



ASL annual '92

FOR SQUAD LEADER ENTHUSIASTS



THE COMMISSAR'S HOUSE

HISTORICAL ASL Scenario A2



Behind the BARRIKADY, 9 November 1942: It was inevitable, I suppose. Given the wonderfully accurate maps of *RED BARRICADES*, a group of long-time playtesters could not resist the challenge of adapting the one ASL scenario (#4) set in the area to that format. Their efforts resulted in this, the second version, of the popular scenario found in *BEYOND VALOR* (the first module released for the system). Although the OBs and situation have not been dramatically altered, players will find that this version has a distinctly different pace than the original due to the terrain. As to the question of which may be "better", it appears to be a matter of individual taste—for certainly both are challenging to play.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



Only those hexes numbered 5-23 are in play.

BALANCE:

- ★ All Russian occupants of building BB18 are Fanatic while within it, as if it were a Factory.
- ✚ Extend Game Length to 9.5 Turns.

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Russians win if they have an unbroken squad (or equivalent) in either building X9 or BB18 at game end.

TURN RECORD CHART

★ RUSSIAN Sets Up First [229]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	END
✚ GERMAN Moves First [328]										

Remnants of the 118th Rifle Regiment [ELR: 3] set up east of the Perimeter (see SSR2): {SAN: 6}



4-5-8	6-2-8	4-4-7								
6	6	13	2	2	2	2	3	12		

Elements of Panzerpionier Bataillon 50 and remnants of Infanterie Regiment 577 [ELR: see SSR6] set up west of the Perimeter (see SSR2): {SAN: 3}



8-3-8	4-5-7	10-2	8-2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	6

SPECIAL RULES:

1. All RB SSR (found on the back of scenario RB5) are in effect.
2. The Perimeter is defined as running along the following roads: V0-V1-V4-V5-V9-W15-W21-Y21-Y23.
3. All Locations of building BB18 are Fortified. Within seven hexes, inclusive, of any hex of building BB18, the Russian player has Maximum (Level A) Booby Trap capability.
4. The Russian may use HIP for three squads (and all SMC/SW that stack with them).
5. Kindling is NA for the Russian player.
6. The German 8-3-8 (or equivalent HS) have an ELR of "5"; all other German units begin play with an ELR of "4".

AFTERMATH: The veteran pioneers of Major Rettenmaier had never seen a battle the equal of that for the "Red House". Although 18 were killed by a booby-trap even before the attack began, one of the enemy strongpoints—the "Chemist's Shop"—fell easily. However, the "Commissar's House" proved to be a veritable deathtrap. The red brick structure had been turned into a fortress with every opening clogged with debris, leaving the Russian defenders with barely visible peep-holes through which they fired with deadly accuracy. Even after the Germans broke into the building, the Russians refused to surrender—resisting from the cellar. Only satchel charges and cans of petrol brought a fiery end to the valiant defenders of the Commissar's House. The victory had been pyrrhic, however. The assault engineers who reached the shore were decimated. Within four days, the elite battalion had lost a third of its strength and the remnant was withdrawn to form a more effective combat group for the assaults still to come.

ASL

The Avalon Hill Game Company's ASL Annual is devoted to the presentation of authoritative articles and tested scenarios for the *SQUAD LEADER* and *ADVANCED SQUAD LEADER* game systems, wargaming's premier tactical simulation. Such articles encompass, but are not limited to, the strategy, tactics, variation, the design and historical background of the *SL/ASL* family of games and modules. The *ASL Annual* is published by the Avalon Hill Game Company (4517 Harford Road, Baltimore, MD 21214, USA) solely for the edification of the serious *SL/ASL* aficionado in the hopes of improving the player's proficiency and broadening his enjoyment of the game.

