



MILLENNIUM'S
END

TERROR
COUNTERTERROR

by

Lisa Smedman,
John Fletcher, and
Sandy Addison





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**THE TERROR/COUNTERTERROR SOURCEBOOK
For Millennium's End**

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INTRODUCTION ▼ ▼

1999, and the world of *Millennium's End* is on the brink of collapse. Cities are crippled by decaying infrastructure and clean, crime-free living space is at a premium. Overburdened and under-equipped police forces have surrendered entire neighborhoods to organized (and disorganized) crime. Multinational corporations run rampant, ignoring environmental laws and squeezing the most work out of the cheapest labor, while labor forces desperately underbid each other for the chance to work in hazardous, toxin-laden factories. Development in Africa and Asia has slowed to a crawl, hindered by corrupt governments, famine, and disease. Inadequate U.N. forces scramble to contain one bush war after another, as Third World governments squabble over dwindling resources and ethnic factions continue decades-old vendettas. Nuclear and chemical weapons exchanges have left much of the Middle East a wasteland, while the Soviet Union has collapsed, leaving behind a legacy of economic disaster and environmental degradation.

Everyone senses the impending crisis, but few feel able to deal with it. The citizens of industrialized nations cocoon themselves in inattention—and, if they can afford it, walls, security guards, and gates—drowning out the world outside with high-tech entertainment centers. Once they might have roused themselves to fight, to organize their communities—but now apathy has set in.

So who, in 1999, cares enough to take action? The terrorists. They are the ones willing to lay their lives on the line, to fight and die for a cause they passionately believe in. Some seek salvation in imposing a religious or political system upon an unwilling population, or in freeing their traditional homeland or people from the oppressive weight of an indifferent government. Some wish to smash imperialism, to preserve the purity of their race by lashing out at “inferior” races, or to save what remains of

the environment through any means necessary. It doesn't matter if the masses see them as fanatics and pariahs—they are in it for the good of the people, who will one day see the light. It doesn't matter how many have to die to achieve their goals—under their system, the righteous shall prosper. It doesn't matter that their targets may seem arbitrary and unjustified—in the minds of the terrorist, each victim is a strategic target, a stepping stone in the journey towards the ultimate goal.

A History of Violence

Terrorism has been with us throughout this century, but became a truly global problem in the 1970s. The student rebellions that swept the Western nations in the late 1960s spawned a number of dedicated fanatics, who, unwilling to continue the war of words, turned instead to bullets and bombs. Hijackings, grenade attacks, kidnappings, machinegunnings, and embassy takeovers were monthly occurrences, and the evening news was filled with images of the world's response—commando raids, martial law, border closures, and police crackdowns.

By the early 1990s, terrorism seemed to have passed its peak. Many of the fanatical anti-establishment groups had disbanded as their members grew too old (or too mature) to continue the struggle, while their leaders had been run to ground and placed behind bars. August 1994 saw the capture of one of the world's most notorious terrorists—after nearly two decades on the run from French police, “Carlos the Jackal” was arrested in Sudan. His previous refuge, Syria, had been forced to evict him due to pressure from Western governments. Sudan took him in, but only as a bargaining chip; they traded him to the French in return for satellite photos of the positions of Christian rebels in the Sudanese countryside.

For a brief period of time, it seemed as if an era had ended, that terrorism might have exhausted itself. But in the later part of the decade, it returned with a vengeance. Israel's 1995 invasion of Palestine breathed new life into Palestinian terrorist groups, while civil unrest in Japan in 1996 gave older Japanese terrorist movements a new focus. Infuriated by the end of apartheid and the “surrender” of South Africa to the black majority, white supremacists rose up in arms. In North America and Europe, neo-fascists and neo-nazis blamed ever-worsening economic conditions on ethnic minorities, and lashed out accordingly. Islamic fundamentalists used the divisions caused by the Gulf War to launch a campaign to topple secular governments in the Middle East and Asia, and long-simmering ethnic conflicts spread beyond their borders as vigilantes struck out at new targets. In the United States, anti-abortionists began assassinating doctors to press home their point about the sanctity of life. A number of Third World states, disillusioned with ineffective diplomacy or faced with seemingly intractable insurgencies, hired terrorists to covertly achieve their aims. And in many areas, terrorism linked itself with organized crime, and a new term was born: “narco-terrorism,” violence financed by drug profits.

Throughout the 1990s, terrorist attacks grew more violent and bloody. The modern weapons of war—rocket launchers, plastic explosives, and compact but powerful smallarms—made it easier for terrorists to stage attacks by surprise and with unprecedented force. Technology also placed a number of new and deadly tools in terrorist's hands. The end

of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet economy, and the large-scale dismantling of military arsenals produced a black market dealing in nuclear materials and chemical weapons. Genetic engineering and the proliferation of research laboratories gave terrorists easy access to bacteria and viruses that could be used in a unique form of germ warfare.

At the same time, a different form of terrorism came into existence. This second trend veered away from violence and focused instead on using technology to make bloodless but dramatic statements. "Techno-terrorists," as they came to be known, might electronically cause a city-wide blackout, or shut down a mass transit system during rush hour. Computer hackers came to the fore of such groups, their skills more valuable than a ton of plastique. Often, these were the methods used by eco-terrorist and anti-fascist groups. But by the end of the millennium, these environmental and political activists had embraced a more traditional brand of terrorism, and were just as often using bombings and assassinations to strike at their targets.

The results of modern terrorism can be seen everywhere in 1999: guards armed with submachineguns patrol banks and airports; corporate headquarters and government offices are surrounded by concrete barriers, sand bags, and razor wire; armored personnel carriers patrol ethnic neighborhoods; and elite police SWAT teams have been created to deal specifically with the terrorist threat. In a world spiraling down into chaos and lawlessness, terrorism has finally come of age.

The Terrorist Plot

Assignments centered around the actions of terrorists are a natural for *Millennium's End* campaigns. The terrorist underground is a vast web of connections between terrorist cells and their leaders, state or corporate sponsors, black market arms dealers, and criminal organizations. Deceit, duplicity, suspicion, and multiple motives are par for the course, not just for the terrorist groups, but for the intelligence agencies, counter-terrorism organizations, and political and commercial powers involved. Opportunities for intriguing investigation, the suspense of infiltration, and of course hair-trigger action abound. And the stakes could hardly be higher than when innocent lives—perhaps hundreds, or even thousands of innocent lives—are in the balance. This book is the starting point, providing detailed data on a plethora of terrorist organizations with all sorts of agendas and methods, along with information on their tactics and techniques, resources for use in assignments involving terrorists, and an overview of virtually every terrorist group—and many of the major tactical counter-terrorist agencies—active in 1999. Hundreds of potential adventure hooks should provide ideas for scores of BlackEagle assignments, enough to keep any cell busy for years.

One thing to keep in mind: terrorism is a complex issue. While most acts of terrorism are heinous beyond comprehension, and most terrorists are at least somewhat sociopathic, if not completely inhuman, terrorism often has its roots in real injustice. To portray terrorist acts as completely and baselessly evil is to miss out on an opportunity to bring complexity and sophistication to your assignments. On the other hand, softening the effects of terrorism not only downplays a terrible class of crimes, but defuses the dramatic power of their brutality. A very real grievance such as genocide, government corruption, or environmental degradation might

make it easy for *Millennium's End* characters to sympathize with their adversaries—but even if the cause is just, the violent methods of terrorism are not.

Finally, this book is a work of fiction. While many of the terrorist groups and news events it describes are drawn from real life, many details have been changed to fit the *Millennium's End* world. Furthermore, many specific details on terrorism and counter-terrorist operations remain secret, and the authors have had to extrapolate from known data to fill in the holes. All events depicted as occurring after mid-1995 are, of course, entirely fictional—we hope!

CHAPTER ONE

THE THREAT ▼ ▼

If you're not paranoid, you obviously don't understand what's going on in the world today.

—Michael Souris, Head of Security, Billington Corporation

In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, symbolically marking the end of the Cold War. Many thought the generations that had grown up in the shadow of the bomb could let go of their fear. It didn't work out that way.

The power vacuum left by the fall of the Communist bloc allowed long-standing grudges to develop into unchecked violence. In the many ex-communist countries, the lack of functioning economies lead to widespread crime and a new phase of violence and political instability. The few remaining Marxist countries struggled to survive without the aid of the defunct Soviet Union and isolationist China. The Western democracies faced their own challenges—urban decay, secessionism, corruption, crippling government deficits, organized crime, growing corporate autonomy and environmental destruction.

In 1999, the average person no longer worries about being one of the nameless victims of a nuclear war—he or she worries about being the victim of terrorism. Discontent is widespread at millennium's end and the desperate, the criminal and the fanatic have turned to violence to express their anger. Virtually anyone can find themselves looking down the barrel of a gun. A minor government official, a corporate officer, someone with immigrant parents, or just a consumer of a particular product—anyone can be targeted by terrorists simply because of the mundane reality of who they are. But being a target isn't the only danger—simply being in the wrong place at the wrong moment can set up a senseless death.

THE TERRORIST

George Washington was a terrorist. To describe a man as a terrorist is a term of honor.

—a member of the Baader-Meinhof gang

To normal society, terrorism seems irrational. To the terrorist, acts of violence and disruption are demonstrations of resolve. The line between a terrorist and a guerrilla soldier or “freedom fighter” is often blurred. The difference boils down to the nature of the target selected, and the methods used.

The target of a soldier is primarily military in nature. While attacks may involve stealth, they are made against opposing military units, or against the infrastructure that supports the military. The objective is to decisively defeat the enemy’s forces, to wear down the enemy through attrition, or to demoralize the opposing force by these means.


The target of a terrorist may be military or civilian, governmental or corporate. Attacks are almost always covert, though well-publicized after the fact, and are designed to intimidate a population or government by offering the threat of more violence to come. While the target is often specific, the numbers killed are not important, as long as the attack is vivid, pointed, and demonstrates the vulnerability of the target group. Favorite terrorist methods include bombings, murders, and ambushes. If there is combat with the police or military, it is waged at a low intensity and is designed to have lasting psychological, political or economic impact.

THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Terrorist groups can be described according to eight axioms: Activity; Ideology; Methodology; Discipline; Organization; Connections; Public Profile; and Funding. Within each of these axioms, as shown in the diagram on the next page, terrorist groups follow certain profiles or maintain certain levels or types of activities. These issues are discussed in detail below, and all active terrorist groups covered in this book are described according to these axioms in the Terrorist Organization Master List on page 90.

Activity

Terrorist groups have varying levels of activity, and any given group is prone to ebbs and flows in its activity level as membership, ideology, and methods change. For game terms, any given terrorist group can be said to have four potential theatres of operation: local, national, regional, and global. The local theatre is a specific region, city, or even neighborhood in which the group’s interest is focused. The national theatre, obviously, is the country in which the group is based or that it is concerned



ACTIVITY

Local
National
Regional
Global

dormant
sporadic
active
vigorous

IDEOLOGY

Aboriginal
Anarchist/Reactionary
Eco-Terrorist
Ethnic
Leftist/Communist
Mercenary/Freelance
Nationalist/Separatist
New Millennialist/
Social Revolutionary
Hate-based
Religious Fanaticist
Fascist/
Right Wing Extremist

METHODOLOGY

Consumer Intimidation
Corporate Sabotage
Techno-terrorism
Political Repression
Popular Terror

DISCIPLINE

Weak
Solid
Hard
Fanatical

FUNDING

Crime
Legitimate Business
Mercenary Activity
Private Donation
State Support

PUBLIC PROFILE

Broad Support
Community Support
Divided Support
Minority Support
Indifference
Popular Rejection

ORGANIZATION

Bureaucracy
Electronic Network
Gang Hierarchy
Military Hierarchy
Religious Hierarchy
Scattered Cells

CONNECTIONS

Black Market	none
Corporate	poor
Military	modest
Political	good
	excellent

with, if there is such a country. The regional theatre is a larger area of operations such as western Europe or the Middle East, while the global theatre is, obviously, the entire world.

Most terrorist groups are not active in all potential theatres. Many focus their concerns very locally, and never conduct terrorist actions on a global scale. The ETA, for example, is by far most active in the Basque region of Spain (its local theatre), but does carry out attacks elsewhere in Spain and occasionally elsewhere in Europe (national and regional theatres, respectively). Others, like the Worldwide Islamic Jihad, are nearly global, and cannot be said to have a specific local theatre—even if they do concentrate attacks at one time or another on specific areas.

Within a given theatre, a terrorist group's level of activity can be described as Dormant, Sporadic, Active, or Vigorous (or not applicable, if the group is not operating in that theatre). Each of these terms roughly describes how active the organization is in carrying out acts of terrorism. Dormant groups exist, if only in name, but are not carrying out any acts of terrorism.

They may be in a state of disorganization, or gone to ground, or they may be focusing their efforts in another theatre. Sometimes, groups fall completely apart—but their names may later be resurrected by others with similar ideologies. Sporadic groups carry out acts of terrorism infrequently and on an irregular schedule, either because of poor resources or problems of organization or infighting within the group. Active groups carry out their actions with some frequency, and generally do a fair job keeping their names in the headlines. Vigorous groups are exceptionally active—very few groups have the resources to remain vigorous for extended periods.

Ideology

A terrorist group's ideology is its *raison d'être*, and dictates its targets and sometimes its methods. Most terrorist groups are dedicated to a single cause or ideology, but terrorists occasionally have overlapping priorities or change their agendas over the years. The ideologies of virtually every terrorist group in existence are covered by the eleven broad categories below—though these categories are somewhat generalized, as it can be hard to cubbyhole (or even fathom) the motivations of many groups.

Aboriginal Terrorists

Aboriginal terrorists seek to reclaim land and resources that were stolen from them by colonial powers. Frustrated by long series of broken promises and the failure of governments to recognize treaties signed in previous centuries, aboriginal terrorists seek an improved standard of living and equality for members of their population, who often face intense racism. Unlike mere activists, aboriginal terrorists see the government as an occupying force, and vow to continue their armed struggle until their land claims are at last formalized and their people are recognized as an independent nation.

Due in part to the deteriorating biosphere and failing global economy, nativist movements have become especially active at millennium's end. The Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico still trouble the Federales in 1999. The continued friction between Russia and Japan has lead to convert Japanese support of Siberian native movements and Russian assistance to the fledgling Ainu Bear Warrior Resistance Front. The long suffering Aborigines of Australia have found their voice in 1999, and begun to demonstrate their claim to Australia's vast wilderness by non-compliance, civil disobedience and stealthy, surgically precise attacks against government holdings on their lands.

Some groups with aboriginal membership have other political agendas. Shining Path, a Peruvian terrorist group, incorporates Indian symbols and beliefs, but has Maoist rather than aboriginal goals.

Anarchist/Reactionary Terrorists

The agendas of some terrorist groups are so vague they can only defined by what they oppose: the current government, prevailing social norms, capitalist economics, etc. Sometimes these groups form as direct opposition to other political/terror groups. Most active in the 1960s and early 1970s, many of these groups once incorporated socialist or communist dogma into their rhetoric, and some especially stubborn groups still espouse it today. Well-known terrorists in this mold include the Baader-Meinhof Gang of Germany, the Japanese Red Army, and the Italian Red Brigades.

In 1999, a decade after the fall of communism, these groups are composed almost in equal parts of determined but deluded students and destructive sociopaths. They do not have large memberships or wide support. While their bombings and acts of sabotage are destructive, they are merely criminal, and are not considered a serious threat by most governments. The French anarchist group Action Directe (AD), for example, emerged in the 1980s, claiming to be part of an anti-NATO alliance of terrorists. They attacked both government and business targets, specifically outspoken Jews. The best known group in 1999 is the

European Christian Resistance Front (ECRF), an unlikely network of anti-EC movements which issues disjointed, contradictory and grammatically unsound proclamations and seems to have no clear agenda. Like AD, the ECRF is anti-NATO, anti-European Union and anti-Semitic.

Other examples of these types of movements active in 1999 include: 1st of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (Spain); Alfaro Lives, Damn It! (Ecuador, anti-government); Angry Brigade (Britain, anti-government); Armed Proletarian Cells (Italy, anti-capitalist); Combatant Communist Cells (Belgium, anti-NATO, anti-capitalist); Frente Revolucionario Anti-Fascista Patriótica (Italy); and November 17 (Greece, anti-fascist).

Eco-Terrorists

Eco-terrorists, or green terrorists, are those who believe that only drastic, direct action can save our deteriorating planet. Their targets are twofold: corporations (especially multi-nationals) whose resource exploitation or manufacturing methods destroy eco-systems and pollute the planet; and the military-industrial complex, whose products not only have the capacity of destroying the planet but also deplete resources that would otherwise be used for peaceful purposes.

Eco-terrorists usually strike at economic targets, rather than at individuals, employing the methods of consumer intimidation and corporate sabotage. They sabotage resource-extraction equipment, bomb factories, sink ships (particularly whaling ships), and enlist computer hackers to disrupt the flow of corporate information. The more extreme groups show less regard for human life, kidnapping or even assassinating corporate CEOs and government officials involved with either the military or any administration seen as not doing enough to protect the environment.

Eco-terrorists tend to be well educated. They are often supported (unwittingly) by the general population, through contributions to environmental charities—the more radical of which have contacts with, or even fund, these extremists. Eco-terrorist groups include Gaia's Fist, the ETG, and militant factions of PETA and GreenPeace.

Ethnic Terrorists

Ethnic terrorist organizations exist for the sole purpose of gaining revenge for past or present atrocities committed against their ethnic group. At the same time, they can share some of the goals of nationalist/separatist or aboriginal organizations, in that they are seeking either to create a separate nation state for their group (usually in the area of a traditional homeland) or are seeking equality with the majority population. In many cases, though, their plans extend no further than the next act of revenge against the former aggressor.

Ethnic terrorist organizations usually arise either during a period of oppression or a short time after it—but once formed, these organizations can continue to exist for decades after the last survivors of the injustice have died, and long after widespread public support for their cause has waned.

Ethnic terrorists almost always confine their actions to attacks on the government that perpetrated the atrocity. They target both its infrastructure and officials. Because the oppression in question often

forced survivors to flee to other countries as refugees, the attacks are not limited to the nation itself, and actions are often carried out by ethnic communities living in other countries.

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, and Kurdish Workers' Party all target Turks and the Turkish government for past injustices. A number of Sikh groups attack the Indian government and symbols of it abroad, in revenge for general oppression and the 1984 destruction of the Sikh Golden Temple.

Leftist/Communist Terrorists

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the break up of the East Bloc, the impoverishment of Cuba and the isolationism of China, a few idealists continue to cling to the romance of revolution and world socialism. While the utter lack of international support, funding, and public enthusiasm had greatly diminished these groups' efforts, it has also winnowed out any ambivalence. Those who remain in the service of international communism are completely and utterly dedicated. This does not mean, however, that they are united. Sometimes a group will splinter, with different factions embracing competing philosophies—Marxism-Leninism versus Maoism, for example. At other times, factions will temporarily band together in an umbrella organization when their goals are similar, then break apart again and fight each other once that goal is achieved.

While the seeming futility of their struggle makes them superficially similar to anarchists, anti-capitalists, and anti-imperialists, communists differ because their dogma gives them a model for post-revolutionary society.

The most persistent of the communist revolutionary fronts still active in 1999 include: Bandera Roja (Red Flag) in Venezuela; Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement in Honduras; Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo in Argentina; Fighting Communist Party in Italy; M-19 in Colombia (which combats both the government and FARC's Cartel-backed insurgency); Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front in Chile; People's New Maoist Army in the Philippines; Popular Forces 25 April in Portugal; Maoist Revolutionary Union in the U.S.; Shining Path in Peru; and Turkish People's Liberation Army.





Mercenary/Freelance Terrorists

A freelance or mercenary terrorist organization sometimes begins with a specific cause or goal in mind, but winds up selling itself to the highest bidder. Others are in it for the money from the start. Usually a freelancer's employer is either another terrorist group, a corporation, or a nation state. These mercenaries are employed as proxies in political terrorism or as operatives for corporate or political infighting.

Two well-known examples of freelance terrorist organizations are the Japanese Red Army and the Abu Nidal Organization. The JRA originally intended to fight Japanese imperialism and American intervention in Japanese affairs, and does remain active on political issues in Japan. But, motivated by the idea of starting an international revolution, they hired themselves out to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who supplied training and equipment in return for attacks on Israeli targets. The ANO, originally a Palestinian nationalist group, now operates almost entirely as a mercenary organization. It attacked Syrian targets on behalf of the Iraqi government, then switched sides and worked for Syria, carrying out attacks against Jordan. Other groups have less political histories, though: one of two groups operating under the name "Mano Blanco" is nothing more than a high-tech corporate goon squad.

Nationalist/Separatist Terrorists

The ebb and flow of history and the redrawing of borders by remote powers has divided many cultural groups. The traditional territories of many peoples are today parts of larger countries or are divided between several.

Some minorities see the continuity of their culture, religion, and language at risk in the face of the dominant culture. Many can make

legitimate claims of persecution. To them the nationalist cause speaks loudly. They seek to throw out the forces which currently govern their homelands and unite their peoples under new, sovereign governments.

In rare cases, the motivation for separatism is social rather than cultural. The Northern Italian League, while accepting Italy as a cultural whole, advocates the formation of a sovereign state in prosperous north-western Italy on economic grounds: they do not wish to support the poorer parts of the country. A splinter group, the Front for a Sovereign Lombardy, began a tax revolt campaign in 1996. By 1999 it had escalated into a three-sided gang war between government agents, the Front, and the Mafia representing the interests of their have-not homeland of Sicily.

Nationalist agitators exist in practically every nation on the planet. Examples of such groups active in 1999 include: Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (Corsicans in France); Arab Organization of 15 May (Europe); Armed Revolutionary Lebanese Factions (Lebanon); Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia; Black June (Middle East); Breton Liberation Front (France); Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (El Salvador); Committee For Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners (France); Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (Yugoslavia); the Cymric League (Wales); Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Lebanon/Israel); ETA (Spain); Front de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse (Corsicans in France); Irish Republican Army (Ireland/Britain); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka); Macheteros, aka "Machete Wielders" (Puerto Rico); Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (France); New Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (Europe); NALQ (Canada); Organization of the Armed Arab Struggle (Europe/Middle East); Palestine Liberation Front (Lebanon/Israel/Europe); Palestine National Salvation Front (Middle East); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Middle East/Europe); Popular Struggle Front (Lebanon/Israel).

New Millennialist/Social Revolutionary Terrorists

The contemporary anti-establishment movement has grown out of two sources: the international socialist movement of the 1960s, and the popular American image of the hero who stands up against corrupt authority. While communism is an acknowledged failure, the romance of social revolution persists and continues to foster a whole sub-culture of motivated youth. Born in the 1970s, they represent the convergence of the computer age and their parents' radicalism. They are young, hip, and highly computer-literate. They share a belief that the march of technology has invalidated many social conventions and that everything from the home and the work place to the structure of education must be radically overhauled. They believe that the bloated government bureaucracies of the twentieth century cannot adapt to the new millennium even with the massive intervention of their corporate sponsors. Change will come and it is up to their generation to shape it.

Various cliques exist within the movement, ranging from the passive optimism of the "Zippies" through the confrontational "Cyberpunks." The cyberpunks are the most aggressive branch of the movement, and specialize in techno-terrorism. Some new millennialist groups are much more primitive, however, such as the rather anarchist 21 Underground, which is generally anti-technology in all regards.

Racial Hate Groups

Racism and cultural intolerance are age-old sources of human conflict, and some racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan are among the oldest functioning terrorist groups on the planet. Modern groups tend towards two points of view: that a particular racial group is superior, or at least that the distinguishable races of humanity represent archetypes and should not be diluted by intermarriage or mixed communities; and the simpler view that immigrants or minority groups (most often, in the U.S., blacks or Jews) are undermining the culture or economy of the dominant society. Neither view can be supported empirically, of course, so hate-groups usually rely on Nazi doctrine or extreme religious views to back them up.

Hate group targets are usually minorities, though in a few cases once-powerful minorities (such as whites in South Africa) spawn hate groups opposed to the majority.

Violent political movements known to have racist motivations include the Afrikaner Resistance Front in South Africa; Ein Tirol in Italy; the Ku Klux Klan; Warriors of Islam, a radical African-American Muslim group; the Anglo-Saxon League in Great Britain, Nihon Ichiban in Japan and the Zhirinovsky Nationalists found in parts of Russia.

Religious Fanatics

Religion is one of the defining qualities of cultural identity, and is often the spark that ignites conflict. Most religious terrorist struggles are localized, and occur in places where two or more groups clash over holy sites, or where a religious minority is being repressed by an opposing theocracy. These groups often turn to international terrorism to draw attention to their causes, but most true international groups with religious overtones and structures, such as the Worldwide Islamic Jihad, really pursue agendas which are more political and cultural than religious.

A second type of religious terrorism is spawned by the growing phenomenon of cults. A cult's charismatic leader generally sees him- or herself as above the law, if not divine, and illegal acts are common by radical cults. Most still don't turn to terrorism, though, simply because their ideologies don't call for it. When they do, as in the case of the Japanese cult that nerve-gassed the Tokyo subway system in 1995, they often know no bounds.

Many causes which are primarily political do have religious components. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Catholic, nativist Irish Republican Army combats the Protestant, colonial British government. In response to the IRA, the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defense Association, and other Protestant militias attack Catholic targets. In India and in Sikh communities in Britain and Canada, members of the Khalsa movement plan for the liberation of the Punjab. The presence of many Sikhs in the Indian Army makes the situation very difficult for the Indian government.

Terrorist groups active in 1999 and known to be motivated by religious fanaticism include Al Dawa (Call of Islam) in Iraq; Al Gama'a al Islamiya in Egypt; the Amal Militia in Lebanon; Dal Khalsa, the worldwide Sikh independence movement; Hizbullah Lebanon (a faction of the

Worldwide Islamic Jihad); Islamic Amal in Lebanon; Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters in Ireland; and Worldwide Islamic Jihad.

Right Wing Extremists/Fascist Terrorists

Just as many terrorists in the 1970s espoused radical left-wing views, a growing number in the nineties are pushing radical right-wing agendas. Right-wing radicals see strict morality, tight social order, and repression of dissenting views as the cures for modern problems. These movements look back nostalgically at the fascist regimes of the 1930s and are generally pro-military, pro-industry and anti-immigrant. Some see aggressive, empowered government as the solution to cultural disintegration and declining standards of living, while others strike out against any government that seems to hinder individual liberties and has ties to perceived enemies.

In 1998, Japanese militarists staged a successful coup, sweeping away the corrupt capitalist government and replacing it with a right leaning, moralist junta. In Russia, the Zhirinovsky Nationalists have stepped up their campaign against the reform-minded democratic government. The Italian National Alliance Party, who claimed to be moderates in the 1980s, openly acknowledge their ties to the fascism of the Mussolini era. Their members of parliament play the political game in Rome, while their black shirted "legionaries" harass Bosnian and Albanian refugees in the camps around Brindisi. In America, Germany, France and England, right-wing groups are often barely distinguishable from hate groups, as so much of their rhetoric is aimed against immigrants or minorities seen as agents of economic, social, or moral disintegration.

Some of the violent right-wing movements existing in 1999 are the 11th Hour Brigade and Column 88 in Great Britain; The Gray Wolves in Turkey; Avanguardia Nazionale, Mussolini Action Squads, La Fenice, Revolutionary Action Movement, and Ordine Nuovo/Ordine Nero, all in Italy, the Socialist Nationalist Resistance Party of Syria and the Warriors of Christ the King, in Spain.

Methodology

Determined partly by ideology, a terrorist organization's methodology depends mostly on its goals. Most seek political empowerment and engage in popular terror (attacks on the general population) as a means of polarizing support and provoking the authorities. Other methods are motivated by concerns for the environment, profits, or personal gain. The following are the most common methodological approaches taken by terrorist groups.

Consumer Intimidation

Consumer intimidation is practiced mainly by eco-terrorists to change the buying habits of the public, influence corporate policy, and deter the exploitation of natural resources. It is similar to and may overlap with a campaign of popular terrorism, but differs in that its methods are narrowly focused. Whereas the deliberately random nature of popular terrorism makes the citizenry fear constantly for their lives, the goal of

consumer intimidation is to deter a specific act—like patronizing a particular gas-station chain. A citizen that complies may feel safe from attack.

Consumer intimidators lace foods, drugs, and other consumables with poisons, or simply spoil products to damage their reputations. They taint resources to prevent their exploitation, spiking trees and staining animal pelts. They threaten product producers, wholesalers and users with threats of physical violence or corporate sabotage. One radical group recently splintered out of GreenPeace is thought to have purchased an ex-Soviet diesel-electric attack sub, and is planning to use it to sink whaling vessels. In Paris, a series of murders of people wearing fur coats has been blamed on Les Amis du Mammiferes.

Consumer intimidation has also been practiced by major corporations under the guise of eco-terrorism, both against competitors to reduce their market share, and against themselves to avert suspicion and gain public sympathy.

Corporate Sabotage


In 1999, many corporations feel they are above in the law. Under the right conditions, they have no compunction about attacking the assets of their competitors. Arson and bombing attacks on factories and offices are not unusual, nor are attacks on railways, roads, airfields, and other elements of public infrastructure on which a target corporation relies. Key managers may be kidnapped or murdered, and if that doesn't intimidate the workforce, a few of them might disappear as well.

These tactics are usually employed between corporations, but are sometimes also used by eco-terrorists and despotic governments, envious of corporate assets.

Techno-Terrorism

New millennialists, eco-terrorists, corporations, and other groups wishing to make powerful, destructive statements while minimizing loss of life and alienation of the public often turn to techno-terrorism. Techno-terrorists target infrastructure, often electronically. Some groups bomb power stations or uplink sites, but most never even touch a weapon. The disruption of all communications in Washington D.C. in September 1994 was caused by dozens of time-encoded software worms placed by a single group of cyber-terrorists over the preceding year, for example, as was the breakdown of NATO's Operation Black Bear Exercise in August of 1995.

Some groups employ hackers for reasons other than terrorism—uncovering evidence of corruption or collusion, extorting money by



threatening data, destroying records or diverting funds. While these acts are certainly illegal and often directly support the terrorists' actions, they are not themselves acts of true techno-terrorism.

While techno-terrorism is a favorite method of groups preferring to attack infrastructure over people, it has not escaped the attention of more murderous groups. In 1997, disaster was narrowly averted at Honolulu International Airport, when hackers infiltrating the air-traffic control system routed multiple aircraft into the same landing pattern. Although one ground collision did occur, quick-thinking air-traffic controllers were able to reroute traffic visually and prevent more serious accidents.

Political Repression

Many governments — particularly military dictatorships and other totalitarian regimes — either openly employ or covertly support “death squads” that fulfill the same role as a terrorist cells. Through murder, torture, the destruction of homes and businesses, forced relocation, and “disappearances,” they terrify the populace, keeping them in line and preventing organized uprisings against the state. Political repression often looks like popular terror, although the targets are more selective and the methods often less covert than those of the latter. Furthermore, victims of political repression know they have no authority they can turn to for protection or solace, which is a calculated segment of the effect.

Government-supported groups carrying out political repression are often parts of regular military or police units. Sometimes, special death-squad units are created under the euphemism of “Special Forces,” “Task Forces,” or other elite-sounding titles. In many cases, however, political repressors are civilian groups secretly armed, funded, or trained by the military or police. Political repressors usually operate within a single country, although covert cross-border incursions into neighboring states do occur, and some groups will send assassins after expatriate spokesmen around the globe.

Some states that actively use terrorist tactics against their citizenry in 1999 include Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Cambodia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

Popular Terror

Popular terror is the most widespread terrorist method. It uses violence to create anxiety in the population and attempts to force a response from the authorities that will polarize the public. High profile hostage-taking and attacks with bombs and firearms are the most common methods of instilling terror in the population.

Most terrorist attacks are against human targets. Assassination, from surgical sniping to indiscriminate bombings, is a common tactic. The latter are usually carried out in areas with high concentrations of civilians, such as cafes, shopping centers, book stores, hotels, and busy streets. Transportation facilities are also favored vectors, as they are target-rich environments and their closure (or the intimidation of the populace away from them) has a dramatic effect on the functioning of

society. Airplanes (which can also be fired upon with missiles), trains, ships, railway stations, airports, cruise ship terminals, and subway platforms are all ripe targets.

Human targets might also be selected for kidnapping, either to obtain a ransom or to intimidate others in the target group. Kidnapping is also used to obtain the release of fellow terrorists who have been incarcerated, by means of a prisoner swap. Again, aircraft and ships can be used to hold large numbers of victims hostage, either directly or by bomb threat.

Often, a victim of assassination or kidnapping is not the target itself; a close family member of the target might be killed or kidnapped instead. Another alternative is to terrorize the target by means of death threats, with no actual violence being carried out if the terrorists' demands are met.

The specific victims, or classes of victims, of popular terror are many. Police, lawyers, prosecutors, and justice ministers are targeted to slow or halt their efforts to bring terrorists to trial. Judges are targeted to terrorize other judges into handing down lenient sentences. Ambassadors, diplomats, bureaucrats, and elected officials are proxies for the state itself. Military officers and attaches—even common soldiers—likewise represent their country, and are often a direct, physical manifestation of the oppression the terrorists are fighting. Government ministers are prime targets because they have the power to enact or alter legislation. Alternatively, a terrorist organization might target a president or prime minister, to strike a direct blow at the state.

Corporate executives may be targeted because their business supports the government or produces materials used by government forces. Firms with links to the defense industry, chemical and oil companies, or the nuclear industry are likely to be targeted. Alternatively, the officers of a company might be victimized simply because they represent the “bourgeois” or capitalism.

Intellectuals, professors, and students are targets because they spread ideas that might sway the populace against the terrorist cause. Economists are a particular target. Reporters and journalists who write stories critical of terrorist activities or the terrorists' larger political movements put themselves in danger, as do priests, missionaries, and labor leaders who exercise their capacity to organize a segment of the population.

Tourists are targeted because they bring economic wealth to a country, and because killing them damages the government's international reputation. Alternatively, they may be targeted because their customs and morality are at odds with those espoused by the terrorists. Athletes (particularly those competing in international sporting events) are targets because they represent their country abroad. The fact that they often wear team uniforms makes them easy to spot.

Finally, members of a particular ethnic or religious group are easy targets, as are those belonging to a particular economic class or holding passports of a particular country.

Aside from human targets, popular terrorists often focus on military targets. Individual soldiers, patrols or entire military bases may be attacked as enemies of the terrorist forces. A favored technique is to kill or kidnap a single soldier, then use that soldier's uniform and identification as a means of entering a base. UN peacekeepers and NATO soldiers on maneuvers are particularly tempting to terrorists looking for public-

ity. Military lounges, barracks, and recreational facilities are popular targets, as are any civilian restaurants or nightclubs where military personnel congregate.

Terrorists also attack recruiting stations, temporary camps in the field, permanent bases and headquarters in cities, and communication networks. Supply depots are tempting, because they offer the terrorist the option of stealing weapons and explosives as well as wreaking general havoc. A well-trained and equipped terrorist group might tackle more difficult targets, such as nuclear submarines or missile launch facilities.

A third major target type are government targets, which are generally attacked either in direct assaults or through bombings. Embassies and consulates, legislative buildings, government offices, palaces, headquarters of various political parties, provincial and municipal offices, and town halls are all obvious targets. Others have a less tangible connection with the state—museums, schools, post offices, social centers, recreational facilities and landmarks or monuments of national pride, such as the Eiffel Tower or Statue of Liberty.

Terrorists might attack police stations (especially those that contain weapons and are poorly guarded), court houses, or the offices of judges, lawyers and other law enforcement officials, as well as symbols of international authority, such as United Nations missions, world trade centers, and Interpol offices.

The final major objective type are media targets. Media attention is a major factor in swaying the populace, and radio and television stations, as well as uplink sites and network nodes and crossover points, are prime targets. The media can be targeted in an attempt to coerce a favorable (or less condemning) editorial position, to close down government propaganda (in the case of a state-controlled media), or to simply ensure a well-publicized attack. Many attacks are simply destructive, but terrorists often attempt to hold a broadcast facility long enough to send their own message out over the airwaves.

Not all terrorist attacks against the media are violent. A terrorist might simply record a video, send it to a television station, and threaten violence unless it is aired. In many cases, however, this is hardly necessary—some groups reportedly receive substantial income by taping their attacks and selling the tapes to the news media.

Discipline

Terrorist leaders are generally fanatical about their causes, but the quality of their help can vary. By their nature, most rank and file terrorists believe strongly in what they do, but many turn to terrorism for money or adventure, or as a result of blackmail or an unbalanced mental state—and not all of those will unthinkingly give their lives to the cause. Less than fanatical terrorists are more likely than professionals to lose their nerve and fail to complete difficult assignments, surrender rather than fight in the face of authority or a superior force, and inform on their compatriots when captured.

Generalizations are difficult to make, and even harder to apply to individual terrorists. Nevertheless, a terrorist group's membership discipline can be described as Weak, Solid, Hard, or Fanatical. In Weak terrorist groups, members are not likely to stick around for a standup fight, and attempts at sophisticated terrorist acts often go wrong, if they occur at all. Weak groups are often bands of thugs, insurgents, or poorly-



trained mercenaries. Groups with Solid discipline are effective with low-level terrorism, but cannot hold up in the face of serious counter-terrorist actions, and are constantly vulnerable to informants if they aren't careful with information. Hard groups are deadly serious about their work, are able to carry out sophisticated acts of terrorism in the face of dangerous odds, and are unlikely to surrender to authorities unless clearly in an untenable situation. Fanatics are never captured alive, if they have anything to do with it.

Obviously, in any group, individual leaders tend to have higher levels of devotion than the rank and file. The discipline level assigned to a terrorist organization represents the likely average of an active cell or low-level action group.

Organization

A terrorist organization may be a small group of three or four individuals under a single leader, or it may be an organization with hundreds or even thousands of members, taking orders from a centralized command with all of its attendant bureaucracy. Terrorist leaders themselves may be active participants in front-line operations, or may direct the actions of the terrorist rank and file from a remote, covert location. In any event, terrorist groups are almost always highly structured, and generally fall under one of the following organization models.

Bureaucracy

A large, bureaucratic organization may be headed up by a single, domineering leader, or by a council of senior members. In either event, it is actually run by a number of interconnected Bureaus, Committees, Councils, and Directorates, each of which has a specific function within the organization.

Many bureaucratic terrorist organizations are built loosely on the Soviet governmental model. Power radiates from a Political Bureau, a small group of the most influential individuals in the organization which has absolute authority over all of the organization's various operations. This bureau is often supported by a Central Committee and/or Revolutionary Council, which are comprised of the heads of the various major departments and the general upper echelons of the organization, respectively. These two organizations have policy-making authority and advise the Political Bureau, and generally function democratically or by consensus.

Below these upper bodies are any number of directorates or departments. Generally, an Intelligence Directorate gathers and maintains information on potential targets, conducts counter-intelligence, and assists in planning operations. A Membership Committee keeps track of the organization's members and agents, and handles recruiting. It is often responsible for maintaining false identities for members as well. A Political Directorate acts as the Public Relations office, distributing propaganda to the world at large as well as keeping in touch with the organization's constituency and its international supporters. A Financial Directorate, Committee for Revolutionary Justice, and Military Directorate, and any number of other minor branches and sub-branches, are all common fixtures of bureaucratic terrorist organizations.

Obviously, only the largest of terrorist organizations have the resources to support such a burdensome command structure. Beyond size, a terrorist organization must also have the support of a stable national government or powerful corporation, for such a bureaucracy requires offices, records, communications, and other infrastructure safe from hostile authorities or counter-terrorist agencies. Nevertheless, like governments, corporations, and conventional military organizations, large terrorist groups find they need substantial management at the top in order to function effectively, and the bureaucratic model has worked for many.

Electronic Network

The advent of the information age and international computer networks has provided terrorists with a new method of organizing and communicating with one another. By using computer, fax, and cell phone technologies, terrorists are able to recruit members, gather intelligence information, plan operations, transfer funds, and communicate with one another without ever meeting face to face.



Using passwords and network “handles,” the terrorists hide their identities from one another as well as the world at large.

A terrorist group organized via the electronic network has several unique characteristics. Rather than being organized along hierarchical lines, the group practices true anarchy. Individuals may join or quit the organization as they desire, participating only in those actions that interest them. Two techno-terrorist/hacking groups, the Children of Danu and NetWedgie, organized dozens of hackers to disrupt of NATO’s exercise Operation Black Bear in 1995 (see Chapter 2). Actions may also be undertaken at the individual level, allowing a single person to actively and anonymously carry out a terrorist action.

The loose organization of the electronic network also presents some problems. Unofficial or unsanctioned actions often occur, muddying the group’s objectives. The official party line is constantly changing as individuals redefine it to suit their own interests and beliefs. There is also the ever-present danger that the terrorist group will suffer electronic infiltration by its enemies, who can then disseminate information, discredit the terrorist group, or subvert its actions.

Gang Structure

The rampant violence and decay in many big cities has blurred the line between political terrorist movements and criminal gangs. Local terrorist movements often operate like gangs, and ambitious gangs sometimes include terrorism in their repertoire of violence.

