primary decisive terrain is the city of LODZ.

(S/NATO) Avenues of Approach: The main road between LESZNO and LODZ is route 12, which passes east through JAROCIN, KALISZ, and SIERADZ, where it joins the larger S8 highway connecting to LODZ.

#### II. MISSION

(S/NATO) 5th Infantry Division's mission is to secure the III US Corps left flank against counterattack from Soviet forces in WARSAW by occupying and defending LODZ. This also secures the right flank of I German Corps as they advance against WARSAW. 5th Infantry Division is to begin their advance east toward LODZ at 10 0200Z APR 00 from LD RED DEVIL at LESZNO, crossing PL RED DIAMOND within 48 hours, and securing OBJ LIMA (LODZ), taking up defensive positions facing east in LODZ NLT 15 0200Z APR 00. Tactical disposition and movement order of the division is at the discretion of the Commander.



#### III. EXECUTION

#### Commander's Intent

(S/NATO) The Center of Gravity of III US Corps rests on the main axis of advance, held by 2nd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division. Priority of fires, reinforcements, and supplies is on this central element. 5th Infantry Division is operating on a secondary axis of advance to LODZ.

(S/NATO) The Critical Vulnerability of the main thrust to LUBLIN is the opportunity for enemy flanking attacks to deflect, delay, or deny the mission's success. This could come from the left flank (north) from WARSAW via LODZ.

(S/NATO) The Desired End State of this mission is the security of LODZ at the junction between the III US Corps advance on LUBLIN and the I German Corps advance on WARSAW, followed by the successful liberation of both major cities by NATO and Allied forces.

#### Concept of the Operations

(S/NATO) The Scheme of Maneuver for III US Corps is to focus support on the main advance into LUBLIN where the heaviest and most mobile vehicle assets are located. 2nd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division will surround and defend the city while the Polish Silesian Corps liberates the city. 29th and 24th infantry divisions will screen the right flank of the main advance toward KRAKOW while 5th Infantry Division screens the left flank of the main attack as far as LODZ. The purpose of OPERATION RESET is to push the Soviets back to the original Polish border past BIALYSTOK, WARSAW, LUBLIN, and KRAKOW and create a defensive line there to prevent further Soviet incursions.

#### Tasks

(S/NATO) 5th Infantry Division is to advance along route RED and 1st and 2nd brigades are to move around the city of LODZ in a pincer movement (north and south) with 4th Brigade moving in to seal the west side of the city. Once the city is invested and captured from the three understrength Soviet brigades occupying it, 1st and 2nd brigades will occupy defensive positions on the east side of the city while 4th Brigade remains in the center of the city with supporting elements as a maneuver reserve.

#### Coordinating Instructions

(S/NATO) 5th Infantry Division is to move from LESZNO to LODZ generally along route 12 in a two-up-one-back triangular formation led by 1st and 2nd brigades. Division trains will travel with 4th Brigade in the rear, and DIVARTY will be ready to stop and support any contact by the advance brigades. Soldiers in all areas should be prepared to enter MOPP when chemical or biological agents are encountered. ROE is at the commander's discretion; however, collateral civilian casualties are to be avoided whenever possible.

#### IV. SERVICE SUPPORT

#### Administration

(S/NATO) All EPWs are to be transferred to 6th Polish Security Regiment for consolidation, interrogation, and transport. Casualties are to be evacuated to the nearest Battalion Aid Station, with more severe casualties transferred to III US Corps 1st Medical Brigade MASH in WROCLAW via any available ground transport.

#### Logistics

(S/NATO) All elements of the 5th Infantry Division have received three days of combat supplies of all classes. Additional supplies are held at the III US Corps headquarters in WROCLAW and will be distributed as needed beginning on day 4 of OPERATION RESET. Beginning on day 3, units in combat are to send vehicles to the III US Corps supply depots in WROCLAW to requisition food, fuel, ammunition, and any other supplies.



#### V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

#### Command

(S/NATO) Location of Key Leaders: The 5th Infantry Division command staff and HQ element are to remain in the rear one-third of the division area with adjunct support units and the division reserve brigade (4th) while the division is moving. Upon occupation of LODZ, the command staff will relocate to the center of the city.