While most of the material in the *ASL Annual* is solicited by the editor, articles from the general readership are considered for publication at the discretion of the *ASL* staff. Submitted articles should be typewritten, double-spaced, and embrace the tenets of common English usage. There is no limit on word length. Accompanying illustrations for consideration should be neatly done in ink, and be paired with a hex-by-hex or unit-by-unit listing. Photographs must have caption and credit line written on the back. Rejected materials will be returned to the author whenever possible and whenever accompanied by a SASE. Potential authors are advised that accepted material becomes the sole property of The Avalon Hill Game Company upon publication. For further information, write to Rex A. Martin, c/o Avalon Hill.

Of interest also to the *ASL* buff would be Avalon Hill's bi-monthly periodical *THE GENERAL*. Despite its much broader field of interest (namely, the entire Avalon Hill line of games), rarely an issue goes by that does not have new material on the *ASL* system. Mailings are made close to the end of February, April, June, August, September and November. One-year subscriptions are \$15.00; two-year subscriptions are \$24.00. Paid advertising is not accepted, but news of importance to the gaming community is solicited. Convention announcements must be received at least six months in advance and contain information pertaining to any Avalon Hill titles for which events will be offered.

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SHOWDOWN AT TUG ARGAN PASS

ASL SCENARIO A39



TUG ARGAN PASS, SOMALILAND, 11 August 1940: Despite Mussolini's inclination to remain on the defensive in East Africa, the Duke of Aosta, in command of Italian forces in Ethiopia, believed that his best move would be to overrun British Somaliland and seal off the French in Djibouti. Somaliland, part Italian, part British and part French, was the most primitive 300,000 square miles in Africa, almost totally devoid of resources. But Somaliland also comprised the "Horn of Africa", and thus dominated the entrance into the Red Sea, Britain's vital life-line to the Middle East. Accordingly, on 3 August, Italian forces crossed the open border from Ethiopia. Splitting into two columns, the Italians struck for French Somaliland and for the crucial British port of Berbera. After taking Hargeisa, a small and undefended British town, on the 5th and then spending three days converting it into a supply dump, General de Simone, in command of the main Italian column, resumed the advance. The British, meanwhile, had moved to block the route to Berbera at Tug Argan—where six hills, each a mile apart, overlooked the winding road. Arriving at the "pass" on the 11th, de Simone did not hesitate. A heavy artillery barrage was brought down, and then an Italian brigade was hurled at the first hill, occupied by a company of Indian infantry.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

⊙ Add one MMG to the British OB.

⚡ Add one M11/39 to the Italian OB.



31	25

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Italians win if, at game end, they Control hex 25BB5 and a majority of the other Level-4-hill hexes.

TURN RECORD CHART

⊙ BRITISH Sets Up First [90]	⚡ 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	END
⚡ ITALIAN Moves First [146]										



Elements of the 3/15th Punjab Regiment [ELR: 3] set up on board 25: {SAN: 4}

4-4-7 12	2-3-7 2	9-1 1	8-1 1	8-0 1	6-14 3	2-7 2	1-12 2	5-1 [2-11] 1	8 1	5 1S 6	1S or Gun 8
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Elements of the Raggruppamento Corazzato Africa Orientale [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the west edge of board 31: {SAN: 2}

4-4-7 4	3-4-7 18	1-3-7 3	9-2 1	9-1 1	8-0 1	7-0 1	4-14 2	4-14 2	2-5 5	4-14 1	30-1 3
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SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Very Dry, with no wind at start.
2. All buildings are wooden. All Orchard and Hammada hexes are Crag; all Scrub hexes are Brush. No roads or bridges exist.
3. The British receive one module of 80+mm OBA with Scarce Ammunition, which can fire HE and Smoke.
4. The Italians receive one module of 100+mm OBA (HE and Smoke) with Plentiful Ammunition, directed by an Offboard Observer at Level 0 in any west-edge hex secretly recorded prior to British setup.
5. The four initial Italian 4-4-7s are Assault Engineers (H1.22).