Gangs are organized in loose hierarchies. They often form along social and ethnic lines and are usually closed to outsiders. Loyalty is high, although gangs generally have little tolerance for members who become liabilities, and any challenge to authority can lead to expulsion from the gang and/or a violent death. The Masters, a gang which kidnapped and killed three members of the Detroit city council in 1997, was only cracked when gunfire from an internal squabble alerted passing police.

While deceptively simple in organization, gang loyalties are very important to members, and should not be taken lightly by investigators. While even low-level members may know a surprising amount about their gang’s activities and assets, they will probably not talk out of fear and loyalty. The only exception might be someone ejected by the gang, someone who is angry and has nothing to lose.

Gang networks developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with the more mature biker gangs moving up the criminal ladder into serious organized crime, and street gangs taking over local vice and street crime. They began to set up chapters in other cities, creating criminal undergrounds trafficking in drugs, guns, stolen merchandise, and prostitution. In 1999, the FBI estimates the Bloods, based in Los Angeles, have over 3000 members in over 20 cities nationwide.

Gangs typically have one or more gig houses which are used as bases of operations. They are usually well armed and most have sophisticated communications methods.

Military Hierarchy

The military model is common among terrorist organizations that started out as guerilla military forces. Generally, the leadership (an individual or council) oversees a number of brigades, which are subdivided into battalions, then companies, then cells. Smaller groups might omit one or

two of the intervening levels, but the military system of subdivision remains the same. Like a conventional army, a number of additional resources are attached to each level—a battalion might have a small quartermaster section, responsible for the acquisition, storage, and dispersal of weapons and explosives used by the regular companies, for example.

Typical terrorist actions are carried out by individual cells. Larger actions are broken into discrete tasks, each given to a single cell which probably has no knowledge of the overall plan. In this manner, sensitive information is kept out of the hands of the foot soldiers, who are vulnerable to capture and interrogation. Only the leadership one level higher than the units in the field sees the big picture.

Religious Hierarchy

Extremist religions have spawned a number of terrorist organizations. Some small but dangerous groups are well known and actively supported by their congregations—the Identity Christianity sects, for example. Others, like the Sikh terrorist organizations, are well supported but are quite invisible to the religious community as a whole. Still others, like the Worldwide Islamic Jihad, are large international organizations that enjoy the support and protection of a number of nation states.

A religion-inspired terrorist movement is typically organized along the same hierarchical lines as its parent faith. Leaders assume the titles awarded to religious leaders, or are in fact the leaders of the sect. Members are initiated with religious ceremonies, and cell leaders use church teaching to inspire their actions—and justify them afterward. The late leader of the first Bruder Schweigen, Robert Matthews, is known to have baptized his recruits in the Aryan Nations chapel, proclaiming them “reborn” as Aryan Warriors.

Funding for the terrorist organization comes from tithes collected from the faithful, who may not be aware that they are offering financial support to terrorist activities. Churches, temples and mosques may serve as places of refuge or safe houses for the terrorists—again, often without the knowledge of the general worshippers.

Scattered Cells

Smaller terrorist groups or those that are widely scattered across an international theater often do not have the personnel or resources to support large governing structures. They still need some sort of command structure, however, to coordinate the actions of individual cells.

These scattered cells are typically coordinated and directed by a group of leaders, one or two from each cell or group, who operate as a council. Sometimes this council is under the direction of a charismatic leader; other times decisions are made by majority vote or consensus. In addition to doctrine and strategic planning, the council also centralizes fund-raising, budgeting, and equipment purchases, and acts as the chief negotiators with governments and corporations in hostage takings or hijackings, presenting the group’s demands to the public. They also handle the dissemination of official propaganda; when a member of the terrorist organization is interviewed by the press, that person will typically be a member of the council.

Rather than directing operations from afar, the leaders of a scattered cell organization participate in actions in the field. Thus the capture and

subsequent interrogation of a cell leader can provide valuable information. In some cases, the identities and locations of other leaders can be learned. The identities of members of cells not under that particular leader's control, however, are not usually known. No membership lists are kept; each cell leader knows his or her members by sight.

Individual cells are generally self-regulating and more or less autonomous within the general rulings and doctrine set by the council. They are responsible for their own intelligence gathering, logistics, supply, and discipline. While targets are usually determined by the council of leaders, the cells themselves handle the planning and execution of their actions.

Connections

Connections are outside sources from which a terrorist movement receives support. Movements often receive support through several different channels, and for game purposes they are described as having None, Poor, Modest, Good or Excellent connections through each of their various channels, a rough description of how much they can rely on each channel for supplies and assistance. The sections below cover the most common channels that terrorist groups rely on, with a brief description of the type of support that might be garnered at various levels. In all cases, the connections come through for terrorist groups only when it is in their best interests to do so—nobody acts out of goodwill in the terrorist underworld. It's also important to note that sometimes connections represent a small faction within an organization. The fact that a terrorist group has military connections, for example, may mean that a handful of rogue supply or intelligence officers are diverting resources to the terrorists—not necessarily that the entire army knowingly supports or is allied with the group. In fact, it's not unheard of for a terrorist group to have supporting connections within the same military organization it is fighting.

Black Market

International smuggling is not limited to drugs and guns—there are large markets for high-tech items, untraceable stolen vehicles and merchandise, and forged passports and documents. Terrorists with Poor black market connections have few contacts in the underworld, and may have to do a little time-consuming research before they can locate a trafficker that deals in what they want. When they do, they are treated with suspicion, and pay inflated prices up front and in cash. Attempts to get ahold of rare, expensive, or heavily-restricted items probably take some time, as well. At Modest levels, the terrorists may get a fair shake, but will still probably have to pay up front. Black marketeers will barter and haggle with groups on Good terms, accommodating their requirements and schedules. If a group is on Excellent terms, its members can easily get ahold of all but the most restricted and rare merchandise, and may even be able to negotiate credit terms.

Corporate

Prudent multinational corporations often try to maintain good relations with guerrilla movements, bartering their resources for a safe business environment. Many terrorists take to such arrangements quite agree-



ably, as long as it furthers their own goals. Sometimes, however, a terrorist group with a conflicting ideology (e.g. an anti-capitalist movement) must conceal such arrangements from the terrorist rank and file, which may react violently when it realizes the upper echelon has “sold out” to the enemy.

Some corporations go so far as to create quasi-terrorist groups to act on their behalf, or to revive organizations that were dwindling or dormant due to lack of resources or public support. The members of corporate-sponsored terrorist organizations are usually recruited through a series of middle men so that the identity of the true employer is well hidden. Recruits are selected for their willingness to take orders, accept money and not ask questions. Political and social philosophy is discouraged. These criminals and psychopaths are simply hired help, and will attack whatever target their employers point them at. They are usually targeted at other corporations to perform acts of sabotage, espionage, harassment, and intimidation. Sometimes they wage campaigns of consumer intimidation to increase their market share, as well as popular or anti-government terror to support their interests in a given country.

Poorly and Moderately connected groups receive only money and supplies from their sponsors. Fronts with Good connections might receive training abroad and even intelligence such as aerial photographs and satellite images. Excellent connections warrant sanctuary on company property and economic leverage to free captured terrorists. Corporate-organized groups always have Good or Excellent connections with their organizers.

Military

Terrorists with connections to the organized military use them to acquire weapons, training, intelligence and military equipment. A Poorly connected guerrilla movement could expect a small training cadre and some surplus weapons. A Modestly connected front might receive some formal training and quality weapons. A Good connection with a sympathetic military source allows access to sophisticated and expensive weapons and explosives, and possible assistance in operational planning. If a group has Excellent connections and the friendly military is located near the area of terrorist operations, they might even involve themselves directly by providing transportation, intelligence, air or artillery bombardment as well as logistical support.

Political

Terrorist organizations are often covertly supported by a national government or political party. The legitimate party will usually stay at arm's length, keeping all transfers of cash and equipment secret. Poor political connections provide a group with moral support and perhaps sanctuary for dissidents among the connection's constituents. Moderate political connections can supply the organization with intelligence as necessary for their cause, and offer education in political revolution to recruits from the terrorist group. Good connections in legitimate governments can give safe passage to terrorists by providing false passports and documents and offering a safe haven after a terrorist operation is completed. Excellent connections may even train terrorists as espionage agents or disguise them as diplomats.

Terrorists supported by political masters can be expected to perform missions for them such as controlling or eliminating dissidents who have fled the country and live abroad.

Espionage organizations have excellent political connections and may in turn support terrorist activity. Groups that have used terrorist tactics in the past include the CIA and KGB, as well as French, Israeli and North Korean agents.

Public Profile

Though officially outlaws, many terrorist organizations enjoy some degree of support with the general public, or at least a specific constituency. Supporters of the terrorists may form sympathetic political movements, hold public demonstrations, and even provide supplies and havens for the terrorists. In game terms, the following descriptions indicate the general public's resistance to investigation of terrorists by the authorities.

Broad Support

These groups are taking action on behalf of the majority of the population. Most civilians obstruct authorities whenever possible, lying and misdirecting police, and even hiding terrorists when necessary.

Community Support

A group which enjoys community support draws on a particular ethnic group or social class of the population for recruits and supplies. Within an ethnic neighborhood, for example, investigators will be stymied in the same ways as if the group had Broad support. Outside of that community, on the streets of a large metropolitan city, support for the terrorist group will be Divided or Minority.

Divided Support

The social group that the terrorists claim to be acting for is actually deeply divided as to whether or not the terrorists' actions are justified. The terrorists can rely on covert help, such as misdirecting authorities, from less than half the populace, and overt assistance is even less frequently given. In a divided community, even relatives and coworkers may disagree with a terrorist group's actions and betray them to the authorities.

Minority Support

The terrorists in question only enjoy the assistance of a small fraction of the population even among their supposed constituency. Because of this, large donations, rallies, and similar shows of support are unlikely. Because supporters are so few, those who speak up are likely to be singled out by police. A slim minority of citizens will provide even covert help—the chance of obtaining open assistance is negligible.

Indifference

The terrorists' motives are too esoteric or obscure for the media, and the public reacts to their acts of terrorism like any other violent crime. The public will neither hinder nor, in many cases, go out of their way to aid authorities in catching the terrorists. The general public will, for example, ignore persons distributing literature or painting graffiti, but won't necessarily volunteer information to police, either.

Popular Rejection

Groups with this reputation are social outcasts, despised by the public at large and supported only by a thin network of equally fanatical citizens, if at all. If anyone resembling a terrorist is seen, someone will summon the police. If such a group attempted to hold a rally or distribute literature, they might be booed or even attacked by an angry mob.

Funding

Terrorist groups generally rely on one or more supporting agencies or connections for many resources, but most need additional sources of cold, hard cash. There are a variety of potential sources.

Crime

Crime and terrorism are related in two ways. Primarily political terrorist groups engage in crime to finance their terrorism. On the flip side, criminal organizations, for whom greed is foremost, also engage in terrorism to protect their rackets.

A popular way for neophyte terrorist groups to fund themselves is through bank robbery. Alternatively, terrorists often hold up postal vans, couriers, or vehicles transporting cash or other valuables. All of these activities require careful planning, not to mention intelligence gathering, but are often worth the risk. The neo-nazi gang Bruder Schweigen netted over one million dollars in a Seattle armored car robbery in 1983.

Non-violent methods of illegally raising funds include counterfeiting and simple fraud—passing bad checks, using stolen or fake credit cards, and taking delivery of merchandise with forged documents.

Extortion is extremely popular worldwide for its publicity value and possible profits. Terrorists typically kidnap an important person and demand, and often receive, a ransom from a state, corporation, or wealthy family. The hijacking of airliners and ships continues to be common and profitable for terrorists, despite the best efforts of governments to provide security. Governments and corporations alike live in fear of terrorists sabotaging a manufacturing plant, a mine or an oil field. The mere threat of a shutdown is enough to garner a terrorist group recognition and money.

Criminal organizations sometimes turn to terrorism to protect themselves from prosecution and competition. Their attacks are aimed at intimidating members of the judiciary, police, other criminals and members of the news media who might portray their organization in an unfavorable light. The Italian Mafia's vendetta against the country's judiciary, for example, was begun in the 1980s and continues in 1999. The Medellín Cartel in Colombia co-opted the revolutionary organization FARC, and escalated its guerilla conflict into an all-out civil war in an attempt to establish a government controlled by the narcotics industry. Other illegal drug empires have engaged in popular terrorism in an attempt to weaken public opposition to the drug trade—an act which has been termed "narco-terrorism."

Legitimate Business

Some long established, well-funded terrorist movements have had the foresight to invest in legitimate businesses. The PLO, initially funded by donations from sympathetic Arab countries, made large investments under the names of its private members. It created Samed, the Palestinian Martyrs Work Society, a corporation which operated factories in Lebanon employing displaced Palestinians. Samed also operated farms in Egypt and central Africa, providing produce for Palestinian consumption and export. Before the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the PLO claimed to have been self-sufficient, providing Palestinians with food, clothing, and employment.

Other organizations have similar legitimate investments, either raising funds or laundering the profits of their terrorist or criminal activities.

Mercenary Activities

Some terrorists hire themselves out as mercenaries to raise money for their cause. An entire terrorist group might operate in this manner, or individuals within the group might rent themselves out as guns for hire. The cyberpunk group known as The Triad, for example, has been known to hire its computer expertise out to corporate interests.

Private Donations

Some terrorists have wealthy patrons who front them money because they have an idealistic belief in the cause. It is rumored, for example, that a French industrialist is bankrolling a branch of the European Peoples' Democratic Resistance Front. Nationalist guerrillas often derive substantial funds from donations by people in their communities, and from expatriates. The Irish, Basque, Assyrian and Armenian nationalist terrorists receive large amounts of money from ethnic communities in the United States.

State Support

Many terrorist groups are sponsored in whole or in part by governments or factions within governments. State support generally comes in three varieties: creation, training, and funding of local political terrorists (death squads); protection, training, and funding of international terrorists using the state as a base; and funding for international terrorist groups abroad. Scores of countries around the world terrorize their own population through the first form of state-sponsorship—such instances are often seen internationally as cases of human rights violations (which they undoubtedly are) rather than true terrorism. A much smaller number of nations actually train and harbor international terrorists, most notably Algeria, Armenia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and the Sudan. Many more nations funnel money to terrorist groups abroad, sometimes directly and openly (many Arab states openly support Palestinian groups), and sometimes through covert channels (such as the Israeli Mossad's support of the EPDRF). In all cases, however, the state expects a return on investment—through general support of the state's goals or direct actions on the state's orders.

CHAPTER TWO

TERRORIST

ORGANIZATIONS▼▼

This section is a resource for the GM, a source of background information on specific terrorist groups which should also, hopefully, suggest scores of ideas for adventure scenarios. A total of fifteen terrorist organizations are described in detail over in this chapter, followed by a master list outlining scores more—virtually every significant international terrorist group active in 1999—through their major axioms. The fifteen detailed groups were selected in part because they are active and interesting groups with lots of potential for game use, and in part because collectively they represent a broad range of terrorist motivations, activities, and organization.

Each of the detailed terrorist descriptions has two sections. The first is formatted like a report from the BlackEagle/BlackEagle L&P Branch database on criminal organizations. It can be shown or given to any players who access that information source or any close equivalent. BlackEagle relies largely on the published (though not necessarily public) information put together by other intelligence agencies—the particular source agencies for a given entry are listed under the “Source” heading in the listing. As a result, while the L&P database is generally accurate, it can contain omissions, inaccuracies, outdated information, and the occasional falsehood. In particular, it is generally thought to under-estimate the number of personnel in a group, while over-estimating terrorist resources and reserves. That’s not always true, however—operatives will want to treat that notion with as much caution as anything in the database, or any other piece of intelligence they can’t verify first-hand.

Following each database entry is a Real Scoop section, for the GM’s eyes only. It contains up-to-the-moment, accurate data on the activities of each terrorist organization in 1999, a lot of which is simply not available to BlackEagle or the world’s intelligence agencies. It also corrects inaccuracies in the database information—trust the Real Scoop where it conflicts with the database.

Abu Nidal Organization

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) is a large, experienced, and well-financed terrorist group that has had its fingers in Middle-Eastern intrigue and international terrorism for over twenty years. Although ostensibly a Palestinian organization dedicated solely to the destruction of Israel, the ANO has proved a willing pawn in the games of the many secular and fundamentalist Islamic sponsors it has served.

The Real Scoop

Contrary to rumor (and the BlackEagle database), Abu Nidal is very much alive and in control of the ANO. He owes his continued survival to the fact that he is extremely cautious. Fearful of Mossad booby traps, he never speaks on the phone or radio himself, instead relaying his orders. He refuses to drink anything served to him by others. He is suspicious of everyone, and will even order his own relatives killed if he thinks they have turned against him. Yet he trusts his personal guards implicitly, and does not arm himself at home or at his headquarters, relying upon them to guard him.


Second in command of the ANO is Sulaiman Shalev. Other important leaders are Mustafa Hussain (a.k.a. Alaa) who is in charge of planning terrorist actions, and Ibrahim Alamda (a.k.a. Khaldun), in charge of "revolutionary justice" (discipline of members). The organization has a true total membership of 2,000 (including both the operatives who carry out paramilitary actions and the more covert, information-gathering operatives). Its members are all Palestinians, often recruited from the refugee camps of Lebanon.

Estimates of the ANO's resources are well off the mark. The group's total assets stand at about \$500 million—aside from direct contributions from government sponsors, the ANO makes its money through an efficient network of legitimate businesses and front organizations in countries throughout the Middle East and Europe. Ironically, one of the ANO's most profitable business ventures is Global Arab Airlines—a carrier noted for its stringent security measures and unbroken safety record. The ANO also relies heavily on "protection money" raised through blackmailing wealthy Arab states. Those who refuse to pay become the targets of terrorism.

The ANO has few ties with other terrorist groups. One exception is ASALA (covered below)—the ANO provides explosives, funds, documents, and occasionally intelligence to these European terrorists in return for attacks on Jewish targets. When staging its own operations, however, the ANO uses only Palestinians.

The intelligence gathered by MI-6 is correct—the ANO was indeed behind the series of terrorist incidents that led to the Israeli occupation of the Negev. Ironically, the group was actually acting in a mercenary manner, under the employment of right-wing factions in the Israeli government. Both these right-wing Israelis and the ANO leadership wish to discredit the mainstream Palestinian leadership, for their own very different reasons. This relationship continues, and, though unstable, will likely continue throughout 1999 so long as terrorist attacks remain a motivator for hawkish Israelis and reactionary Palestinians.

At the other end of the spectrum, Mossad, Israel's espionage agency, has made the assassination of Abu Nidal and other leaders of the ANO a top priority. Recently, Mossad struck a deal with Egypt, in which the



Abu Nidal Organization

#CR0000716

(also Black June, The Democratic Nation for a Popular Revolution, Fatah--The Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Arab Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems. Some alternate names are aliases, other are names for specific subgroups or cells)

Source: FBI, CIA, MI-6

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

General attacks of popular terrorism and assassination in Israel and Palestine, and elsewhere in the Middle East and northern Africa, on a regular and frequent basis. Select assassinations in Europe and worldwide, although never in the U.S.

Affiliations:

Past support given to Action Direct [#CR0000821] in France. Explosives taggants found at ASALA [#CR0001430] attacks have matched those found at ANO bombings, indicating some trade between those organizations, or a common supplier. [MI-6]

Personnel: 500 to 800

Operating Since:

1973 (split from PLO following Yom Kippur war)

Structure:

Highly organized and bureaucratic terrorist organization with a network of legitimate political and business connections in the Arab world. Headed by a small ruling council, which is advised by several larger bodies and which controls a number of intelligence, counter-intelligence, and logistics departments. The bulk of the organization's field personnel are part of the intelligence section, which is responsible for carrying out terrorist acts. [FBI]

Leaders:

Sabri Khalil al-Banna [#LL3619242] (also known as Abu Nidal, meaning "Father of the Struggle"). Believed deceased, or at least in very ill health. Alaa (alias, true name unknown) [#LL6987153], head of operations. Ibrahim Alanda (aka Khaldun) [#LL3814169], head of recruiting and/or discipline (believed).

Legitimate Connections:

Unknown. Several business connections and front organizations are suspected to exist throughout the Middle East and Europe.

Resources:

All manner of military smallarms. A wide array of technologically advanced weapons. Effective logistics support services and connections with the international weapons markets. \$3 to \$4 million in assets, with large credit reserves with sponsor states and a large supply of ready cash. [MI-6]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Hundreds of attacks and assassinations against diplomatic personnel, Palestinian officials, and Jewish civilians in London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Bucharest, Vienna, Athens, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, Bombay, New Delhi, Karachi, Khartoum, the West Bank, and Cyprus. Israelis are preferred targets, but non-Israeli ambassadors, consuls, commercial attaches, high commissioners--even city council members who promoted Israeli-Palestinian friendship societies--from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Britain, and Austria, have also been slain.

The ANO has also committed numerous hijackings, rocket attacks on airplanes, and bombings of airline offices and airport ticketing counters, and have even attacked aircraft crew members on their way to work by commuter bus. Victims include British Airways, Alitalia, Pan Am, Gulf Air, Egyptair, and Alia. In recent years, however, the ANO has been concentrating its attacks on ground-based targets. [MI-6]

Grenade and machinegun attacks on Jewish civilians have been carried out at synagogues and in restaurants, hotels, and clubs frequented by Jews. In a 1997 attack, ten Jewish children visiting Israel from Britain were killed when the ANO attacked their tour boat with speed boats.

Additional Commentary:

The ANO is an international terrorist organization committed to the total destruction of Israel. It seeks to undermine any movements towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and attacks groups who

support such a settlement—including other Palestinian groups and elements of the Palestinian government which are trying to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal from the Negev region of Palestine. The ANO is a radical organization even by the standards of other Palestinian nationalists, and, though it is well-supported by other nations opposed to Israel, particularly Islamic fundamentalist states, has at best a divided following among the Palestinian communities of the Middle East.

The Abu Nidal Organization has its roots in the terrorist branch of Al Fatah, a powerful faction in the PLO. This group, known as Black September, was responsible for numerous bombings and hijackings, as well as the murders of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Abu Nidal, a member of Al Fatah, split from the PLO in 1973, over the latter organization's decision to limit its terrorism to the borders of Israel. Shortly thereafter, ANO agents assassinated several PLO leaders, and Nidal himself was tried in absentia by the PLO and sentenced to death. Since that time the ANO has repeatedly proved to be a violent and dangerous organization.

The ANO supported the creation of Palestine in 1994, but is opposed to Palestine's current leadership on the grounds that these officials have recognized Israel's right to exist. The ANO may have been behind the terrorist attacks that prompted Israel to occupy the Negev region of Palestine in 1995 [MI-6], although the ANO did not claim responsibility for the attacks.

The ANO has a long history of mercenary activities on behalf of state sponsors, and of shifting allegiances. After its formation, the group was headquartered in Iraq, from which it repeatedly attacked Syria on behalf of the Iraqi government. Later, when the ANO was expelled in an Iraqi attempt to gain western favor, the group moved to Damascus, Syria, where it staged attacks against Jordanian groups. When relations thawed between Jordan and Syria, the ANO was asked to leave Damascus, and moved to Tripoli. Libya used the group to attack Egyptian targets. In 1991 the ANO switched sides yet again, moving to Egypt, which targeted them against Palestinian groups that backed the wrong side during the Gulf War. The Egyptians may also be using the ANO to strike at Libyan targets [CIA]. The ANO's current headquarters is in Egypt, although its exact location is unknown.

Abu Nidal is known to have undergone open-heart surgery and is rumored to have died in the late 1980s. If still alive, he is in his early 60s and is likely in poor health.


Last Update: December 11, 1998

agency is leaking Israeli military secrets to the Egyptians in return for detailed information on the location and makeup of Abu Nidal's top-secret headquarters. Mossad plans to launch a covert strike against this headquarters in the near future. Unknown to Mossad, however, certain elements in the Egyptian government are in turn leaking the Israeli intelligence to the ANO. The terrorists will soon be launching a series of strikes against Israeli military targets, both in occupied areas of Palestine and inside Israel. The only question is which will come first—the Mossad raid on the ANO's Cairo headquarters, or the attacks on Israeli military bases. So far, the ANO does not know where the Egyptians are getting such detailed information (although Abu Nidal himself has suspicions), and is still in the dark on the upcoming Mossad raid.

Egypt, for its part, is indeed using the ANO to strike at Libyan targets, conducting small insurgent raids on military installations as well as attacks of popular terrorism. But the government is divided on the wisdom of continuing to support the ANO—especially since Libya has terrorists of its own that may be used in retaliatory raids. For the moment, Egypt continues to supply the ANO with money, intelligence, weapons, explosives, and training. The weapons are usually of Soviet manufacture, and include Polish WZ 63 submachineguns, Kalashnikov AKM rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Aside from Libya, the ANO is currently focusing its attacks on moderate members of the Palestinian government. The victims are either eliminated with gunfire, or are killed by bombs placed in their cars. As well as attacking Palestinian officials, the ANO stages occasional attacks on Israeli and Libyan embassies and consulates. The method of attack is either a car bomb (sometimes a suicide attack) or a guerrilla raid using automatic weapons.

A typical ANO action group has three to seven members. They receive orders from the leadership via coded messages, and thus the cell does not contain an official leader. Use the NPC Stereotypes for one to two Urban Revolutionaries (page 127) and/or High-End Grunts (*ME v2.0* p. 157), plus three to five Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156). Use a mix of Intellectual Terrorist, Thug/Psychopath, and Veteran Terrorist Personality Types (pages 127-129).



Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia/Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (ALSALA/JCAG) #CR0001430

(also Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), Revolutionary Movement (ALSALA-RM), the Only Organization)

Source: EuroTer, CSIS, FBI, MI-6

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Frequent and regular terrorist actions against Turkish targets in Europe, Australia, the Middle East, and North America. Both JCAG and ALSALA are truly international organizations, with cells based wherever Armenian communities are found.

Affiliations:

Past association with the Japanese Red Army [#CR0000425], the Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Prisoners [#CR0001456] (believed defunct), and the Armed Revolutionary Lebanese Factions (FARL) [#CR0000972]. [MI-6] All ties with the JRA are believed broken, but it is unclear whether connections with FARL still exist. Possible associations with ETA [#CR0000998], NALQ [#CR0003975], and Abu Nidal Organization [#CR0000716]. [EuroTer]

Personnel: 500 (ALSALA), 100 (JCAG) [FBI, CSIS]

Operating Since:
1975

Structure:

Loose affiliation of independent terrorist cells. Leaders of these elements form a periodic council to determine overall strategy and doctrine, and to direct the cooperation of cells involved in large or complex operations.

Leaders:

Hagop Hagopian (deceased). Current leaders unknown.

Legitimate Connections:

ALSALA and JCAG make use of a number of Armenian social clubs in the countries in which Armenians have settled, drawing financial support and recruits from these organizations.

Resources:

Although underfunded by the Soviet Union in the past, this group has grown rapidly in the late '90s, with substantial funding believed to come from the Republic of Armenia. Many ALSALA members are veterans of the Armenia/Azerbaijan war, which gave the organization a pool of hardened veteran fighters and contacts in the international arms trade. Nevertheless, this group's weaponry is limited to explosives and smallarms. [EuroTer]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Sporadic bombings and assassinations worldwide in the 1970s and '80s. More recently, bombings of government-owned factories and businesses, and of bazaars and other crowded public areas in Turkey. Numerous attacks on Turkish diplomats, military attaches, and commercial attaches abroad, in France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, the U.S. (Los Angeles and Boston), Canada (Ottawa), Lebanon, and Iran. Car bombings and machinegun attacks on Turkish embassies in Paris, Vienna, Zurich, Lisbon, Tehran, Ottawa, Sydney and Melbourne, Turkish-owned tourist bureaus, airline offices, and banks in various countries, and the Turkish United Nations mission in New York. Attempted bombings of two Turkish airliners in France and England in 1983. Seizure of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa in 1985, rocket attack on the same building in 1996.

Additional Commentary:

The lines between ALSALA and JCAG, two disorganized and intertwined networks of Armenian terrorist cells, are blurry at best. In any event, both organizations (if they are in fact distinct and separate) share the same goals: revenge on and restitution from the Turkish government for the deaths of 600,000 and displacement of another one million Armenians in the First World War--a genocide perpetrated as a supposed punishment of Armenian support of Turkey's enemies. The only ideological distinction between the two groups lies in their victory conditions: JCAG seeks to establish an independent Armenian state in areas that are currently part of Turkey, while ALSALA wants to link the sites of historic Armenia (eastern Turkey and northern Iran) with the ex-Soviet Republic of Armenia.

The actual Armenian population in Turkey is negligible--as a direct result of the 1915 diaspora, large communi-

ties of expatriates exist in the U.S., France, Lebanon, and Iran, and it is from these communities that ALSALA and JCAG gain their support. Attacks against Turkish officials began at an apparent grass-roots level in the early 1970s, and it wasn't until 1975 that an official terrorist organization, JCAG, was created. JCAG had and still has a strong following in Los Angeles and New York, and is responsible for most of the Armenian terrorist actions in North America. [FBI] The group is also active in Europe, and has staged terrorist actions within Turkey itself. The Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), which surfaced in 1983, is believed to be an offshoot or successor organization to JCAG, or perhaps simply an alias. [MI-6]

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was also formed in 1975, by Hagop Hagopian, a Lebanese Armenian living in Greece. Hagopian was killed in Athens in 1988, but the group continues to operate from there, taking advantage of the long-standing animosity between Greeks and Turks.

ASALA actions in Europe have not been limited to strictly Turkish targets. A series of bombings in France of western airlines serving Turkey, and the attempt to place bombs on two airliners in Europe, led to a crackdown by French police in 1983. In retaliation, ASALA staged a series of bombings that struck Paris in 1986. The attacks were claimed by the Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Prisoners [#CR0001456], but are thought to have been a joint effort between ASALA and the Armed Revolutionary Lebanese Factions (FARL) [#CR0000972], possibly with the assistance of either the Iranian or Syrian secret service. [EuroTer] Bombs were placed in galleries, department stores, subway stations, hotels, on trains, and in shopping arcades in an effort to obtain the release of Varoujan Garabedjian [#LL4913500], an Armenian terrorist then being held by France. One year later, Armenian terrorists attacked the French embassy in Beirut. A similar series of retaliations were aimed at Swiss officials and airlines, after Swiss officials arrested two Armenian terrorists in Geneva. Retaliations against Canadian targets in 1985 never materialized, although their threat did disrupt Ottawa for several days. [CSIS]

If ALSALA and/or JCAG have a headquarters or a single leadership body, its identity is not known. JCAG is known to have significant support within ethnic communities in the United States [FBI], although expatriate support for ALSALA is less clear.

Last Update: January 3, 1999

Armenian Terrorists

An outgrowth of a festering hatred of Turkey among many of Armenian descent, Armenian terrorist groups center around two organizations: the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). Both are loose networks of independent terrorist cells intent on avenging past wrongs against their community. Specifically, they seek to punish Turkey for oppression during and after the First World War. JCAG grew out of Armenian communities in America, while the shadowy ASALA has its roots in Europe.

The Real Scoop

JCAG and ASALA are not closely related, although they are very similar causes. ASALA is the larger, somewhat more organized and active group. Both networks coordinate their actions through occasional meetings of the leaders of the most active cells, but communication and cooperation between the separate organizations is not strong.

What is now known as JCAG (which also sometimes goes by ARA), was formed in the late 1980s. The original JCAG of the 1970s had more or less disbanded — the new members now are almost entirely Americans of Armenian descent. The group's headquarters is in Los Angeles, and its seniormost leader is George Livikian, a 32-year-old American citizen. Cells are also active in Boston and New York, and in London, England.

Their targets range from the political (Turkish diplomats and embassies) to civilian (Turkish travel agencies, coffee houses, and ethnic organizations). Although the London cell has been somewhat active, most JCAG activity has been in North America. Contrary to information in the database, JCAG does not operate in Turkey or the Republic of Armenia—although some members have probably visited, and some might have dual membership in ASALA.

ASALA has three main factions. After the death of Hagop Hagopian, Berek Varejian, a French citizen, assumed leadership and set up headquarters in Paris. His section of ASALA is responsible for the majority of attacks on Turkish targets in Europe. It concentrates on attacking Turkish airlines, consulates, and ambassadors. Recently, a handful of its members were captured by German police, and they await trial in that country. ASALA is planning a series of bomb attacks on Lufthansa Airlines, in an attempt to have these prisoners freed.

A second major ASALA faction, which often calls itself the ASALA Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM), believes in limiting the attacks to targets within Turkey. Their leader is Monte Melkonian, and the group is headquartered in Athens. This group is responsible for most of the attacks by Armenian terrorists within western Turkey. Posing as tourists, they enter Turkey to carry out machinegun and grenade attacks on Turkish civilians in Istanbul and other major Turkish cities.

The third group has set up headquarters in the Republic of Armenia, where its members have an opportunity to join the Armenian Army (and gain valuable training and experience) and carry out attacks against Armenia's neighbors—Azerbaijan as well as Turkey. This group is much more closely aligned with the French cells, and communicates and cooperates with them frequently.

JCAG has expressed in its propaganda a solidarity with other ethnic movements, such as those of the Basques and Turkish Kurds, but few actual contacts link JCAG to the Basque ETA or Kurdish terrorists. What connections do exist are generally limited to the swapping of small amounts of arms and explosives for Spanish or Turkish passports. JCAG does, however, have direct connections with Quebec separatists, and has staged joint operations with the NALQ, including the 1998 bombing of the Turkish Consul in Quebec.

ASALA's connections, on the other hand, are not surprisingly stronger in Europe and the Middle East. ASALA receives logistical support and weapons from the Abu Nidal Organization. Its members also regularly attend training camps run by the Armed Revolutionary Lebanese Factions (FARL) in the Sudan. As a result of these connections, the group not only opposes "Turkish imperialism" but also "Zionism" in its propaganda. The group has been responsible for a handful of attacks on Jewish targets in Europe, including the 1995 assassination of Israeli diplomat Aaron Wiesendahl outside his Paris apartment.

Despite reports to the contrary, ASALA has also stayed closely in touch with the Japanese Red Army, many of whose older members trained with ASALA terrorists in Lebanon. The groups do not perform joint actions, but do work together on arms smuggling operations. This close cooperation began in the mid-1990s, when ASALA set itself up as the primary supplier of weapons and explosives that entered the black market as the American military withdrew from northern Europe. ASALA also communicates and even operates jointly with the NALQ in Canada, much more so than most analysts believe.

But like JCAG, ASALA has also publicly claimed connections that do not really exist. After bombing the Turkish airlines office in London in 1979, ASALA expressed solidarity with terrorists in Northern Ireland in their fight against "British fascism." ASALA cells based in London occasionally purchase explosives from the IRA, in return for surplus Russian weapons, but that is the extent of the groups' links.

ASALA has another valuable connection, though—one which has accounted in part for its rapid growth in the 1990s. Service with the Armenian Army provides ASALA terrorists with military training they can use in their efforts. In the '80s, ASALA had only about 100-200 members, most of them in Europe. In recent years however, expatriates under the sponsorship of ASALA have flocked to the Republic of Armenia to join the war against Azer-Baijan, a neighboring ex-Soviet state. If those on active duty with the Armenian Army are included, the membership of ASALA is closer to 1,000.

ASALA also has links with Syria, which provides the group with financial support, intelligence on Turkish targets, and false Syrian passports. At one point the group had a headquarters in Damascus, but this has been abandoned in favor of the headquarters in Armenia. At the behest of Syria, ASALA has recently begun attacking Saudi Arabian targets. Two Armenians riding a motorcycle tried to bomb the Saudi embassy in Athens; the bomb bounced off a light post, killing one of them. In keeping with its primary goals, ASALA also occasionally conducts raids into eastern Turkey, targeting government industries and municipal-level government offices. Although ASALA claims to be "liberating territory," these raids are often just hit-and-run affairs that see the terrorists retreating to Armenia after a bombing, or even the papering of a town with propaganda leaflets. The Republic of Armenia steadfastly denies any connection with these raids, despite the fact that some of the terrorists killed within Turkey prove to be members of the Armenian Army. Due to the possibility of these actions provoking a war with Turkey, the Republic of Armenia is on the verge of kicking ASALA out.

Both JCAG and ASALA obtain financial support from Armenian communities around the world. Both are well-known in most tight-knit Armenian communities, but because of their different agendas (JCAG wants to set up a separate, fascist state, while ASALA wants to expand the existing Armenia) there is often conflict over which organization to support. Open conflicts between faction members or supporters are rare, though, and no deaths have yet resulted.

Armenian terrorists of either JCAG or ASALA tend to be young people in their 20s and 30s. Many of them have never even visited Turkey, but all can trace their ancestry back to a relative who was killed in the forced exodus of 1915. A typical action group consists of anywhere from six to sixteen members. They are completely integrated into the larger Armenian community of their parent city, receiving varying degrees of support from that community. Use three to eight each of the Urban Revolutionary (page 127) and Cheap Thug (*ME v2.0* p. 156) NPC Stereotypes, with maybe a High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157) for the leader. Give the leader the Charismatic Leader Personality Type, with a mix of Intellectual Terrorists, Terrorist Recruits, and Veteran Terrorists for the remainder (page 127-129).

Afrikaner Resistance Front

#CR0002198

(also Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Aryan Warriors of the Aryan Church of the Transvaal, New Boer Militia)

Source: MI-6, FBI

Type: Political terrorist organization/guerilla insurgency

Scope:

Frequent ambushes, raids, and other acts of insurgency, plus acts of assassination and urban popular terrorism throughout South Africa.

Affiliations:

ARF members have received para-military training from the Aryan Nations Church [#CR0001899], based in Oregon. [FBI] Past affiliation with Inkata Freedom Party (both in political action and acts of violence) discontinued (believed).

Personnel: 2,000 claimed in propaganda. 500 active (believed), plus thousands of active supporters willing to aid the group if needed. Many more providing covert aid and intelligence (believed). [MI-6]

Operating Since:

1994

Structure:

Military-style hierarchy. Militia units of five to fifteen individuals are organized into regional companies, which fall under a single central command. The military leadership is advised by leaders of quasi-religious and social groups which support the ARF cause. [MI-6]

Leaders:

Pik Van Grubel [#LL3797044], Minister of the Aryan Church of the Transvaal. Fredrich Oosterdam [#LL1565389], Colonel of the 1st Boer Militia.

Legitimate Connections:

Possible connections with members of the South African Defense Forces; recruits and instructors may be drawn from the country's legitimate army.

Resources:

Smallarms, explosives, some light military weapons. Moderate funding from white activist groups within South Africa. Possible intelligence from sympathizers within South Africa's military and security organs.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Sporadic bombings of South African government infrastructure and black political parties. Gunfire and bomb attacks on black community centers and churches. A 1994 attack on a train in which forty-seven blacks were killed on their way to work. Conspiracy to assassinate President Mandela and other government officials. Numerous ambushes and bombings of army patrols and attacks on depots.

Additional Commentary:

The ARF is believed to be a breakaway militant wing of a long-standing secret society of Afrikaner men called the Broderbond (Brotherhood), which has been influential in South Africa's civil service, military, business and the Dutch Reform Church since the 1950s. The reform of South Africa's constitution and the election of a majority government split the Broderbond, with radical conservative elements determined to combat majority rule (some intelligence reports have even suggested that the abolition of apartheid was part of a longer term Broderbond agenda to retain control of the country). The ARF is a separatist/nationalist movement seeking the overthrow of the South African majority government or the establishment of an autonomous Afrikaner homeland.

The organization was originally led into militancy by Pik Van Grubel [#LL3797044], head of the Aryan Church of the Transvaal. As the group went underground, however, Grubel passed control of military operations to Herbert Oosterdam, so that the former could retain his position as spiritual leader and public spokesman for the ARF. Oosterdam formed and commanded the first military units of the ARF.

Oosterdam was killed in a 1995 raid by police on the ARF's Pretoria safehouse. That raid unearthed the much-publicized plot to assassinate Mandela and DeKlerk, and intelligence gathered from it greatly weakened the ARF. Unfortunately, command of the military operations passed on to Oosterdam's nephew, Fredrich Oosterdam [#LL1565389], who seems to have learned well from the ARF's early mistakes.

A second high-profile victory for South Africa's police unfortunately turned into a public-relations boon for the ARF. In the Smits Farm incident of 1997, an army patrol avoided an ARF ambush, then routed the attackers to their refuge, the isolated farm of Leon Van Smits, a Boer and ARF sympathizer. The Van Smits family fought alongside the guerillas in a five-day siege, in which all were eventually killed. However, the death of Jan Van Smits, a boy of twelve who was shot by a black soldier while placing explosives under the army's command vehicle, galvanized support of Boers and white sympathizers throughout South Africa, greatly swelling the ARF's ranks and cash reserves. [MI-6]

The ARF conducts both urban and rural operations. In their rural homeland, they use classic guerrilla tactics, setting ambushes to disrupt army patrols searching for their camps, and then melting back into the broken brushland. Blacks and white moderates are ambushed at roadblocks, or attacked in their homes and workplaces with gunfire and grenades. Isolated settlements are first intimidated into giving shelter to ARF guerrillas and then blackmailed into keeping their aid a secret. When run to ground, ARF forces hole up in a supporter's home or remote bush camp and fight relentlessly until death.