(S/NATO) Succession of Command: If the division Commander becomes a casualty, the senior brigade commander in the division is to take command. If that is not possible, continue through the remaining brigade commanders until one is available to take charge. That brigade commander's position will be taken over by his Deputy Commander.

# Signal

(S/NATO) Primary: Encrypted frequency-hopping radio communication by FM radio. (S/NATO) Alternate: Clear radio communication by FM radio using CEOI while on the move to set up renewed encrypted communication via SINCGARS ERF. (S/NATO) Contingency: Encrypted radio communications by HF radio when stopped (temporary measure until VHF/FM comms can be reestablished). (S/NATO) Emergency: Vehicle-borne courier.

Respectfully,

Jacob Torgerson LTG, Commanding

III US Corps

"America's Hammer"



SECRET//NATO R 17 2230Z APR 00

FROM: HQ, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

TO: HQ, III US Corps PRECEDENCE: URGENT

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NATO SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT

SITUATION: It has been one week since the beginning of OPERATION RESET. Enemy strength has been overwhelmingly much higher than expected, with predicted reductions to enemy unit capabilities not in evidence during the operation. Our movement to PL RED DIAMOND was uneventful; however, the assault on LODZ did not go as planned and we are currently in KALISZ after a 12-hour fighting retrograde movement from LODZ.

INTELLIGENCE: The three Soviet infantry brigades around LODZ are dug into heavily fortified and mutually supportive positions and further supported by 122mm howitzers and BM-21 rocket launchers located in or around the airfield on the west side of the city. Aside from an unknown number of T-72s and a couple of T-80 tanks, they have at least a dozen BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs, and several BRDM-2 armored cars with ATGMs mounted (likely AT-5). The tenacity of the airborne unit in particular is ferocious, and their morale does not seem to be heavily impacted. The Spetsnaz detachments were particularly troublesome and ambushed several patrols and columns, destroying many vehicles. In addition to the Soviet forces, there appears to be an entire Red Brigade of Polish "volunteers" with a mix of civilian, Soviet, and Polish military weaponry and light vehicles. These are non-uniformed units, although some wear identifying armbands, and they blend into the local population to scout, snipe, and harass friendly units. They were probably trained by the Spetsnaz and equipped over the winter. This situation may not be common along the rest of the FEBA and may only be a result of fighting against a mixture of Soviet mechanized infantry, airborne troops, and special forces (Spetsnaz).

<u>OPERATIONS:</u> 5th Infantry Division is combat ineffective and incapable of field operations, including self-defense. Our only choices are to surrender if pursuit continues, or to split up and continue fighting as we move to the rear to regroup, probably in Germany if the situation warrants.

LOGISTICS: We have none. Supply vehicles sent to III US Corps for resupply have not returned or communicated with the division. Soldiers are down to their last basic load, and vehicles are down to their last tank of gas. Rations are short and medical supplies are nearly nonexistent. Repair, maintenance, and resupply options are minimal and most of the few vehicles that remain are badly in need of refitting and repair, particularly of tracks and wheels.

<u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>: We have had no communication with III US Corps or any other adjacent or friendly units for more than 48 hours. Communications within the division are sporadic at best due to losses of command staff and an ongoing lack of batteries.

<u>PERSONNEL:</u> Our end strength is down from about 50% of table strength to around 25%, with vehicles around 10% of nominal strength. 5th Infantry Division is operationally capable of acting only as a straight-leg infantry battalion, and the battalions are, at best, functional companies.



#### COURSE OF ACTION:

I have personally given the order to abandon the offensive and move as rapidly as possible into Germany via the open Polish western border, where I will attempt to reorganize the division if communications are available and a higher headquarters can be contacted.

Some of the remaining Polish troops, as well as stragglers from other units and civilian refugees who are capable of fighting, will accompany the battalions to help maintain some combat capacity and assist in gathering information and movement through civilian-occupied areas. The battalions and companies will move on their own until further notice. Operational command has been turned over to my subordinate commanders to get what is left of their units safely away from the front lines.

I will now let the "Red Devils" of the 5th Infantry Division know that we are on our own.

Respectfully,

M. A. Buonagurio MG, Commanding

5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized)

"We Will"