AFTERMATH: Making use of combined arms but forced to cross open ground, the Italians managed to take the hill and then hold it against two determined Punjabi counterattacks that day. But assaults launched on two more hills were turned back by the outnumbered defenders, who inflicted heavy losses. No further Italian progress was made that day. Determined to break through to the coast without delay, de Simone ordered attacks against all British positions the next day, but despite heavy shelling only one more hill was cleared. Three further days of furious fighting saw the British still in position astride the pass, but by now the threat of being outflanked and overrun was too great for General Godwin-Austin to accept. On the 15th, he signalled his superiors in Cairo that he was withdrawing, and asked for evacuation from Somaliland. Covered by a rear-guard drawn from the Black Watch and Northern Rhodesian regiments, the British force embarked on waiting warships at Berbera for transport to Kenya. The Italians overran the port on 19 August. But the conquest of British Somaliland had been costly, in lives and time, for *il Duce*. And ultimately, it would prove futile: for within a year, the entire Italian empire in East Africa would be reconquered.



SOLDIERS OF THE SUN

The Japanese in ASL

By Charles Markuss

CODE OF BUSHIDO has finally filled the largest "gap" in the ASL system, and has probably been as eagerly awaited by hard-core wargamers as Allied soldiers once awaited reinforcements when fighting the Japanese. In many respects the orange-gold counters are unique in ASL; they are a wargamer's dream and behave the way we would have all cardboard troops under our command act—hard to break and, if used properly, almost unstoppable. They are tenacious in defense, and in most cases will fight to the last HS or SMC, while the abundance of snipers causes extreme discomfort and hair loss (usually torn out in frustration) to their opponents. But when ASL giveth with one hand, it taketh back with the other: the ferocious and mercurial Japanese are even less controllable than other nationalities in the system, thus providing players with many new challenges. Also welcome in *COB* are the extra overlays and rules for the Pacific Theater of Operations, which makes most of the ETO or North Africa terrain seem pretty neat and tame in comparison.

In attempting to review *COB*, this article provides some background information on the Japanese soldier and, in that process, will try to scotch a few myths about his capabilities, tactics, training, weapons and his treatment of captives. Our understanding of the IJA (Imperial Japanese Army) and IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) is not helped by the dearth of English translations of Japanese accounts of World War 2, by the profound cultural and religious differences that still exist between Japan and the West, nor by the lingering effects of skillful wartime Allied propaganda which—together with more recent products of mass-media—have so colored our perceptions. Thus, the Italian soldier is still unfairly portrayed as a genial, if boastful, coward (the butt of jokes among the ignorant); the German, likewise, as an obese and humorless moron; and the Japanese as a savage and unfeeling "inferior being". During the war, both sides resorted to crude but effective racist propaganda to belittle and dehumanize their foe; but the Allies' animal imagery was particularly malicious, pervasive and long-lasting. As early as January 1941 (i.e., be-

fore more vocal Allied "thought-control" molded attitudes and exploited prejudices even further), the British C-in-C Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, described the Japanese he had observed in China as "various sub-human species". Many memoirs of Allied soldiers' war experiences are littered with similar comments, demonstrating that even front-line troops are not always more immune to "hate indoctrination" than civilians. Even the most flattering comments about Japanese courage and stoicism are interlaced with racist metaphors, the most printable of which include "robot fanatics", "the most formidable fighting insect in history", and "soldier-ants". While such language conveys something of the understandable emotions of fear and loathing that the Japanese instilled in their enemies, this (50 years later) does nothing to demolish prejudices or promote understanding (much less reconciliation) between former enemies. Although some personal accounts of wartime experiences describe the Waffen SS in similar terms, this dehumanization of the enemy soldier is still largely reserved for the Japanese.