The ARF's urban campaign consists of bombings of government buildings and assassination of government officials and black leaders. Drive-by shootings are a preferred method. The location of the ARF's headquarters is not known, but is believed to be in or near Potgeitersrus, Transvaal, South Africa.

Despite recent gains in sympathizers, the ARF has only minority support even among the white community, although there are isolated rural regions where support is heavy. Its members have adopted many of the trappings of the Identity Christianity movement, and have allied themselves with American and European neo-nazis. [FBI]

Last Update: November 20, 1998

Afrikaner Resistance Front

The Afrikaner Resistance Front (ARF) is an organization of white South Africans dedicated to the destruction of majority rule in their country and the return of the apartheid system, or the creation of a South African whites-only state. To date, the group has only operated in South Africa, where it conducts guerilla warfare against the army as well as urban terrorism—but with its quasi-religious overtones and links to white supremacist movements in the United States and Europe, can an international expansion be far off?

The Real Scoop

With South Africa's racial history, the fact that ARF supporters are such a minority is perhaps surprising. Scattered across South Africa's Afrikaner population, however, those radical enough to support the group's goals and methods are well-entrenched in virtually every segment of society, including the very police and military forces that are supposed to combat them. Civilian supporters provide money, vehicles, weapons, and hiding places. Through Broderbond sympathizers in the police and military, the ARF has received several hundred Galil 7.62mm assault rifles and Uzi submachineguns and crates of ammunition, grenades and explosives.

Most active members of the ARF are young men, largely of rural upbringing. Trained by ex-members of the South African Defense Forces, they have considerable firearm skills, and excellent rural survival abilities. Though not deployed on operations, all ARF women are fully trained in firearms and would actively participate in the defense of a

home or ARF safehouse. Claims in ARF propaganda that over 2,000 fully-trained and armed Aryan warriors are ready to fight for their Afrikaner homeland are accurate.

Many factions of the Broderbond (which is indeed an active old-boy network among influential South African whites, although mainstream membership includes many majority-rule proponents) still provide covert support to the ARF, although government anti-corruption crack-downs have made this more and more difficult. Neo-fascist and neo-nazi groups abroad exchange information with the ARF, and ARF members have trained at the Aryan Nations Church compound in Oregon.

The ARF at one time had ties with the Inkata Freedom Party (an influential black/Zulu party opposed to the ruling ANC party), though they were broken off after the two groups failed to derail the elections of 1994. The ARF now actively targets its former allies, some of whom have become members of South Africa's government. One of their particular targets is Mtonga Kambula, a former Inkata Freedom Party member who now serves as Minister of Zulu Culture. The ARF believes Kambula to have been responsible for a 1994 incident in which five ARF members were caught—apparently by Inkata members—in the act of setting bombs at a railway station. The men were gruesomely executed by “necklacing”—placing gasoline-filled automobile tires around their necks and setting them on fire. The five men had previously argued with Kambula's faction over the proposed bomb attack, which was to have been directed against a train station frequented by Zulu workers.

Thus far, the ARF have not staged terrorist actions on the international stage, preferring instead to focus their efforts on creating a secure “homeland” for the white race within South Africa. However, South Africa will be hosting a World Health Organization conference on AIDS in November of 1999 in Pretoria. ARF members are gearing up for a series of attacks on attendees. Pik Van Grubel will head up a propaganda blitz describing the disease as “God's plan to return Africa to the hands of his Chosen People by weeding out the inferior races,” while Fredrich Oosterdam will coordinate the attacks of dozens of ARF action groups in military-style assaults on the hotel and convention center where the WHO conference is being held. Should the attacks on the WHO conference go well, Fredrich Oosterdam hopes to expand ARF activities to attacks on black South African government officials and South African embassies elsewhere in Africa.

A typical ARF militia squad encountered in the Transvaal bush includes one South African Defense Force veteran (Guerilla) leader and 8-10 militia (6 Terrorist Recruits, plus 2-4 Thugs/Psychopaths), armed with a combination of civilian hunting rifles, pump action shotguns, Galil assault rifles, and possibly hand grenades. The veteran and up to half the squad may wear Class II ballistic vests, if the weather doesn't prohibit it. All carry knives, medical kits, and supplies for up to two weeks in the bush.

Typical ARF urban cells are led by a Death Squad member (page 125) or High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157), and include four to seven Guerillas (page 126) or Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156). Use the Charismatic Leader, Veteran Terrorist, Terrorist Recruit and Thug/Psychopath Personality Types (pages 127-129). The group should be armed with assorted medium caliber handguns. Two squad members may carry Galil assault rifles, and some may have body armor. They will have and use grenades and other explosives.

Aryan Soldiers of the New Millennium Strike Force (ASNMSF)

#CR0002716

(also Aryan Soldiers, The Silent Brotherhood)

Source: FBI, BATF, Arkansas State Police

Type: Political/religious terrorist organization

Scope:

Acts of popular terror limited primarily to southeastern U.S. at a moderate level of activity. The Silent Brotherhood has taken credit for crimes committed in the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia and Florida. [FBI]

Affiliations:

The Aryan Soldiers are one of several groups belonging to Aryan World [#CR0001695], a shadowy umbrella organization for right-wing hate groups. Other members of this U.S.-based umbrella group include the KKK [#CR0000820] and Posse Comitatus [#CR0003694], and it is likely that many members of any one of these groups also belong to one or more of the others. [FBI]

Personnel: 50

Operating Since:

1994

Structure:

Military-style terrorist organization consisting of cells of five to eight individuals reporting to a central authority.

Leaders:

Albert Enderbee [#LL2356455], former Deacon of the Aryan Church of the New Millennium (ACNM).

Legitimate Connections:

The Aryan Church of the New Millennium is believed to be a silent partner in the Family Foods restaurant chain.

Resources:

High-quality smallarms and military equipment. Explosives and man-portable rockets. Ready cash in excess of \$300,000. [BATF]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Robbery of several banks and armored cars in Louisiana and Mississippi in 1994-95 and 1997-98. Murder of Nashville television producer Teddy Abraham in 1995. Bombing of Atlanta Baptist Church which killed two and wounded thirteen, including the mayor of Atlanta and a federal judge. Conflicts with law enforcement personnel have also led to the wounding and deaths of numerous local and state police officers and agents of the FBI, IRS, BATF, US Park Service, and US Marshals.

Additional Commentary:

Spawned by the militant Aryan Church of the New Millennium (ACNM) and believed headquartered at that cult's compound near Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the Aryan Soldiers organization is dedicated to the overthrow of the U.S. government and the establishment of a whites-only nation. The ACNM firmly believes that the "Satanic Jewish-Liberals" have secretly taken over the U.S. government, and Judgment Day is at hand, as described in the excerpt from a Church pamphlet:

"The Lord will signal the start of the Final Battle, ARMAGEDDON, with a rain of Atomic fire, destroying the evil cities of the Children of Cain. The Canaanites that survive the fire, the Jews and Humanists, the Negroes and the Asians, will blame the White Man for God's WRATH and take up arms against God's Chosen. That day is coming soon. We, the Aryan Nation, the true SONS OF ISRAEL, must be PREPARED. It is we who will FIGHT for God against the servants of Satan!" (from sermon 16 of "Are You Ready?") [BATF]

Aryan Soldiers terrorists are recruited by the Church's charismatic leader Albert Enderbee [#LL2356455] from among his fanatical and separatist congregation. In 1997, an undercover FBI agent penetrated the organization and reported that indoctrination includes a special baptism by Enderbee, as well as worshipful attention to the teachings of Adolf Hitler and slain Bruder Schweigen leader Robert Matthews [#LL0365926]. He also confirmed that the ACNM communicated and traded logistical support with a number of violent hate groups through a network known as Aryan World. [FBI]

Aryan Soldiers attacks have mostly been fund-raising robberies of banks and armored cars (all owned, or

perceived to be owned, by Jews or blacks). Only a few acts of true popular terrorism have been carried out, including the kidnapping and execution of a television executive claimed to be part of a "Zionist" media conspiracy, and the sensational bombing of an Atlanta church with a primarily black congregation. Although most of the group's attacks have been well-planned and completely successful, several Aryan Soldiers were almost captured after a bank robbery in 1998 in Birmingham, Alabama. During the escape, the Aryan Soldiers used an anti-tank rocket on a pursuing police car. Nevertheless, they were photographed and several, including Enderbee, were positively identified. Unable to return to the ACNM compound in Arkansas, they are now thought to be in hiding in Idaho. [BATF]

Outside of the Aryan Church of the New Millennium and associated Identity Christianity sects, the Aryan Soldiers enjoy no public support.

Last Update: February 17, 1999

Aryan Soldiers

The Aryan Soldiers, or Silent Brotherhood, is one of the single most organized and active hate groups in the United States, and is the primary action arm of the larger and more shadowy Aryan World network. Despite the increase in the group's activities and media presence over the past few years, however, the Silent Brotherhood is internally politicized, and faces an impending factional war.

The Real Scoop

The Aryan Soldiers consider it their sworn duty to fight the evils imposed on the White Race by the Zionist Occupational Government (referred to in their literature as the ZOC). Their mandate includes attacking prominent Jews, actively resisting agents of the federal government like the IRS and FBI, and counterfeiting to bankrupt the Federal Reserve, although their efforts have not yet included much of the latter.

The Aryan Soldiers' ostensible leader, Albert Enderbee, is currently hiding out in a KKK stronghold near Boise, Idaho, after a narrow escape following the group's 1998 Birmingham bank robbery. Enderbee was badly wounded by police gunfire, and now has only partial use of his legs. The majority of the Aryan Soldiers regard him as a "retired" leader, but the dozen or so followers who fled with Enderbee to Idaho maintain that he is the only true leader of the organization, since God saw fit to install him as Deacon of the Aryan Church of the New Millennium.

But with Enderbee at least temporarily out of the picture, practical command of the ASNMSF has passed to "Happy" Ned Barnfield, a U.S. Army veteran and hard-core racist who had acted as the group's lawyer for several years. Having earned the leadership by default, Barnfield is working hard to consolidate his hold on the organization.

Meanwhile, Enderbee has been building support among the KKK of Boise. Should he return to Arkansas, there will be a bloody fight for the leadership of the Aryan Soldiers.

The FBI has seriously underestimated the support that the Aryan Soldiers receive from other right-wing political and social groups. Aryan World—an umbrella organization of North American hate groups—has a handful of informants in government and federal law enforcement agencies, and knew in advance of the FBI's infiltration of the Aryan

Soldiers. They deliberately fed the agent false information, portraying themselves as a poorly organized group of fanatics with only a minimal membership—albeit with excellent weapons.

In fact, Aryan World is well organized and serves hundreds of different right-wing groups, ranging from middle-class church congregations to fanatical terrorist cells such as The Order. Its connections extend to German neo-nazi groups, white South African religious extremists, and South American anti-Jewish groups, and it uses a sophisticated computer network to send literature and communications across borders. Aryan World can also provide its member groups with access to a series of safehouses throughout the U.S.

Through black market connections coordinated by Aryan World, Aryan Soldiers have the most modern weapons and ballistic armor available on the black market. The group totals between 300 and 400 Soldiers, all of them fairly well trained in firearms and tactics by armed forces veterans at the ACNM compound and surrounding acreage outside Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

A highly profitable way to finance their efforts has been armored car robberies. The Silent Brotherhood has netted over two million dollars in six holdups. They plan carefully for these robberies, with escape routes, alternate vehicles and anti-vehicle weapons to deter pursuit. In all their operations, they use only American or German-made firearms—"liberated" military smallarms or civilian semi-automatic weapons, often converted to full automatic fire.

The Silent Brotherhood's most recent attack took place in August of 1999, when four Aryan Soldiers marched onto the campus of Norris College, an African-American women's university in Atlanta. Wearing masks and swastika arm bands, they shouted anti-female and anti-black rhetoric until security guards began closing in, then revealed automatic weapons and began firing at random. Seven women were killed and four wounded.

The group's future plans include a series of attacks on synagogues and churches with predominantly black congregations throughout the southeastern U.S. The group has also targeted a series of prominent Jewish citizens for assassination: pop star Sharon Silver; investment banker Saul Klinghoffer; television host Sam Spiers; and marathon runner Ruth Goldstein.

A typical Silent Brotherhood war party consists of one Charismatic Leader and a mix of Terrorist Recruit and Thug/Psychopath Personality Types, with perhaps a Veteran Terrorist thrown in as well (page 127-129). Use one High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157) and/or one Guerilla (page 126) NPC Stereotype along with four to eight Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156). All should be armed with Colt or S&W pistols and MAC, Colt, or H&K submachineguns.

Children of Danu [#CR0002125]

(also The Dannans, The Tuatha De Danann)

Source: Firewall, INSYCON Corporation, FBI

Type: Politically-motivated criminal organization

Scope:

Acts of sabotage and techno-terrorism carried out with moderate frequency in or through the Internet, GenNet, and other international computer networks. Acts of net sabotage have affected corporate and governmental operations worldwide.

Affiliations:

The terrorist organization Gaia's Fist [#CR0000971] has been mentioned in Children of Danu literature, and vice-versa, although the degree of cooperation between the groups is not known. [FBI]

Personnel:

Unknown. Estimates range from 5 to 30 core members, with up to 200 sympathetic hackers available to participate in operations. [Firewall, INSYCON]

Operating Since:

1995 (believed)

Structure:

Unknown. Likely a loose affiliation of computer hackers.

Leaders:

Real names unknown. Net aliases taken from Irish mythology: the Dagda [#LL3935333], the Morrigan [#LL5003921], Nuada of the Silver Hand [#LL4104216], and Lugh of the Long Arm [#LL5000347].

Legitimate Connections:

Unknown, although it is likely that most members have legitimate employment in the information industry, probably with companies that meet their ethical standards.

Resources:

Virtually unlimited access to most major international networks (public and proprietary). Access to data and intelligence on virtually every target and intelligence service that might oppose them. Excellent hacking skills and software. [Firewall]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Records and data theft and destruction. Distribution of copyrighted material. Distribution of passwords and security information. Telecommunications fraud. Conspiracy to commit acts of espionage against Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, China, Denmark, Egypt, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Zaire. [INSYCON]

Additional Commentary:

The Children of Danu claim to be an organization of hackers dedicated to transforming society by awakening humanity to cyber-consciousness, and opposed to environmental exploitation by government and multinational corporations. They call themselves "Virtual Revolutionaries," and claim that only through the attainment of their goals can global disaster be averted. The group acts by corrupting databases, distributing information on breaking into restricted government and corporate subnets, disrupting corporate communications and computer-controlled manufacturing plants, and blackmailing targets with threats of any or all of the above. The members' alter-egos, fairy elements of Irish mythology (referred to as the Sidhe or the Faey), are appropriate to their apparent ability to come and go at will and without detection.

The majority of the Dannans' activities have not been made public by either their victims or the terrorists themselves, so the full scope of their activities is not known. [Firewall] Most known victims are corporations with arguable records for environmental exploitation. Often, attacks are limited to theft of damaging records which are then forwarded to environmental groups or even government agencies. However, several victims have suffered major damage to their business records and information systems, or have had their operations brought to a halt. In one of their biggest and most public operations, the Dannans brought NATO Operation Black Bear to a complete halt in 1995. They gained access to a major NATO communication network, then distributed information on how to penetrate the net to hundreds of other hackers. The scrambled communica-

tions and network misfunctions resulted in a major embarrassment for the NATO armies, as journalists broadcast live footage of soldiers securing busy supermarkets and tanks running into each other in narrow German streets. [FBI]

The GenNet security organization Firewall estimates the total membership of the Children of Danu at approximately 25 core members, supported by a web of hundreds of amateur hackers around the world. A great quantity of their communications have been traced to origination in the Londonderry area, in Northern Ireland, although no specific address has been identified, and it is not known whether this is the home of the organization or just of some of its members. [Firewall] It is believed that most of their communications originate from portable computers with cellular links, although conventional efforts at tracing the calls have been inexplicably unsuccessful. It is likely that some or possibly all of the members do not know each other by sight, or possibly even by real name.

The Children of Danu have no direct public support in Ireland or elsewhere, although they are well-known and have many sympathizers among certain segments of the network programming and hacking communities.

Last Update: October 19, 1999

The Children of Danu

Although some would hesitate to call them a true terrorist organization, there is no doubt that the Children of Danu promotes anarchy and criminal activity throughout the world's electronic networks. The Dannans, as they are sometimes called, believe that the world is rapidly heading towards either annihilation or massive revolution—and they're doing their best to get the revolution underway before destruction becomes inevitable.

The Real Scoop

The Children of Danu organization was created in 1994 by Sean (The Dagda) McMahon of Cork, Ireland, with the intent of propagating a radical environmental message across the Internet. McMahon's efforts attracted others within Ireland and around the world, and the organization quickly snowballed well beyond McMahon's original vision. Within a year, individual contributors to the group's efforts began aggressively seeking out—or stealing—environmental information damaging to corporations or government agencies to which the Children of Danu were opposed, and McMahon, an accomplished hacker himself, eagerly seized upon this technique. By 1999, the Dannans are one of the most active hacking organizations on the net, and frequently carry out acts of electronic sabotage, theft, and techno-terrorism.

The group is truly one of the information age. Most of the membership know one another only by email and reputation. Only the core Irish members have actually met in person, and know each other's real names. Second in command is Meabh (The Morrigan) Kavanagh of Londonderry, who launched the group's first real act of techno-terrorism in the fall of 1995. By creating false shipping documents at British PetroChem, she had a drum of toxic waste delivered to an EC Environment Committee meeting at The Hague. Padriag (Nuada) O'Shaughnessy, an engineer employed by Eire Telecomm, joined in 1996 and has arranged a covert feed to EuroNet, making it very difficult to trace their operations.

The only core member of the Dannans who isn't from Ireland is Greg Littledeer, an American who joined in 1997, bringing with him extensive experience from his employment with INSYCON, where he worked on the GenNet architecture and programming. Taking the name Lugh of the Long Arm, he began feeding the Dannans various undocumented secrets of GenNet design and special protocols that would let them move about like ghosts, leaving no record of their passage. Littledeer is based out of Boston.

The Children of Danu have an ongoing rivalry with another "node" of cyberpunks, the Triad. They scorn the Triad's mercenary activities, and view the group as part of the social order they are fighting, despite the frequent similarities in style and activity between the two groups.

Between the resources and skills of Littledeer and O'Shaughnessy, the core members of the Tuatha have nearly complete access to both the GenNet and EuroNet systems. As might be expected, all of the members own extensive arrays of computer equipment, but their abilities also give them access to and use of thousands of other computers on the net—meaning that any one of them could easily carry out all but their most sophisticated operations from little more than a palmtop with a cellular modem.

The Tuatha have many admirers on the Net and can often count on users to cover up for them. In fact, some efforts to track down the Sidhe have been sabotaged by the very freelance hackers that were hired to do the job. The group receives moderate covert funding from environmental groups in the U.S. and Europe. It has recently also been the recipient of a series of anonymous leaks from someone at Firewall (see page 109). The group has treated this information with scepticism so far, however, as they don't know the source of the information and suspect a possible sting in the works.

The Tuatha have supported the efforts of "non-virtual" pro-environment terrorists like Gaia's Fist, but have no direct connections with this or any other such organization.

The Tuatha's current project involves infiltrating a number of financial institutions, with an eye to diverting funds from several major oil corporations, logging companies, and chemical companies into the coffers of environmental groups. If successful, the transfers will total in the millions of dollars. This venture is extremely risky, however, due to the tight security of both the banks and the corporations involved. This will be a "make or break" situation for the Tuatha; Firewall is sure to put every effort into shutting them down and at last putting these hackers behind bars.

Finding a group of Tuatha De Dannan members operating together in the field is extremely unlikely, although one might be encountered in support of another pro-environmental terrorist movement. If encountered in person a Dannan would be best represented by the Cyberterrorist NPC Stereotype (page 124) of the Intellectual Terrorist Personality Type (page 128). The Children of Danu are all highly experienced computer operators—count on them having and using the absolute best in electronic equipment.

European People's Democratic Resistance Front (EPDRF)

#CR0003822

(also The Front)

Source: Interpol, GSG-9

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Moderately active popular terrorist organization operating throughout the E.C. and eastern Europe.

Affiliations:

None known.

Personnel: 200 (believed)

Operating Since:

1995 (believed)

Structure:

Loose affiliation of independent terrorist cells, each of five to ten individuals.

Leaders:

Hilda Baderhoff [#LL2368536], age 28, journalist, Germany

Legitimate Connections:

Possible links to the non-violent German group People Against Fascism. It is not known whether this group provides direct support, or is merely a recruiting ground. [GSG-9]

Resources:

Smallarms and explosives. Low cash reserves, although some individual cells are thought to have wealthy backers. Access to an intelligence network of activists and sympathetic journalist, and perhaps some government officials. [Interpol]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Assassination of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Bombing of the Grisehm Chemical Werks in Austria, resulting in eleven deaths. Assaults on or murders of neo-nazi and right-wing activists in Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

Additional Commentary:

The EPDRF is a loose confederation of twenty or so terrorist cells that claim to combat the rise of fascism in Europe. Although the types of actions taken seem to vary from cell to cell, common actions include assassinations of neo-nazi and anti-immigrant activists and politicians, exposes of fascist sympathizers among government and corporate officials, and attacks on businesses and even law enforcement officials seen as fascist supporters or even overly-conservative politically.

The EPDRF was founded by Hilda Baderhoff in the early 1990s. Baderhoff was an anti-nazi activist operating primarily through the EuroNet and GenNet whose house was burned by a mob of skinheads in 1995. The perpetrators were never captured or prosecuted, and Baderhoff later cited this incident as the primary cause of her turn towards terrorism.

The Front's first known activities began in May 1996, when a Norwegian cell exposed the power behind a local right-wing party: a clique of wealthy businessmen who had been Nazi collaborators in WWII. Later that year, a group in Poland operating under the same name tipped off the government to an attempted military coup. Forewarned, the government arrested the coup leaders before a major rally in Warsaw.

However, the EPDRF first came to major public attention with the Braunau-am-Inn incident of 1997. A believed EPDRF sniper shot and killed Russian extremist Vladimir Zhirinovsky as he gave a speech commemorating Adolf Hitler's birthday. In the rioting that followed, over-zealous neo-nazi "security officers" (the Austrian government had refused to provide security for Zhirinovsky) and supporters exchanged fire with the sniper, police, and a number of armed onlookers who later proved to have no affiliation with the EPDRF. When the gunplay was over, the sniper, four journalists, a police officer, six Brown Shirts and eighteen members of the crowd were dead, and twenty-four were wounded.

That event sparked a number of violent clashes between EPDRF cells and right-wing extremists, the most successful of which was a grenade attack in Paris, which killed four neo-nazis marching in a demonstration,

and wounded eight others. Attacks of this nature continue in a sporadic but increasing frequency.

EPDRF activities took a disturbing turn in 1998, with the bombing of the Griseim Chemical Werks plant in Linz, Austria. An EPDRF press release after the incident claimed that it was in retaliation for corporate support of fascist politicians in Austria and Germany, though in the past, such connections were simply made public. Investigators were unable to find any direct connections between the corporation or its officers and directors, and any fascist politicians or movements. [Interpol]

Three police slayings in 1998 are also believed to have been carried out by EPDRF cells, although the group only claimed responsibility for one. In all cases, the officers were shot on the street when off-duty, and all were known or suspected to have fascist leanings. There is some indication that these and the Griseim bombing were the acts of individual, perhaps renegade cells, and are not generally sanctioned by the remainder of the organization. This may indicate a growing rift in the Front's membership. [GSG-9]

These later attacks have eroded the once-solid support the Front enjoyed in the media and among the public, although sympathy still runs high in areas where such incidents are not much in the news. Although the EPDRF has no structure within the United States, some activist groups have spoken out in support of expansion to the U.S. The Front is not well-funded and has no centralized logistics system, but there is evidence that some cells get substantial funding through wealthy private donors, including prominent Israelis living in Europe [GSG-9], although a Mossad report claims no evidence of the latter.

Last Update: November 8, 1998

The European People's Democratic Resistance Front

The European People's Democratic Resistance Front, or EPDRF, is an organization of independent groups opposed to the regrowth of fascism, neo-nazi groups, and hate crime in Europe. Small, disorganized, and underfunded, the group has nonetheless caught the attention of the media—and the support of much of the public.

The Real Scoop

After going underground, Baderhoff travelled extensively throughout Europe, setting up cells in Norway, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Most of her recruits are upper middle class intellectuals; dedicated but not especially worldly or experienced in street level conflict. While most cells communicate irregularly with each other, they have no central command, and each group has to arrange its own training and weapons. These cells do, however, exchange information semi-regularly about the activities of neo-fascist movements in their region via the EuroNet.

Prominent leaders of the Front include Anton Riise, age 25, a Norwegian philosophy student, and Zbigniew Pastorlich, age 32, a Polish shipyard worker.

The EPDRF has no central resources as such, and each cell must cultivate its own sources of money, training, and supplies. The French cell in Lyon has arrangements with local philanthropist Jacques Collier. Under his funding, they have received para-military training in the United States, and supplies of weapons and communications equipment. In contrast, most Polish cells have to scrounge and rebuild old military equipment for their use. Unlike their western European compatriots, many of the Poles are actually skilled tradespeople. Most cells have moderate black market connections.

While most EPDRF groups do not engage in theft, some cells consider certain conservative business people and corporations acceptable targets for theft and extortion.

The Front has many supporters among moderates and liberals, and receives a great deal of unsolicited intelligence from sources in the media, government, and civil service. As soon as a fascist or neo-nazi leader has been identified by the media, or a rally has been announced, the news report is filed, marking the subject as a potential target for the EPDRF.

In recent months, the EPDRF has forged an important alliance with agents of the Israeli secret service, Mossad. As yet the intelligence agency has provided only information, but there is the possibility that financial support, training, and equipment might be forthcoming. Mossad's tacit support is viewed with suspicion, since much of the neo-nazi violence the Front opposes is actually directed against Muslim immigrant workers. But others within the Front argue that Mossad is trying to prevent the re-emergence of fascism in Europe due to a genuine concern that Jews are equally viable targets of fascist violence.

EPDRF has recently adopted a policy of "cutting off the head of the snake." While many of the cells still attack rallies, their leaders have come to realize that these are often suicide missions, due to the heavy firepower the neo-fascists can bring to bear and the superior training of their adversaries. Thus, many of the cells have switched tactics, and now go after the fascist leaders instead. Intelligence provided by Mossad has helped make these attacks possible; so far, all of the information provided has been good.

Because EPDRF members have only minimal knowledge of explosives, their most common method of assassination is the drive-by shooting. But more subtle tactics are also used. Many of the terrorists have respectable middle-class backgrounds, are university educated, and are of "pure stock." Thus they are readily accepted into the homes of the more well-to-do neo-fascists as nannies or servants. Having gained the trust of their intended targets, they can conduct the executions on their own terms. Such covert operations can also result in the capture of documents or computer files that identify other neo-fascist leaders. To date, the EPDRF has about half-a-dozen such infiltrations underway—only one has yet been completed.

EPDRF operatives vary greatly in training, experience and dedication. Many have no real terrorist skills and should be represented in game terms as unskilled civilians. Those who have received training should be treated like Intellectual Terrorists.

A typical cell engaged in reprisal against a neo-fascist movement is led by a Charismatic Leader and includes four to six Intellectual Terrorist Personality Types (page 127-128). Use the Urban Revolutionaries NPC Stereotypes (page 127). AK-47 and AKM assault rifles are most commonly used, due to their ready availability on the European black market.

Gaia's Fist

#CR0000971

(also Green Brigade)

Source: FBI, MI-5, Koan Choa Cho, EuroTer

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Very active group conducting popular terrorism and corporate sabotage, operating in North America and Europe.

Affiliations:

Believed to have ties to organized crime and drug distribution in the U.S. [FBI] Ties with The Children of Danu in that organization's statements have not been alluded to by Gaia's Fist, and are otherwise undocumented. [EuroTer]

Personnel: 100-200

Operating Since:

1995 (believed) [MI-5]

Structure:

Organization of scattered terrorist cells, each composed of four to eight members.

Leaders:

Lydia Scorda [#LL4263993], Michael Glassman [#LL5142971]

Legitimate Connections:

Various environmental organizations, including Earth First!, Sea Shepherd Society, GreenPeace, and the Coalition of Green Parties.

Resources:

Smallarms, explosives, access to technological and information system resources. Moderate funding. Limited military training and international intelligence. Extensive network of sympathizers, providing access to underground shelter and transportation.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Bombing of whaling ship *Toshika Maru* in 1995. Kidnapping of Marli Reardon in 1995. The South Bend Nuclear Plant murders. Numerous bombings of factories, offices, and government agencies in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Additional Commentary:

Gaia's Fist (named after the Greek goddess of the earth) was formed by militant environmentalists from a number of protest organizations as well as members of the Green Party disenchanted with the political process. Due to the involvement of the latter, the group is also known as the "Green Brigade." [MI-5] The group first surfaced in 1995, taking responsibility for the sabotage and sinking of two whaling ships, the bombing of an automobile factory and two chemical plants, the murder of several engineers working on an atomic plant, and the well-publicized kidnapping and ransom of Marli Reardon, CEO of a multinational lumber company. Attacks have continued steadily ever since, usually at the rate of about a dozen major actions per year. [EuroTer]

Gaia's Fist targets industries that are major sources of pollution, exploit the environment, damage habitats, export toxic waste to the Third World, experiment on animals, conduct genetic engineering, manufacture nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or associated components, or whose products endanger human health. They also target government officials soft on exploitation and judges and legislators who prosecute radical environmentalists or call for tougher response to eco-terrorism. Industrial targets include chemical plants, automobile factories, pulp mills, lumber companies that either practice clearcutting or operate in sensitive rainforests, pesticide producers, department stores that import the products of Third World "sweat shops" or forced laborers, nuclear power plants (usually in the construction stage), dams that flood sensitive ecosystems, and whaling ships. They sabotage facilities and product, and target executive officers. Assassinations are common, as are kidnappings.

Gaia's Fist is known to operate both in Europe and in North America. It recruits heavily from legitimate, non-violent environmental organizations in these areas. The FBI has documented connections between the terrorists and the Green Party, and believes that political donations are being siphoned off by this group. The

IRS is currently auditing the American Coalition of Green Parties in an attempt to verify this. [FBI]

The FBI also reports that Gaia's Fist has a number of connections to organized crime, particularly to the drug trade. A large segment of the organization's funds are believed to come from the distribution of "soft" drugs such as marijuana and hashish. Recent investigations have unearthed connections with the Golden Lotus triad [#CR0000941] of Hong Kong and with Turkish opium smugglers, leading to speculation that the group is moving into harder drugs. [FBI]

The suspected leaders of Gaia's Fist have eluded capture despite positive identification. MI-5 reports place Michael Glassman in the area of Bournemouth, England, but the Japanese intelligence agency Koan Choa Cho reports sighting him in Osaka. Although no physical headquarters have been located, the organization is believed to be run from London, Berlin, Paris, San Francisco, and/or Vancouver.

Last Update: August 23, 1998

Gaia's Fist

Gaia's Fist is an environmental activist group radical even by the standards of most radical environmentalists. Some of the more innocuous actions performed by Gaia's Fist, like tree spiking and ramming whaling ships, are applauded and actively supported by less militant environmental organizations. But most draw the line when it comes to bombing factories or assassinating CEOs of corporations that are major polluters—actions in which innocent people often die, and which have made Gaia's Fist the most violent eco-terrorist group in existence.

The Real Scoop

Gaia's Fist was formed by Lydia Scorda and Michael Glassman in London, England. Cells were quickly organized in cities throughout Europe and North America by founding members. Key headquarters were established in Paris and Berlin—as well as in Vancouver and San Francisco (North America's west coast, with its long history of environmental activism, proved especially receptive). The group is currently trying to establish a headquarters in Tokyo, but so far has only one cell operating in Japan (in Osaka).

The extreme nature of this group's actions and goals come in part from its unique composition. Most individual members of Gaia's Fist became involved through interest in the environmental cause, but a few were terrorists first—and environmentalists second. Jerome Hammersmith, in particular, had been previously active in Britain's Angry Brigade, and had also worked with the JRA and the Palestine Liberation Front in Europe, on a freelance basis. He attached himself to Gaia's Fist in 1995, and it is probably due in part to his influence that the group is as violent as it is. A few other members have been active in other terrorist organizations as well, particularly groups supporting aboriginal, ethnic, or feminist causes, but few of those groups are as violent or as dogmatic as Gaia's Fist has become.

Despite the past activities of these members, Gaia's Fist itself maintains only nominal connections with other terrorist groups. It does, however, rely upon other terrorist organizations for weapons and explosives. The British cells have purchased explosives and small arms from the IRA, while in North America contacts have been established with 21

Underground, a group of radical extremists who want to return the U.S. to a pre-industrial state by striking at the public infrastructure (freeways, power plants, pipelines, communication facilities, etc.).

Gaia's Fist is supported in part by public donations made to a number of front organizations posing as peaceful environmental protest groups, and by funds that trickle in through the environmental activist network, most of which were originally donated to innocuous public environmental groups by citizens with no wish to support terrorism. Although they have connections with the Green Parties in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, the direct financial link suggested by the FBI does not exist.

The group raises the majority of its funds in a manner typical of most terrorist organizations—by robbing banks (particularly those that deal with multinational corporations) and by kidnappings, which in some cases have resulted in a ransom of more than one million dollars being paid. They also practice extortion, demanding protection money from corporations in return for a reprieve from attack. Since, however, the group has a history of ultimately resuming violent actions against such targets, this method is becoming less lucrative as potential victims wise up.

Another way Gaia's Fist raises money is through the growth and sale of marijuana. The group does not have connections with organized crime, nor does it import drugs. Its supporters instead cultivate marijuana in remote wilderness locations, harvesting and selling these crops themselves and turning the money over to Gaia's Fist. These growers are on the periphery of the organization, only rarely do they know more than one or two of the actual terrorists. Many Gaia's Fist members support the legalization of marijuana, arguing that hemp is a more readily renewable resource than trees. Gaia's Fist does not traffic in hard drugs—the suggestion in the database that they do, and that they are involved with the Mafia, is based on faulty data.

For the most part, Gaia's Fist cells operate autonomously, with actions decided upon by consensus. Every year, however, a representative from each cell is chosen to attend an electronic GenNet conference at which the organization's general strategies and tactics are decided. The next such conference is due to be held on October 12, 1999, a date which the United Nations has declared an "International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction." On this date, a general action plan for the next two years will be decided—which industries are priority targets, which type of action (kidnappings, bombings, publicized mock trials) best suits the group's intended image and goals, and what sort of operations require the cooperation of multiple cells. Within the scope of this action plan, individual cells will create and carry out their own missions.

Gaia's Fist terrorists tend to be well-educated members of the middle class. They typically enter the terrorist organization after spending several years in the environmental movement and becoming disillusioned with peaceful protest, which they see as being too slow and ineffective. All share an urgent belief that immediate, drastic steps must be taken to save the Earth. A typical cell consists of four to six members. Use the Urban Revolutionaries NPC Stereotype (page 127), splitting the Personality Types among Charismatic Leaders, Intellectual Terrorists, and Veteran Terrorists (page 127-129).

Euskadi Ta Askuatasuna 2000 (ETA)

#CR0000998

(also Basque Homeland and Liberty, ETA M, ETA MM, The Witches)

Source: MI-6, Spanish National Police, Interpol, EuroTer

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Extremely active terrorist group in Northern Spain, also carries out sporadic attacks against the Spanish and E.C. governments, as well as Interpol and NATO, throughout the rest of Spain and Europe.

Affiliations:

Past support from regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua. Documented connections with the IRA [#CR0000632] that includes cross-training and exchange of personnel and resources [MI-6]. ETA MM is in direct conflict with Spanish organized crime, targeting its vice and drug operations.

Personnel: 50-100

Operating Since:

1959

Structure:

Military-style hierarchy of small operational cells, supported by a bureaucratic command and intelligence section. [Sp. Nat. Pol.]

Leaders:

Jose Antonio Urruticoechea Bengoechea [#LL2359114] (ETA M). Lukito (alias: Basque for "the fox") [#LL3645269] (ETA MM).

Legitimate Connections:

Uncertain. Interpol believes that the ETA receives no tangible support from the legitimate Basque National political party. However, Spanish national and provincial police insist that there is a connection between ETA and non-violent Basque nationalist groups, and treat terrorists and peaceful protesters with equal brutality. There is speculation that former ETA M members have entered the political arena through the Herri Batasuna party.

Resources:

Smallarms, explosives. Moderate funding from criminal activities and private donors in Spain and abroad. [Interpol]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Numerous assassinations and attacks on Spanish political and industrial leaders, as well as uncounted incidents of harassment and property damage in the Basque region of Spain. Assassination of Jose Luis Garcia in 1995, abduction of Police inspector Jaime Alvarez in 1996, execution-style murder of U.S. serviceman Teddy Phillips in 1997, assassination of EC representative Marco Alarcon in 1997.

Additional Commentary:

Headquartered somewhere in Bilbao, in the northeastern Basque region of Spain, Euskadi Ta Askuatasuna 2000 (ETA) is a terrorist group striving to bring autonomy to the Basque people. Their terrorism seeks to elevate the profile of the Basque struggle, creating both internal and external pressure on the Spanish government to recognize the autonomy of the Basque country. The "2000" in the name refers to the year 2000, which they believe (or promise) will begin a new era for the Basque people.

ETA was formed in 1959 by young militants within the PNV, the Basque Nationalist Party. Its original goals were the defense of the Basque language and culture and to ensure democracy for the Basque people. Early ETA groups were undisguised Marxist/Leninists, and the 1960s saw a struggle emerge within the group between the nationalists and those who wanted to become part of the larger socialist revolutionary movement.

The 1970s saw the development of a new branch, ETA M (for military). ETA M members are known as "Autonomous Commandos," though most lead legitimate civilian lives. Nevertheless, ETA M is responsible for more than a dozen spectacular assassinations and kidnappings directed against individuals in the Spanish government and industry, as well as a spate of bombings in the late 1990s aimed at government, military, and commercial facilities. Although they rarely make international headlines, recent bombings in northern Spain

have reached an almost weekly rate, and Spanish authorities are on the verge of imposing martial law in some cities. [Interpol]

ETA M attacks representatives of the Spanish federal government, representatives of the European Union, the Spanish National Police, and Interpol, and are believed behind the death of Marco Alarcon, a Spanish representative to the E.C. parliament. [EuroTer] ETA M also opposes organized criminals, pornographers, and some international commercial interests which they see as undermining Basque culture. The group operates primarily in the Spanish Basque country, the provinces of Navarre, La Rioja, Euskal Herriko and Sorbarbe, but sometimes stages attacks in the Spanish capital of Madrid or even outside of Spain. Alarcon was killed in Brussels.

In early 1995, a second splinter group formed, calling itself ETA MM (Militant Media). Its leader took the name "Lukito," Basque for fox [#LL3645269]. This group's stated goal is to elevate the battle from a strictly military one to a "war of words." Through the media, they would demonstrate to the European Community the plight of the Basque people under Spanish rule, particularly human rights abuses by Spanish authorities. [EuroTer]

Most of ETA MM's operations are aimed at publicizing embarrassing or incriminating evidence on Spanish authorities, with occasional similar actions against European or NATO officials. Violent actions are usually directed at individuals or institutions that have been previously targeted in the media, but which have not changed their ways or been prosecuted by authorities. Witnesses claim that all ETA MM commandos are female, and the Basque media, in an apparent allusion to Basque folklore, have dubbed the group "The Witches."

Typical of ETA MM's later style was its first known criminal act. The ETA has long demanded that the Basque language be the working language in all manufacturing facilities in the region. One of many companies that did not comply was a multinational soft drink bottler. In 1995, ETA MM targeted the company and the plant's general manager Jose Luis Garcia in a media campaign, releasing among others documents showing that the expense accounts for the plant's management were twice the cost of the language program. The company continued to resist the proposal, and attempted to sue the journalist who released the document. Shortly thereafter, Garcia was poisoned at a company function. ETA MM terrorists had hijacked the catering truck to carry out the assassination.

In a very highly-publicized case a year later, ETA MM released documents and testimonials accusing a Spanish police inspector, Jaime Alvarez, of participating in and covering up the death of a Basque activist in police custody. Despite widespread coverage in the European media, and independent verification of many of the details, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior failed to investigate. Alvarez was kidnapped outside his apartment building in Bilbao. Ten days later a video tape was released, on which an emaciated Alvarez confessed to torturing the activist and promised to name other police officers who participated or helped cover it up. He was released, but died in the hospital under police custody.

The Witches' boldness and vigilante activities have made them favorites of the tabloid media and set them apart from other terrorist groups. They are seen by some feminist groups as champions of disadvantaged women fighting the oppressive, conservative, Catholic, male-dominated government. Even right-wing groups have applauded their vigilante actions against the region's organized criminals. [EuroTer]

Last Update: January 18, 1999

Euskadi Ta Askuatasuna 2000

One of Europe's oldest active terrorist groups, Euskadi Ta Askuatasuna 2000, or ETA, has not been as well-known as the IRA or many other separatist groups—although that is changing. ETA has long been fighting for the independence of the Basque region from Spain, and has recently brought that fight to the international scene.

The Real Scoop

As indicated by the database entry above, ETA is a complex organization with a number of nominally-independent factions. While the main body of the organization, ETA itself, is most active in the Basque region of Spain, carrying out a steady campaign of bombings, assassinations, and ambushes against symbols of authority or opposition, two of the more radical factions have expanded the intensity and scope of the conflict. ETAM is simply one of the more violent of the many militant subgroups, but it's notable not just for its activity but also for the fact that it has begun operating outside of the Basque region and even outside Spain. ETAMM, on the other hand, represents a completely different approach—one which is considerably more media-savvy than ETA has been in the past. ETA MM's unique approach and composition also set it apart from the remainder of ETA and from other terrorist groups as well.

ETA as a whole receives much of its funding from membership fees and private donations. Like the IRA, a substantial part of ETA's funds come from American émigrés. Most of these finances are funneled through the Homeland Credit Union, a legal financial institution that so far has remained above police suspicion. ETAM bolsters its share of such donations through the kidnapping of prominent Spanish business owners as well as bank robberies and extortion. ETA MM eschews bank robberies, though it often procures supplies (and cash) by robbing pharmacies.

General ETA propaganda often supports other nationalist revolutionary groups like ASALA and NALQ, but there are no connections between these organizations. The group does, however, have a longstanding connection with the IRA. Small arms, forged documents and information on European Community anti-terrorist efforts are bartered back and forth. In February of 1998, ETAM staged a raid on the engineering stores of the Espania-Pyrenees Mining Corporation. More than 500 kg of TNT and detonating supplies were stolen. While some of these explosives were used by the Basques in their bombing campaign, part of the haul was given to the IRA in return for military rifles, grenades, and the training of ETAM members.

ETA MM refuses to deal with the black market or organized criminals, and thus has no direct access to high-tech military weapons. Because of the group's preferred methods, however, this does not seem to be a limitation.

As the database indicates, ETAM is the most internationally active faction of ETA. The database information is far from complete, however—the world's intelligence services are completely ignorant of the group's biggest effort. In December 1999, the European Economic Summit meeting will take place in Madrid, at the recently completed Excelencia Hotel—and ETAM plans to blow up the entire affair. ETAM has infiltrated the construction crew and, to a lesser extent, the engineering service that are building the hotel, and these agents have been placing

hundreds of kilos of explosives within the structural members of the building. Dozens of ministers from countries across Europe will be on hand for the summit, and security will be extremely tight. But the bombs are already in place, and even now a timer is ticking off the days and hours until the summit. When zero-hour comes, the explosive charges will level the building, killing dozens of important diplomats and Spanish government officials. This project, as complex and dangerous as it is, has been successfully kept secret not only from the Spanish authorities themselves, but from the mainstream leadership of ETA, who would probably not approve such a drastic measure.

ETA MM also has its own agenda, though its current activities are not quite so ambitious. The Witches general tactic is not based so much on massive surprise attacks as on embarrassment and public scrutiny, followed only if necessary by retribution. Acting on information from Basque sympathizers in government and business, ETA MM investigates select targets thoroughly for corruption, illegal acts, and anti-Basque activities. They make such information public. If the victim is powerful or rich enough to avoid official retribution, they arrange for his or her humiliation and death, either at their own hands or at the hands of the victim's other enemies.

If possible, ETA MM uses drugs to incapacitate or kill their victims. The drugs are obtained mainly in robberies of pharmacies and through forged prescriptions; some simpler preparations are homemade by the members of the group. "Lukito" was a pharmacy student at the time she went underground, and several of her group have medical or biochemical backgrounds.

ETA MM operations rely heavily on accurate intelligence and careful planning. They use disguise and bravado to gain access to their targets and then use drugs and/or torture to make their victim "pay for his crimes against the Basque people." They have inherited a variety of small arms from their ETA predecessors. 9mm automatic pistols and submachineguns seem to be their weapons of choice, though their operations seldom include gunplay as a planned component. Unlike ETAM, The Witches do not as a rule use explosives.

The typical ETA M action group includes six to nine members, plus up to a dozen "civilian" supporters—usually spouses or family members. Use two or three Urban Revolutionaries (page 127) NPC Stereotypes, bolstered by three to five Guerillas (page 126) and/or Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156). Use the Charismatic Leader Personality Type for the commander, and the Intellectual Terrorist and Terrorist Recruit Personality Types for the others (pages 127-129).

Picking up on the nickname given them by the press, ETA MM cells call themselves "covens." Four out of five operatives are women, and group leaders are always female. A "coven" staging an operation is typically comprised of one Charismatic Leader and four to six Intellectual Terrorist Personality Types (pages 127-129), armed with assorted 9mm automatic pistols and occasional Uzis or MAC submachineguns. Use the Urban Revolutionaries NPC Stereotype (page 127). They wear civilian cloths or appropriate disguises to blend in with the local population, and equip themselves with the drugs and related equipment necessary for their planned mission.

Irish Republican Army

The Irish Republican Army is one of the oldest and most well-known terrorist groups on the planet. Seeking the end of British rule in Northern Ireland and the reunification of Ulster with the independent Republic of Ireland, the IRA is a predominantly Catholic organization that fights not just the British army, but also several equally brutal (and criminal) Protestant/pro-British terrorist groups within Northern Ireland. The history of British involvement in Ireland goes back many hundreds of years, and involves a great deal of brutality on the part of the British. But Northern Ireland is predominantly Protestant and supportive of British rule, and though the IRA enjoys intense support in certain communities, it is generally as much a pariah organization in Northern Ireland as it is elsewhere.

The Real Scoop

Though the IRA (technically the PIRA, but since the Official IRA and other competing groups have mainly fallen by the wayside the PIRA has once again taken to calling itself the IRA) is indeed a venerable organization with strong support from its constituency, it has throughout its history suffered from factionalization. With the beginning of its continental operations in 1997, and a groundswell of activity in Northern Ireland since the collapse of the peace talks, the group might have been on the verge of a new era of terrorism and activism. Factionalization has reared its ugly head once again though, and infighting among the group's leadership is doing as much to protect innocent lives in Europe as MI-5 and the British Army together.

Patrick Flannagan is the overall leader of the IRA, but the mastermind behind the attacks in continental Europe is 35-year-old Sean O'Toole, a member of the IRA's inner circle or Army Council. While Flannagan is fairly conservative in his approach to terrorism, O'Toole heads a faction of the IRA that believes that the political process is a waste of time, and wishes to abandon it totally in favor of non-stop violence. His sister, Brigid Connor, takes the opposite view. She is a Sinn Fein party member who was elected to the British parliament in 1996, and who renounces the violence of the IRA.

O'Toole has no love for his sister; indeed, a number of attempts have been made by the IRA on her life, forcing her to resort to a 24-hour bodyguard. She rarely dares to return to Ireland, and spends her time in London, fighting for the rights of Catholics in Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland according to her own agenda. Should she wish to do so, she could reveal a number of the IRA's secrets—including information that would lead to the arrest of O'Toole and a number of top IRA members. Thus far, however, she has remained silent.

Beyond these attempts on Connor's life, and occasional low-level disputes, there has been no open hostility between these three main factions of the IRA—yet. It remains to be seen whether O'Toole will attempt to take control of the organization away from Flannagan, or if the latter will move first to protect his turf.

The IRA's assets are estimated at five million dollars, but the organization's true holdings are probably worth more like \$10 million, and its annual budget is in the range of three to four million. A portion of this money is raised through levies on nationalists in Northern Ireland.

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

#CR0000632

(also Provisional Irish Republican Army, PIRA, Provos, Official Irish Republican Army, Irish Republican Socialist Party, Irish National Liberation Army)

Source: MI-5, Interpol, FBI, EuroTer

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Large, experienced, well-organized and very active terrorist group operating primarily in Northern Ireland, but also commonly in England and elsewhere in Europe.

Affiliations:

Longstanding connections with organized crime in North America, particularly with east-coast Mafia families. [FBI] Ties with several European nationalist movements, including the ETA [#CR0000998] and Armenian groups, and with various Palestinian factions. [EuroTer, MI-5] The IRA is in direct conflict with the Ulster Freedom Fighters [#CR0002564], an anti-IRA terrorist organization in Northern Ireland, and other "loyalist" groups. [MI-5]

Personnel: 300-500, with thousands of active sympathizers in Northern Ireland. [MI-5]

Operating Since:

1919

Structure:

Military-style hierarchy of "active service units" of three to four members each, organized into companies, battalions, and brigades. The seven senior members comprise an Army Council, headed by a Chief of Staff, which oversees the organization. Members are known as "volunteers," civilian supporters as "auxiliaries." Splinter groups generally follow similar structures.

Leaders:

Patrick Flannigan (PIRA Chief of Staff) [#LL2138416]

Legitimate Connections:

The IRA is directly associated with the political party Sinn Fein (pronounced "shin fain"--translates as "Our-selves Alone"), which holds a number of British Parliamentary seats. The IRA also receives financial support from U.S.-based groups such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee. [MI-5]

Resources:

Smallarms, from hunting rifles to modern military weapons. Grenades, mortars, and explosives. Strong connections in the black market, excellent access to international intelligence, extensive training with other terrorist organizations. Excellent funding, including assets approximated at \$5 million and ready cash exceeding \$500,000. The bulk of income (estimated \$1 to \$2 million annually) comes from Irish-American organizations in the U.S., and IRA involvement with American Mafia drug smuggling. [EuroTer]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Hundreds of bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, murders, machinegun attacks, robberies, and ambushes of police and military personnel in Northern Ireland in the past thirty years. Scores of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and mortar attacks in England over the past twenty years. Over a dozen bomb attacks in Europe since 1997, including the bombing of the British embassy in Paris, which killed twenty-six people. Assassination of a member of the British royal family in Spain, in 1998.

Additional Commentary:

The IRA and its splinter groups seek the reunification of Northern Ireland (part of the UK) with the Republic of Ireland, and the removal of the approximately 10,000 British Army troops currently stationed in Northern Ireland. The group's name and structure were established during a two-year guerrilla war against the British (who first occupied Ireland in 12th century) which ended in 1921 with the partition of Ireland. The group's more notorious terrorist activities began in 1969, with attacks on British soldiers (on and off duty), police officers, and judges. It spread from Northern Ireland to England in 1972, with bombings of department stores, public buildings, and pubs frequented by British soldiers. In 1979, the IRA escalated to attacks on British military officers, diplomats, army barracks and messes, government offices, and embassies throughout Europe, and then expanded these attacks to include E.C. government facilities and representatives in 1997, on the grounds that the E.C. has governmental authority to end the Irish division. [Interpol]

The IRA has long been a fractious organization. In 1969, the IRA split into two factions: the smaller Official

IRA, a Marxist group interested in a political settlement; and the Provisional IRA, determined to use force to drive the British out of Northern Ireland. The PIRA became the dominant organization, and is in fact what most people are referring to when using the term IRA. Another group splintered off in 1975: the Irish Republican Socialist Party (military wing: the Irish National Liberation Army), Trotskyites devoted to replacing British rule with a "worker's state." That group is now thought to be defunct. [MI-5]

The IRA continues to be most active within Northern Ireland, where support is very strong among working-class Catholic communities. Ambushes of British Army patrols are very common, especially in rural areas, as are kidnappings of soldiers, loyalist leaders, police officers, judges, and prosecutors. Ambushes employ snipers and/or radio-controlled explosives hidden beside or in culverts under roads. Kidnapped victims are typically killed in execution-style shootings, although the IRA has conducted attacks in which congregations of Protestant churches were simply machinegunned. [MI-5] In all of their activities in Northern Ireland, the IRA is aided by an extensive network of informants who keep British Army units under observation. The group also regularly monitors British radio traffic and routinely taps telephones. [MI-5]

Outside of Northern Ireland, the IRA is famous for bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings, and mortar attacks, which are usually made with disposable, hand-made mortars mounted within vans or other vehicles. The IRA is thought to have numerous active and sleeper cells in England, although it is doubtful there are many in continental Europe. [EuroTer] As a result, the group's actions outside of Northern Ireland focus less on small, harassing attacks and more on major statements. The IRA's most successful attack outside of Great Britain was the car-bombing of the British Embassy in Paris in 1997, which leveled the building and killed twenty-seven. Statements made in 1998 indicated that such major attacks will likely be attempted against E.C. targets in the coming year. [Interpol]

The IRA is headquartered in Belfast, Londonderry, and Armagh. [MI-5] IRA members are known to have trained in Libya and Sudan, and the group has received weapons and intelligence from both these countries and from several Palestinian groups. [MI-5]

It's worth noting that there are several anti-IRA terrorist organizations active in Northern Ireland. The two primary organizations are the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF--military wing called the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) [#CR0002564]) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) [#CR0001103]. Both target innocent Catholics and IRA members alike. [MI-5] Any Irish nationalist is potentially a target for their shootings, car bombs, and pub bombs, referred to in slang as "Paddy bopping."

Last Update: January 11, 1999

Money is also raised illegally, through extortion, fraud, kidnap ransoms, protection rackets, smuggling, and bank robberies and raids on postal stations in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

The IRA has connections with a number of European and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, including the Red Brigades in Italy, and Basque ETAM separatists, Armenian ASALA members, Gaia's Fist cells in Britain, and individual cells in the ANO and other Palestinian organizations. It does not utilize outsiders in its actions, but does from time to time enlist logistical support or use intelligence provided by these organizations when staging raids in continental Europe, and frequently trades with them in weapons and passports. The IRA's links with these groups were forged when the group sent members to train in Libya in the 1980s; Libya continues to supply arms and explosives to the IRA on occasion.

The British understanding of the IRA's current capabilities—and problems—is incomplete. On the one hand, British estimates of IRA resources are dangerously low. In Northern Ireland itself, the IRA struggle is on the verge of becoming an overt civil war against British army. Entire sections of cities, particularly in Belfast and Derry

(Londonderry), are under IRA control. In England, nearly 100 IRA cells are active or just awaiting activation. Clearly, this level of activity requires far more personnel than the MI-5 estimates of 300-500—the true number is probably closer to 1,500.

Fortunately, the IRA has little opportunity to fully exploit its resources. In addition to the leadership squabbles, individual Companies and Battalions are so isolated from one another (a necessary counter-measure against both the highly-skilled British intelligence services and the brutal Protestant militias) that they often evolve their own doctrines somewhat apart from the central command. As a result, some groups see street violence in Ulster's cities as the critical strategy, while others combat the British Army in the countryside. Some hold that the British can only be made to succumb through attacks in England, while others prefer to take the fight to the E.C. Many are protective of the IRA's reputation among Irish expatriate groups in the U.S. and elsewhere, or believe in honoring certain limits to the violence—while others would gladly conduct terrorism in the U.S., target the British royal family, or seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. With so many potential directions and so much infighting over the correct one, MI-5's low estimate of the IRA's current capabilities hasn't proved dangerously wrong—but if the group gets its act together, British and European counter-terrorist agencies are going to wish their data was more accurate.

Despite all of these internal conflicts, there is one discernible trend in the IRA's efforts. The major thrust of the IRA in 1999 is towards forcing the European Community recognize (and forcing Britain to recognize) the independence of Northern Ireland. Over the next year at least, under O'Toole's guidance, the campaign in continental Europe will be stepped up considerably. While currently only a dozen or so IRA cells operate on the continent, the plan is to have more than forty cells active by the turn of the millennium—so O'Toole is working hard to establish new cells and transfer existing ones to the continent. In the immediate future, the E.C. bombing attacks will be concentrated in Brussels, Berlin, and Vienna, but no European city will be safe in the future.

As one of the oldest existing terrorist organizations, the IRA developed many of the tactics now in common use by other groups. One favorite technique is known as a "come on" ambush. A telephone call is made to the police, warning of a bomb in a public building. In fact, there is no bomb inside—the explosive is hidden under the road, in front of the building. When the police or army bomb disposal team arrives on the scene, it is detonated as they approach the site. British police and SAS forces are familiar with this technique, but it is still new to the police forces of continental Europe, where it was used with devastating effect in the bombing campaign of 1997—and will likely be attempted again.

The IRA tends to attract mature terrorists to its ranks, as well as a number of working-class recruits. It is suspicious of outsiders and unfriendly to student revolutionary groups. Some of its members served with the British Army for the benefit of the military training. Although the vast majority are Catholic, there are some Protestants within the IRA's ranks. As a result of the group's age and international connections, IRA members can be armed with almost any sort of military or civilian weapon made in this century—including equipment made in Czechoslovakia, Russia, China, or even Venezuela. Standard operating procedure

involves a great deal of precaution to ensure that no fingerprints or DNA samples are left on weapons or other potential evidence, or taggants or signature chemicals are picked up from explosives or munitions.

A typical “active service unit” consists of three or four members. Usually, three to four such units work together in an attack, each carrying out a single facet of the operation under the direction of a single commander. For each cell, use two or three Veteran Terrorists, maybe one Intellectual Terrorist or Thug/Psychopath, and a Charismatic Leader Personality Type (pages 127-129) for the commander. Use a mixture of Cheap Thug and High-End Grunt NPC Stereotypes (*ME v2.0* p. 156-157).



Japanese Red Army

One of the most eclectic terrorist organizations in existence, the JRA has clung to a ideology of world revolution for almost three decades. Revitalized by the civil unrest in Japan and increasingly chaotic international climate, the JRA and its daughter organization the AIIB have rebounded in the 1990s to grab the international headlines they enjoyed in the 1970s.

The Real Scoop

The history of the JRA and the AIIB is a complex one. The JRA was founded in the early seventies, a Marxist group so radical and violent that its ideology verged on anarchism. The group's goal was not just social justice, but a complete overthrow of all government and social systems, worldwide.

In the mid-seventies, Fusako Shigenobu, one of the group's founding members, created the Arab committee to coordinate cooperation and cross-training with Arab terrorist groups. The JRA became closely involved with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which provided training and weapons to the group. In return, JRA terrorists served the PFLP in a mercenary capacity, carrying out attacks on Israeli targets. By the mid seventies, the Arab committee had become the most active branch of the JRA, and was famed for its frequent and daring hijackings.

In its early years, the JRA funded itself by kidnaping wealthy Japanese executives and robbing local gun stores for weapons. By the mid-seventies, however, the JRA discovered a more lucrative method of extortion: hijacking planes. This activity vaulted the group into the international scene and brought it worldwide media attention. In 1977, the JRA received \$6 million from the Japanese government, after five of its members hijacked a Japanese DC-8 airliner in Bombay and threatened to kill all its passengers. The money, handed over in used \$100 bills, was shared with the PFLP.

By the late seventies, however, the JRA was suffering internal strife and violent purges, and by the early 1980s the Arab Committee (now the only active portion of the JRA) had less than 15 members. In an attempt to revitalize the group, Shigenobu went outside the Japanese and Palestinian terrorist cliques, recruiting violent political idealists opposed to the European Community and frustrated by the diminishing prospects for world communism. The resulting merger of approximately forty individual Japanese, Palestinian, and European terrorists was renamed the Anti-Imperialist International Brigades (AIIB). The group still receives orders from Shigenobu, and from the current leader of the PFLP, Yusif Habib, who also selects the group's targets. But it is officially an independent organization under the leadership of 55-year-old Pieter Clausen, a former member of the nearly-defunct Baader-Meinhof gang.

As reported by Japanese intelligence, Shigenobu has returned to Japan, and now concentrates on recruitment and training of new JRA members from the ranks of dissatisfied students and workers. She plans a people's revolution that will throw the military out of power—preferably before Japan returns to constitutional democratic law, which she opposes equally. Together with a core group of other longtime members of

Japanese Red Army (JRA)/Anti-Imperialist International Brigades (AIIB) #CR0000425

(also Rengo Sekigun, Sekigun-ha (Red Army Faction), Anti-War Democratic Front (ADF), Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB))

Source: Keisato, CIA, MI-6

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Anarchist/left-wing terrorist organization that frequently carries out terrorist acts on its own ideology and on a freelance basis for other organizations, particularly Palestinian groups. Although centered in Japan, the JRA has carried out operations in southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, India, and the U.S., and was at one point headquartered in Lebanon. [CIA]

Affiliations:

The JRA maintains close connections with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) [#CR0001639]. The status of past links to the North Korean government is not known. Links to Japanese organized crime are suspected. [Keisato]

Personnel: 200 (believed) [CIA]

Operating Since:

1970 (approx.)

Structure:

Loose hierarchical gang of semi-independent terrorist cells of seven to ten members each.

Leaders:

Fusako Shigenobu [#LL0367522] (a.k.a. Marian Fusako Okudaira, Miss Yuki)

Legitimate Connections:

None known

Resources:

Small arms, explosives, moderate black market and intelligence connections. Moderate funding through kidnapping and freelance operations. [CIA]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Lod airport attack (Tel Aviv) in 1972. Bombing of Shell Oil refinery, followed by the hijacking of a ferryboat, in Singapore in 1974 (escape abetted by a Palestinian seizure of a Japanese embassy). Seizure of the French embassy in Holland in 1974, and of the U.S. consulate in Malaysia and attack on the Japanese embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. Attacks on Japanese, U.S., British and Canadian embassies in 1986 and 1987. Bombing of Nakagawa Technical Institute in 1996. Attempted assassinations of three members of the Japanese royal family in 1997, including one by a student wielding a Samurai sword.

Additional Commentary:

The Japanese Red Army had its origin in two 1960s student protest groups: Keihin Ampo Kyoto, communists opposed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; and Sekigun-ha (Red Army Faction), a group of student protesters who wore red helmets when battling the riot police. These groups merged around 1970 to form Rengo Sekigun (United Red Army), formally known as the Japanese Red Army (JRA) to differentiate it from the Red Army Faction of Germany. In the words of its founder, the JRA's purpose is to "consolidate the international revolutionary alliance against the imperialists of the world." They hope to establish a people's republic in Japan, and, according to some of their older rhetoric, to spark a revolution that will cleanse the world of capitalism and imperialism--a Third World War.

The most active arm of the JRA--the Arab Committee--was formed in the 1970s and led by Fusako Shigenobu [#LL0367522]. She was responsible for arranging for members of the JRA to receive formal terrorist training in a Beirut camp operated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) [#CR0001639]. That group all but disbanded in the late 1980s, only to reappear in 1995. [CIA] Shigenobu set up headquarters for the JRA in Beirut and Baghdad, and formed cells in Paris, Berlin, and other European cities. The Japanese intelligence agency Keisatu reports that she may have returned to Japan in 1996, but her current whereabouts are unknown.

In its early years, the JRA raised millions of dollars through several spectacular hijackings, including one in which nine members armed with Samurai swords hijacked a JAL jet to North Korea in 1970. There they

exchanged training and intelligence with the North Koreans, and are believed to have trained the two agents who bombed a Korean Air Lines flight in 1987.

The Japanese Red Army stopped claiming credit for violent actions around 1977, though its members continued to be involved in terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s, usually in connection with a group called the Anti-Imperialist International Brigades (AIIB). It's not known whether the AIIB is a splinter group now separated from the JRA or simply a new name, although some intelligence services believe that the AIIB is under the JRA's control. [CIA, MI-6] In 1986, the AIIB fired mortars at Japanese and U.S. embassies and exploded a car bomb outside the Canadian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. In 1987 they fired rockets at the British embassy in Rome and attacked the U.S. embassy with home-made rockets and a car bomb. The AIIB also attacked the U.S. embassy in Madrid, Spain, with rockets fired from makeshift launchers. JRA members are also thought to have been involved in the 1988 bombing of a club in Naples. The attack coincided with the anniversary of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya, which was supporting the JRA at the time. Recent actions include the 1995 poisoning of a kibbutz well in Israel, with the resulting loss of forty-two lives, and a 1997 grenade attack on Jewish passengers at Heathrow Airport in Britain. The group also claimed responsibility for six separate attacks in 1998 on U.S. and Japanese military personnel stationed in Europe and Bahrain.

Membership in the Japanese arm of the JRA fell to a low of 20-30 active members in the 1980s, but rose in the mid-1990s with the steadily worsening economic conditions in that country. [CIA] The goals of Japanese revolution were revitalized with the student and worker protests of the past few years, and the JRA is now very active in Japan, where it violently opposes both the military government and the plans to return to constitutional law. Red helmets have become visible again on the students and young workers who battle police in the streets, and the JRA has staged dozens of attacks on "imperialist" targets, including the well-publicized series of unsuccessful assassination attempts against members of the royal family. Since early 1998, the JRA has focused almost exclusively on military targets, staging hit-and-run raids on buses carrying soldiers, nightclubs and recreational centers frequented by military personnel, and the private homes of military officers. Today, membership in the JRA is estimated at about 200. [CIA] The group derives a steady income through the kidnapping and ransom of Japanese executives, and probably through the AIIB's freelance actions for the PLFP and occasionally other groups. [MI-6]

Although once headquartered in Lebanon, the JRA is now believed to be run from within Japan, possibly Tokyo. Despite the growth in its ranks, the JRA enjoys only minority support from the Japanese populace, and no public support outside of Japan.

Last Update: December 19, 1998

the JRA (most of them in their 50s) she directs the actions of the younger cadre, the cells that carry out the attacks. This inner circle of aging JRA leaders includes Minoru Fujisawa, Takashi Kitagawa, and Nozomi Araki.

While the AIIB continues to rely upon its Palestinian mentors for financial and logistical assistance, the JRA has established its own base of financial support, and no longer regards the PFLP as its senior. The JRA has returned to its roots, relying upon kidnapping and extortion (particularly of airlines, which pay protection money to avoid hijackings) to raise funds, and upon thefts of Japanese military equipment to arm its members. Perhaps distracted by the violence and political strife in that country, Japanese intelligence organizations have seriously underestimated the strength of this terrorist group—total membership is currently at about 1,000.

The JRA has recently re-established connections with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, whose members trained with the JRA in Lebanon in the 1980s. The two groups work closely on weapons and explosives procurement, and swap intelligence on European targets.

One of the Red Army's particular targets is the Japanese royal family, who the JRA says still bears the guilt of Emperor Hirohito's actions during World War II and the resulting death of millions of Japanese. The monarchy represents Japanese imperialism. Because repeated assassination attempts have failed, the JRA is switching tactics. Current plans revolve around the recent successful insertion of JRA recruits who have no criminal record into the royal household as servants. These hidden agents have been given orders to use poison against the royal family—the organization is now just waiting for the right moment, preferably a function where General Chieko Nakatsuka, leader of the provisional Japanese military government, can also be eliminated.

When it first formed, the JRA drew its membership from students and intellectuals. But the violent purges of its membership in the 1970s and its fanaticism have attracted a number of recruits who are a little less ideological and are simply addicted to violence. More recently, the unrest in Japan has contributed a number of working-class and middle-class members to the organization. A typical JRA action group includes seven to eleven members. Use a mixture of Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156), High-End Grunts (*ME v2.0* p. 157), and Urban Revolutionaries (page 127) NPC Stereotypes, with one or two Charismatic Leaders, a couple Intellectual Terrorists, three or four Thugs/Psychopaths, and two or three Terrorist Recruit Personality Types (pages 127-129). Because it is almost exclusively supplied by ASALA, most of the JRA's weapons are American.

Like those of the JRA, many members of the AIIB are less than totally committed to ideology. Many are long-time veterans of left-wing or Palestinian terrorism, who had no alternative career path available to them when their causes dried up or changed course. Most are experienced, and although they rarely work with organizations other than the JRA and PFLP, many have personal connections with members of groups across Europe. Use a mixture of Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156), High-End Grunts (*ME v2.0* p. 157), and Urban Revolutionaries (page 127) NPC Stereotypes, represented by a mix of Charismatic Leader, Intellectual Terrorist, and Veteran Terrorist Personality Types (pages 127-129), with one or two Thugs/Psychopaths thrown in for spice.

Mano Blanco

A minor and localized terrorist group by most standards, the Mano Blanco is characterized by the audacity of its first action and the way in which it defies the scrutiny of the world's intelligence services. Few terrorist groups have burst onto the scene out of nowhere the way Mano Blanco did with its takeover attempt in Belize, and few have so effectively covered their trials with a hodgepodge of confusing and contradictory clues.

The Real Scoop

The BlackEagle database entry on the Mano Blanco is largely inaccurate, and its mistakes reflect a general confusion in the intelligence world over this minor group's activities, resources, and plans. The reason for this confusion is simple—there are two independent groups at work: a disorganized band of right-wing Guatemalan extremists (the real Mano Blanco); and a well-trained corporate-sponsored terrorism/industrial sabotage team masking its activities as those of the former.

Both groups entered the realm of terrorism with the 1996 coup attempt in Belize. That year, multinational giant Techtonics, Inc. assembled a team of mercenaries to eliminate the Prime Minister and several other key government officials in Belize. The company sought to clear the way for Union Richfield, a Techtonics subsidiary, to exclusively exploit an enormous newly-discovered oil reserve off that country's coast. Prime Minister Malloy, along with Interior Minister Jonathan Kielor, were refusing to grant exclusive oil rights, and were blocking all contract agreements pending the passage of strict environmental legislation. The leaders feared the unchallenged influence of such a powerful corporation in such a small nation, and were simply attempting to put protective measures into place. Techtonics, however, interpreted the climate as heading towards nationalization, which would lead to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of development—and billions in potential profits.

Knowing that a series of physical or character assassinations would only harden resolve against the company's position, Techtonics sought a way to eliminate its opponents without implicating itself. The solution appeared in the form of a radical Guatemalan nationalist group. The Mano Blanco advocated the annexation of Belize—Techtonics offered the means to fulfill that dream. Through its mercenary proxies, the corporation offered to fund and back the nationalists' coup attempt, providing the additional manpower and equipment to hold the small country until the Guatemalan Army completed the annexation.

But Techtonics knew that the coup would fail—in fact, the company was counting on it. The annexation of Belize would lead to an international crisis that might take years—and quite some violence—to resolve (Belize is a member of the British Commonwealth, and the U.K. would not likely allow the takeover). That would be counter-productive to profitable oil exploitation. So the corporation, which was feeding the insurgents the bulk of their intelligence, arranged for the coup to occur while a British SAS unit (see page 99) was training in the country. Techtonics' mercenaries ensured that the target ministers were dead within an hour of the start of the coup, and were then airlifted out of the country. The Mano Blanco nationalists were left to face the SAS without assistance, and were quickly defeated.

Mano Blanco

#CR0002514

(also Strike Force units)

Source: Interpol, CIA

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Terrorist/insurgent organization operating primarily in Guatemala, Belize, and perhaps Mexico. Participation in and/or plans for terrorist operations in Europe is suspected. [CIA]

Affiliations:

Unconfirmed connections with the Zapatistas, various Palestinian terrorist factions, and U.S. Mafia. [Interpol]

Personnel: 100 (believed)

Operating Since:

1990

Structure:

Military hierarchy of "action groups" of ten or twelve members each, organized into companies and overseen by a battalion commander. [CIA]

Leaders:

Unknown

Legitimate Connections:

Funding and/or logistical and intelligence support from the Guatemalan army almost certain. [CIA]

Resources:

Access to modern military smallarms, explosives, and training. Excellent intelligence. Good funding.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Attempted takeover of Belize in 1996, resulting in the death of Prime Minister Binnie Malloy and seventeen other government officials and personnel. Assassination of journalist Robert Grey in 1997, and trade union leader Marco Chinchorro and professor Allen Graves in 1998.

Additional Commentary:

The Mano Blanco is a Guatemalan paramilitary/terrorist group seeking the annexation of Belize by Guatemala. [CIA] The issue of the sovereignty of Belize (once known as British Honduras) has roots going well back into colonial times, when the territory was technically owned by Spain but used and settled by English privateers and colonists. It was further exacerbated when Britain reneged on an 1859 treaty, and by the 1940 Guatemalan claim of sovereignty over Belize--a claim enshrined in the Guatemalan constitution.

Belize became a fully independent nation in 1981, in a negotiated settlement between that nation, the United Kingdom, and Guatemala. However, the government of Belize ignored some aspects of the agreement. In reprisal, Guatemala broke off diplomatic relations with Britain (they were not restored until 1986) and prohibited any trade and communication with Belize.

Relations between Belize and Guatemala have largely normalized, and the Guatemalan government has shown no real intention of exercising its constitutional sovereignty claim (as a side note, Mexico also has an outstanding claim of sovereignty over Belize). The issue is not one of major public concern in Guatemala, and it is thought that the Mano Blanco group may simply be using it as a right-wing rallying cry in an attempt to attract a following for a larger agenda. [Interpol] However, no such agenda has been put forth to date.

The group was formed in 1990, under the direction of former military officer Luis Mirando [#LL1821736] (now deceased). The group took its name from its symbol: a white fist. This is thought to be a racist statement; the majority of Belize's Creole population is descended from African slaves and Mayan Indians, while Mano Blanco members tend to be of Spanish descent. A small but vocal activist group throughout the early 1990s, its escalation to terrorism in 1996 was sudden and unexpected.

The group's most dramatic action took place in February 1996. Mano Blanco insurgents infiltrated Belize and seized key installations around the capital city, including the Governor's Palace (the principal government building), radio and television stations, the country's main uplink site, and key bridges leading into the city. They killed the prime minister and five cabinet members and broadcast propaganda for several hours, in an

apparent attempt to provoke an annexation by the Guatemalan military. Fortunately, a British SAS unit happened to be training in the country, and put down the coup in less than one day of fighting.

Despite this intelligence gaffe, which resulted in the death of several of the group's leaders, Mano Blanco continues to remain active and appears to generally have good resources, including almost certain support from the Guatemalan army or at least factions within it. Mano Blanco often operates from temporary bases in Guatemala, sending bands of guerillas into Belize to stage assassinations of government officials, left-wing journalists, labor leaders, and other members of the intelligencia. Random violence is fairly rare, although the group has no clearly identifiable modus operandi. The fact that many attacks are almost surgical military-style raids, utilizing top-grade equipment and excellent intelligence, while others are much less professional (and sometimes even botched), indicate major differences between individual cells or factions, and suggest that the group is going through a period of internal struggle or factionalization. [Interpol]

The Mano Blanco may have connections with terrorist and insurgent groups in other parts of the world. The organization is believed to have recently established ties to the Zapatistas of Mexico, and to various Palestinian groups. Links with Mafia families in the U.S. are also suspected. [Interpol] A CIA report also claims that factions of Mano Blanco are working hand-in-hand with Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URGN) [#CR0001618], an extreme left-wing group waging an active guerilla war against Guatemala's military government. The report also refers to possible future actions in Europe. [CIA] No such connections or plans have been reported by any other agencies.

Mano Blanco is believed to be headquartered in Guatemala City, although it is known to use a series of temporary camps in the jungle as training and staging bases. Intercepted radio transmissions from those camps indicate that individual units are often called "strike forces" and identified by number. [CIA] No leaders have been identified since the failed coup in Belize, and the group does not have a significant following among the population of Guatemala or Belize.

Last Update: January 17, 1999

With Malloy, Kielor, and other key cabinet members out of the way, further attempts to block Techtonics fell by the wayside. Union Richfield began construction of its offshore oil rigs.

Having succeeded with the Belize operation, Techtonics decided to use its terrorist cells on the international stage. One strike force was responsible for sabotaging an Exxon oil rig off the coast of California in 1996. The rig collapsed during a storm, spilling 635 million liters of oil into the sea. The mission was a complete success; the collapse was blamed on hasty and slipshod construction techniques.

The terrorists who work for Techtonics Inc. are kept well supplied with the latest weaponry, explosives, and gear. Most of this equipment is American-made, something that differentiates this group from other terrorist organizations in Central and South America, whose members have had to rely upon imported, Soviet-made equipment. While members of Techtonics cells do not wear uniforms, their training, equipment and bearing often reveals that they are part of a para-military force. The strike forces are experts in the art of industrial sabotage, launching precision strikes against refineries, pipelines, and both land-based and offshore oil rigs.

Occasionally, the mercenaries are instructed to carry out the sort of untargeted and random bomb attacks favored by other terrorist groups, as a means of disguising their true targets. They likewise sometimes stage false kidnappings, making improbably high ransom demands (which they have no intention of ever collecting) and then killing the hostage when these demands are not met.

Techtonics' support is strictly covert. Only the leadership of the mercenary group know who their employer is; others know only that they are working for a wealthy client. Techtonics terrorist cells have no connections with other terrorist organizations. They do study the targets and methods of other groups, however, with an eye to disguising their own raids as the handiwork of other organizations. They are often instructed to publicly claim an action in the name of another terrorist group.

Meanwhile, a few of the Mano Blanco guerillas survived the failed coup attempt and escaped to Guatemala to regroup, but with their source of corporate funding suddenly cut off and their numbers decimated, they no longer pose a threat to Belize. The group sometimes stages isolated assassinations or kidnappings, and frequently issues propaganda, but is otherwise almost defunct. The remaining Mano Blanco leaders do not realize that they were double-crossed, or that their mercenary partners escaped unscathed and continue to operate—their sponsors convinced them that the SAS presence was unforeseen and that the operation was a total failure for both parties. Nevertheless, Techtonics keeps tabs on the remaining Mano Blanco insurgents, always prepared to snuff out the remainder of the group should the truth surface.

Techtonics terrorist teams are currently active in Mexico, where they disguise their actions as the work of the Zapatistas, a grassroots Mayan Indian peasant organization. One of their primary targets is PEMEX, Mexico's national oil company. Techtonics cells have sabotaged PEMEX refineries, pipelines, and oil rigs, and assassinated company executives and Mexican government officials in a campaign designed to hurry the de-nationalization of the Mexican oil industry.

Within Belize itself the cells stage only selective attacks. Their targets are those who call for nationalization of the offshore oil fields, labor leaders agitating for better working conditions, executives and employees of rival corporations and oil exploration companies, and anyone close to a connection between the Techtonics and the coup. The attacks are always carefully disguised as the work of Mano Blanco terrorists.

Techtonics cells are also active, from time to time, in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East, staging assassinations of the executives of rival oil corporations or politicians whose policies and statements are harmful to the corporation. In the U.S., the attacks are designed to look like the work of organized crime. In Europe, the attacks are disguised as the work of "anti-capitalist" terrorist organizations. In the Middle East, they are disguised as the work of Palestinian extremists.

Techtonics also provides limited funding to outside terrorist organizations. To prevent Guatemala from acting on its stated goal of annexing Belize, Techtonics has been providing covert financial support and arms to Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URGN), a guerilla organization dedicated to overthrow of Guatemala's military government. As a result of this support, URGN has recently abandoned the peace process that was initiated in the early 1990s in favor of renewed assaults against the Guatemalan government. Techtonics is careful to keep the level of this support low; it does not want Guatemala to erupt into open civil war.

A typical Techtonics action group has seven to twelve members, mercenaries drawn from armies and police forces around the world. Use Death Squad (page 125) and High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157) NPC Stereotypes, represented by the Veteran Terrorist Personality Type (page 129). For Guatemalan Mano Blanco units, use Guerilla (page 126) and Cheap Thug (*ME v2.0* p. 156) NPC Stereotypes, with Thug/Psychopath and Veteran Terrorist Personality Types (pages 127-129).

Nouveau Armie pour le Liberation du Quebec

The question of sovereignty for Quebec, a province made distinct from the remainder of Canada by its French heritage and language, has been a focus for fringe (and sometimes mainstream) Canadian politics for many decades. It's also been the basis for separatist terrorism since the 1960s, culminating in the growing activities of the NALQ.

The Real Scoop

A relatively young organization which carried out only sporadic attacks in the past few years, the NALQ has been developing its support, resources, and connections, and is now ready to move on to sustained and aggressive terrorism. Given the group's proven viciousness, it's certain that any future campaigns will be serious in scope and deadly in results.

The NALQ was founded by Albert Langois, a member of its precursor organization, the FLQ of the 1960s and 70s. Langois is, however, largely a figurehead—the group gained its true direction from Josette Carboneau, who, contrary to the database, lives in and leads the organization from Quebec. Carboneau's initial efforts reflected her capacity for brutality, but not for strategy—her early acts were random expressions of frustration and hatred. The group's activities over the past year or two, however, have been tightly focused on building resources, gathering supporters, securing funding, and establishing connections with other groups. They've been very successful, and the NALQ is now poised to carry out serious campaigns against the Canadian authorities.

One of Carboneau's biggest successes was in funding. The NALQ is indeed receiving large amounts of money from a French industrialist. Henri Lapierre, CEO of the Finance Forté group of companies, is bankrolling the NALQ to the tune of \$5 million in return for "future considerations" for his companies, should Quebec become a sovereign nation. Lapierre is also Carboneau's lover (the two first met when she interviewed him for *Le Devoir* in 1994), and she hid at his chateau in Nice after fleeing Canada in 1996. He has not, however, provided training for the NALQ, and has no connections with other terrorist organizations. He is simply a "silent financial partner" in the group.

NALQ propaganda claims that the group is recruiting and training for a popular armed uprising, and while that's not really true, they do expect widespread sympathy actions when they launch the Oublier Le Canada bombing campaign (mentioned below) in 1999. Membership in the NALQ currently stands at about 500. Of these, approximately 300 are attached to the group's military wing, commanded by Jean-François Canard, a former NCO of the Canadian Armed Forces 22 Battalion, Engineers. After joining the NALQ in 1995, he began instructing the group in the use of explosives.