The causes of the war between Japan and the Allies need not be discussed here, but myths abound even with respect to the Pearl Harbor attack—which has long epitomized the Japanese at their most "typical" (i.e., engineering "ungentlemanly" and "unprovoked" assaults on a guiltless victim). In reality, as recent research shows, the US government knew, well in advance, what was to befall the United States, but chose to ignore the warnings for political reasons; in the words of one author, America was "trying to lever Japan into the war". Roosevelt's major problem was, as he himself put it, "how we [the USA] should maneuver the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves". In 1944, Britain's Minister of Production admitted that Japan "was provoked into attacking America" and that it was "a travesty of history" to allege that the USA was reluctantly forced into the war. This is not to question the morality of Roosevelt's stratagem which, by goading Japan, destroyed the prevailing

mood of American isolationism and generated instant (and essential) public support for the President's already considerable material aid to the Allied camp. Nor does the foregoing attempt to condone or belittle Japan's appalling behavior in China (including large-scale drug trafficking by the IJA), which provided the background to America's decision to go to war.

But, seen from Japan's viewpoint, the tightening Western trade embargo against her in response to her grisly adventures in China and Manchuria left Japanese leaders with a stark choice—either bow to Western pressure and quit those areas with an unacceptable loss of "face" internationally, or obtain the vital raw materials being withheld by the West by seizing the Dutch East Indies and neighboring territory. As the domestic consequences of backing down were perceived to pose a threat to Japan's militaristic regime, war was regarded as a viable foreign policy option in Japanese deliberations. Moreover, Japan felt (with some justification) that her economic exploitation of China and other areas was no worse than American or British behavior in China, in Japan itself, and elsewhere for decades previously under pretexts like the "Open Door", the "Monroe Doctrine", and the "Commonwealth" (although this did overlook the profound differences in the frequency and scale of brutality exercised by Japanese overlords compared to most others). Japan had, in any case, no intention of remaining economically subservient to the USA. To the militarists in power, war became the only "honorable" course; by 1940, more moderate Japanese politicians who still favored dialogue with the West were either behind bars or had been cowed into silence. Like Hitler, most Japanese strategists saw the Allies as morally degenerate and believed that they would quickly become war-weary and sue for peace, all of which contained an element of wishful thinking since even the military had little confidence of winning any prolonged conflict. Nor was there any deliberate intention of starting hostilities without first declaring war; this actually occurred due to blunders by the Japanese diplomatic staff and decoding problems, and the London *Times* observed

at the start of the Russo-Japanese War that such polite formalities "have been comparatively rare in modern history". If the events of this war were not warning enough for America, the US ambassador in Tokyo reported that the Pearl Harbor attack was freely rumored in the Japanese capital before December 1941. The wonder is not that Japan went to war with the West in 1941, but rather that her anti-war faction delayed it for so long.

There is also a pervasive myth that the Allies then faced Japan's full might in 1941-42—whereas in fact only 11 of her 51 divisions were employed in over-running the Pacific, and her losses (some 15000 men and 4 destroyers) were but a fraction of her enemies'. Throughout most of the war, the bulk of Japan's land forces (and, moreover, her best, qualitatively) were deployed in China and Manchuria to protect Japanese interests there since the high command saw war with the USSR as inevitable. Here much of Japan's armor and most of her infantry divisions remained until 1944: of the 51 divisions available in 1941, 35 were in China or Manchuria; in 1943, 42 (two of these armored) of the 70 mobilized were there, declining to 37 of the 97 (later 99) available between 1944 and early 1945. By mid-June 1945, 43 of the 164 (later 174) Japanese divisions mobilized were stationed there.

INFANTRY

Perhaps *ASL*'s most-inspired counter artwork to date can be found on the Japanese leader counters rated "8+1", "9-1" and higher, which depict an officer advancing with sword upraised and sidearm at the ready—brash, angry, brave but noisy—and obviously intent on winning the war all by himself. Of course, inexperienced junior officers in all armies often behave like firebrands, feeling obliged to "prove" themselves by leading from the front (or, worse, from *well in front*), but among the Japanese such attitudes and antics were commonplace. Not surprisingly, this high-profile and often highly irrational behavior, along with that unmistakable badge of officer or NCO rank (the sword), was very unhealthy. As early as 1940, German military advisors in China described to General Stilwell examples of this conspicuous posturing among Japanese officers, which the Allies soon witnessed for themselves. Indeed, after losing about half of his officers in the early part of the Bataan campaign, the CO of the 65th Brigade had to emphasize the perils to his officers of being literally the first man in the column, of issuing orders only from a standing position, of melodramatically eschewing cover, and of wearing distinctive clothing/insignia. All this in the hopes that the survivors would remain alive long enough to participate in the final push to capture the area.