In addition to its bombings and other attacks, the NALQ's agenda includes slogan painting, pamphleteering, and other propaganda efforts, often carried out by sympathizers and other non-terrorists. To support these activities, cells of the NALQ regularly execute robberies and other criminal acts for money and resources. Construction sites are regularly raided for their explosives, and occasional raids on police or military facilities yield firearms, explosives, and other weapons.

Nouveau Armie pour le Liberation du Quebec (NALQ)

#CR0003975

(also Quebec New Army; L'Esprit de '69; Les Maquis)

Source:

Quebec Provincial Police (QPP), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Carries out acts of terrorism in Canada with moderate frequency, and sporadically worldwide.

Affiliations:

The NALQ has carried out actions "in sympathy with" Armenian terrorist groups, but it is unknown if direct connections exist.

Personnel: Estimates vary from 200 [QPP] to 800+ [RCMP]

Operating Since:

1993

Structure:

Loose coalition of scattered terrorist cells of four to eight personnel each.

Leaders:

Albert Langois [#LL3259065], Jossette Carboneau [#LL4844937]

Legitimate Connections:

Individual MLAs within the Quebec legislature are known to be privately sympathetic to the NALQ, but none have expressed public support of the terrorists' actions. [RCMP]

Resources:

High quality military firearms, explosives, and equipment. Moderate levels of funding through private donations and acts of robbery. Corporate support for some actions is rumored. [RCMP]

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Incitement of the 1996 Montreal riots. 1997 bombing of the QPP headquarters in Montreal. 1998 bombing of Turkish Consul's residence in Montreal. 1998 murder of 17 civilian refugees under U.N. protection in Burma. Numerous additional bank robberies, bombings, and murders.

Additional Commentary:

The Nouveau Armie pour le Liberation du Quebec (NALQ) is a nationalist terrorist group seeking the separation of the province of Quebec from Canada, the destruction of corporate monopolies in Quebec, and the establishment of a sovereign socialist regime. The NALQ is the latest in a series of such armed groups, which began with the now-defunct Fronte de Liberation Quebecois (FLQ) in 1963. That group committed bombings and armed robberies, as well as the kidnapping of a Quebec cabinet minister and a British diplomat in 1970 (the cabinet minister was also murdered), but was largely defunct by the mid 1970s.

Many of the same FLQ terrorists, paroled or returned from exile, sought out more peaceful means of change in the 1990s; one of their number even ran as a political candidate for the Quebec New Democratic Party in 1994. The move into the mainstream, however, diluted the original goal of separation. Some supporters of the original FLQ rankled at this. Albert Langois [#LL3259065], a sympathizer and associate of two of the kidnapers of 1970, dropped out of the right-wing Le Franco-Quebecois Fronte in 1993 to recruit young people to the true cause. His converts look up to him as their link to the FLQ of the 1960s. [RCMP]

An early disciple who became a leader in the NALQ was Jossette Carboneau [#LL4844937], a journalist with the Quebec newspaper Le Devoir. Her 1995 book "Quebec, Je Ne Me Souviens Pas" ("I Do Not Remember Myself," a spin on the slogan "Je Me Souviens," which appears on every Quebecois automobile license plate) detailed all the injustices perpetrated on her generation by the government, the Catholic Church, the business world and the "establishment" in general, and became something of a bible for Quebec's social revolutionaries.

In June of 1996, a massive riot broke out following a rally at which Carboneau was a key speaker. In the general mayhem two were killed, seventeen hospitalized and sixty-two arrested. Carboneau was charged with inciting the riot, but fled to France via New York state before she could be arrested. She is believed to now be

living in Paris. [CSIS]

The NALQ targets symbols of federal authority and the property of national and international corporations which are controlled by English-speaking interests (anglophones). Outside of Canada they attack symbolic targets, attempting to embarrass the Canadian federal government. One of the NALQ's first major actions was the daring robbery of the understaffed QPP detachment in the town of St. Pierre in 1997. Because of the bravado and speed of the terrorists, no call for aid was sent. When the next shift came on duty they found the station's firearms, ammunition, and electronics missing and their fellow gendarmes locked in their own jail. Later that year, a powerful car bomb exploded outside the headquarters of the QPP in Montreal, killing forty-five, including twenty-eight police officers. Simultaneously, the group's first manifesto was released, in which the NALQ declared war against the federal government of Canada, the Provincial government of Quebec, and all corporate interests "oppressing the working peoples" of Quebec.

In 1998, the NALQ bombed the home of the Turkish consul in Quebec City, allegedly in support of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia [#CR0001430]. The consul survived the blast but one of her three children and the housekeeper were killed. [CSIS]

Perhaps the most provocative and unusual NALQ action was the murder of seventeen civilians in Burma in 1998. These refugees were under the direct protection of a Canadian infantry unit operating as part of the United Nations forces. Although the multiple statements released by the NALQ (all apparently genuine) were somewhat contradictory, it appears that the act was an attempt to embarrass the Canadian military and government. [CSIS]

In addition to the robbery of banks and police and military depots, the NALQ also raises money by directing sympathizers working for banks and other large institutions to embezzle funds. [RCMP] Unsubstantiated rumors persist that a French industrialist has provided high levels of funding and training abroad. [CSIS] It is known that NALQ terrorists generally carry high-quality military firearms and equipment, often of American manufacture. A raid on a camp outside Shawinigan in September, 1998, substantiated the claim that the NALQ had obtained heavy military armaments. Investigators turned up a number of military manuals and several cases of ordnance including, Stinger missiles. It is generally believed that this raid netted only a portion of the heavy weapons obtained by the NALQ. [RCMP]

The NALQ enjoys broad support among many communities in Quebec. It is believed to be headquartered in Montreal. [QPP]

Although a complete transcript is not available, a partial report obtained from the CSIS indicates concern that the NALQ has infiltrated certain QPP detachments and even units of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Last Update: December 3, 1999

For its armed attacks, the NALQ invariably chooses poorly defended targets like rural police stations or isolated military or government offices. They have been known to stalk government employees, business people, and police officers, and attack them when they are isolated and unprepared. Bombings to date have most often been carried out in Quebec City and Montreal, and are usually timed car bombs set to blow up government buildings during busy morning hours.

NALQ has done its best to integrate itself with other socialist revolutionary movements around the world, sharing information and sometimes attacking targets of these allied groups in Quebec. In the past they have had dealings with the Franco-Quebecois Front (FQF) a right wing, anti-immigrant, "Quebec for Quebecois" activist movement. Ironically they have also dealt with the Warriors of the Eighth Fire, a militant

Mohawk secret society. The NALQ has also had dealings in the past with a collection of mysterious groups in Louisiana called Le Fraternité de St. Jean.

In the past two years, the NALQ has established strong connections with the Armenian terrorist group ASALA. Quebec separatists participated in the 1998 bombing of the home of the Turkish consul in Montreal, providing intelligence, assistance in preparation, and the plastic explosives used in the attack (which were purchased in France). Contrary to the beliefs of the authorities, though, the bombing was planned and carried out by ASALA agents, not those of the NALQ. This is actually more troublesome than the official presumption that the NALQ acted on ASALA's behalf: many groups carry out attacks "on behalf of" like-minded organizations, even when they have little or no connection with them. The Montreal bombing, however, was a real joint effort, and heralds future cooperation between these two sophisticated terrorist groups.

Thus far, fears that the NALQ has subverted entire units of the Canadian Armed Forces are unfounded. But Canard has been using his connections within the military to persuade individual soldiers—especially those with explosives training and access to weapons and equipment—to join the NALQ. In an operation planned for the fall of 1999, these military engineers will use their expertise to provide a symbolic demonstration of Quebec sovereignty. At midnight on November 11, they will simultaneously demolish dozens of the bridges, highways, and land-based communication lines that connect the province with the rest of Canada. The code name is Oublier Le Canada (Forget Canada).

A typical NALQ cell is led by a Charismatic Leader and comprised of two or three Intellectual Terrorists, one to five Terrorist Recruits, and possibly a Thug/Psychopath Personality Type (pages 127-129), all armed with assorted semi-automatic civilian versions of assault rifles (some altered to automatic fire) of mostly American manufacture. Use the Urban Revolutionaries (page 127) and Cheap Thugs (*ME v2.0* p. 156) NPC Stereotypes.



Sikh Terrorists

Although not as well known as some of the world's older ethnic terrorist groups or as well covered in the media as the various Islamic or Palestinian organizations, Sikh terrorist groups are very active internationally, especially in North America, Europe, and of course India. There are a number of quasi-independent Sikh terrorist movements in operation, but most true international efforts stem from Dal Khalsa and the Khalistan Commando Force.

The Real Scoop

It's true that Dal Khalsa and the Khalistan Commando Force are not as well known as most active international terrorist groups, but that may not remain the case for long. Although their acts of terrorism to date have been limited to rather typical bombings and assassinations, Dal Khalsa is implementing a plan that, if successful, may result in the most shocking terrorist act to date.

Inspired by the 1984 industrial accident in Bhopal, in which a gas leak at a chemical plant killed thousands of people, Sikh fundamentalists have turned in recent years to industrial sabotage as a terror tactic. They have targeted a number of factories, particularly chemical plants, causing scores of deaths by bombing storage tanks and pipelines.

These attacks, while fairly effective in and of themselves, have really just been training exercises. The ultimate targets await: nuclear power plants. In 1998, disaster was narrowly averted at the Baba Atomic Power Station in India. Bombs planted by Dal Khalsa terrorists in the power plant's water cooling system were disarmed only minutes before they were to have detonated. Had they exploded, the plant would have been forced to release large quantities of steam and radioactive gas to prevent a meltdown, if it could be prevented at all, and tens of thousands of people would have been severely irradiated.

The incident was hushed up by the Indian government, and is not widely known. Rather than go public with their efforts, however, and risk preparing the populace and authorities, the terrorists have chosen to maintain the element of public surprise, and are planning a repeat of the action. They've targeted several other nuclear power plants for potential attack, and will stage their effort late in the year. Security around Indian power stations has been dramatically increased, but there are always soldiers who are susceptible to bribes.

In North America, agents of Indian intelligence services have been much more successful than CSIS in infiltrating Canadian Sikh terrorist organizations, and Canada in particular has become something of a battleground. In 1999, a "dirty war" is in full swing, with agents of both sides working to unmask and neutralize agents of the other. The Indian government's efforts have met moderate success, not so much because of the terrorist leaders who have been assassinated and plots that have been thwarted (although there have been some of each), but because of the increased paranoia and precaution that these efforts have forced onto the Sikh organizations. Although the friction has not yet heated to this point, it's likely that the distrust brewed by the constant search for moles will lead to severe purges by the end of the year, and possible factionalization between Dal Khalsa and the Khalistan Commando Force. Nevertheless, Indian authorities have not become aware of Dal Khalsa plans to carry out another nuclear plant bombing. And the violence between the terror-

Dal Khalsa/Khalistan Commando Force

#CR0002578

(also Babbar Khalsa, Sikh Student Federation 10th (or Dashmesh) Regiment, International Sikh Youth Federation)

Source: RCMP, EuroTer

Type: Political terrorist organizations

Scope:

Acts of popular terrorism carried out with moderate frequency in India, Pakistan, Britain, Canada, and the United States.

Affiliations:

Early support for Dal Khalsa from the Indian government (using the group as a political tool) ceased in the early 1980s. Pakistan is now believed to provide intelligence and/or funding to several Sikh separatist groups, and many Sikhs fought on the side of Pakistan in the 1994 war with India. [RCMP] Sikh groups have historical ties with the IRA [#CR0000632], it is believed that modern Sikh terrorists trade information and documents with the group. [EuroTer]

Personnel: 200 (believed), up to 400 in associated organizations

Operating Since:

1978

Structure:

Loose affiliation of associated terrorist organizations, most assembled along military or Sikh religious hierarchical lines. Dal Khalsa, the most influential group, is headed by a five-man council known as the Panchat. [RCMP]

Leaders:

Kuldip Singh Jagpal [#LL1526645] (Dal Khalsa)

Legitimate Connections:

Members belong to various Sikh temples in Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan, and the United States, although actual support from these temples is unknown and probably varies greatly. [RCMP]

Resources:

Small arms, explosives, and military equipment of varying quality. Solid funding, probably through religious organizations. Moderate levels of training, primarily through members' prior service with the Indian army. Many members have combat experience from military service on either side of the 1994 India/Pakistan war.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

1984 attacks on and occupation of Indian consulates in Vancouver and Toronto, probable involvement in assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi by her own Sikh bodyguards (all in response to the Golden Temple massacre). 1985 bombing of Air India jetliner in London and baggage terminal in Tokyo (the latter explosive was intended for another Air India flight, but the plane was behind schedule). 1996 bombing of the InterChem chemical plant, killing twenty-six and sickening hundreds. 1998 machinegun attack on India Daily News Bombay office, killing fourteen (Dahmesh Regiment). Numerous bombings, arson attacks, and acts of sabotage against industrial plants, railway lines and communication facilities.

Additional Commentary:

Dal Khalsa and the Khalistan Commando Force are two loosely associated Indian groups at the heart of an international network of cooperating Sikh terrorist organizations that includes Babbar Khalsa (in India and Canada), the Sikh Student Federation 10th (or Dashmesh) Regiment (in India and North America), and the International Sikh Youth Federation (in Canada). [EuroTer] The goal of all of these groups is the creation of an independent homeland and revenge on the Indian government for the death of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the attacks on the Golden Temple at Amritsar.

Sikhs are a religious/ethnic minority of India, representing two per cent of the population, concentrated in the Punjab region. Outside of India, Sikh communities exist in Canada, the U.S., Britain, East Africa, Germany, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Sikhism was founded in the 15th century, and became a militant sect in 1699 as a result of harsh Muslim oppression. Militant Sikhs symbolize their faith through the "five Ks": kesh (uncut hair); kangha (a comb); kachha (pants worn by soldiers); kara (a steel bracelet that protects the right wrist against sword blows); and kirpan (a sword). They do not use tobacco or alcohol, or eat meat.

A Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, was founded after World War I. In 1981, it demanded autonomy for the Punjab, but stopped short of demanding full independence. The majority in the party are moderates who prefer to work within India's existing political system.

In 1978, Dal Khalsa was formed; one of its early leaders was Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Dal Khalsa called for the creation of an independent nation, to be known as Khalistan ("land of the pure"). The group turned to terrorist activities in the early 1980s, in part as a reaction to an influx of Hindus into the Punjab during India's "green revolution" and in part due to repressive measures taken by the Indian government against Sikhs. Dal Khalsa attacked government officials, police officers, and Hindus, as well as moderate members of the Akali Dal who did not support the creation of a fully independent Khalistan.

In 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the army to attack the Golden Temple at Amritsar (the premier Sikh holy site), where Bhindranwale had taken refuge. During "Operation Blue Star," commandos and Indian army units attacked the temple with machine guns, mortars, and tanks. Bhindranwale and his armed followers were killed, as were hundreds of innocent pilgrims who were trapped in the crossfire. The temple was damaged and profaned, and its priceless library burned. This action became a rallying cry for Sikhs, and despite its decapitation, Dal Khalsa rebounded quickly, becoming very active and remaining the most influential Sikh terrorist organization even when others sprang up. [RCMP] Other groups formed since the incident include the Khalistan Commando Force, operating in the Punjab since the late 1980s; Babbar Khalsa ("tigers of true faith"), a group formed in India but now active in Canada as well and led from Vancouver; and the Dashmesh Regiment, also with Indian and North American branches. Its name (Dashmesh means "10th Regiment") refers to the 10th and last Sikh guru, Gobind Rai, who established the Sikh military tradition.

Sikh groups in India typically target politicians, Hindus, moderate Sikhs, Nirankaris (a breakaway sect that was excommunicated in the 19th century), military personnel, state-owned businesses, and journalists. Dal Khalsa also singles out military officers who were involved in the raid on the Golden Temple, and provokes disturbances by throwing severed cow heads into Hindu shrines, thus desecrating them. Machinegunnings and arson are also common acts within India, especially New Delhi.

Abroad, Sikh terrorists most often bomb Indian jetliners. The Babbar Khalsa, the Kashmir Liberation Army, and the Sikh Student Federation 10th Regiment all claimed responsibility for two aircraft bombings in 1985. The bombs, hidden inside stereo tuners, escaped the Air India's tight security because they were placed aboard connecting Canadian flights out of Vancouver. [RCMP] Some Sikhs were killed in these bombings, but the terrorists justified their deaths with the claim that for nearly a year they had been warning Sikhs not to travel by Air India.

Sikh terrorists in Canada operated for a number of years in the 1980s with little interference from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, due to the fact that CSIS had few members who could translate Punjabi. Canadian authorities scrambled to correct the situation with a number of affirmative action hiring programs, but have yet to be successful in infiltrating the tightly-knit terrorist network, whose members are often part of extended families or have belonged to the same temples for decades.

Attacks by Sikh terrorists worldwide often coincide with the anniversary of the attack on the Golden Temple (which began on June 3), or with Sikh holy days. [EuroTer]

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ists and Indian agents has generally been mistaken by Canadian authorities as part of the ongoing war between different factions of Indo-Canadian drug smugglers.

Funding for Sikh terrorist organizations comes from donations made by fundamentalist Sikhs, as well as from bank robberies, extortion, immigrant-smuggling operations—even from smuggling high-grade heroin from the poppy fields of India and Pakistan to North America and Europe. Although the majority of Sikh terrorist cells operating in India carry out unsophisticated attacks and have little or no formal training in their field, Dal Khalsa and the Khalistan Commando Force both train their personnel well for international attacks and select actions in India. Sikh terrorists receive instruction at training camps mostly outside of India, run by ex-soldiers, mercenaries and a handful of the groups' most experienced agents. The busiest training facility is located in British Columbia's Fraser Valley, although several others are run at rural locations in the U.S. and in Pakistan.

As mentioned in the database, Sikh militant organizations were in contact with Irish Republican Army groups during the earlier part of this century. However, the relationship was not maintained, and modern Sikh terrorists operate independently, with little interaction with or assistance from other terrorist organizations.

A typical cell consists of three to five members. Use the Cheap Thug NPC Stereotype (*ME v2.0* p. 156) and the Terrorist Recruit Personality Type (page 129). Larger groups also have Charismatic Leader Personality Type (use the Urban Revolutionary (page 127) or High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157) Stereotype). The majority of these terrorists are keshadhari (baptized Sikhs), but sahajdhari (unbaptized Sikhs) are occasionally included, due to their ability to pass for members of other religious faiths. Friction sometimes occurs between the two groups, however, and a sahajdhari disgruntled at the lack of respect shown to him by his fellow terrorists might be persuaded to turn on the group. Retribution for such betrayal is always swift and merciless.

Among Sikhs, saffron is the traditional color for religious martyrs. Sikh terrorists about to commit an action may don saffron-colored turbans. Another prequel to action is to drink amrit—sweetened water that has been stirred by a double-edged dagger—the traditional drink of the Sikh warrior going into battle.

The Sword of God

A shadowy organization thought to be affiliated with Worldwide Islamic Jihad, The Sword of God may not be particularly active, but it is efficient. Although one or two bodies have been recovered, no member of The Sword has ever been positively identified, and the group's true origins and goals are the subject of speculation.

The Real Scoop

The Sword of God is less a terrorist organization than a religious secret society, with members numbering close to 600, that uses terrorist methods to pursue and disguise its actual goals. It hides its true motives behind terrorist rhetoric urging a pan-Islamic theocracy.

Although The Sword of God is a modern organization, its roots go back centuries—all the way back to the First Crusade. The Sword of God has goals that are both more subtle and more profound than political revolution. It seeks the return of the many cultural treasures—specifically the one true copy of the Qur'an, dictated to the scribe Abu Talib by God himself directly through the lips of Muhammad and completely unsullied by human intervention—lost when the city of Antioch fell to Christian crusaders in 1098. The Sword of God firmly believes in the existence of this original version of the Qur'an, and that it was taken by members of the Knights Templar to Europe sometime in the twelfth century. Unsure of the whereabouts of the treasure in 1999, The Sword is investigating the holdings of the Catholic Church, the Church of England, and various semi-secret organizations like the Freemasons and the Rosicrucians.

The Sword of God is structured in the classic manner of a secret society, and its true motives are hidden even from its low-level members. In fact, members ascend within the organization through four levels of initiation. Initiates of the first rank are indoctrinated in the beliefs of the Kharijites, a 7th century sect which holds that the leadership of Islam should not automatically fall to aristocrats and descendants of Muhammad, but should be selected by consensus from men of piety and moral character. Recruits are led to believe that this is the driving ideal behind the organization and that its goals are largely political in nature. Neither belief is completely true—as initiates rise in level, they learn that The Sword of God is led by a secret Imam, a holy man of great spirit, and that further advancement requires great piety and religious dedication (second level). They are then indoctrinated with The Sword's true history (third level), and finally (fourth level) learn about the existence of the true Qur'an and The Sword's dedication to locating it. Individuals who attain this level are invariably long-term members of the group, whose piety and dedication to the society have been tested time and time again.

Among the group's fourth-level initiates are a clique of wealthy businessmen from the United Arab Emirates, including one of the Emirs. This group provides funding for equipment, training, and travel. Contrary to the information in the database, The Sword does not cooperate with the Saudi Matawa, a fervent fundamentalist religious group with legal powers equivalent to the police in that nation. In fact, The Sword actively opposes the Matawa, believing that the group's cultural totalitarianism is counter-productive to the elevation of Islam in the modern

The Sword of God

#CR0003658

Source: Interpol

Type: Political/religious terrorist organization

Scope:

Sporadic but well-planned and executed bombings and assassinations carried out globally.

Affiliations:

The Sword of God may have been created as an arm of the Worldwide Islamic Jihad [#CR0001716], or may have been absorbed partially or completely by that organization at a later date. Affiliation with WIJ is known, but the nature of the link is not clear.

Personnel: 100 (believed)

Operating Since:

1992

Structure:

Loose military-style hierarchy (believed)

Leaders:

Unknown

Legitimate Connections:

Support from wealthy families or factions in oil-rich nations (particularly the matawa, or religious police, of Saudi Arabia) is suspected. [Interpol]

Resources:

Wide range of smallarms and explosives, including current military hardware. Access to high-quality video-processing facilities, probably good computer/information systems skills and access. Excellent training and intelligence.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

1994 machinegun attack on a businessmen's club in London, killing four. Bombing of the IMBOA bank building in Hong Kong, 1995. Two unsuccessful apparent robbery (or perhaps assassination) attempts in Vatican City in 1997. Several bombings and robberies at Middle Eastern universities, and thirteen known assassinations in Egypt, France, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, seemingly at random, 1995-1998.

Additional Commentary:

According to the videotapes routinely delivered to local television stations after their attacks, The Sword of God's goal is "To free Muslims from the oppression of the False Caliphs, and bring forth a new age of Islam, united before God, ruled by moral strength and piety." (These particular words are almost always included in the narrative). Analysts believe the group wishes to overthrow the democratic and monarchist governments of the Islamic world and establish a pan-Islamic theocracy. [Interpol]

The Sword of God first surfaced (or first used this name) with the 1992 assault on German tourists in Luxor, Egypt. Since 1992, The Sword has carried out a series of well-planned and executed attacks and assassinations throughout the Middle East, Europe, and as far off as Hong Kong. Each attack has been followed by a videotape or disc explaining details of the attack that only the terrorists could know, often accompanied by sophisticated computer graphics and explanations of the methods used. In each case, a narrator's voice proclaims, "The Sword of God has struck another blow for the faithful. We shall triumph. The infidel cannot hide from us forever." Like the quote above, these particular words are almost always present. [Interpol]

Very little information is available about this group. Its members are all followers of a fundamentalist Islamic sect that is thought to date back to the beginning of this century. It is believed that the sect's followers belong to a number of fundamentalist organizations, and take their instructions from the Worldwide Islamic Jihad [#CR0001716].

While The Sword of God's tactics are traditional (if unusually well-executed), the group's message is unclear. Targets include moderate Muslims, non-Muslims who challenge the doctrines of Islam, institutions and individuals representing secular Arab governments, and tourists and foreign companies in predominately Islamic

countries. Victims have included people of every religion and dozens of nations. No rationalization is ever given for the attacks, which, if it were not for the video statements, would often seem to be unconnected to the Islamic cause. [Interpol]

The headquarters of The Sword of God is unknown, although it may be in the city of Medina, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [Interpol] It is not believed to have a large following, even among Islamic fundamentalist communities, except perhaps through affiliation with the Worldwide Islamic Jihad.

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world, and hopes that among other things possession of the Qur'an will give The Sword sufficient clout to take over administration of Mecca and Medina from the Saudi group.

The Sword has safehouses in most European capitals, as well as in Tripoli, Cairo, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Tehran, Damascus, and El Dar el Beida (Casablanca). The Sword has contacts within many Arab governments, as well as independent Islamic organization such as the Lebanese Shi'ite factions and fundamentalist movements in several countries. Many of its members are also members of Worldwide Islamic Jihad, although the association is less one of ideology than an attempt to use WIJ intelligence and efforts to conceal their search for the Qur'an. The Sword also has operatives in immigrant communities in Europe and North America (particularly in New York, Washington D.C., and Toronto), and has even infiltrated the Nation of Islam in the United States.

Agents of The Sword are extremely active in pursuit of their goal (although many members don't really know what it is). That doesn't mean that the group is all that active in terrorism, however. The vast majority of The Sword's actions aren't even criminal, much less violent, and it is only when agents must break into private homes, businesses, churches, or museums in search of information, or when they must act to protect the group's anonymity, that they resort to violence. To hide their quest, they steal and destroy other records, set fires, and kill informants or investigators when necessary. Such actions are made to look like humble criminal efforts or random terrorism, and even then the group only releases a video to take credit by name to distract investigators, or when attempting to provoke a response from specific enemies.

The men who belong to The Sword of God make every effort to hide their allegiance. Agents of The Sword could be represented by Charismatic Leader, Intellectual Terrorist, or even, on low-sensitivity missions, Terrorist Recruit Personality Types (pages 127-129)—use the Urban Revolutionary NPC Stereotype (page 127). A team on a specific mission would include one of the above types and two to six first level initiates (Intellectual Terrorist or Terrorist Recruit Personality Types, again represented by the Urban Revolutionary Stereotype). All are well-equipped and, if necessary, well-armed, for their missions.

Worldwide Islamic Jihad (WIJ)

#CR0001716

(also Islamic Jihad, Pan-Islamic Front, Hizbullah [#CR0001132], Islamic Command, Hamas [#CR0002211], International Arab Youth League, Matawa International, Worldwide Mujahiddun, Islamic Uprising)

Source: CIA, EuroTer, Interpol, FBI, MI-6

Type: Political terrorist organization

Scope:

Highly active terrorist organization carrying out actions at all levels on a broad scope worldwide.

Affiliations:

Linked to nearly every fundamentalist Islamic terrorist or activist organization in existence, as well as many Palestinian groups. Known to share facilities in the Sudan with FARL. Supported by the governments of Algeria, Iran, and Sudan. Past support from Syria has been severed. Very few ties to non-Islamic terrorist organizations, although some trade in documents and intelligence has been traced. [EuroTer]

Personnel: 20,000 (claimed). 200+ trained terrorists operating internationally, with perhaps as many as 2000 trained terrorists, insurgents, and assassins operating in local theatres. [CIA]

Operating Since:

1994 (some branches operated independently from as far back as the 1970s, before joining or being absorbed or annexed by WIJ in the 1990s. It is possible that WIJ has made attacks in the name of groups that are not formally attached to the umbrella organization.)

Structure:

Bureaucratic organization headed by a ruling council which oversees a number of directorates and other administrative bodies. Terrorist actions are carried out by the Intelligence Directorate. A Doctrinal Directorate is apparently heavily involved in strategic decisions, and may advise the ruling body on religious matters. Furthermore, the ruling council is also advised by several outside religious organizations, most predominantly the religious leadership of Iran. [FBI, EuroTer]

Leaders:

Hasan Ali Abujani [#LL1013791] (Chairman). Mohammad Islam Jari [#LL3635992] (Intelligence Directorate head). Aba Zaria [#LL2113488] (Political Director--deceased).

Legitimate Connections:

WIJ sponsors, covertly or overtly, a number of Islamic relief organizations, including Worldwide Islamic Relief Fund, the International Muslim Aid Society, Islamic Development Organization, Hamas Rescue and Development, and Crisis Muslim Brotherhood. [CIA] The operations of these and other supported relief or educational organizations are invariably the spearhead of WIJ efforts to usurp governmental authority in countries targeted for overthrow. [EuroTer]

Resources:

Excellent connections to the international arms markets, both for smallarms and heavy weapons. [EuroTer] Weapons-grade plutonium (known), nuclear explosives amounting to 15 kiloton yield (claimed). Excellent international intelligence capability, with a sizeable body of well-trained intelligence personnel. [EuroTer] Moderate to excellent training facilities, with a large cadre of expert terrorists and insurgents available to train new members.

Suspected Criminal Activities:

Bombing of Jewish community center in Buenos Aires (twenty-six dead, 200+ injured) in 1994. Bombing of the American University in Athens (twenty-eight dead) in 1995. Conspiracy to assassinate the Pope in Manila, 1995. 1996 Machinegun attack at the Metropole shopping complex in Paris (eighteen killed). 1997 "Aladdin" bombing of the Star Struck Theatre in New York (114 dead). Sabotage and sinking of the Island Princess in the Mediterranean (seventy-nine dead), bombing of the Splatx nightclub in Berlin (nine dead, including five U.S. servicemen) and the Mobile Natural Gas Company (fourteen dead in the neighboring Wildwood Estates trailer park) in 1998. Thousands of bombings, assassinations, and tourist killings in Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Lebanon, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

Additional Commentary:

Worldwide Islamic Jihad is a pan-Islamic terrorist movement launched after the Gulf War. It advocates the overthrow of secular governments in Islamic countries and seeks to establish nations based on Islamic Law, perhaps under a single Islamic leadership. Secondary objectives include the destruction of Israel, disruption of

the Palestinian/Israel peace accord, and revenge on Western powers for colonial oppression of culture and economy. Founded in 1994 by Hasan Ali Abujani [#LL1013791], a Palestinian arms merchant based in Damascus, Worldwide Islamic Jihad has managed to pull together a number of fundamentalist groups into its umbrella organization. Groups known to operate under the WIJ umbrella include the Iran-backed Hizbullah [#CR0001132], a number of Palestinian organizations including Hammas [#CR0002211], and fundamentalist factions in Egypt. [Interpol]

WIJ is particularly notable not only for its high level of activity, but also because it is the only terrorist group to credibly claim possession of one or more nuclear weapons. Shortly after its formation in 1994, WIJ announced that it had, operable or in development, nuclear weapons with a total yield of over 15 kilotons. WIJ backed up this claim by producing samples of weapons-grade plutonium, thought to have originated from dismantled Soviet arsenals. [CIA] The analysis of several western intelligence services indicates, however, that WIJ probably does not have operable nuclear weapons, and probably will not be able to fabricate them for several years at least. This conclusion is backed by several facts: first, that WIJ has yet to use, or seriously threaten the use of, any nuclear weapons; second, that since the fundamentalist takeover of Algeria that made that country the seat of WIJ, Algeria has made no claims to ownership of nuclear weapons; and third, that there is no evidence that Iran, the only WIJ sponsor state likely to have the technology to support nuclear development, has shared this technology with WIJ. [CIA, MI-6] Nevertheless, this threat is taken very seriously, and WIJ's undisputed possession of at least some weapons grade plutonium has been the focus of over seventy known investigations and operations by western intelligence organizations. [Interpol]

WIJ is also notable for its activity and success in overthrowing the governments of secular or moderate Islamic (or primarily Islamic) states. Algeria was WIJ's first success in this regard, and it is believed that WIJ also has a high level of influence in the government of Sudan (although that government was pursuing a fundamentalist Islamic agenda before WIJ's inception). [CIA] WIJ is waging serious campaigns of terrorism, discontent, and insurgency in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, and many analysts believe that the governments of the former two nations are perilously close to falling. [CIA] Pakistan is known to possess not only operable nuclear weapons probably totalling over 100 kilotons in yield, but also short and medium-range delivery systems. [CIA]

WIJ foments overthrow through a multi-pronged approach which wins the support and loyalty of the most impoverished Muslims in its target countries. WIJ revitalizes religious institutions on a grassroots level and establishes social services and schools. Through all of these vectors, WIJ pushes the message of fundamentalism, Islamic law, and loyalty to Islam over the government. Simultaneous to this effort, armed terrorist cells target foreign diplomats and businessmen, tourists, government institutions, police, military personnel and facilities, and of course Jews and any symbol connected with Israel. Demonstrations are held, and efforts are made to provoke authorities into heavy-handed response. In Algeria, and later in Pakistan and Indonesia, terrorism accelerated to include attacks on journalists, feminists, judges, university professors, businessmen, labor leaders, writers, media personalities, and any other members of the intelligentsia--even those with no apparent political stance. In the final stages of the Algerian overthrow, the government largely fell apart--an estimated one-third of all elected officials had been assassinated or had fled the country, and the army was so factionalized that few units responded to calls for defense against WIJ's final offensive. [CIA]

Although now headquartered in Algiers, WIJ was first centered in Syria. President Hafez al-Assad, himself a survivor of an attempted fundamentalist coup by the Muslim Brotherhood [#CR0001983] in 1982, moved to have Abujani arrested in 1996, shortly after the Algerian overthrow. Unfortunately, Abujani had just fled the country, having already secretly moved most of his organization.

WIJ has also threatened Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt has been battling fundamentalist factions and terrorist groups since the 1980s, and though violence in that nation has escalated in recent years, most analysts agree that democracy remains largely intact and the military remains secular and under the command of the relatively stable government. [EuroTer] The situation is perhaps the opposite in Tunisia, which, despite determined efforts to combat fundamentalism, is showing signs of instability. [CIA] Tunisia banned WIJ in 1996, and began an intensive campaign to root out the organization's agitators in that country. As part of this campaign, BlackEagle assisted the Tunisian national police in locating and closing down several training camps, a safe house, and a printing operation. Retaliatory assassinations of two BlackEagle operatives in Myanmar began the feud between BlackEagle and WIJ that still continues, with a total of eleven operatives murdered by the

end of 1998.

In January 1999 the E.C. sent British, Italian and German forces to raid three terrorist staging areas in what is believed to be the largest single anti-terrorist operation to date. An estimated 100 WIJ personnel were killed, most of them terrorists, but it is not believed that a crippling blow was dealt to the organization or its program of terrorism. [EuroTer] Nevertheless, as a result of this action, WIJ has promised to step up its attacks on the civilian populations of these countries.

International terrorism by WIJ is seen as both a strike against an external enemy and a show of strength for the benefit of supporters or potential supporters in Islamic countries. International attacks are focused at a wide variety of targets, particularly high-profile diplomats, government officials, and businessmen, Jewish or Israeli institutions, and public or civilian shopping malls, universities, nightclubs, and other places where large numbers of people congregate. Nations who participated in the Gulf War (on the side of the U.N.) are favored targets or theatres for terrorism. However, target selection is very broad and hard to predict, as many of WIJ's sub-organizations have their own international agendas. [MI-6]

WIJ enjoys a great deal of public support in fundamentalist Islamic nations, and among fundamentalist communities abroad. Supporters provide a great deal of funding, as do state sponsors and possibly activity in the international arms black market as well as corporate extortion, protection rackets, and other criminal activities. [Interpol, EuroTer]

Last Update: February 27, 1999

Worldwide Islamic Jihad

Perhaps the best known and most feared international terrorist group in 1999, Worldwide Islamic Jihad has tendered its likely possession of nuclear weapons, its involvement in the overthrow of several secular African governments, and of course its ongoing firefight with BlackEagle/BlackEagle, into notoriety that has made its name a household word—and that doesn't even account for the scores of bombings, hijackings, and assassinations the group carries out each year in the U.S., Europe, and other parts of the world. Without question, WIJ is in 1999 the largest, most active, and most successful terrorist organization in the world.

The Real Scoop

Many lay observers might take exception with the last part of that statement: in the U.S. and Europe, WIJ operations are prevented or shut down by authorities as often as not, and dozens of WIJ-affiliated terrorists are captured and punished every year. Furthermore, WIJ's goal of creating a pan-Islamic state seems, given the fractious nature of Arab and Islamic politics, no more realistic than the goals of all those other radical fringe groups. But to truly assess the WIJ's success, one must understand the group's complete agenda.

International terrorism is really just a sideline activity for the WIJ, a tool for propaganda and for distracting target governments and supporting Western states from the group's more important efforts. In 1996, two years after founding his organization, WIJ leader Hasan Ali Abujani laid down a twenty-year plan to create, if not a single Islamic state, then at least a coalition of independent Islamic nations under the control of a single theocratic body. This super-state would be a true military and economic superpower, would elevate fundamentalist Islam to become the dominant culture, religion and law in the world, and would break the

Western stranglehold on the planet's globalizing culture. In Abujani's future, all Islamic countries (and perhaps many others as well) would be under totalitarian religious rule, and all international trade, law, and culture would be accountable to WIJ's interpretation of Islamic standards. So by any true standard, WIJ is an extremely successful organization—for in 1999, this plan is right on schedule.

The main thrust of the plan, at this stage, is the overthrow of unstable secular governments of largely Islamic nations, and their replacement with fundamentalist Islamic governments controlled by, or at least sympathetic to, WIJ. As the database mentions, WIJ has been successful in Algeria and the Sudan, and is making significant progress in Tunisia, Indonesia, Syria, and most disturbingly, Egypt and Pakistan. What most observers miss, however, is the fact that fundamentalist politics have been elevated into the mainstream in virtually every Islamic country in the world, and that wherever there is poverty, hunger, or political discontent among Muslims, the psychological, political, and military stage is being set for revolution. As mentioned in the database, WIJ's insurrectional activities are always preceded by "hearts and minds" campaigns among the most disaffected of Muslims, and those campaigns are well underway in virtually every impoverished Islamic community in the world.

Terrorism enters into the plan in two ways. Obviously, assassinations, bombings, drive-by shootings, and other attacks on the government, military, and populace are a large part of WIJ's insurrection activities within target countries. On the international stage, however, terrorism serves to fuel the propaganda machine—to mark the enemies of Islam and demonstrate to constituent Muslims that their faith and culture can strike out successfully against these enemies. Terrorism is the most obvious and glamorous tool at WIJ's disposal, and successful acts are great recruiting tools. Terrorism also distracts Western governments from the group's real agenda, and helps deter their interference. It matters little if the success rate isn't high, so long as the successes are huge, shocking, and well-covered in the media—for failures rarely make the headlines the way successful attacks do, and WIJ has thousands of capable and eager volunteers to replace its losses.

Despite the fact that terrorism is not the main focus of WIJ, it is still a major part of the group's activities, and WIJ pursues it aggressively. The skepticism of Western leaders over the group's nuclear capability is unfounded; WIJ is actually on the verge of nuclear weapons capability. While the 1994 announcement was premature (WIJ had acquired adequate supplies of weapons-grade plutonium but was still struggling with construction techniques), WIJ should have a working nuclear warhead by the end of 1999. Where and when it will be used is an open question: revenge on the European capitals that carried out the Sudan raids is one possibility, and a detonation anywhere in the U.S. is equally tempting. But Pakistan is also on the short list, as a WIJ takeover there would give the group control over several more nuclear weapons. In any event, its use as a implement of extortion, threat, and media hype is certain to precede and follow any actual detonation.

As far as conventional international terrorism goes, any Western nation is fair game. In the wake of the E.C. attack on its training camps in the Sudan, WIJ will be focusing more than the normal number of its terrorist attacks on England, Germany and Italy in the foreseeable future. Civilian targets will of course remain popular, but tougher

military targets will also be tackled—and these attacks will be very serious, an attempt not just to gain media attention and intimidate the populace, but also to show the Western powers that military adventurism will lead to significant military losses.


The ongoing war with BlackEagle/BlackEagle also continues. As mentioned in the database, this feud began after a series of successful BlackEagle operations against WIJ in Tunisia in 1998. WIJ retaliated against the company by assassinating two operatives in Burma. A group of BlackEagle operatives in Europe, whose intelligence on a related assignment uncovered the fact that a major WIJ official (Aba Zaria, listed in the database) was in France, took it upon themselves to ambush him and four aides, killing all of them. Several more incidents followed over the remainder of the year, resulting in a total of eleven BlackEagle operatives and fourteen WIJ personnel killed. This running feud is still quite active in 1999, with several additional incidents occurring over the course of the year (see *BlackEagle Express* #117, in the *BlackEagle/BlackEagle Operatives Kit*).

Concern within BlackEagle that the assassination war is turning into a serious attempt by WIJ to destroy the company are founded, but not precisely as many operatives see it. While WIJ leaders are loath to let BlackEagle get in the last shot, and are eager to discourage the company from taking future anti-WIJ contracts, tasking resources to the politically pointless destruction of BlackEagle is not on the organization's agenda. As in the case of BlackEagle, several of the WIJ attacks have been the unsanctioned actions of WIJ agents working on their own time. After the May 1999 attack mentioned in the *Express* #117 newsletter, WIJ leaders will issue an order against unauthorized attacks on BlackEagle operatives. That doesn't mean the organization won't authorize future attacks in response to BlackEagle operations—contractual assignments or retaliations for the most recent assassinations. Furthermore, one experienced WIJ terrorist leader, Rahmed Islam Ali, has made it a personal goal to deal a crippling blow to BlackEagle, and he may not be inclined to follow orders to the contrary. In either case, WIJ attacks against BlackEagle after spring of 1999 are likely to be fewer, but more pointed and deadly when they do occur.