Various *ASL* rules reflect this largely Japanese trait, such as the reverse side of SMC counters having "reduced" and "impaired" abilities to reflect the effect of wounds, the inability of Japanese leaders to break voluntarily, and the "automatic" wounding of leaders who fail MC, rather than the normal breaking and (hopeful) rallying in a subsequent game turn. Instead, Japanese leaders bleed—and usually die—very quickly in *ASL*, simulating the fact that loss of "face" was unthinkable to most Japanese officers. They would fight until they dropped since *bushido* (literally "military" or "knightly ways"—the precepts of knighthood) or, more accurately, the modern edited version thereof with which the Japanese had been indoctrinated since childhood, demanded death before dishonor—akin to the moral codes of ancient Rome or of medieval chivalry. Moreover, Japanese military law demanded death from any commander fleeing in the face of the enemy, failing to exhaust all possible means of continuing the fight or allowing himself to be captured. A good example of this obsession with "face" occurred in Burma when a senior Japanese officer on horseback, brandishing his trusty sword, attempted to board a British tank. Knocked off by

hammer blows to his head, he fell under the tracks but, despite his agony, then drew his pistol and fired back at the tank to save "face".

Japanese officers displayed what the British General Slim later described as a distinctly theatrical show of courage; they liked an audience and performed as if one always existed (even when totally alone). A wartime American publication noted that they were keen to demonstrate "toughness" and maintain "face", being prone to indulge in "paper heroics", which could include displays of swordsmanship on defenseless victims in front of raw Japanese troops to "blood" them. An amusing example occurred in New Guinea when an officer, "wielding his sword with theatrical fervor", and his men overran an Australian OP. Destroying the radio set with his cold steel, it was (commented the Australian account) "perhaps his first taste of action". But against men capable of self-defense such behavior had its perils, as shown by an incident in Burma when a British and a Japanese officer encountered each other while bathing in a stream. In the ensuing hand-to-hand struggle, the Japanese officer, rather than summon the help which was probably nearby, chose to fight on alone—and was drowned. Traditionally, a "dog's death" (i.e., dying in an unworthy cause) was spurned by the *samurai*. But such man-to-man encounters (blade against blade, or the equivalent) would certainly have won their approval. Such behavior, however, often made the Japanese officer a liability to his men in combat, who were sometimes needlessly sacrificed in bizarre attempts to re-enact medieval-style pitched battles. So, while the Japanese in *ASL* have a generous "5" LG factor in DYO (prior to publication it was actually "4.5"), this is more a reflection of the crucial importance of men with leadership abilities in a military machine not noted for its encouragement of individual initiative than any reflection of the quality of Japanese tactical leadership. For instance, experience indicated that while many more Japanese patrols were officer-led than Allied patrols, the former were almost always "out-patrolled" by the latter (i.e., the Allies got the better of them).

Thus Japanese leaders in *ASL* use the peculiar, Finnish-style, rank structure to simulate the fact that their eagerness to fight and strike personal blows in combat often distracted them from the (arguably) more important role of leading, guiding and supervising their men to avoid or quickly correct foul-ups in battle. There were many complaints of poor leadership, inadequate supervision and the lack of any sense of responsibility among Japanese officers more engrossed with the lottery of the melee and the need to lead by aloof personal example. *ASL* penalizes this "hands-on" approach with less generous leadership DRMs compared to the other non-Finn leader counters, while their Commissar-like attributes in the game reflect their often unintelligent fanaticism and the fear that their subordinates had for them due to the power of life and death that they so casually exercised. It was commonplace for Japanese leaders to despatch wavering or wounded men, who were encouraged to indulge in hero-worship (modern "neobushido" again) and taught to obey orders unquestioningly, and so were willing tools for their leaders to wield. Moreover, the Japanese soldier probably had a greater (albeit often unjustified) faith in his officer than the usually more cynical and less impressionable Allied or other Axis troops, at least until the tide of war turned against Japan with a vengeance and some cases of insubordination and even "fraggings" of selfish or over-aggressive Japanese officers were recorded. In addition, since most Japanese soldiers avoided or shirked any responsibility, even greater burdens were placed on officers—further aggravating bad tactical leadership. The armed forces of Japan were far more polarized than most Western counterparts, with a comparatively small group of innovators who were a revered and privileged elite (the commissioned officers) on the one hand, and a large and