WIJ recruits its terrorists (called Mujahiddun or Holy Warriors) from refugee camps and pockets of poverty around the Muslim world. They are trained in the basics of terrorism on the job and at impromptu camps in Islamic countries all over the world. Unlike many terrorist organizations, WIJ rarely encourages members to join military forces for the training, but does frequently fund tuition and expenses to send members to universities in the U.S., Canada and Europe for the formal education, familiarization with Western culture and languages, and sometimes the specific goal of setting up safehouses or supporting the underground network of personnel, information, and documents. Such relatively low levels of training are sufficient for the vast majority of WIJ's personnel requirements, but each year scores of members are graduated to a higher level of training. WIJ operates formal training facilities for true professional terrorists in Algeria and the Sudan, although the E.C.-sponsored raid in January of 1999 shut several of these down. Once educated in firearms, explosives, espionage, religious indoctrination, and strategies of insurrection, these WIJ agents are sent to

moderate Muslim countries to stir up fundamentalism, and to Europe and America to make symbolic attacks against western imperialist institutions.

In Islamic countries, WIJ agitators are moderately well funded, and usually have broad support in the communities in which they operate. Agents in Western countries receive high levels of funding and but often operate in hostile or indifferent non-Muslim communities. A cell of WIJ agents outside of the Islamic world is led by a Charismatic Leader Personality Type (page 127) and generally made up of two or three Intellectual Terrorists and perhaps one or two Thugs/Psychopaths or Terrorist Recruits (page 129). Use a mix of High-End Grunt (*ME v2.0* p. 157), Urban Revolutionary (page 127), and Cheap Thug (*ME v2.0* p. 156) NPC Stereotypes, varying the mix according to the group and the mission. Such cells are usually well armed and equipped for their missions, with handguns, SMGs, explosives, sophisticated communications gear, and sometimes body armor. They plan meticulously, and usually have several carefully considered escape routes available. Groups of WIJ agitators operating in Muslim countries are best represented by four to seven Terrorist Recruits and Thugs/Psychopaths led by a Charismatic Leader. Use the Urban Revolutionaries and Guerillas (page 126) NPC Stereotypes. They are typically armed with AKM assault rifles or similar inexpensive weapons, and their operations and equipment are not always as sophisticated as elements operating in the West.



THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION MASTER LIST

Starting on page 92 and running for the next several pages is the Terrorist Organization Master List. This document represents a rough overview of virtually every significant terrorist organization operating anywhere on Earth in 1999. The list describes each group according to the axioms laid out in Chapter One. It's Real Scoop data, for the GM's eyes only—these axioms represent the actual ideologies, goals, and resources of the companies in question, which are often quite different than their public perceptions. In fact, many of the less active organizations may be thought dead or defunct by the public and/or international intelligence agencies. Most of these organizations will never be significant in your *Millennium's End* campaign, even if it focuses closely on terrorism, but if you wish to feature or refer to a terrorist group in any capacity, there should be one on the list to fit your game requirements.

The first axiom listed on the table is theatre/activity. As mentioned in Chapter One, any given terrorist group can be said to have four potential theatres of operation: local, national, regional, and global. The table lists the names of the local, national, or regional theatres in which each group operates, along with the level of activity within the theatre—sporadic, active, or vigorous (dormant groups are not listed). Obviously, this is level of activity can change dramatically over time, even over a relatively short period (like the length of 1999). Several of the terrorist organizations covered in detail earlier in this chapter are mentioned as having escalating plans for late 1999, that might increase their level of activity in one or more theatres by year's end.

The second column on the table is ideology. There are many possibilities, as discussed in Chapter One: aboriginal, anarchist/reactionary, eco-terrorist, ethnic, leftist/communist, mercenary, nationalist, new millennialist, hate, religious, or right wing/fascist. In the case of religious, aboriginal, or nationalistic struggles, the Master List specifies the constituent ideology in question.

The third column covers methodology. Far and away the most common method of terrorism is popular terror: seemingly random acts of violence against the population at large, which can take many forms. Other possibilities include consumer intimidation, corporate sabotage, techno-terrorism, and political repression, in the case of state-sponsored terrorist groups or governments practicing terror against their own populations.

Terrorist groups may be organized along a number of different models (the next column on the Master List). Most can be described as bureaucracies, electronic networks, gangs (similar to American street gangs), military hierarchies, religious hierarchies (generally based on the constituent religion the terrorist group serves or claims to serve), or scattered cells.

The next axiom on the list is connections. Terrorist groups may have connections in the international black market, with supporting corporations, or in the military or government of states in which they work or by which they are supported. The depth of a terrorist organization's connections in any or all of those categories is listed according to the four-point scale covered in Chapter One: poor, modest, good or excellent (categories in which groups have no connections are not listed). In the case of corporate, military, or political connections, the organization or political group is specified. Note that connections within such organizations do not

necessarily mean that the organizations condone the terrorist groups—often, terrorist connections are with dissident individuals or factions which aid the terrorist without the knowledge of the larger organization.

A terrorist group's public profile describes the level of support it receives in the theatres in which it operates, or from its constituency elsewhere. Terrorist groups can be said to have broad, community, divided, or minority support, or be treated indifferently or rejected by the public at large.

The second-to-last column on the table describes funding sources. Potential sources include crime, legitimate business fronts, mercenary activities, private donations from constituents, and/or state support from one or more nations. These are simply the sources of funding, and say little about the amounts of money a terrorist group can draw upon.

Finally, there's discipline. Although vague, the level of discipline describes roughly how devoted typical low-level members of a group are to their cause, and how well they'll hold up to the stresses of siege, combat, negotiations, questioning, and the rigors of terrorist activities. It may also be an indicator of how susceptible an organization is to infiltration, or to having members turned or bought off. Obviously, the dedication of terrorists varies considerably from individual to individual and situation to situation, and leaders are generally more disciplined than nervous recruits. The scale rates each organization's discipline as either weak, solid, hard, or fanatical. The terms are defined in Chapter One.

Terrorist Organization

	name	theatre/activity	ideology	methodology
ANO	Abu Nidal Organization	Palestine: vigorous Middle East: sporadic	Mercenary/ Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
AD	Action Directe	France: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
ARC	Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse	Corsica: active France: sporadic	Nationalist (Corsican)	Popular terror
ARF	Afrikaner Resistance Front	South Africa: vigorous	Nationalist (Afrikaner)/Hate	Popular terror
	Ainu Bear Warrior Resistance Front	Japan: sporadic	Aboriginal	Popular terror
	Al Dawa	Iraq: active	Religious (Islam-Shiite)	Popular terror
	Al Gama'a al Islamiya	Egypt: vigorous	Religious (Islam)	Political repression/ Popular terror
AVC	Alfaro Lives, Damn It!	Ecuador: active	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	Amal Militia	Lebanon: vigorous	Religious	Political repression/ Popular terror
	Les Amis du Mammifères	France: active	Eco-terrorist	Consumer intimidation
	Anglo-Saxon League	U.K.: sporadic	Hate	Popular terror
	Angry Brigade	U.K.: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
15 May	Arab Organization of 15 May	Europe: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
FARL	Armed Revolutionary Lebanese Faction	Europe/Middle East: sporadic	Communist/ Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
ASNMSF	Aryan Soldiers of the New Millennium	U.S.: sporadic	Hate	Popular terror
	Aryan World	U.S.: active	Hate	Popular terror
NAP	Armed Proletarian Cells	Italy: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	Europe: active Turkey: active	Ethnic/ Nationalist (Armenian)	Popular terror
	Avanguardia Nazionale	Italy: vigorous	Fascist	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
RAF	Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red Army Factions	Germany: active Europe: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	Bandera Roja	Venezuela: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	Black June	Middle East: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
	The Bloods	U.S.: sporadic	Mercenary	Popular terror
FLB-ARB	Breton Liberation Front	France: sporadic	Nationalist (Brittany)	Popular terror
	Bruder Schweigen	Western U.S.: sporadic	Hate/Fascist	Popular terror
CAD	The Children of Danu	Global (net): active	New millennialist/Eco-terrorist	Techno-terrorism
MPL	Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement	Honduras: sporadic	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
CERF	Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front	El Salvador: sporadic	Nationalist	Popular terror
	Column 88	U.K.: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
CCC	Combatant Communist Cells	Belgium: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners	France: active Europe: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
HRB	Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood	Yugoslavia: active	Nationalist (Croatian)	Popular terror
	The Cymric League	Wales: sporadic	Nationalist (Welsh)	Popular terror
	Dal Khalsa	India: vigorous Canada: active Global: active	Nationalist (Sikh)/ Religious (Sikh)	Popular terror
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Lebanon/Israel: active	Communist/ Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
	Ein Tirol	Italy: active	Hate	Popular terror
ERP	Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo	Argentina: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror

Master List

organization	connections	public profile	funding	discipline	index
Bureaucracy	Black market: excellent Political (Egypt): good	Minority support	Legit. bus./Mercenary Private donation	Hard	14, 33-36, 37, 39, 62, 120
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	11, 34
Gang	Black market: modest	Community support	Crime	Solid	15
Military hierarchy	Military (S. Africa): good Political (S. Africa): modest	Divided support	Private donation	Fanatical	16, 41-43
Religious hierarchy	Black market: poor	Community support	Crime	Fanatical	11
Religious hierarchy	Political (Iran): good, (Sudan): modest	Community support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	16, 134
Religious hierarchy	Political (Sudan): excellent, (Algeria): good	Community support	Private donation/ State support	Fanatical	16, 134
Military hierarchy	Political (Cuba, Libya): modest	Minority support	Crime/ Private donation	Solid	12
Military hierarchy	Political (Syria): excellent	Community support	Crime/State support	Hard	134
Scattered cells	none	Indifference	none	Solid	18
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	16
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	12, 54
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Minority support	Crime/Private donation	Hard	15
Scattered cells	Black market: good Polit. (Iran, Syria): modest, (Sudan): excellent	Minority support	Crime/ Private donation	Solid	15, 37, 38, 39, 86
Military hierarchy	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime/ Private donation	Fanatical	44-46
Religious/military hierarchy	Black market: good	Popular rejection	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	44, 45-46
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	12
Scattered cells	Black market: excellent Political (Armenia): modest	Divided support	Private donation/ State support	Hard	13, 15, 33, 34, 37-40, 58, 62, 67, 68, 75, 76, 103
Military hierarchy	Black market: good Political (local): modest	Minority support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	17
Gang	Black market: good Political (Cuba, N. Korea): poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Fanatical	9, 11, 65
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Community support	Crime	Solid	13
Scattered cells	Political (Iran): good	Minority support	State support	Hard	15
Gang	Black market: good	Popular rejection	Crime	Hard	24
Military hierarchy	Black market: poor	Community support	Private donation	Hard	15
Religious hierarchy	Black market: modest Military (U.S.): poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Fanatical	25, 29, 115
Electronic network	none	Community support	none	Solid	47-49, 53, 109
Military hierarchy	Political (Cuba): modest	Minority support	Crime/State support	Solid	13
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Divided support	Private donation	Solid	15
Scattered cells	none	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	17
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	12
Scattered cells	Black market: good Political (Libya, Sudan): good	Divided support State support	Crime/	Hard	15, 37, 38
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Minority support	Private donation	Solid	15
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Minority support	Crime	Solid	15
Religious hierarchy	Black market: good Political (Pakistan): modest	Community support	Crime/ Private donation	Solid	16, 77-80
Bureaucracy	Black market: good Political (Syria): modest	Divided support	Private donation/ State support	Hard	15
Scattered cells	none	Divided support	Crime/Private donation	Solid	16
Military hierarchy	Black Market: modest	Minority support	Crime	Hard	13

Terrorist Organization

	name	theatre/activity	ideology	methodology
	11th Hour Brigade	U.K.: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
ETG	ETG	U.S.: active	Eco-terrorist	Corporate sabotage
ECRF	European Christian Resistance Front	France/Germany: vig. Europe: active	Anarchist/reactionary/ Hate	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
EPDRF	European Peoples' Democratic Resistance Front	Europe: active	Reactionary	Popular terror
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 2000	Basque: vigorous Spain: active Europe: sporadic	Nationalist (Basque)	Popular terror/ Consumer intimidation
	La Fenice	Italy: active	Fascist	Popular terror
	Fighting Communist Party	Italy: active	Leftist/communist	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
GRAPO	1st of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group	Spain: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	Le Fraternité de St. Jean	Louisiana: sporadic	Nationalist (Cajun)	Popular terror
FRAP	Frente Revolucionario Anti-Fascista Patriótica	Italy: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
FLNC	Front de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse	Corsica: sporadic France: active	Nationalist (Corsica)	Popular terror
	Front for a Sovereign Lombardy	Lombardy: active Italy: sporadic	Nationalist (Lombardy)	Popular terror
GF	Gala's Fist	Europe: vigorous U.S.: active Global: sporadic	Eco-terrorist	Consumer intimidation/ Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
	The Gray Wolves	Turkey: active	Fascist	Political repression/ Popular terror
Green	GreenPeace (factions)	Global: sporadic	Eco-terrorist	Consumer intimidation/ Corporate sabotage
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity	Guatemala: active Cent. America: sporadic	Nationalist (Guatemala)	Popular terror
IRA	Irish Republican Army	N. Ireland: vigorous U.K.: active Europe: active	Nationalist (Irish)	Popular terror
	Islamic Amal	Lebanon: active	Religious	Political repression/ Popular terror
	Italian Mafia	Europe/N. Am.: active	Mercenary	Corporate sabotage
INAP	Italian National Alliance Party	Italy: active	Fascist	Political repression
JRA	Japanese Red Army	Japan: sporadic Europe: active Global: sporadic	Anarchist/ Leftist/ Mercenary	Popular terror
JCAG	Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide	U.S.: active U.K.: sporadic	Ethnic/Nationalist (Armenia)	Popular terror
	Khalistan Commando Force	India: active	Ethnic (Sikh)/Religious (Sikh)	Popular terror
KKK	Ku Klux Klan	U.S.: active	Hate	Popular terror
	Kurdish Workers' Party	Turkey: active	Ethnic/Nationalist (Kurd)	Popular terror
LTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	Sri Lanka: vigorous India: active	Nationalist (Sri Lanka)	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
	Macheteros	Puerto Rico: sporadic	Nationalist (Puerto Rico)	Popular terror
	Mano Blanco (Guatemalan nationalists)	Belize: sporadic	Nationalist (Guatemala)/ Right wing	Popular terror
	Mano Blanco (Tectonics enforcers)	Global: sporadic	Mercenary	Corporate sabotage
FPMR	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front	Chile: sporadic	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	Maolist Revolutionary Union	U.S.: sporadic	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	The Masters	U.S.: sporadic	Mercenary	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror

Master List (con't)

organization	connections	public profile	funding	discipline	index
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	17
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Divided support	Crime/Private donation	Solid	12
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Hard	12
Scattered cells	Black market: modest Political (Israel): modest	Community support	Private donation	Solid	30, 31, 50-52
Military hierarchy	Black market: good Political (Cuba): modest, (Nicaragua): poor	Community support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	15, 37, 39, 56-59, 61 62, 103, 115
Scattered cells	Military (Italy): poor	Minority support	Crime/Private donation	Solid	17
Scattered cells	Black market: poor Political (Italy): poor	Minority support	Crime	Solid	13
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	12
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Fanatical	76
Scattered cells	Black market: poor Political (Sudan): poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	12
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Community support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	15
Bureaucracy	Black market: good Corp. (local bus.): good Political (Lombardy): good	Community support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	14
Scattered cells	Black market: good	Minority support	Crime	Hard	12, 47, 49, 53-55, 62, 111, 119
Military hierarchy	Black market: good Political (Turkey): poor	Minority support	Private donation	Solid	17
Bureaucracy	Black Market: good	Divided support	Private donation	Hard	12, 18, 53
Military hierarchy	Military (Cuba): good Political (Cuba): modest	Community support	Crime/Private donation/ State support (Cuba)	Hard	72
Military hierarchy	Black market: excellent Political (Ireland): modest, (Libya): poor	Divided support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	15, 16, 40, 54, 56, 58, 60-64, 78, 80, 101, 102, 103, 113, 117, 119
Military hierarchy	Military (Syria): excellent Political (Syria): modest	Divided support	State support (Syria)	Hard	16
Gang	Black market: excellent	Popular rejection	Crime/Private donation	Hard	30
Gang	Political (Italy): poor	Minority support	Private donation	Solid	17
Gang	Black market: good Political (N. Korea): modest, (Sudan): excellent	Popular rejection	Crime	Fanatical	11, 14, 37, 39, 54, 65-68, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Divided support	Private donation	Solid	13, 37-40, 111
Scattered cells	Black market: modest Political (Pakistan): good	Community support	Crime/Private donation	Hard	77-78
Bureaucracy	Political (local): poor	Minority support	Crime/Private donation	Solid	16, 44, 45
Bureaucracy	Black market: modest	Community support	Private donation	Solid	13
Military hierarchy	Black market: good	Divided support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	15
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Minority support	Crime/Private donation	Solid	15
Military hierarchy	Corp. (Techtonics, Inc.): poor	Indifference	Crime	Weak	69-72
Military hierarchy	Corp. (Techtonics, Inc.): ex.	Popular rejection	Mercenary	Hard	14, 69-72
Bureaucracy	Black market: good	Broad support	Private donation	Hard	13
Scattered cells	none	Popular rejection	Crime	Fanatical	13
Gang	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	24

Terrorist Organization

	name	theatre/activity	ideology	methodology
	Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne	Britanny: active France: sporadic	Nationalist (Britanny)	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril	Colombia: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	Mussolini Action Squads	Italy: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
	NetWedgie	Global (net): active	Anarchist	Techno-terrorism
	New Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine	Europe: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
	Nihon Ichiban	Japan: sporadic	Hate	Popular terror
NALQ	Nouveau Armie pour la Liberation du Quebec	Quebec: vigorous Canada: active Global: sporadic	Nationalist (Quebec)	Popular terror
	November 17	Greece: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	The Order	Florida: active	Hate	Popular terror
	Ordine Nuovo/Ordine Nero	Italy: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
OAAS	Organization of the Armed Arab Struggle	Europe/Middle East: sporadic	Nationalist (Arab)	Popular terror
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front	Lebanon/Israel: active Europe: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
	Palestine National Salvation Front	Middle East: sporadic	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
PETA	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (factions)	U.S.: active	Eco-terrorist	Consumer intimidation/ Corporate sabotage
NPA	People's New Maoist Army	Philippines: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
FP-25	Popular Forces 25 April	Portugal: sporadic	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Europe: active Middle East: sporadic	Communist/ Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
PSF	Popular Struggle Front	Lebanon/Israel: active	Nationalist (Palestinian)	Popular terror
	Posse Comitatus	U.S.: sporadic	Hate	Popular terror
BR	Red Brigades	Italy: sporadic	Anarchist/reactionary	Popular terror
	Revolutionary Action Movement	Italy: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	Colombia: vigorous	Nationalist (Medellin Cartel)	Political repression/ Popular terror
SL	Shining Path	Peru: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	Socialist Nationalist Resistance Party	Syria: sporadic	Fascist	Political repression
SG	The Sword of God	Global: sporadic	Religious (Islam)	Popular terror
	The Triad	Global (net): active	Anarchist	Techno-terrorism
TPLA	Turkish People's Liberation Army	Turkey: active	Leftist/communist	Popular terror
	21 Underground	U.S.: sporadic	Anarchist/New Millennialist	Corporate sabotage/ Popular terror
UDA	Ulster Defense Association	North Ireland: vigorous	Reactionary/religious	Popular terror
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters	North Ireland: active	Reactionary/religious	Popular terror
	Warriors of Christ the King	Spain: sporadic	Fascist	Popular terror
	Warriors of Islam	U.S.: active	Hate	Popular terror
	Warriors of the Eighth Fire	Northeast U.S.: sporadic	Aboriginal (Native American)	Popular terror
WIJ	Worldwide Islamic Jihad	N. Africa: vigorous Global: active	Nationalist (Islamic state)/ Religious (Islam)	Political repression/ Popular terror
	Zapatistas	Chiapas: vigorous Mexico: active	Aboriginal (Mayan)/ Leftist	Popular terror
	Zhirinovsky Nationalists	Western Russia: vigorous Russia: active	Fascist/Hate	Popular terror

Master List (con't)

organization	connections	public profile	funding	discipline	index
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Minority support	Crime/ Private donation	Solid	15
Military hierarchy	Black market: good	Minority support	Crime	Hard	13
Military hierarchy	none	Minority support	Crime	Weak	17
Electronic network	none	Divided support	none	Weak	23
Scattered cells	Black market: poor Political (Libya): modest	Divided support	Crime/ State support	Hard	15
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime/Private donation	Fanatical	16
Scattered cells	Black market: good Corp. (Finance Forté): mod.	Divided support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	15, 37, 39, 58, 73-76, 111
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Private donation	Solid	12
Gang	Political (local): good	Indifference	Private donation	Fanatical	46
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Minority support	Crime	Solid	17
Scattered cells	Political (Libya): modest, (Sudan): good	Minority support	Crime/ State support	Solid	15
Military hierarchy	Political (Iraq, Libya): excellent, (Syria): good	Divided support	State support	Hard	15, 54
Scattered cells	Political (Syria, Iran): modest	Divided support	Crime/State support	Solid	15
Scattered cells	none	Divided support	Crime/ Private donation	Hard	12
Military hierarchy	Black market: good	Community support	Private donation	Hard	13
Scattered cells	Black market: modest Political (Libya): poor	Popular rejection	Private donation/ State support	Solid	13
Bureaucracy	Political (S. Yemen, Libya): good	Community support	State support	Hard	15, 65, 66, 67
Scattered cells	Political (Libya, Syria): modest	Divided support	State support	Hard	15
Gang	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime	Hard	44
Scattered cells	Black market: modest	Popular rejection	Crime/Private donation	Hard	11, 62
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime/Private donation	Weak	17
Bureaucracy	Military (Medellín Cart.): ex. Political (N. Korea): modest	Community support	State support (Medellín Cartel)	Solid	11, 30, 116
Bureaucracy/ Military hierarchy	Black market: good Military (Peru): poor	Divided support	Crime	Fanatical	11, 13
Military hierarchy	Military (Syria): good	Divided support	State support	Hard	17
Religious heirarchy	Black market: excellent Political (Arab states): modest, (U.A.E.): good	Indifference	Private donation	Fanatical	81-83
Electronic network	none	Indifference	none	Hard	30, 49
Military hierarchy	Political (N. Korea): modest	Minority support	State support	Solid	13
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Popular rejection	Crime	Solid	15, 54
Military hierarchy	Military (UK): good	Community support	Private donation	Hard	16, 61
Military hierarchy	Military (UK): good	Community support	Private donation	Hard	16
Religious hierarchy	Black market: good	Popular rejection	Private donation	Fanatical	17
Religious hierarchy	Black market: modest Political (Iran): poor	Minority support	Crime/ Private donation	Fanatical	16
Scattered cells	Black market: poor	Minority support	Crime	Hard	75
Bureaucracy	Black market: excellent Political (Algeria): excellent, (Iran, Sudan): good	Community support	Crime/ Private donation/ State support	Hard	16, 25, 81, 83, 83, 84-89, 103, 111, 115, 120, 134, 138, 141
Bureaucracy	Black market: poor	Community support	Private donation	Solid	11, 70, 71, 72
Gang/Mil. hierarchy	Black market: good Military (Russia): modest Political (Russia): good	Minority support	Crime/Private donation	Hard	16, 17

CHAPTER THREE

COUNTERTERRORIST

AGENCIES ▼ ▼

Ask most members of the public to describe a counter-terrorist agent and the response will likely be something like this:

“A highly trained member of an elite military organization armed with the latest in high-tech weapons, entirely clad in black.”

While this description is generally accurate, it hardly covers the entire spectrum of security and counter-terrorist organizations. Put simply, the groups who most often deal with terrorists and put a stop to their plans are often a country’s intelligence agencies or federal police authorities. Only when a terrorist group can evade the normal intelligence network are tactical units, like the one described above, brought into play.

The intelligence and national police agencies that track and foil terrorist groups, however, are far too many and far too large to cover in this book. They’re also not the focus of attention—or conflict—when a serious terrorist incident blows open. That’s when the tactical units come into play—and they’re what’s covered here. The half-dozen groups listed in this chapter are far from complete, but do cover the most important, well-respected, and busiest groups that deal with terrorists.

As with the preceding chapter, the listings in this book are broken into two parts: the BlackEagle Intelligence Organizations Database, listing information directly available to operatives accessing the company’s resources or conducting similar research; and a Real Scoop, covering behind-the-scenes information for the GM only.

Special Air Service

The granddaddy of all counter-terrorist organizations, the British SAS, a military special operations unit, literally invented most of the tactics used against terrorists as well as the very concept of the modern counter-terrorist tactical unit.

Real Scoop

Most of the information in the database is correct and essentially complete. The most notable comment, and the one which may be heading the SAS towards trouble, is the semi-official “no quarter” policy alluded to in the database. There are no publicly-confirmed incidents in which SAS troops killed obviously-surrendering suspects. However, SAS operations are almost always set up to take place outside of the public eye, and are planned to prevent any opportunity for surrender. Such shock tactics are legitimate strategies against dangerous, well-armed foes, to be sure, and there is rarely any doubt about the guilt or innocence of most target suspects. Nevertheless, the SAS’s killed-to-captured ratio is much higher than that of most other organizations.

Few among the public, or in the military and civilian chain of command that oversees the SAS, are overly-concerned about the deaths of terrorists at the hands of over-zealous SAS troops. However, the organization has one detractor: William Monahan, a journalist from Northern Ireland whose sister was severely wounded in an SAS raid. Patricia Monahan was shot in a raid on her apartment targeted at three IRA terrorists that had taken temporary refuge there. It was assumed that Monahan was a sympathizer, who could be expected to resist the raid, and she was therefore considered by the SAS to be a legitimate target (and therefore virtually condemned to death by the no-quarter policy). In fact, Monahan’s apartment was being used against her will—she was little more than a hostage. In the raid, Monahan was shot in the jaw and neck, and was paralyzed from the neck down for life. Though of catholic descent, William Monahan is a loyalist and would probably have accepted, if bitterly, an explanation that the shooting had been an accident. In the confusion after the incident, however, the SAS and local officials stuck to the story that Patricia was a suspected IRA sympathizer and that though she was unarmed and unresisting, her shooting was warranted.

Sensing a cover-up Monahan has since devoted quite a bit of effort to investigating SAS practices. He has become something of an expert on the organization, and has accumulate a great deal of evidence concerning the probably-unnecessary deaths of suspects in SAS actions. He’s published several articles (though his growing obsession has reduced his outlets to fringe, often left-wing publications), and while they have had little impact on public perceptions they have not gone unnoticed by the SAS and other British security services. His writings to date have been relatively harmless, but if he stumbles on any of the SAS’s less legal activities (see below), or if he ever manages to get his most damaging knowledge into print, he may be seen as too much of a threat.

One of the most damaging issues that Monahan has not yet fully uncovered is that of the SAS’s deployment. With military as well as counter-terrorist duties, the SAS is probably the most active special operations unit on the planet. Like those of most semi-covert agencies, a lot of the SAS’s activities go unreported. The fact that SAS units worked behind enemy lines throughout the entire Gulf War, with a higher success



Special Air Service

#LE0000281

(also SAS, 22 Special Air Service Regiment)

Source: SAS, CIA, EuroTer

Type: Military special operations/counter-terrorist tactical unit

Nationality:

UK

Mandate:

Military special operations unit responsible for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, both within the United Kingdom and abroad. Also tasked with long range reconnaissance, sabotage, and intelligence gathering during conventional military operations. [SAS]

Jurisdiction:

Intervenes in terrorist/hostage situations in the UK (except Northern Ireland) only on the request of local law enforcement. One unit capable of counter-terrorist action is available on 3-minute call at all times. Outside the UK, and in Northern Ireland, acts according to military chain of command. [EuroTer]

Command:

Independent regiment of the UK army. Headquartered in Hereford, England.

Personnel: 320 (tactical), 150 (approx)(support)

Structure:

Officially the SAS is known as the 22nd Regiment. The unit consists of four active (Saber) squadrons lettered A, B, D, and G, and one reserve squadron designated R squadron. There is also an enlarged headquarters unit consisting of training, research and weapons testing, counter-revolutionary warfare, demolitions, and intelligence units. Each of the four Saber squadrons is broken down into four troops of one officer and 15 soldiers each. Each troop has its own area of expertise: mountain and arctic warfare, amphibious warfare, desert warfare, or free-fall parachuting, although all are heavily cross-trained. Each troop is broken into four four-man patrols, believed ideal for achieving surprise with reasonable firepower and mobility. Each soldier is trained in one area of specialty, including communications, demolitions, medicine, and languages. [SAS]

Leaders:

Lt. Col. Jeremy Smith [#LL5149637]

Training and Equipment:

Not only is the SAS arguably the best-trained military/counter-terrorist unit in the world--it actually developed most of counter-terrorist tactics now employed by similar organizations the world over, and was instrumental in the development not just of special operation tactics, but in the very concept of military special operations. In fact, the flash-bang grenade was first developed at the behest of the SAS.

Counter-terrorist training (and doctrine development) is conducted by the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing (CRW). Each Saber squadron does one tour of duty under the command of the CRW, and conducts intensive training in hostage rescue and close combat techniques. [SAS]

The members of the SAS are armed and equipped with the best weapons and material possible at any given time. In counter-terrorist operations, SAS members generally carry Glock 19 pistols, versions of the MP5 SMG, and flash-bang and CS grenades. Heavier weapons include Remington shotguns and AI PM Counter Terrorist sniper rifles. Other equipment includes Class III tactical vests, fire-resistant clothing, gas masks, climbing equipment, and throat radios. [SAS]

On military operations, SAS armaments include the Colt M16A2 with M203 grenade launcher, the L85A1 assault rifle, and both offensive and defensive hand grenades. The choice of weapons is often left up to the individual soldier, the only requirement being standardization of ammunition within the troop. Other equipment includes satellite communications, computers, camouflage clothing and field medical equipment. It's generally safe to assume that the SAS have the best equipment for the task they face. [SAS]

Additional Commentary:

"Who Dares Wins" is the official motto for the British Special Air Service (SAS) and in its colorful history it has often dared much, and more times than not has won. The SAS has served as the model for most special forces units that have been created since the end of World War II.

The SAS history starts in the western desert during the Second World War, where it was responsible for the destruction of over 400 German aircraft. SAS units parachuted behind enemy lines to disrupt German communications during the latter stages of the war.

In the 1950s and 1960s the SAS was involved in counter-insurgency operations in southeast Asia and the Middle East. During the 1970s and '80s, with the rise of terrorism in Europe, the SAS role was expanded to include counter-terrorist activity. They also became deeper involved in "the troubles" in Northern Ireland. During the Gulf War, SAS units operating behind enemy lines sought and destroyed Iraqi missile sites, and are thought to have destroyed over half of Iraq's nuclear arsenal. Currently the SAS is continuing its operations in Northern Ireland, against both the Protestant and Catholic terrorists. In 1998, to help combat any further attacks by the IRA in Europe, a liaison team from the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing was permanently deployed to Belgium. Similar teams from France, Spain, Germany and Belgium have joined the SAS in Brussels. In 1998 this organization was formally named the European Community Terrorist Liaison Group (EuroTer).

Along with its obvious qualifications, the SAS's tradition of victory in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations also gives them an edge when facing such opponents. An excellent example was the Belize coup attempt in '96--virtually all of the mercenary forces involved in the coup fled when word went out that an SAS sabre was intervening. [CIA]

SAS soldiers have a reputation of being cold-blooded killers, largely been due to a rumored "no quarter" policy. While there is no evidence that the SAS, officially or unofficially, condones the deliberate killing of all suspects, it is clear that in counter-terrorist operations SAS soldiers do kill all terrorists who do not immediately and obviously surrender. [CIA]

Last Update: June 19, 1999

rate at destroying Iraqi missile sites and launchers than the combined efforts of six air forces flying hundreds of sorties, was not widely reported until years after the war. Many of the SAS's actions, however, are not as straightforward, glamorous, or legal as those of the Gulf War.

SAS troops often carry out missions of recon, sabotage, and sometimes even abduction and assassination, not just in areas of conflict but also within the borders of other sovereign nations. SAS troops were on the ground in Sudan, for example, for more than a week before the 1999 EC raid on terrorist compounds there. The final stage of that action was, of course, quite public, which excused the SAS's earlier role. But SAS missions have also put troops in Algeria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Russia, Yugoslavia, South Africa, and (most damaging) Ireland, all without the knowledge of those governments. Such actions are clearly violations of international law and could even be seen as acts of war—and the British security establishment would go to great lengths to keep them out of public knowledge.

The SAS has a special relationship with the IRA, which it has combatted for decades. SAS units have been assigned to Northern Ireland (where the agency operates with a much freer hand than elsewhere in the UK) for more than two decades, and have become enmeshed in the difficult politics of the Troubles. There have been many instances of unsanctioned actions on the part of SAS personnel, including abductions and assassinations of suspects.

Although it has been called upon to act against them on occasion, the SAS has an uneasy truce with the UFF and other loyalist terrorist groups. In fact, the SAS has even cooperated at times with the UFF, bartering information, a look-the-other-way attitude, and sometimes even weapons and documents for intelligence and information.

GSG-9

#LE0001025

(also Bundergrezschutzgruppe-9)

Source: GSG-9, CIA, EuroTer

Type: Counter-terrorist tactical unit

Nationality:

Germany

Mandate:

Counter-terrorist and hostage rescue of German nationals anywhere in the world. [EuroTer]

Jurisdiction:

Germany, and elsewhere in the world at the invitation of foreign governments or mandate of German government. [EuroTer]

Command:

Headquartered in Berlin, Germany. Independent section of Dept. P, Ministry of the Interior.

Personnel: 180 (tactical), 800 (support) [GSG-9]

Structure:

Tactical personnel are organized into six combat units of thirty men each. The remaining personnel of the unit are strictly support staff.

Leaders:

Hans Hoft (commanding) [#LL5520469]

Training and Equipment:

GSG-9 is one of the world's foremost elite counter-terrorist units. Tactics are modeled closely on the SAS, although GSG-9 training includes neither the military special operations elements nor the heavy emphasis on individual action. GSG-9 training focuses primarily on hostage rescue and the short, sharp tactical actions that usually culminate a terrorist standoff. [CIA]

Standard weapons include the HK P7M13 pistols, the MP5 series of SMG, and the G3 SG/1 sniper rifle. Various stun, smoke and CS grenades are also standard issue. Class III tactical vests, fire-resistant clothing, gas masks, climbing equipment, and personal radios are standard equipment.

Additional Commentary:

GSG-9 was formed in 1972, from police units because the German government feared that an elite military unit would bring back memories of the Waffen SS. However, the unit has not suffered from the fact that its members are police officers and not soldiers. Since its inception it has racked up an impressive record, the most famous incident being the freeing of 79 hostages from a hijacked 737 in 1977. In the past decade GSG-9 has conducted operations against anti-European Community terrorists in 1994, eco-terrorists in 1994 and 1996, neo-nazi skinheads throughout the 90s, and most recently cells of the Irish Republican Army in 1998.

While it lacks the SAS's international reputation, GSG-9 is still an effective counter-terrorist unit. Right from the start of the organization, GSG-9 saw terrorism as an international problem, and has promoted links with counter-terrorist units in other nations. As a result it is on reasonable terms with most of the world's intelligence agencies (including BlackEagle/BlackEagle). It has also been instrumental in the formation of the European Community Terrorist Liaison Group (EuroTer). This organization acts as a clearing house for intelligence on terrorist activities, and as a coordinating agency for tactical counter-terrorist agencies in the EC. It functions similarly to Interpol. [EuroTer]

The E.C. State Security Act of 1996 allows European nations to suspend some constitutional rights in terrorism cases, and Germany has taken the most aggressive advantage of that option. [CIA] Terrorism suspects may be subject to property searches and arrest without warrant, and denied access to attorneys and other constitutional protections. Though there have been no documented cases of abuse by GSG-9, this is a controversial policy.

Last Update: February 1, 1999

GSG-9

With a history of counter-terrorism operations almost as long and glamorous as that of the SAS, GSG-9 is one of the most capable and respected agencies in the world. Unlike the SAS, however, GSG-9 is a civilian agency with no military or special-operations component.

Real Scoop

The information in the database is largely accurate. GSG-9 is the sole German agency responsible for tracking and monitoring terrorist groups. The struggle against terrorism and violent neo-fascism in Germany has been a rough one over the past decade, and the powers granted to GSG-9 and other police organizations have been sweeping by American standards—including the ability to conduct some search-and-seizure operations without warrants and the suspension of many civil and legal rights for terrorism suspects. This has placed a tremendous amount of power into the hands of GSG-9 commander Hans Hoft. Hoft has so far handled this power responsibly. However, a change in command could make GSG-9 into a goon squad. Furthermore, this policy has some very dangerous international implications. In 1998, GSG-9 arrested terrorism suspect Joaquim Al-Asam, an Egyptian citizen. Al-Asam was held for eighteen days without being formally charged and without being allowed contact with attorneys, associates, Egyptian officials or anyone else. Although Al-Asam's connections with terrorist organizations were quite real, officials in the Egyptian government threatened to go public and force an international showdown if Al-Asam was not released. Hoft was ordered to release and deport Al-Asam, despite clear evidence against him.

As Germany takes a larger role in international affairs, it has also become a more common target for international terrorism. To combat this new threat, Hoft has ordered GSG-9 to expand its intelligence to include outside terrorist groups that pose a potential threat to Germany. As part of this collection of information, Hoft has started to hire third party security firms (like BlackEagle/BlackEagle) to do any needed extra-territorial surveillance. If any of these terrorist groups do prove to be a threat, Hoft plans to neutralize them with any means available. These means might be as innocuous as alerting the local officials of the terrorist's plans, or might go so far as framing the terrorist groups for local crimes or, if necessary, assassination. Hoft also plans to use third party firms to accomplish these operations. Foreign organizations that GSG-9 pays particular attention to include the IRA and ETA (both of whom have expanded their European operations in recent years) and ethnic and religious groups with growing constituencies among immigrant communities in Germany, especially the WIJ and ASALA.

GSG-9 has no mandate for extraterritorial operations, and would certainly face national and international scandal if these plans were made public. Moreover, many critics have pointed out that GSG-9 seems to have greater interest in foreign terrorist organizations than in local ones. These criticisms are largely unfounded, as GSG-9 has been aggressive and successful in dealing with neo-nazis and other German terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the spectre of the SS, so carefully avoided in GSG-9's formation, still has the potential to taint the reputation of any German organization of GSG-9's mandate and powers.

Delta #LE0000366
(also Delta Force, Delta Forces Operational Detachment-Delta)

Source: U.S. Army, CIA, FBI

Type: Counter-terrorist tactical unit.

Nationality:
US

Mandate:
Foreign counter-terrorist actions where American lives are threatened. Domestic counter-terrorist actions against selected targets. [FBI]

Jurisdiction:
Anywhere outside the United States borders, according to military chain of command. Inside the United States, Delta can only be deployed in situations of threats to military security, such as hostage situations on military bases or the threat of nuclear weapons use. [FBI]

Command:
Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Normally an independent unit under the command of Army SOCOM (Special Operations Command), which in turn is a part of JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command); however, for many missions command of Delta is assumed directly by JSOC.

Personnel: 240 (tactical), 60 (support)

Structure:
The force is organized into three squadrons of 80 men each. In turn, these squadrons are subdivided into 16-man troops with 4-man patrols being the smallest unit level. [U.S. Army]

Leaders:
Lt. Colonel Harry Pollack [#LL2221124]

Training and Equipment:
Delta draws its personnel from elite special operations units of the US Army, and occasionally Navy and Marine Corps. All personnel brought into Delta are already proficient in many areas of military special operations, and are given additional training in hostage rescue, counter-terrorism, and personal security. Despite the fact that Delta is a military unit, personnel are encouraged to wear civilian hairstyles (so that they can successfully masquerade as civilians if necessary), and may not have any identifying tattoos or marks.

Delta issues the Beretta 92F pistol and the MP5 series of submachineguns. The M-16 assault rifle is the preferred longarm, while the M24 is the preferred sniper rifle--although different weapons are allowed according to the individual soldiers' preferences. Other equipment includes Class III tactical vests, fire-resistant clothing, gas masks, climbing equipment, personal radios, and grenades of all types. [CIA]

Additional Commentary:
Formed in 1977 by Colonel Charles Berwith, Delta was closely based upon the SAS Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing. It first came to public attention with the failed hostage rescue in Iran in 1980. Despite the fact that the failure was largely unrelated to Delta's role, the incident did little to help the organization's early reputation with the public or those charged with procuring funds. This reputation remained unsteady when Delta was deployed in response to the 1983 Achilli Lauro incident, and was again unable to act due to unexpected intervention by Italian officials. [CIA]

Although meant to be strictly a counter-terrorist unit, Delta has often been used as a special forces strike unit. It was deployed in this role in Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, and Somalia, with general success. This has led some to charge that Delta's role should be limited to military special operations, or even that, since that roles is redundant with other military units, Delta should be disbanded. [U.S.Army]

Last Update: November 16, 1998

Delta


One of two American military units with counter-terrorism missions (the other being the Navy's Seal Team Six), Delta has a public history shrouded in bad luck and failed missions—which has caused many to question its purpose and future. Ironically, Delta's performance off-camera has been excellent. Perhaps the fact that these successes are out of the public eye is just one more facet of Delta's bad luck.