mostly uneducated group with few if any privileges (the rest) on the other. There was little common ground between these two extremes, and hence there was little fraternity to soften the differences in rank.

Below staff rank, most Japanese officers in the field had few reservations about sharing the hardships of their men. But this egalitarianism was less common in barracks, and officers were taught to be (and their men encouraged to regard them as) "fathers", "mothers" and "older brothers" to their subordinates—although by Western standards (at least) the treatment meted out by superiors to those of lower rank was harsh and usually downright brutal. In this respect, Japan's armed forces did not mirror Japanese society, for once in uniform "whatever his lineage or social position the son of a nobleman might be slapped across the face by the son of a peasant" and some higher-ranking officers would violently bully or otherwise humiliate subordinates in full view of the latter's own men! Such means were also resorted to in "settling" disputes between more technically competent subordinates and their superiors in matters such as the tactical deployment of artillery or armor—which goes some way to explain the Commissar-like demand for obedience to the letter at the expense of tactical efficiency, and the performance of officers who often carried a chip on their shoulder when going into battle (not the best incentive for behaving rationally).

With a range factor of just "4" for even the elite Japanese squad and a "3" for the conscript MMC, they do badly in comparison to most other nationalities in *ASL* and most of their opponents enjoy at least parity—and often have a one- or two-hex range advantage over them. The poor range factor simulates various difficulties under which Japanese troops operated.

First, most Allied soldiers agreed that on the whole the Japanese soldier was a bad shot, probably because marksmanship was given a lower priority than achieving skill with the bayonet. Ideally, bayonet practice was conducted for hours on a daily basis when opportunity allowed (at the expense of target practice) and even had recreational status. Only one source consulted by the writer speaks favorably of "Nipponese marksmanship" (an editorial in *Purnell's History of the Second World War*, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1968), and this compliment is made in the context of defensive fire against US amphibious landings—where the Japanese would have plenty of good targets at which to fire. A British liaison officer serving with Chinese guerrillas in Malaya observed that only his own irregulars shot worse than the Japanese. Significantly, firing from the hip (i.e., less accurately) was advocated in some published hints/guides for the Japanese soldier.

Second, as already noted earlier, Japanese tactical leadership left a lot to be desired, and most officers seemed all-too-willing to squander the lives of their men for very meager tactical returns (despite numerous exhortations to kill as many "foreign devils" as possible) in *banzai* charges against Allied troops in good defensive positions and possessing heavy firepower. While colonels and above usually (but not always) had fairly good tactical sense and were less hot-headed than their subordinates, they were no more able to exercise a tight control on their volatile underlings in the heat of battle than a player in *ASL* can confidently predict how his forces will behave under fire. It was difficult for commanders to prevent such irrational behavior on the battlefield amid the noise, confusion, limited visibility, distractions and poor communications often prevalent. Moreover, "walkie-talkie" radios as an aid to tactical control were not widely available to the Japanese; the typical outfit for a whole Japanese *division* included just eight radios over and above those for air-to-ground liaison, and few were man-portable in the context of frequent, rapid moves of the sort simulated in *ASL*. Although walkie-talkies did exist in the IJA/IJN, they

were not only scarce but of poor quality and generally poorly-protected against the damp climate; thus their performance was even worse than Allied equipment. Runners and messengers were a poor but necessary substitute, especially at night in jungle terrain, and the comparatively large 13- or 15-man Japanese squad (and similarly proportioned platoon and company TO&Es) further burdened officers in their attempts to control their comparatively unwieldy formation in close terrain.