Real Scoop

Delta has never been able to shake the spectre of its two first public performances: the aborted Iran hostage rescue attempt and the *Achilli Lauro* incident. In neither case was the negative press related to Delta's actual performance—the many blunders in Iran were everyone's fault but Delta's, and Italian authorities unexpectedly intervened just before Delta went into action in the *Achilli Lauro* case. An organization whose mandate and funding were secure might relish this negative image—so long as the leaders and policy-makers have confidence in them, it's just as well that terrorist organizations underestimate a counter-terrorist agency's tactical capabilities. In a world of shrinking budgets and political gamesmanship, however, Delta's mandate and funding are anything but secure—and this undeserved negative image is nothing but a liability.

Lt. Colonel Pollack is a man who sees the writing on the wall. In 1998 Delta barely survived the budget cuts that have become a withering reality within the American military. Pollack knows that unless Delta can be shown to be an effective unit in a publicly-visible role, it may well not see the 21st century. Fortunately, Pollack sees such a role, in a genuine threat to U.S. security: the Worldwide Islamic Jihad.

Pollack believes in WIJ's nuclear threat—is perhaps even obsessed by it—and sees its elimination not only as the perfect fulfillment of Delta's mandate, but also the perfect opportunity to prove Delta's worth. Unfortunately, American intelligence services have dismissed WIJ's nuclear capability as a non-immediate threat, so Pollack has had to pursue the issue largely on his own. With a few dedicated members of his staff, spending their own time and often their own money, Pollack has called upon personal connections in the U.S. and international intelligence community as well as outside organizations like BlackEagle, to put together what may be one of the most complete dossiers on WIJ in the world (this despite the fact that Delta is not an intelligence agency, and that such research is beyond Pollack's mandate and authority). He hasn't firmly identified the location of WIJ's nuclear threat, but when he does, he'll send Delta after it—with or without the blessing and support of his superiors.



Hostage Rescue Team

#LE0002211

(also HRT, FBI-HRT, the Feds, G-Men)

Source: FBI

Type: Hostage rescue/counter-terrorist tactical unit.

Nationality:

US

Mandate:

Response to hostage situations and special operations requirements already within the jurisdiction of the FBI.
[FBI]

Jurisdiction:

Federal offenses, interstate crime, and counter-espionage actions within the borders of the US. [FBI]

Command:

Headquartered at the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Field Office (WMFO). Commanded by WMFO Assistant Special Agent In Charge, though frequently detached from WMFO chain of command for deployment under command of other regional offices.

Personnel: 150 (tactical), 30 (support)

Structure:

The HRT is organized into two groups of 75 personnel each. One group is constantly on call while the second trains. [FBI]

Leaders:

Special Agent Kathy Smith [#LL5510812]

Training and Equipment:

All HRT members are experienced FBI agents or special agents, with extensive training in investigative techniques and the law as well as additional training in hostage-rescue and counter-terrorist actions. Training tends towards raids and criminal stand-offs rather than reactions to hijackings, a staple training subject of many other counter-terrorist agencies.

Weapons include the Smith and Wesson 1076 pistol and custom MP5PDWs rechambered for 10mm. Assault elements are equipped with Class III body armor, fire-retardant clothing, personal radios, and a variety of hand grenades. [FBI]

Additional Commentary:

Under American law, the military (including counter-terrorist units such as Delta) can only intervene within the United States under special circumstances which do not include most acts of terrorism. Many local police forces, and virtually all 56 of the FBI's field offices, maintain SWAT elements for use in hostage situations, but the FBI felt the need for a central, highly-trained force for use in especially-difficult situations. The HRT is that force.

The HRT's tactics are similar to those used by police SWAT units, as well as by dedicated counter-terrorist units around the world. The HRT is well-trained, and has been largely spared from the budgetary and jurisdictional infighting, and the problems with corruption, faced by the remainder of the FBI. [FBI]

Last Update: June 21, 1998

FBI Hostage Rescue Team

American military counter-terrorism units like Delta cannot normally act within the U.S. or in coordination with law enforcement agencies. That's where the FBI Hostage Rescue Team comes in—not just to rescue hostages, but to foil all sorts of terrorist actions.

Real Scoop

While the info in the database is for the most part factually correct, it masks a deep division within the HRT—a division that affects the unit's personnel, its future, and potentially its performance. The HRT is riddled with internal strife surrounding renegade actions and a struggle for control of the unit.

Since the “Justice Lost” scandal of 1998, where over twenty high-ranking federal officials failed to go to trial on drug charges, the FBI has been plagued not just by corruption, but also by maverick agents who no longer trust their agency but are still determined to pursue justice—on their own terms. Within the HRT, a loosely-defined group of individuals from both tactical groups has bypassed the normal chain of command to act on its own. Some actions taken by these mavericks have included blackmailing corrupted public officials into retiring, kidnapping suspects and transporting them to jurisdictions with strict or harsh judges, and in at least one case assassinating a known Mafia don. In another incident, two freelance terrorists wanted in Brazil were dumped bound and gagged on the Brazilian embassy doorstep in Washington.

While there have been a couple of prosecutions of these FBI agents, most have received little or no disciplinary action. Often evidence against them has just disappeared, and it's clear that the group has sympathizers in the chain of command above them as well as the rank and file of non-HRT FBI agents. Kathy Smith, the HRT's leader, however, is not one of them. Smith has ordered investigations into the events, but none of her efforts have yet borne fruit.

These renegade actions, and Smith's investigations, have factionalized the HRT. While Smith does have many supporters—individual agents still committed to the rule of law and opposed to vigilante action—others are vehemently opposed to the investigations and Smith's leadership. Discipline has become a problem which will probably grow to affect the HRT's tactical capabilities if it is not corrected.

Smith has another problem on her plate as well: keeping her job. Agent Sampson Hood, leader of HRT Team 1 and popular with the mavericks and their supporters, has ambitions concerning the HRT leadership slot. He has been quite open in his attitude towards Smith and her leadership, but has faced no disciplinary action because of tacit support further up the chain of command. He has conflicted with and gone against Smith's direct orders in a number of tactical situations, although to date only in minor ways. He is looking, however, for an opportunity to undermine her position completely by defying orders in such a way that his judgement appears superior or hers flawed. Hopefully, the lives of few innocent hostages will be on the line when Hood makes his move.



Firewall

#LE0000738

(also the Hackers)

Source: GenNet Consortium, FBI, CIA

Type: Electronic counter-espionage, counter-terrorist, and investigative organization.

Nationality:
US

Mandate:

Maintain the security of the GenNet. Investigate violations of GenNet security in cooperation with Federal, State, local, and occasionally foreign law enforcement agencies. [GenNet, FBI]

Jurisdiction:

The GenNet.

Command:

A department of the General Access National Information Network Consortium, the non-profit corporation that administers the GenNet. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. [GenNet]

Personnel: 80 - 100 (believed)

Structure:

Firewall is made up of eight to ten loosely-defined "response groups" of three to six technically-skilled personnel and sometimes one or two support personnel. Response group structure changes on a continuing basis. [GenNet]

Leaders:

James "Jackhammer" Jellico [#8121500]

Training and Equipment:

Firewall recruits information systems specialists from around the United States, particularly from among talented students and researchers with notable security or hacking skills. Several of Firewall's members have come to the group as a condition of release from prison. [FBI] Although the organization requires employees to remain on the cutting edge of information technologies, it conducts neither formal training programs nor research on a regular basis. [GenNet]

As a department of the GenNet Consortium, Firewall operates a large array of cutting edge computers, from palmtops to supercomputers, and has unrestricted access to all GenNet backbone servers, routers, and NAP handlers. The organization also has limited access on a need-basis to the assets of several of the consortium's members, most notably INSYCON corporation and the NSA. [GenNet]

Additional Commentary:

Firewall is tasked to maintain GenNet security and create standards for data and transmission protection. The first part of that mandate has made Firewall (the term comes from computer slang for an electronic barrier resistant to hackers) perhaps the world's foremost authority on electronic terrorism and terrorist groups.

Firewall has a number of interesting assets at its disposal, including limited access to the subnets of most of the GenNet consortium's members (or unlimited access, in the case of organizations whose proprietary networks form part of the GenNet backbone). Firewall also enjoys a great deal of goodwill with the corporate community, and Firewall investigators have been known to ask for, and get, nearly complete access to corporate subnets when carrying out investigations of sabotage or net-related terrorism. Firewall also has a close relationship with the FBI and other government agencies. [CIA]

Interestingly, Firewall appears to be somewhat selective about its investigations. A number of computer crimes in certain categories (such as violations of the Communications Decency Act) have gone almost completely uninvestigated. [FBI] It appears that Firewall investigators pursue cases as much according to their own interests as according to requests from Consortium members or law enforcement officials.

Last Update: December 4, 1998

Firewall

Not a tactical agency in the conventional sense, Firewall is the organization that investigates, intercepts, and combats terrorism on the GenNet. Unlike the other units covered in this chapter, Firewall is not a government agency, and its agents have no power of arrest. However, Firewall personnel work closely with federal and state law enforcement agencies, and call upon them to actually arrest suspects once Firewall has identified and located them.

Real Scoop

The info in the database is more or less correct, if a little shallow. Firewall is a largely informal organization, in that its internal structure is subject to rapid reorganization according to current security situations. It is the antithesis of the BlackEagle office—rather than each agent being indefinitely assigned to a given cell, Firewall agents put together ad-hoc response groups to developing situations based upon the skills required and the interest of the individual members. This sometimes leads to some confusion, inefficiency, and mild turf warfare, but the Firewall hackers wouldn't have it any other way.

Like many hackers, some members of Firewall just cannot bear being locked out of any information source. Three anonymous Firewall agents (calling themselves the Paranoid's Club) in particular have taken it upon themselves to go beyond their agency mandate, and have accessed scores, perhaps hundreds, of subnets and sites beyond the scope of their authority. So far, they have mostly limited their activities to looking—though on a couple of occasions they have forwarded anonymous tips to others at their agency or other law enforcement groups.

Most of their activities have been straightforward in nature, but a recent incident has much broader implications. The Paranoid's Club have recently been scrutinizing INSYCON, in the mistaken belief that an employee there might be leaking critical GenNet backbone passwords to the Children of Danu (the leak they're looking for is not Greg Littledeer, who's been away from INSYCON long enough for his most damaging specific knowledge to be obsolete, but is in fact a Firewall agent named Gordon Webster). Their efforts were distracted, however, when the Club stumbled on evidence of INSYCON's God Codes—secret back doors into GenNet security systems known only by their creators (see the *Miami Sourcebook*, page 76). They haven't found any actual codes as of yet, only references in a few INSYCON internal documents—but they're getting close.

Unfortunately, the Paranoid's Club has not been paranoid enough. Their efforts have caught the attention of two parties: the NSA and Gordon Webster. Webster is eagerly following the Club's efforts in the hopes that he can steal whatever God Codes the Club turns up, while the NSA (which has been aware of the codes for some time) is assessing the threat posed by the Club and the danger of exposing the God Codes—and is preparing to act.

An odd coincidence may be about to throw the entire issue into the light of day, however. Paranoids Club founder Mark Patterson had his Dupont Circle apartment broken into and ransacked, and several pieces of computer equipment were stolen. This was in fact a completely random robbery, but Patterson didn't see it that way. Convinced that some agency—the NSA, the CIA, perhaps the KGB working for INSYCON—is after him, Patterson has gone into hiding.

Special Emergency Response Team

#LE0001919

(also SERT, RCMP SERT, Mounties)

Source: RCMP, CSIS, CIA

Type: Hostage rescue, SWAT, and counter-terrorist tactical unit.

Nationality:

Canada

Mandate:

Conduct counter-terrorist and hostage-rescue actions for the RCMP, or at the request of local or provincial law-enforcement agencies. [RCMP]

Jurisdiction:

According to RCMP chain of command. The RCMP has full authority throughout Canada, although in some areas it must cooperate with either provincial or municipal police forces. SERT is the only tactical agency in Canada that has jurisdiction in airports. [RCMP]

Command:

Independent department of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Headquartered in Ottawa.

Personnel: 150 (tactical), 50 (support)

Structure:

Two teams of 75 constables each. One team is on constant alert while the other in is training. [CIA]

Leaders:

Commissioner Eric McKenna [#LL3602011]

Training and Equipment:

All SERT members are drawn from a pool of experienced RCMP constables, and undergo a rigorous training course in police special operations, hostage rescue, and counter-terrorist tactics. Training is ongoing, with each team spending at least five months out of the year in intensive training exercises. As a result of difficulty the RCMP has faced in the past dealing with ethnic terrorist groups (and policing ethnic neighborhoods in general), a major recruitment drive aimed at ethnic minorities was launched in the 1990s. This has made the RCMP, including SERT, one of the most diverse law enforcement agencies in the world. [CIA]

SERT teams are equipped with MP5 SMGs and Browning High Power pistols. Body armor, flame-retardant clothing, gas masks, and personal radios are standard issue.

Additional Commentary:

The RCMP, the largest police force in the world, is responsible not just for national duties but also for much of the municipal and provincial law enforcement throughout Canada. Other police forces exist, but they are usually local to major Canadian cities. The provinces of Ontario and Quebec also have their own provincial police forces. The RCMP has the sole responsibility for policing airports within Canada. [RCMP]

SERT, the counter-terrorist branch of the RCMP, has not had the experience or enjoyed the reputation of the SAS or GSG-9, but it is an effective organization nonetheless. SERT personnel are well-paid, highly-motivated, and not known to be in any way corrupted. The organization is backed up by the intelligence and investigative resources of the RCMP and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), both of which have reputations for thoroughness--but rivalry between them has at times hampered investigations into terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the fact that in many places the RCMP is the local police force gives it two major advantages when combatting terrorist groups: first, there are generally local RCMP constables familiar with the local situation and able to brief incoming terrorist specialists; and second, there are few jurisdiction problems. [CIA]

Last Update: May 30, 1998

RCMP Special Emergency Response Team

Although somewhat more low-key than its American, British and German counterparts, the Canadian Special Emergency Response Team is a progressive and capable counter-terrorism organization with a high success rate. Despite its clear position as the premier counter-terrorist unit in Canada, however, the SERT is endangered by jurisdictional infighting between the RCMP and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service.

Real Scoop

Most of the information in the database is accurate, as far as it goes. It misses the fact, however, that contrary to current intelligence (and legislative mandate) the RCMP is operating off Canadian soil. Since 1997 the RCMP has a department that has operated externally similarly to MI-6 and the CIA. Called "Black Branch," this department differs from those organizations in that its focus is not espionage against other countries, but against international criminal organizations which pose a threat to Canada. Although Black Branch is not the same as SERT, it was created to operate hand-in-hand with SERT and the two organizations frequently cooperate. Unlike the extra-mandate activities of GSG-9 and Delta, however, Black Branch is an approved agency, set up and watched over by the RCMP's leadership and civilian chain of command.

In the two years since its creation, Black Branch has managed to place moles and/or get double agents into several Chinese Tongs, the Yakuza, and the Italian and U.S. Mafias as well as several terrorist organizations: JCAG, Babbar Khalsa (a Sikh group), an independent cell of eco-terrorists linked to Gaia's Fist, and NALQ. Another major target that has not yet been successfully penetrated is WIJ.

The object of these undercover operations is to identify key leaders of these organizations, to intercept plans for terrorist actions before they can be carried out, and to set up sting operations. So far, only two of these raids have been carried out, with mixed results. The first, the raid on an NALQ camp in Shawinigan mentioned in the terrorist database (see page 75), was a partial success, although several key arrests were not made and the terrorists, apparently alerted beforehand, managed to remove much of their weaponry. The second action, a raid against a safehouse in Sherbrooke, went disastrously wrong. All three suspects at the safehouse were killed, along with one SERT member. What the RCMP was unaware of (and still does not know) is that one of the terrorists was a CSIS mole.

Ironically, in this particular case, it was the CSIS and not Black Branch that was operating outside of its jurisdiction. Should CSIS's involvement be exposed, it would create a minor legal scandal. However, the exposure of Black Branch's foreign operations would be a much bigger issue, especially if, as planned, SERT personnel are used to capture or assassinate terrorists outside of Canada's borders. The Sherbrooke incident alerted CSIS to the fact that the RCMP has unaccounted-for covert assets, and it is only a matter of time before the CSIS uncovers Black Branch.



CHAPTER FOUR

RESOURCES ▼▼

Millennium's End assignments involving terrorism require more than just an outline of related terrorist organizations. Specific location maps and NPC Stereotypes are particularly useful, and a handful of each are presented later in this chapter. More important even than those specific items, however, is the section just below outlining terrorist techniques and activities. It should give you a fairly good idea of what terrorists set out to accomplish and how they go about it, both in terms of an overall terrorist campaign and specific actions of terrorists appearing in your in-game assignments.

The techniques and activities section is very general in scope, whereas the maps and NPC descriptions are fairly detailed. Use any or all of these resources as they are presented, or add detail or modifications to better fit them to the specifics of your campaign.

WHAT TERRORISTS DO

To the lay observer, it may seem as though a terrorist organization's activities are simply random acts of violence striking out at perceived enemies or the public in general, with little rhyme or reason to the specific targets or scope of the campaign. While that's often true in the case of small, disorganized, or neophyte terrorist groups, in most cases terrorist activities are much more sophisticated than one might imagine. Like businesses and governments, well-run terrorist organizations have short, medium, and long-term plans that encompass financial, public relations, and membership and constituency goals, as well as their actual operations. Individual terrorist attacks are not randomly carried out, but are carefully selected and planned, generally in the context of complete campaigns of terror, to address all of those issues in addition to their effect on the enemy and furtherance of the group's ideology.

The Terrorist Network


Through mutual arms suppliers and fences, common political supporters, cross-training, and exchange of personnel, many terrorist groups have contacted and had dealings with other groups. During the cold war, both East and West operated guerrilla training camps where terrorists and insurgents from around the world would meet. Members of the IRA and PLO, for example, trained together in Libya in the 1970s. Temporary exchanges of personnel, especially those with critical skills, contacts, or access to intelligence, have also been common since the 1970s. With the decrease in state support since the end of the cold war, this practice has become even more common, to the point that many of the world's most wanted and dangerous individual terrorists have all but abandoned any one ideology and simply drift from organization to organization, lending their expertise to whichever group most needs it—or bids the highest.

Many such individuals, as well as more conventional criminals and sociopaths, have entered the relatively new market for freelance terrorism. While a few terrorist organizations have operated on a freelance or proxy basis for decades, it is only in the late '90s that a large pool of individual mercenary terrorists has prospered. By necessity, such individuals have contacts in many, sometimes dozens of groups—although for security reasons they learn as little about their clients as they reasonably can. Nevertheless, the growth of freelance terrorism has strengthened the international network of terrorist organizations.

Terrorist groups also often come in contact through mutual supporting fringe groups. Radical non-terrorist ecological or left-wing social/political organizations in particular often divert funds and other resources to multiple terrorist groups with similar ideologies, generally without the knowledge or consent of their patrons. These groups are also fertile recruiting grounds, and members recruited into different terrorist groups often maintain their professional or personal relationships with one another. Religious and ethnic terrorists likewise rely on community organizations worldwide for support and personnel, and often interact with like-minded terrorist groups through them.

Connections like these sometimes lead to active support between otherwise unconnected groups. During the Al Fatah attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Japanese Red Army staged a suicide attack at Lod airport in Israel; the two groups had trained together in Lebanon. Direct financial support is also known. Members of the neo-nazi group Bruder Schweigen sent the proceeds of their 1983 armored car robberies to various KKK and neo-nazi groups across the United States.

A common form of support between otherwise unconnected groups involves bartering information and supplying connections for weapons and other supplies. It is known that the IRA's 1997 attack on a British royal in Spain was facilitated by ETA M. In return for providing the IRA with intelligence, false documents and safehouses, the Basque nationalists received arms and a promise of "future considerations." Terrorists are probably the single largest segment of the market for stolen or false passports and personal documents—groups like the WIJ that have connections in multiple governments often obtain and sell false passports in bulk to other terrorist groups.



Tactics and Activities


As with any sophisticated type of operation, there's a right way to set up and run a terrorist front, and a wrong way. Certain formulas have been successful in the past and continue to be used by the terrorists of 1999. Below are a few notes on some of the many types of activities and operations carried out by modern terrorist organizations.

Hijacking

Hijacking is the practice of seizing an aircraft or other vehicle by violence or threat of violence. There are many potential goals of a terrorist hijacking: the taking of hostages for ransom or exchange for imprisoned comrades; the seizure of cargo or robbery of the passengers for profit; passage to a friendly country; and/or the humiliation or demonstration of the vulnerability of the company or nation which operates the vehicle. The vehicle itself cannot generally be retained and sold for profit—a stolen jetliner would not be bought by any reputable operator, and could not be flown on international flights—though it might be held for ransom by the terrorist group or a sympathetic country.

Aircraft hijackings tend to be the most sophisticated, because of the high degree of security given aircraft and airports. Terrorists do extensive surveillance before hijackings. At least one terrorist will book a flight on an airplane of the same type as the one to be hijacked, to get a good look at its interior. Others will get a first-hand look at the airport, casing the physical security and getting a feel for weaknesses in procedure. Armed with detailed information, the terrorists can then disguise themselves either as passengers, airplane mechanics, baggage handlers or other ground crew to gain access to the plane.

One of the keys to the success of a hijacking is the ingenuity with which the weapons are smuggled onto the aircraft. The hijackers can try to take them through airport security by disassembling them and disguising their X-ray image by hiding them inside appliances or with other dense objects. A more effective way to get the weapons on the plane is to have someone with security clearance hide the weapons inside the security area. A custodian could, for example, hide a briefcase full of weapons in a maintenance cart while the terrorist takes an identical but innocuous briefcase through security. The two cases could be switched in the gate lounge without drawing attention and the terrorist would then board the plane with the weapons. In most Western airports, even cleared



personnel go through extensive security checks. However, a single aircraft often flies a lengthy route with several legs, any one of which could originate from a Third World airport.

A typical hijacking is performed by a cell of five or six terrorists. Two terrorists, one of them the leader, choose seats in the first-class compartment close to the cockpit. They carry handguns, grenades, or small SMGs. Another three or four terrorists, armed with explosive charges and weapons, choose seats in the main cabin of the airplane. Even when firearms are employed, grenades are often used as backup weapons—the terrorist need only pull the pin and hold the grenade; if he or she is attacked, the grenade will fall to the ground and explode.

Once the plane is airborne the hijacking begins. The leader and one other terrorist make their way to the cockpit, where they threaten the captain and flight crew. At least one of these terrorists must speak English (the standard language for international airline operations) so that radio transmissions can be made.

In the main cabin, two or three terrorists threaten the passengers and other crew members while the final terrorist places explosive charges inside the cabin. This terrorist must be familiar with the airplane and know its weak points. These charges must be in place before the aircraft lands, either for refueling or at its destination, so that they may deter any counter-terrorist actions with the threat of destruction of the aircraft and passengers.

Such sophisticated preparations and weapons are not absolutely necessary, however—terrorists have succeeded in hijacking airplanes with very low-tech weapons. In 1970, nine members of the Japanese Red Army hijacked a plane from Tokyo to North Korea using only samurai swords that they had smuggled on board inside fishing-rod cases. To practice for the hijacking, the terrorists had rented a large hall, in which they set up chairs that duplicated the layout of the airplane cabin. Security measures since 1970 have grown greatly in intensity and sophistication, but the aggressive use of any lethal weapon, coupled with a clever plan, can be all that is required.

Death on Wheels

As with street gangs, terrorists favor the drive-by shooting (the killing of pedestrians from moving vehicles) as a method of assassination. Another favorite method is to strike at a target who is travelling by automobile—a public and vulnerable point in even the most secure schedule. Armenian terrorists have perfected this technique, using motorcycles or scooters to weave through heavy traffic to reach the target vehicle. One terrorist drives the motorcycle, while a second, armed with handguns or an SMG, sits behind facing backwards. They drive past the target's car when it is stopped at a red light or stuck in traffic, rake the vehicle with automatic weapons fire, then drive away.

Individuals who know they are potential targets often employ armored cars and/or chase cars full of bodyguards. Such actions are deterrents against simple shootings, but no automobile, no matter how well-armored, can withstand an anti-tank rocket (a favored technique of FARC in Colombia), or a powerful, well-placed culvert bomb (the Italian Mafia used one against a well-known prosecutor that left a twenty-five meter crater in a freeway). An unpredictable schedule is the only defense against a determined, well-equipped automotive assassin.

The Man-Portable Missile

Man-portable surface-to-air missiles are the weapons of choice for bringing down aircraft without having to sneak aboard as passengers—or even having to approach the aircraft. The Russian SAM 7 and American Stinger missiles are both readily available to any terrorist organization that is well-funded and has a state sponsor or decent connections in the black market. Both of these infra-red-guided missiles are particularly effective against slow, unmaneuverable aircraft, especially during take-off or landing. Their one drawback is in their firepower—designed for use against fighter and attack aircraft, most man-portable missiles don't have the punch to reliably take out a large modern airliner. They home in on the engines (the aircraft's primary heat source), which are generally set on the wings well apart from the aircraft body, and their warheads don't have the power to destroy much more than the engine itself. A lucky shot (or multiple hits) many ensure a kill, but otherwise a skilled pilot can often land the plane with minimal loss of life.

Nevertheless, because of their small size, man-portable missiles can be concealed easily enough to get them close to civilian airports. An aircraft landing or taking off (on a predictable flight path with no room to maneuver) could be easily hit from the airport perimeter or even the rooftop of a building that lies within a kilometer or two of the airport, along the plane's flight path.

Getting the Word Out—Even on the Job

In his handbook on terrorist methods, the Brazilian terrorist leader Carlos Marighella suggested a method by which urban guerrillas holding up financial institutions to help finance their revolution could avoid being confused for common bank robbers.

In this particular activity, revolutionaries have two types of competitors—bandits and right-wing counter-revolutionaries. This to some extent confuses ordinary people, and therefore the guerrilla will try to make clear the purpose of his action, in two ways: he will refuse to behave like a bandit, either by misguided violence or by taking money or personal possessions from customers who may be in the bank; and he will back up his expropriation by some form of propaganda... handing out pamphlets or giving people leaflets explaining the political purpose of what he is doing.

Handing out propaganda at the scene of the crime isn't the only option—the crime itself can be a propaganda tool. Croatian terrorists who hijacked a plane out of New York in 1976 used it to drop propaganda leaflets over London and Paris. The seizure of television or radio stations can similarly be used to broadcast propaganda messages.

Discipline

The IRA has a reputation for strict discipline, and often orders “punishment shootings” for those who desert, embezzle proceeds from raids, or commit other “crimes.” The shootings take the form of “kneecappings” in which the victim is shot in the back of the knee, shattering the kneecap and causing injuries that cripple the victim for life. Alternatively, the kneecap is crushed with a block of cement, or shattered with an electric



drill. Similar forms of dismemberment are common in the justice codes of other groups.

More severe crimes, such as informing, are punished with death. Such sentences are carried out in the style (or supposed style) of military executions. In areas where terrorists enjoy the community's support, a tape-recorded confession extracted from the victim just prior to death is sometimes mailed to the family. The body is left where it can be found, preferably by the public and news media before the police.

The process of killing informers (known as "touts" in some terrorist slang) is referred to by the slang term "nutting."

Peoples' Courts

After a successful kidnapping, a terrorist organization will sometimes subject the hostage to a "peoples' court," putting the victim through a mock trial for supposed crimes against the people. Sometimes the hostage is sentenced to corporal punishment (a humiliating beating, for example) and is then released. At other times the hostage receives a death sentence; execution is usually by shooting. In either case, the "jurors" usually hide their faces, though their presence (and that of the mock judge and attorneys) is necessary for effect. Such trials are often videotaped and released to the media.

Sometimes, peoples' courts are used to punish members of the terrorist organization themselves. The Japanese Red Army is notorious for this type of action. In 1972, half of its members were put on trial, then killed, by their own leaders. The method of execution involved the guilty being stripped naked, tied to stakes, beaten with fists or wires, and left to die of exposure in winter temperatures. One of those killed was a woman who committed the crime of becoming pregnant (sexual relations were deemed unrevolutionary). Others were killed simply for failing to show proper revolutionary zeal, or as a result of confessing doubts during a "self-examination" session.

Provoked Responses

Often, the aim of a terrorist organization is not simply to strike a target, but to provoke a heavy-handed response by a government. This response can then be used as an excuse for further terrorist attacks and as a rallying cry for the population at large. The provoked response is effective whenever groups on the edge of a contentious issue wish to propagate instability and prevent a peaceful settlement that requires compromise.

The classic example of the provoked response was the 1914 shooting of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand by the Serbian terrorist organization Black Hand. The terrorists chose Ferdinand as their victim because he had promised, once he became emperor, to grant autonomy to a region that the terrorists would rather see merged with neighboring Serbia. The assassination provoked Austria into declaring war against Serbia, an act which quickly escalated into World War I.

More recently, the provoked response has been a staple of Middle Eastern intrigue. The series of 1995 attacks in Israel and Palestine are a perfect example—they led to the Israeli annexation of the Negev and destroyed the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the two nations. For groups committed to the destruction of Israel, this loss of territory is a minor concern compared to the importance of keeping the people aroused and vilifying their enemy.



Critiques

When the Japanese Red Army hijacked a plane from Bombay to Dacca in 1977, they conducted a survey of their passengers. Each hostage was required to complete a critique of the experience and turn it in as he or she left the aircraft. The critiques asked for a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the operation, as well as for recommendations on how the JRA could improve its next hijacking.

Communications

All terrorist groups have secret methods of communication and contact. Some eschew modern electronic methods as insecure and unreliable and rely on clandestine meetings, written messages in code, passwords and message drops. While concerns over electronic security are founded, physical meetings have their own dangers, and many groups take advantage of the developing global electronic networks to pass encrypted messages by electronic mail, scrambled telephone, and coded fax. While there is always the possibility that electronic messages will be intercepted and decoded, organizations

which use these methods have weighed the risks against the advantages and opted for speed and anonymity over the certainty of direct human contact.

One method of ensuring the confidentiality of electronic communications is to physically distribute passwords and encryption keys on disks—the eco-terrorist group Gaia’s Fist uses this method to ensure that only approved members attend their annual electronic planning meetings.

Some terrorist organizations publish official newspapers—printed or electronic, public or covert—that serve as the mouthpieces for their revolutionary struggles. The bulk of the stories contained in these newspapers are innocuous: updates on the philosophies of the organization; commentaries on world events; denunciations of various governments, rulers, or political systems; and criticisms of counter-revolutionary factions. But sometimes a newspaper is used to send coded messages and instructions to operatives. For this reason, editors are under strict orders to never correct spelling mistakes or grammatical errors—these “mistakes” are part of a secret code.

The Japanese Red Army devised an effective method of safely passing messages from the leadership to the rank and file. A restaurant or other public facility with a pay phone was chosen, and a member would wait there at designated times. Members in the field would then phone in, to give or receive instructions. Codes were used to ensure that the person picking up the phone was indeed a member, and aliases were used to hide the callers’ identities. This system is of limited utility in the developed world in 1999, though, since many urban pay phones are dial-out only or require a registered debit card to operate.

The IRA developed unique low-tech methods of passing information to its active members. In Catholic districts, where the IRA has the support of much of the populace, women bang garbage can lids together to signal the approach of British Army patrols. “Spotters” rent high-rise apartments with commanding views, hanging colored towels on their balconies as signal flags to IRA members in the streets below.

Anonymity

Anonymity is the key to avoiding capture, and wise terrorists go to great lengths to avoid being identified. Wearing gloves and balaclavas or ski masks during public operations is, of course, elemental, but savvy terrorists go quite a bit farther. The IRA, for example, requires its members to always wear overalls and gloves when working with explosives, and to bathe immediately afterwards, to avoid getting telltale chemicals or taggants on their skin which would be detected should the terrorists be arrested. Anyone handling weapons must also wear gloves, so that a cache discovered by police won’t yield valuable fingerprints. Great care is taken when photographing or videotaping hostages, to avoid any landmarks or other clues in the background. All vehicles used are stolen just hours before their use, with license plates also stolen from a different but similar vehicle.

Arms Smuggling

When planning an action against a target on foreign soil, terrorists commonly smuggle the weapons and explosives into the country beforehand. Once a secret arms cache has been set up, members of a cell then enter the country separately, using stolen or forged passports.

Some terrorist organizations act as arms brokers, purchasing weapons and explosives from the country where they are manufactured and selling them to other terrorist groups or guerrilla armies for a substantial markup. At other times terrorists use the barter method, swapping grenades for forged passports, for example, or rifles for information on a potential target.

Recruiting

One method to ensure that new recruits are legitimate (and are not agents of a counter-terrorist organization) is to limit membership only to those who have been personally recommended by an existing member of the terrorist organization. Even so, a thorough investigation of the potential recruit is standard procedure.

Suspicious recruits are often accepted and even sent to training camp, secret headquarters, or safehouses (although precautions are taken to ensure that the location is not revealed). Once there, the recruit is interrogated and, if found to be an agent, executed on the spot. Some groups require recruits to sign waivers giving the organization the right to exercise capital punishment should they prove to be government agents.

A favored tactic of the Abu Nidal Organization, Worldwide Islamic Jihad, and other Third World terrorists is to offer scholarships to young recruits, enabling them to study abroad. Such students are employed as information gatherers, and might be asked to set up an arms cache or safe house. In return, they receive funds to cover their tuition, room and board, airfares, and spending money. Some of these students are idealists who believe in the cause; others are strictly in it for the money and opportunity for education.

Many organizations have an entry oath. Recruits being sworn into the Japanese Red Army undergo the following questions and must answer accordingly:

"Are you determined to act like a soldier?"

"I am determined."

"Are you determined to die; are you determined to do this absolutely?"

"I am determined absolutely."

Government-Organized Terrorism

A number of governments organize terrorist activities to keep their citizenry in line and to stifle all opposition—from peaceful protest and political organization to active and armed resistance. The techniques used include "disappearances," assassinations, torture, and prolonged incarceration without trial.

Some governments are blatant about their activities, making arrests and conducting assassination and torture in broad daylight. Sometimes they videotape their own atrocities. Others wait for cover of night before sending in their death squads—often members of the regular police or military who have shed their uniforms and donned disguises.

Either way, governments hide their covert activities under mountains of bureaucracy, or simply deny they ever took place. Common justifications and lies include descriptions of children and infants as

“armed rebels” in government reports, claims that deaths occurred due to escape attempts or armed resistance, claims that victims were caught in crossfires between police and criminals or guerillas, and the blaming of massacres on insurgents or guerillas. Often the bodies of the victims are mutilated to prevent identification, then burned or buried in secret graves.

Head Games

Terrorism, by its very nature, is a form of psychological warfare—terrorist attacks are designed to affect the morale and attitudes of their targets, as they are rarely decisive military engagements. Successful terrorists have a strong grasp of the psychological in a tactical as well as strategic sense, though.

Negotiations with terrorists are unlike other diplomatic efforts. Terrorists seek to keep negotiators constantly off-guard, generally through the threat of violence against hostages, so that negotiators will be compelled to quickly meet any demands put to them. A way of establishing this is to make a demand early in the negotiations that seems simple, but that the terrorists know will not be met (because of the opposition’s policies, a known lack of resources, or a ridiculously short time limit). The terrorists then kill a hostage when the demand is not met, or is not met to their satisfaction. From that point forward, the opposition’s negotiators will be under a great deal of pressure to meet demands, robbing them of the ability to think things through or to go on the psychological offensive.

Terrorists also use negotiations for propaganda reasons. They frequently make outrageous demands (such as the release of imprisoned terrorists in other countries) that they know could not possibly be met, while fully intending to kill many or all of their hostages. The terrorists can then justify their actions and vilify their opposition by claiming that the government was unwilling to negotiate, and wouldn’t undertake even the smallest effort to save the hostages.

Psychological games are also useful in keeping hostages in line, especially when there are a great many of them, as in a hijacking. A simple technique is mass-punishment (or the threat of it) for the actions of any individual. Coupled with the hope that the crisis will soon be over with no lives lost, this creates pressure within the hostage group against rebellion or escape attempts, and encourages hostages to inform on one another. The threatened punishment might be as mundane as simple beatings or starvation, or may take the form of a bomb hidden in the aircraft or ship (in the case of a hijacking) which would destroy everyone should the terrorists be killed.

A more sophisticated version of the same technique involves singling out a few hostages that best symbolize the terrorists’ enemies, for special punishment or even mock-trial before the others. This diverts attention, frustration, and hatred from the terrorists themselves and towards the “examples.”

One extreme example of psychological warfare against a hostage is the Patty Hearst case. Hearst was kidnapped, abused, and brainwashed, to the point that she later actually participated in the terrorist activities of her captors. While such cases are not common, it is known that long-term hostages can sometimes be conditioned to sympathize with their captors and resist attempts to be freed.

Training


Terrorism requires skills, skills that must be taught and learned. Many of the larger and better-established groups have access to training facilities run by their organizations or state sponsors. Others train informally, passing skills on from one member to another, perhaps infrequently sending accomplished members to camps run by other groups with which they have connections. Many encourage their members to join the army for a few years—sometimes even the army that the group opposes—although rarely when the group is in open conflict with the military, and never when the individual in question is already deeply involved in the group's activities.

What must a terrorist learn? Ideally, as in the military, basic training begins with physical fitness and self-defense skills, perhaps including a little martial arts. From there, the terrorist receives weapons training, starting with small arms drill with pistols and moving up through rifles, grenades, and automatic weapons. Heavy weapons training may also be taught, including the use of rockets, mortars, heavy machine guns, and surface-to-air-missiles. Some small-unit guerilla tactics are also almost always part of the curriculum.

Most terrorists learn the use of explosives. These range from the simple grenade or molotov cocktail (easily tossed into a crowded store or nightclub) to military plastic explosives and demolition charges. The terrorist may learn to make home-made explosives from such common ingredients as fertilizer and diesel fuel, "napalm" from gasoline and Styrofoam, and bombs from metal canisters and scrap metal shrapnel. More sophisticated explosives training includes mine placement and booby traps, and how to work with a variety of commercial, military, and homemade fuses and detonators. Chemical fuses can be cobbled together using acid that eats slowly through a rubber container (typically a condom), while mechanical fuses can range from a simple spring device to a barometric gauge that triggers an explosion once an airplane has reached a prescribed altitude. Other bomb designs are triggered by X-rays, light, or vibration. The elite among the terrorist explosives experts might even learn the basics of nuclear bomb construction—including the acquisition of plutonium and the specialized manufacturing equipment and procedures necessary to put one together. More likely, they might learn to construct the poor man's nuke—a charge of high explosive placed within a container of nuclear or toxic waste, designed to poison an area and kill its victims slowly.

Depending upon the theatre and nature of operations, training might also include wilderness survival—or the skills necessary to survive in an urban environment. The wilderness-based terrorist learns land navigation skills, while the urban terrorist is taught to blend in with the general population, and how to set up a safehouse that will not arouse suspicion.

All terrorists must learn such basic mechanical skills as how to drive (not always a given in the Third World), and in some cases how to pilot an aircraft, helicopter, or speedboat. Basic radio and telephone communications and repair are also taught, as are communications skills and cryptography. Some terrorists receive training in specific techniques, such as the use of scuba gear, hang gliders, or climbing and rappelling skills.



Espionage skills are also learned. Assumption of disguise, use of bugging and surveillance devices, and shadowing a target (or losing a tail)—on foot or by car—are all valuable skills.

The terrorist must also learn the art of forgery: how to create fake documents and how to alter stolen ones. That's not just a matter of duplicating a rubber stamp mark or faking an official's handwriting, or even creating holographic images or magnetic or optical strips—the terrorist forger must also know what specific documents look like and are supposed to communicate, what sort of stamps, signatures, and other approvals are appropriate for given types of documents, and what data is contained in a magnetic or optical strip. The art of computer hacking is also a useful skill, especially for industrial or corporate terrorism. The modern terrorist must be familiar with computer networks and the information they offer. Computers and faxes can also be used to pass information covertly across borders.

The terrorist is also taught such basic skills as how to hot-wire a car and how to pick both mechanical and electronic locks. Terrorists operating against more sophisticated targets must also learn about electronic security, and are taught ways to infiltrate such targets as corporate headquarters, government buildings, or airline terminals.

But these physical skills are really only the tip of the iceberg. Intelligence is the name of the game, and success—and survival—always relies on knowing more than one's enemy. The skills of choosing a target and acquiring information on it are of primary importance. Research and surveillance skills are critical, as are those of planning and tactics. Terrorist groups with the right resources educate their guerrillas on the tactics and procedures used by the security forces and intelligence agencies they face. Counter-terrorist specialists may find their moves anticipated and countered with deadly consequences. Large terrorist groups also try to keep an eye on the global intelligence community,

training their senior members in counter-intelligence and espionage. Maintaining discipline in the ranks, and keeping them free of informants and moles, is another critical skill for terrorist leaders.

Propaganda is also a key issue for the well-educated terrorist: not just the composition of isolated flyers and videotapes, but entire psy-ops campaigns waged against the larger society. A successful terrorist must know how to integrate individual attacks into a campaign that will strike a chord with both supporters and opponents.

Finally, there's fund-raising. The terrorist learns techniques that range from simple fraud (cashing false checks) to bank robbery and extortion. Executive kidnapping is lucrative, as are protection rackets. Alternatively, terrorists learn how to recruit and interest wealthy patrons in their cause, and how

to establish contact with governments that might have a vested political interest in eliminating the terrorists' targets.

Clearly, these skills go well beyond anything that could be covered in a eight-week camp in the desert, no matter how well-organized. Most low-level thugs have little more than a familiarity with the bulk of the above. But the serious terrorist—the professional in it for the long haul—must have a grip on at least these basics.

NPCs

Five new NPC stereotypes are listed in the sidebars over the next few pages. Use these just as you would the NPC stereotypes in the *Millennium's End v2.0* rulebook—to fill generic roles where little information is needed beyond a few skills and Attribute levels. Suggestions on which stereotypes to use to represent members of specific terrorist organizations are made in the listings in Chapter Two.

A couple of the stereotype listings comprise complete sets of NPCs that might typically work together, such as the Elite Counter-Terrorists. If using the group as a

NPC Stereotype: Cyberterrorists

These hackers par-excellence cause havoc across the world's computer systems. Because information is the name of their game, they generally have some sense of who is looking for them (and how hard), and are well-prepared for either flight or fight.

	SysAdmin	SubAdmin	User	User	Uber Hacker
Gender	male	male	female	male	male
Height	200cm	170cm	185cm	185cm	190cm
Weight	95kg	50kg	66kg	66kg	72kg
Int	66	52	88	60	56
Sen	60	38	58	56	42
Agl	47	33	48	37	25
Cor	56	74	64	72	80
Con	34	32	41	36	30
Str	54	42	43	34	34
Per	50	48	56	58	60
App	42	52	80	60	74
Bra	47	49	50	63	77
Wil	48	54	54	62	50
Perception	44	32	44	44	35
Base Speed	14	12	14	13	12
Dam. Factor	5	5	5	4	4
Mass Factor	0.7	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.9

Skill rolls:

Aim	24	33	42	36	12
Autofire	24	48	42	48	17
Longarm	24	43	62	36	17
Smallarm	36	33	42	40	17
Computer Ops	66	68	55	68	75
Civil	72	94	68	74	101
Networks	80	87	75	82	95
Programming	72	88	78	68	104
Security	84	72	74	72	114
Unarmed H-to-H	60	70	70	75	80

Weapons:

weapons	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	DF/DD	dam. type
Ares SMG		7/64		8/64		17	hyd shk
Mossberg ATP6C*			7/90			18	hyd shk
Browning HP	14/40			13/54	12/31	17	hyd shk

*Triple target AV, roll includes +10 for open choke.

whole seems appropriate, do so. Otherwise, choose individual sets of stats from the listing to represent individual NPCs as you would with any stereotype. As with those in the rulebook, the NPC stereotypes listed here tend to increase in capability as they are read from left to right within a set.

The skills covered in each stereotype are quite cursory, with just a handful of weapons typical to the NPC type listed. Don't forget equipment for these NPCs, which isn't listed at all (except for body armor, in some cases—although any of the stereotypes here might choose to employ such protection). Of course, feel free to make any alterations necessary to add detail to these NPCs or better fit them to your campaign or assignments.

The first stereotype listing (opposite) is for cyberterrorists, high-tech

new-millennialists, or armed hackers. These individuals are hackers first, combatants second, and in any sizeable terrorist organization are likely to be protected by compatriots who have chosen violent rather than technical skills as their primary vocation. The individual listings are labelled according to their position in a combined action group, but they can readily be used individually.

The next stereotype covers a typical death squad. As mentioned elsewhere, death squads are generally covert organizations created by despotic governments (or factions within government agencies) to terrorize the populace and suppress opposition. Drawn from police and/or military units and often given elite names, death squad members are generally better-trained than their conventional military or police compatriots—though that says little in many Third World countries. Nevertheless, these death squad members are more skilled than your typical thugs. They may be used together as a team, or individually.

The guerilla stereotype can represent any number of untrained military roles, from dedicated insurgents, to impressed labor in Third

NPC Stereotype: Death Squad

Death squads are the "blunt instruments" used by governments and political parties to silence opposition. Death squads are recruited from the local police and/or military and are therefore heavily armed and unafraid of reprisal.

	soldier	soldier	soldier	sgt.	MG man
Gender	male	male	male	male	male
Height	180cm	190cm	175cm	188cm	186cm
Weight	88kg	95kg	80kg	92kg	78kg
Int	42	46	36	54	62
Sen	46	54	44	60	68
Agl	47	53	55	67	61
Cor	52	44	42	52	72
Con	28	36	52	64	74
Str	62	70	48	42	50
Per	46	32	40	56	68
App	40	48	52	52	44
Bra	53	55	47	65	63
Wil	38	52	44	45	44
Perception	46	55	47	60	65
Base Speed	14	15	15	17	16
Dam. Factor	6	6	5	5	5
Mass Factor	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.8

Skill rolls:

	35	43	47	56	52
Aim	35	43	47	56	52
Autofire	45	62	65	68	72
Longarm	50	60	68	81	75
Smallarm	50	54	56	64	58
Diplomacy	42	60	48	54	64
Coercion	58	70	62	72	92
Unarmed H-to-H	45	29	39	50	58
Grapple	65	39	55	72	82
Punch	65	41	52	68	84

Weapons:

weapons	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	DF/DD	dam. type
FN FAL	4/77	5/87	5/95	7/109		22	hyd shk
(auto)	4/72	5/89	5/92	7/95		22	hyd shk
Llama M-87	13/66	14/70	14/72	16/80	15/74	17	hyd shk
FN Minimi (auto)					6/97	19	hyd shk

World armies, to the thugs employed by local warlords. Their key attribute is that they have guns and know how to use them. Despite the lack of education among many low-level guerrillas, they may have other important skills, such as complete knowledge of a geographical region and the people in it.

Urban revolutionaries are more cosmopolitan versions of the guerrilla. They tend to be better educated than the latter, although that does not make them necessarily more sophisticated, nor better skilled at the tasks of terrorism or insurrection.

The final NPC stereotype covered here represents a small counter-terrorist unit, although the listings can be used independently. These individuals are generally well-trained and intelligent, capable of operat-

ing with precision and initiative.

NPC Stereotype: Guerillas

Guerrillas are usually recruited from the rural poor or disenfranchised peasants. Usually illiterate, their lack of education is balanced by their dedication and local knowledge.

Gender	male	male	female	male	male
Height	170cm	165cm	155cm	190cm	160cm
Weight	54kg	54kg	42kg	87kg	72kg
Int	35	41	39	56	46
Sen	33	39	56	25	47
Ag	39	37	58	25	47
Cor	58	38	39	48	90
Con	38	48	39	48	90
Str	50	58	43	52	62
Per	32	34	40	32	40
App	24	40	32	36	40
Bra	41	39	48	67	79
Wil	48	40	56	58	32
Perception	29	32	44	23	38
Base Speed	13	13	15	14	14
Dam. Factor	5	6	5	5	6
Mass Factor	1.2	1.2	1.6	0.8	0.9

Skill rolls:

Aim	38	40	48	52	58
Autofire	51	64	70	76	80
Longarm	44	60	70	68	72
Armed H to H	20	26	28	36	42
Swing	30	34	36	44	62
Foraging	32	36	38	32	20
Hiding	40	45	30	50	53
Unarmed H-to-H	20	22	24	22	30
Kick	25	27	29	27	43
Punch	30	32	34	32	48

Weapons:

weapons	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	DF/DD	dam. type
AK-47	4/ 67	4/ 83	6/ 93	5/ 91	5/ 95	22	hyd shk
(auto)	4/ 74	4/ 87	6/ 93	5/ 99	5/ 103	22	hyd shk
Machete	11/ 38	11/ 42	13/ 44	12/ 52	12/ 70	2.8	cut

Terrorist Personality Types

Not all terrorist have the same motivations, nor will they all react the same way to a given situation. The following information is included to make generic NPC terrorists a little more interesting and different from one another. Use these personality outlines to flesh out the NPC stereotypes covered on these pages, or for a few basic ideas when creating more detailed non-player characters. Each provides a couple of hints on how such terrorist types might handle negotiations, treat hostages, and make decisions. Remember, though, that these are just a few suggestions—other personality types (or less pronounced versions of those covered here) are of course possible, and not every minor NPC has to be shoe-horned into such a brief description.

Charismatic Leader

"Don't do it for me... do it for the Cause!"

The Charismatic Leader is well educated—at least in the areas of politics, government, and social revolution—and is able to speak with eloquence and passion on these subjects. Drawing upon a natural ability to persuade and motivate others, he or she commands admiration and loyalty from underlings, and either respect or jealousy from superiors, depending on the organization's internal politics and the Charismatic Leader's personal ambition.

The Charismatic Leader does not explain his or her plans, but simply gives instructions, relying on loyalty and force of will to ensure compliance. Followers rarely ask questions—those that do are typically disciplined by a more loyal follower, so that the Charismatic Leader can keep his or her distance from such unsavory activities. The same is true in the treatment of hostages—the Charismatic Leader often takes on an attitude of compassion towards such charges, but at any moment is willing to order brutal retribution at the hands of an underling. In negotiations, the Charismatic Leader is often deceptively easy-going, and comes across as a completely rational human being—but that does not mean that he or she lacks resolve, or is even sane.

NPC Stereotype: Urban Revolutionaries

Recruited largely from educated urban populations, the Urban Revolutionary profile represents young terrorists who are motivated primarily by political and social ideals.

Gender	male	male	male	female	female		
Height	190cm	160cm	150cm	165cm	170cm		
Weight	87kg	66kg	43kg	66kg	72kg		
Int	42	52	32	36	42		
Sen	44	40	36	60	40		
Agl	35	44	47	48	50		
Cor	46	52	44	52	48		
Con	68	92	62	81	61		
Str	44	55	46	47	65		
Per	34	26	26	24	38		
App	46	52	50	52	44		
Bra	47	48	49	48	44		
Wil	32	54	64	70	54		
Perception	35	35	32	44	35		
Base Speed	12	14	14	14	14		
Dam. Factor	5	5	5	5	6		
Mass Factor	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.0	0.9		
Skill rolls:							
Aim	30	64	42	58	52		
Autofire	40	70	62	80	64		
Longarm	50	84	42	64	52		
Smallarm	60	70	54	72	68		
Arson	20	40	30	20	40		
Diplomacy	22	34	38	45	30		
Coercion	34	40	46	65	40		
Foraging	22	42	40	38	20		
Urban	33	60	55	52	20		
Unarmed H-to-H	20	28	44	37	48		
Kick	25	36	44	37	48		
Punch	30	42	66	52	48		
Weapons:							
weapons	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	DF/DD	dam. type
Colt 1911A1	11/ 65	13/ 85	13/ 69	13/ 87	13/ 83	19	hyd shk
CZ-61 Skorpion	8/ 54	10/ 84	10/ 76	10/ 94	10/ 74	15	hyd shk
AR-18	3/ 78	5/112	5/ 72	5/ 84	5/ 92	19	hyd shk
(auto)	3/ 68	5/ 98	5/ 88	5/ 108	5/ 96	19	hyd shk

Intellectual Terrorist

"The problem is the on-going exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist class. The poverty of the lower classes is perpetuated by the exploitation of non-renewable resources by the international military/industrial complex. Don't you understand? We rob this bank to make a statement against the entire system."

NPC Stereotype: Elite CounterTerrorists

Use this stereotype to represent an SAS, Delta Force or other elite team on a counter-terrorist operation. Adjust weapons and equipment as necessary.

	Lt. male	Sgt. female	Spec. male	Spec. female	Sniper male
Gender					
Height	180cm	160cm	165cm	170cm	175cm
Weight	87kg	61kg	66kg	61kg	72kg

Int	52	42	66	54	60
Sen	38	28	45	68	44
Ag	51	54	59	68	73
Cor	34	47	47	44	65
Con	68	79	60	53	70
Str	63	54	67	44	49
Per	36	44	56	54	52
App	44	54	52	62	48
Bra	53	42	53	40	47
Wil	62	44	46	62	56

Perception	32	26	35	32	32
Base Speed	15	15	15	17	18
Dam. Factor	6	5	6	5	5
Mass Factor	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9

Skill rolls:

Aim	48	38	47	53	50
Autofire	58	53	62	72	60
Longarm	58	48	55	53	75
Smallarm	68	60	65	70	65
Armed H to H	30	38	35	50	30
Thrust	45	48	42	70	45
Climbing	47	56	68	76	68
Rappelling	64	70	86	95	88
Hiding	40	46	46	50	50
Creeping	55	56	58	70	74
Unarmed H-to-H	48	50	54	52	46
Grapple	60	68	68	64	50
Block	65	70	75	68	50
Punch	70	75	77	76	50

Weapons:

weapons	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	speed/roll	DF/DD	dam. type
HK MP5A5	1/96	1/84	1/89	3/92		22	hyd shk
(auto)	1/82	1/76	1/86	3/94		22	hyd shk
Glock 17	7/87	7/75	7/80	11/85	11/80	22	hyd shk
WA 2000 w/scope					8/128	19	hyd shk
20cm Knife	6/30	6/53	6/47	8/75	9/50	2.0	cut

*Weapons speeds include -8 adjustment for Class III Assault vest.

Dissatisfied with the failure of conventional methods to fix the flaws of "the system," this pseudo-intellectual dropped out of university to use more direct methods of effecting political change. Although probably not as effective a fighter as some, the Intellectual Terrorist has a sharp mind and is always able to improvise.

The Intellectual Terrorist believes with complete conviction in both the goals and the means of the cause. He or she will often attempt to persuade hostages and victims that the terrorists are doing them a service in trying to change society. Any victims that fail to see the point are obviously part of problem and not the solution. The Intellectual Terrorist is often obsessed with the message, and will take any opportunity to spread propaganda, even to the point of debating the terrorists' goals with negotiators. Otherwise, the Intellectual Terrorist is a cagey and careful negotiator, unlikely to fall for tricks and delaying tactics most often used by counter-terrorist agencies. When in a position of leadership, the Intellectual Terrorist is methodical and

clever, and generally gains the respect of followers through good decision-making if not the power of personality.

Terrorist Recruit

"Shut Up! I don't want to hear about last week! That woman was a victim of the war against the Capitalist Pigs. So just shut up, man!"

The Recruit has been drawn into the world of terrorism by a desire for social justice, the prospect of wealth or fame or perhaps through a personal attachment. Now, after seeing the carnage and being hunted by the law, the romance of social revolution is wearing thin. Under the skin doubt or perhaps even fear is beginning to creep in—the Recruit may have the determination and conviction to follow through with the cause, or he or she may not. The Recruit is the weak link in the chain, and is likely to hesitate, falter, make mistakes, or possibly even betray his or her comrades when the pressure mounts.

The Recruit is unlikely to be put into a position of command or negotiation—but might get stuck there if a superior is killed or the organization is very young or spread very thin. He or she is not a crafty negotiator, and knows few of the rhetorical and tactical tricks employed by counter-terrorist and law enforcement forces. In a leadership position, the Recruit is likely to be hesitant or uncertain, although not necessarily stupid or incompetent. When dealing with hostages, the Recruit might be overly-compassionate or overly-brutal—or both, varying with his or her mood.

Veteran Terrorist

"The People's Revolutionary Struggle will continue with or without me."

The Veteran is a hardened warrior, committed to the cause and always willing follow the order of a competent leader. He or she stays cool even in intense situations, but doesn't always show initiative. The Veteran may be more disciplined than even his or her leaders, and is a good choice for a second in command.

In a leadership position, and in negotiations, the Veteran is methodical and wary if not particularly inventive. He or she has realistic expectations concerning both followers and demands made on authorities. The Veteran is not overly brutal to hostages, but is detached and businesslike when it comes to retribution.

Thug/Psychopath

"Man, we don't need this many hostages. Let's kill a couple, keep the others in line. I'm gonna start with this one."

The Thug really doesn't care much about the Glorious Struggle for the Revolution. He or she was recruited for muscle, and likes to hurt people and blow things up. Cruel to the extreme, the Thug kills without remorse, and often without reason. The other guerrillas may be afraid of the Thug, and for good reason—he or she is the loose cannon whose wrong move may blow a carefully-planned operation, or who might just as easily kill one of them should the mood strike.

As a leader the Thug would probably be a disaster, succeeding only through audacity and the misplaced loyalty of his or her followers. It's much more likely that the Thug's irrationality, capriciousness, and underlying rage and cowardice would cause any plan to go to pieces, and any band of followers to desert or rebel. In negotiations, the Thug is arbitrary and completely unreasonable, and is a real danger to any hostages left in his or her care.




MAPS

Over the next few pages are a handful of maps representing locations likely to be encountered in assignments dealing with terrorism. The maps are pretty self-explanatory, and each has a fairly detailed description alongside. The legend below explains the symbols used on the maps.

The buildings and locales are furnished and outfitted as they might typically appear, but other arrangements are of course possible. The descriptive texts present them in their native condition, but they could of course be in substantially better or worse shape than described, or otherwise altered in detail or atmosphere. No cardinal directions are indicated on these maps, as their alignments can vary according to how you place them in your adventures. Obviously, then, the descriptions accompanying the maps can't talk in terms of north and south. Instead, the maps are described according to their alignment on the page—so when something is mentioned as being “above” something else, it means closer to the top of the page, not overhead or at a higher elevation.

LEGEND FOR MAPS



Terrorist Safehouse

Terrorist safe houses are locations where groups or individual terrorists can meet, stage attacks, or hide after carrying out their actions, all the while secure in the knowledge that their location is unknown and that escape is provided for. The arrangements listed here are typical—other safehouses might be located in similar apartments or in houses or other structures, and might be more or less sophisticated and well-prepared than this one.

This safe house is located in a corner apartment of a modest apartment block, on the third or fourth floor. Windows give a view of the street, and of the alley beside the building. The apartment building was chosen because it is unremarkable and quiet, primarily housing young couples and seniors who do not know their neighbors. No parking is offered, which gives the terrorist an excuse to park a few blocks away on the busy street, allowing them to use different vehicles and surveil the building before approaching. Surrounding buildings are mostly other apartments, making surveillance against the safehouse inconvenient.


A primary concern of the terrorists, besides anonymity, is escape in the case of a raid. This apartment offers a number of escape routes. The elevator and adjoining stairs are located about ten meters from the front door. Because the apartment is located on the top floor, the terrorists can climb the stairs to the rooftop, escaping across the roof of an adjoining three-story building. Alternatively, they can exit via the fire escape (heading either up or down), or cross balconies to the adjoining apartment to force their way in, and exit via the door to the hallway. A few modifications (shown as heavy dark lines) add to the apartment's defensibility—for example, the hall doorways to the main bathroom and the bedroom in the lower right have been boarded over. Anyone entering that bedroom (or heading for the fire escape) must pass through the bedroom at the upper right, and can't be cut off from the lower-right bedroom door as they flee. A lightweight blind at the end of the hallway ensures that a casual onlooker from the hallway won't see into the apartment—and that the terrorists will have at least a second or two to flee or prepare their defenses without being observed, should the alarm be raised from the front door. All of these options and escape routes are thought out ahead of time, and are known to all of the terrorists using the safehouse.

The small den in the upper left has been converted into a cell for a hostage. The large window looking out onto the balcony has been boarded over from the inside (curtains were left hung behind the boarding, so that the modification will not be seen from without), and a tent has been pitched in the room. The hostage, kept inside a featureless tent in the small room, will have no clue as to his or her location and can be easily guarded from within the room by a single guard. A portable stereo plays pop music at a moderate volume, to mute both any noises made by the hostage and any outside noises that might give away the apartment's location to the hostage.

The terrorists have added a couple of cots to the apartment's four beds, allowing it to accommodate eight or nine terrorists in relative comfort. An exercise bike, television and video library grace the living room, and a fairly large stock of food is kept on hand, minimizing the requirement for anyone to venture out should the group go to ground. Even when not hiding out, the occupants are careful to keep a low profile so that other tenants and the building manager do not know how many

are using the apartment. They have installed an extra deadbolt and brace on the front door; the manager is unaware of them (or the other modifications) and does not have a key to the deadbolt.

The terrorists construct their explosives at the table in the living room, hiding the finished materials behind a plumbing access panel in the master bathroom. When working with particularly sensitive explosives, they move the table near the windows (shades drawn, of course) and instruct cohabitants of the safehouse to remain in the lower-right bedroom, where they are least likely to be killed or injured by an accidental blast. Weapons are stored in the bedroom closets, hidden behind clothing.



Terrorist Training Camp


Training camps for would-be terrorists have been set up in a number of different locations over the past century, and have catered to a number of different clients. In the 1970s and '80s, the best known were the camps run by Palestinians near Beirut, which served as training grounds for terrorists from such diverse locations as Japan and Germany. Other training camps were sponsored by Libya, while still others could be found in South Yemen, Cuba, Russia, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, the former East Germany, and Nicaragua and other Central American nations. In the 1990s, the majority of these state-sponsored camps are found in the Sudan and Algeria, where they cater primarily to members of Islamic fundamentalist groups, especially the WIJ. Other camps are known to exist in Iran, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Cuba, and Armenia, though these see only sporadic use. But terrorists also learn their craft in less structured settings—in informal camps run by ex-soldiers in the backwoods of America, or along the country roadways of Ireland.

This typical camp is located in Algeria, and is operated by the Worldwide Islamic Jihad. It caters to a number of terrorist groups, including Al Gama'a al Islamiya from Egypt, Iraqis belonging to Al Dawa, and the Amal Militia of Lebanon, as well as the various sub-groups of the WIJ. It is a much larger and more sophisticated operation than the camp outlined in the *GM's Companion*, reflecting the fact that this camp is run by a state sponsor.

The facility was at one point a military base, and is disguised as such for the benefit of foreign photo-recon. Its buildings are all of standard military construction—plywood and steel siding, for the most part, with occasional construction of cinderblock or concrete. Trainees are quartered in large black tents at the edge of the base (upper left), while instructors live adjacent to the mess. Indoctrination and instruction takes place in the classroom buildings, which also accommodate a small mosque where prayer takes place five times daily. The camp features a large outdoor firing range, a carefully guarded arms storehouse, and a vehicle parkade where jeeps and trucks are housed. The old airstrip is rarely used for fixed-wing aircraft anymore, but serves as a helicopter landing pad. Several fuel tanks are located near the generator shack, behind the supply shack (at center). A prison, built of reinforced concrete and containing a number of small cells, stands near the middle of the camp. Here, prisoners are tried and punished according to rather draconian interpretations of Shari-ah, or Islamic law.

The upper-right corner of the camp has been turned into an obstacle course, complete with a circuit track. At the center of the obstacle course live-fire exercises are conducted—berms of earth, old tires and sandbags (the heavy grey lines on the map) keep stray rounds from escaping. A heavy, vented concrete building stands nearby, surrounded again by a ring of berms. Here, trainees learn to manufacture explosives and to construct triggers and timing mechanisms for bombs. Because both of these facilities are unusual for small military camps, they are shrouded in camouflage netting.

At the center of the camp is another structure covered in camouflage netting—an ancient Boeing 707, purchased third-hand through a front company from a minor airline. The aircraft, long non-functional with its engines removed and wings cut short, is used in training exercises in




which terrorists learn about the layout of jetliners, as well as their cockpit controls and communication devices. The aircraft is also used to help terrorists practice fending off attacks by counter-terrorist units. A handful of cars and old busses in the live-fire area serve a similar purpose.

The training camp is protected by a tall wire fence topped with concertina wire. Guards armed with automatic weapons patrol the perimeter and keep watch over the buildings and surroundings from several squat guard towers, as marked on the map.

Passenger Airliner

The maps on these pages illustrate a Boeing 747-400, the largest and one of the most common international passenger jetliners. The 747 comes in a great many variations, even within the 400 model—this map is typical of the many seating arrangements possible, though the arrangement of the galleys, restrooms, accessways, cockpit, and all elements in the lower deck does not change substantially from aircraft to aircraft. This jet seats 354 coach-class passengers, thirty-two first-class passengers, and 104 passengers in business class. Its crew consists of eight to ten flight attendants and a cockpit crew of two (a flight engineer is not required for the 747-400), although on flights lasting more than eight hours a second cockpit crew is generally seated in the upper-deck business class section.

The main deck map (below) is the only part of the aircraft seen by the majority of passengers. The aircraft is typically boarded from a door in the first-class section (indicated by a gap in the left-hand wall—all doors intended for regular use are indicated by gaps, whereas emergency doors and hatches are marked in grey). The plane must be entered via a jetway or very tall ladder—the door is almost ten meters above ground when the aircraft is on the tarmac. Two aisles run down the main deck, joined by periodic passageways at the toilets and galleys. Seats are arranged in fifty-four rows (marked along the right side of the map), with partitions dividing the deck



into a single first-class cabin (forward), a business class cabin (second forward), and three coach cabins.

A spiral staircase ascends from the first-class cabin to the upper deck (far right). The majority of this much smaller deck is taken up by a second business class cabin, along with a small galley, a couple of toilets, and the flight deck. As mentioned above, the aircraft is normally crewed by a pilot and co-pilot, although there is a third station and an observer's seat. The 747-400 features a glass cockpit, meaning that most controls are represented on a series of flat-screen video displays rather than via analog mechanical instruments. The aircraft is equipped with a GPS-augmented auto-pilot and a TCAS-II collision-alert transponder, which automatically broadcasts its identity and navigation information in response to signals from ground radar or other aircraft.

The aircraft's lower deck is dominated by its baggage compartments, although it also features a central galley accessed by an elevator from the

forward galley on the main deck (adjacent to the leading edge of the wing on the main deck map). The elevator is tiny, having just enough room for a service cart or a single person (perhaps two in a tight squeeze)—but not both. Because of the curve of the hull, the lower deck is much wider near the ceiling than at the floor—the grating pattern represents the floor itself.

The lower galley is used to store and pre-prepare the bulk of the food carried by the aircraft, and it also contains the aircraft's fresh water tanks and access to several utility panels and spaces. Since food and supplies are loaded into the plane through the forward baggage hold, there is a door to that hold in the forward wall of the galley (the hold is not generally entered when the aircraft is in flight, and any use of the access door would alert the flight deck). There is also a small emergency access hatch to the rear baggage hold, although, as mentioned below, tight-fitting baggage cannisters make it impossible to enter the rear hold.


The forward hold does not generally contain baggage cannisters, but is used for loose cargo and surplus supplies, all well-secured by straps and cargo nets when the aircraft is in flight. Even on passenger flights the holds contain quite a bit of material beyond luggage: mail bags, small quantities of air freight, live animals and other cargoes that cannot be shipped by freight companies—even coffins containing the bodies of deceased expatriates are often carried by commercial jetliners.

At the front of the plane is a small fuse locker which houses the fuse boxes for most of the aircraft's electrical systems. This is accessed from a hatch in the floor of the first-class cabin (just forward of the staircase on the main deck map). It does not have access to the baggage hold, although the only thing between them is a thin aluminum partition. Forward of the fuse

locker is the nose landing gear well. There is no access from the well to the fuse locker, either, and the bulkhead is quite sturdy as the gear well is not pressurized. There is, however, a glass peephole looking into the well, to allow a flight officer to visually check the status of the landing gear in the case of an emergency.

The aft two-thirds of the lower deck is made up of the main baggage hold. For the most part, luggage is loaded into cannisters specifically designed to fit into the odd shape of the slope-walled hold—the cannisters fit so tightly that there is no room to for a person to move between or around them. The tapered rear section, like the forward hold, is used for loose baggage of various types.

The dark grey areas on these maps represent utility spaces, which cannot be entered from within the aircraft (if at all) and which are not pressurized during flight. The space at the nose on the main deck houses the aircraft's radar (primarily a weather radar)—that at the stern contains, among other things, the auxiliary power generator.



APPENDIX: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ▼ ▼

Today the Worldwide Islamic Jyhad, God's arm of righteousness and justice, has been granted by God the ultimate tool of His fury. Tremble, cowards in your dusty halls. Tremble, oppressors and Satans. Tremble, and fear us, for the nuclear fire of God's wrath is not far in your future.

—From a Worldwide Islamic Jyhad press release, August 1994

Over the past few decades, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—weapons of mass destruction—have proliferated from the sole grip of the superpowers to the arsenals of regional powers and assorted Third World nations. The acquisition by the Worldwide Islamic Jihad of substantial quantities of plutonium marked the beginning of an era long-feared: a time when terrorist organizations have and use weapons of mass destruction.

So far, no terrorist group has made effective use of such weapons, even as a bargaining chip or blackmail device. Even the WIJ has not proved that it has a functioning nuclear weapon. Some organizations have employed poisonous gas in a limited manner (such as the nerve gas attacks in Japan in the mid-nineties), and many terrorists have been caught in the attempt to obtain nuclear or biological materials, but to date the most brutal and heinous of terrorist attacks have still been by conventional means. Nevertheless, with expanding technology and post-cold-war disarmament making so much raw material available, it's only a matter of time before someone does.

This appendix discusses some of the weapons, devices, and strategies available to terrorists looking to kill en masse. No game statistics are provided for these weapons—the intrigue around acquiring them makes

for excellent gaming possibilities, but there should be no need to quantify their effects. To survive such adventures, operatives must thwart the terrorist efforts or be far away when the weapons are used.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons are the easiest weapons of mass destruction for terrorists to obtain—as mentioned above, nerve gasses have already been used a number of times in a limited capacity. Terrorists can obtain chemical weapons by two means: through the purchase of military weapons on the international black market; or through their own manufacturing efforts. Many types of gasses are easily manufacturable through commonly-available components, with a little bit of education in chemistry, although homemade gasses and delivery systems are not generally as effectual as military devices. Military weapons, on the other hand, can be extremely potent, although most of the NATO and Soviet weapons have stayed off the black market, and those made by Third World countries (most notably Iraq) are often only marginally better than homemade devices.

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had developed both nerve gas and mustard gas, generally delivered through land mines, artillery, and bombs. In the early 1990s it was estimated to have stockpiled more than 500 tons of mustard gas and 75 tons of the nerve agent Tabun. Most of that was used or destroyed during the Gulf War, although some estimates claim that up to 100 tons of chemical weapons remained or were seized by Iran, and much of that has entered the international arms market.

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact employed chemical weapons during the cold war, primarily for delivery via field artillery and tactical missiles. Supplies of these shells were stored across Europe, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. The vast majority of these shells and warheads have been destroyed since the end of the cold war, although some stocks have fallen through the cracks, especially on the Soviet side. Although more than ninety percent of Soviet stockpiles are accounted for, hundreds of tons of weapons were lost, stolen, or seized by the unstable governments of breakaway republics in the 1990s. Fortunately, most chemical weapons have a shelf life of only a few decades—chances are that a good third or so of all the missing Soviet chemical weapons are now inert or at least diminished in effectiveness.

Homemade chemical weapons can be created in a properly equipped laboratory by any competent graduate student; the formula for making VX nerve gas (a common military agent) has been declassified and widely published. Formulas for Hydrogen Cyanide, Sarin (a nerve agent) and mustard gas, all of which date to World War I, are widely available, as is that of Tabun (another nerve agent), developed by the Germans in WWII. The ingredients for these weapons are commercially available for industrial uses, and a careful terrorist could purchase all of the necessary components and equipment with little risk of raising alarms.

The ease with which chemical weapons can theoretically be built belies the complexity of such an operation, however. Handling chemical weapons not sealed inside artillery shells (or even handling older shells that may be leaking or damaged) requires the use of protective clothing, respirators, detection equipment, and antidotes. Any large-scale manufacturing operation would require a secluded location and would be fraught with risk of accident.

A terrorist plot to employ chemical weapons must also account for dispersal. Military chemical weapons are deployed through artillery shells, mines, missiles, or bombs, or are sprayed from armored vehicles or the air. A 155mm artillery shell can spread gas over a radius of 30-45 meters, while bombs dropped by aircraft can spread a dense cloud over 30-60 meters. Both of those delivery systems rely on barrages of many shells or bombs layer an area with gas. While many gasses, especially nerve gasses, are very dangerous in even tiny doses, gas can dissipate quickly in even the lightest breeze. An effective terrorist plot must find a way to deliver a substantial amount of gas to a crowded, relatively confined area, when there's little wind or precipitation. The 1995 gassing of the Tokyo subway system optimized all of those factors, but with no ability to deliver high quantities of gas, the death toll was fortunately limited to only about a dozen.

Mustard gas, the most commonly-available military chemical weapon, causes immediate and violent inflammation of the eyes and lungs and skin rashes that quickly turn into blisters. In heavy doses it is frequently fatal—in lighter amounts its symptoms are lingering and debilitating, but not always lethal. It is heavier than air and can linger for days in depressions in the ground. Its name comes from its smell, which resembles mustard, and its ochre color.

Tabun, Sarin, VX, and other forms of nerve gasses kill by blocking the transmission of signals in the nervous system. Victims suffer immediate respiratory failure and find it nearly impossible to breathe. Victims also suffer blindness, convulsions, and loss of control over the bowels and urinary tract, and generally die within hours if they are going to. Nerve gas is lethal in tiny doses if inhaled, and can also be absorbed through the skin, although a higher dose is required. It is invisible and odorless, and heavier than air, and can remain lethal for two to three hours.

Hydrogen Cyanide blocks the transfer of oxygen from the lungs to the bloodstream. Victims die by suffocation. Hydrogen Cyanide is lighter than air and disperses quickly, and for this reason is not commonly used by military forces. It is easily manufactured, however, and may appeal to terrorist organizations for that reason.

Biological Weapons

Biological weapons generally take a back seat to chemical weapons for military and terrorist applications because they are difficult to deploy, rely on viruses that are usually slow-acting, and are hard to control since their contents, once deployed, do not dissipate as readily as a chemical gas. Nevertheless, biological weapons evoke a tremendous emotional reaction from the public, and that gives them strong potential for use by terrorists. Like chemical weapons, biological agents are available through blackmarket military channels as well as civilian sources, although in both cases availability is much more limited.

The most common military biological agent is anthrax, in a number of variants. NATO developed several anthrax weapons during the cold war. The last were slated for destruction in 1997, though it is conceivable that some small quantities of bombs slipped through the cracks and into the black market. Large numbers were stored in secret bunkers at U.S. airbases in Britain until the 1990s.

The Soviet Union also pursued anthrax as a biological weapon. In 1979, an anthrax outbreak in the Ural Mountains was attributed to the

accidental release of ten kilograms of dry anthrax spores after an explosion occurred at the Microbiology and Virology Institute in Sverdlovsk. Hundreds of people within a three- to five-kilometer radius of the lab were killed. Like the NATO weapons, most Soviet biological agents were destroyed over the past decade or so—but, as with many other Soviet weapons, many are unaccounted for. The chance of a Soviet biological weapon appearing on the black market is not high, but is much more likely than one from a NATO country.

A large array of common but dangerous bacteria are available from civilian sources. For the most part, these agents are stored and grown in medical or bio-engineering labs, for use in research. There is not much black market traffic in biological agents, but they might be found by a determined buyer, and they could easily be stolen from a low-security lab (even the Centers for Disease Control facility in Atlanta, which stores samples of all of the world's most deadly biologicals, has fairly weak security compared to a typical military base or corporate research compound). Alternatively, terrorists might simply pose as a legitimate research institute and mail-order products such as bacterial cell pastes, animal viruses, and toxic proteins. As with chemical weapons, a terrorist group needn't include a rocket scientist to store, manufacture, and deliver a biological agent, but doing so does require some pertinent education and a significant amount of effort and precaution.

A single ounce of Anthrax or Cryptococcosis introduced into a closed air-circulation system (as in an office building or commercial jetliner) could easily infect hundreds or thousands of people.

Many diseases could be delivered through tainting the public water supply downstream of local treatment plants. *Salmonella Typhoid* is a bacteria that causes a deadly form of typhoid fever. Half a kilogram of this bacteria could contaminate six million liters of water (25 million drinking glasses). The disease would develop gradually in a population, over the course of three to four weeks. Victims would suffer headaches, sore throats, and fever during the first week; abdominal pain, stupor, and diarrhea during the second week; and intestinal bleeding or rupturing during the third and fourth weeks, followed by death in one-quarter to one-third of the victims. The disease would be spread further if sanitary conditions were not maintained.

Anthrax, *Salmonella*, and other available agents such as Bubonic Plague and resistant Tuberculosis can be treated fairly successfully if identified early. There are thousands of other possible agents for terrorists to choose from, if they can get them. In 1998, a rumor even circulated through some black market circles that several vials of blood tainted with the Ebola Zaire virus were available for the right price. The rumor was almost certainly untrue—the Ebola virus does not survive well outside of a host or a controlled environment—but with a ninety percent fatality rate within ten days and no known treatment, even the credible threat of an Ebola attack could be a serious terrorist weapon.

Nuclear Weapons

In 1994 the Worldwide Islamic Jihad announced that it had a functional nuclear warhead. While it has yet to use it, the advent of nuclear terrorism can't be too far off. As with chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons can be manufactured from components obtained through civilian channels, or they can originate, either in component or complete

form, from dismantled military arsenals. Unlike other weapons of mass destruction, however, most of the key components of nuclear explosives, regardless of their origin, are highly restricted and difficult to obtain.

Obviously, the most crucial component of a nuclear bomb is the fissile material—plutonium or uranium. Plutonium is a grey metal that commonly comes in 0.9 kilogram bars or in gravel-sized pellets. Plutonium from a warhead takes the form of a fist-sized sphere, commonly called a “pit.” The danger in transporting it—and especially in shaping or milling it—lies not so much in the alpha rays emitted (easily blocked with a lead shield) but in the fact that it is extremely toxic. A few grams of inhaled plutonium dust can kill within days, and even just a couple microscopic particles ensure a lingering death from lung cancer.

Uranium is also a grey metal, also radioactive and toxic though not nearly as dangerous in either regard as plutonium. It is also not as productive as plutonium, in terms of yield: to create a blast of a few kilotons (equivalent to that at Hiroshima), a bomb would require twenty-five kilograms of enriched uranium (containing a high percentage of U-235), as compared to eight to ten kilograms of plutonium. On the flip side, whereas those ten kilograms of plutonium might go for \$500,000 to \$600,000 on the international black market (when and if it were even available), the twenty-five kilograms of uranium might be much more easily found, and purchased for as little as a quarter-million dollars.


While these purchase prices might be within the means of wealthier terrorist organizations, the expertise required to actually construct a bomb is harder to come by. The first step in making a bomb using plutonium is to melt down the nuclear material and shape it into a perfect sphere—the pit. For this process, the terrorists would need a well-equipped lab manned by at least one or two highly-educated and skilled individuals. Alternatively, the terrorists could purchase a pre-made pit, derived from a dismantled warhead (many Soviet nuclear weapons are unaccounted for, and hundreds of Russian, Ukrainian, and American warheads sit in storage awaiting destruction—but the purchase price of a ten-kilogram pit is probably well over a million dollars). Regardless of its source, the pit must then be encased in nearly 400 kilograms of high-quality conventional explosives, required to provide the uniform implosion that starts the nuclear chain reaction. The triggers for the conventional explosives are high-energy capacitors, which are even more closely regulated on the international market than the explosives themselves.

A uranium bomb poses equal difficulties. The mechanics of the bomb sound simple—a small bullet-shaped chunk of uranium is driven into a larger chunk. But the pieces of uranium need to be precisely shaped, lined up, and propelled for the explosion to occur.

A finished nuclear bomb would likely weigh at least a thousand kilos, requiring a large van or a truck for transportation. Wealthy terrorists unwilling or unable to build one on their own might be able to purchase a complete warhead from a sponsor state (Iran and North Korea both have nuclear programs and sponsor terrorism), a renegade faction within a fractured nuclear state (such as China, Pakistan, Russia, the Ukraine or possibly India), or even on the black market. Such a weapon would still require modifications, at least of its ignition circuitry, and would be much harder to transport covertly and much more likely to be sought after by one or more intelligence agencies. Off-the-shelf or home-made, even a

low-yield weapon—say, five kilotons or less—would certainly be enough to level several city blocks and to cause upwards of 100,000 deaths from blast and radiation.

Mushroom clouds, of course, aren't the only nuclear threat terrorists can bring about. An organization holding nuclear material without sufficient resources to build a true nuke might create a "poor man's neutron bomb"—a large conventional explosive designed to scatter tons of toxic and highly-radioactive debris over a city center. Finally, a terrorist might simply use the threat of a nuclear weapon to cause panic—or to blackmail governments. A grain or two of enriched plutonium or uranium is easily purchased, and can be sent to government leaders to "prove" that the terrorists mean business.



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