Third, poor Japanese tactical doctrine played a role. Although they had experienced some of the horrors of 20th century warfare during the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese conflict and paid some lip-service to the tactical changes that developments in weapons technology deemed imperative, in practice the IJA lagged behind most of its enemies. The Japanese military was not blind to the lessons the Great War, but its direct participation was not a particularly traumatic experience and the capture of Germany's former colonies in the Far East had a positive (i.e., uplifting) rather than a negative (and salutary) impact on the Japanese people. There was no Japanese equivalent of Verdun, the Somme or Gallipoli—until World War 2. In theory, Japanese tactical doctrine advocated infiltration, night attacks, speed and surprise at all times, the maximum use of deception, bold outflanking movements, attacks on the enemy's rear and the deployment of snipers behind enemy lines (most of which was a throw-back to Germany's excellent *stossgruppen* tactics of 1917-18). But alas, when these methods seemed to fail in producing the quick tactical results expected, Japanese officers invariably lost patience—and reason—and resorted to their favorite ploy, the all-out frontal attack using cold steel and hot air, regardless of losses, with often inadequate fire support. Even against the largely untrained and/or badly equipped Allied forces opposing them in the early PTO campaigns, such tactics caused the otherwise cunning and opportunistic Japanese heavy and unnecessary losses (as on Bataan, in Johore, on Luzon, in Burma, China, Hong Kong and on Wake island). Only later in the various PTO land campaigns did they begin to absorb the hard lessons of indulging in such blind and fanatical aggression; but judging by events in Burma, the Philippines and Okinawa even late in the war, for every veteran "convert" to rational modern military behavior, there were many more benighted die-hards. Ironically, in the later stages of the 1942 Bataan campaign, the Japanese did resort to careful fire-and-movement tactics after previous drubbings, but clearly this tactical wisdom was not widely exported to anywhere else.

This fatal flaw in Japanese tactical thinking (or rather, non-thinking) was a legacy of 19th Century European (especially French) military practice which flew in the face of the bloody lessons of the American Civil War. Under marshals Foch and Joffre, France had embraced the former's *Offensive à Outrance* theory, which attributed an almost mystical value to the attack in battle and argued that the attacker possessed an "ascendancy", and so enjoyed a "moral superiority" over a defender far outweighing the advantages conferred by defensive deployment. Technological developments (which favored the defense and made frontal assaults foolhardy) were totally ignored. Foch's theory was not exposed as the mumbo-jumbo that it really was until the carnage began on the Western Front in 1914. The IJA was not alone in combining Foch's irrational tactics with more subtle, rational ploys; the Soviets—especially—often took unnecessarily heavy losses as a result but, unlike the Japanese, Russian manpower was almost inexhaustible, and being a land-locked power the Soviet Union could transport and supply her forces with relative ease (therefore, making them more expendable). Japan had none of these advantages and could not afford to use such expensive and, in the long term, self-defeating tactics. Defensive tactics, despite becoming increasingly important and appropriate in

the face of the mounting Allied counter-offensive, were held in contempt by the IJA (at best, the defensive posture was a temporary lull and springboard for further offensive action) and were thus neglected in training. This in turn led to unimaginative, dogged and "last man" resistance in gradually untenable or irrelevant positions. One of the few exceptions to this rule was the defense of Peleliu in its initial stages; even on Okinawa, the brilliant Japanese defense in depth and careful husbanding of men and materiel in the early stages of the fighting was squandered in a hopeless, old-style, counterattack that cost the Japanese their best formations. Although the defense of Okinawa bought Japan time to prepare for Allied invasion these changes in tactics came too late to avoid the defeat caused, in part, by less inspired methods elsewhere.

Fourth, and coupled to this over-aggressiveness, Japanese tactics and operational planning were inflexible, unimaginative and persistent in application (i.e., predictable). Accounts of the fighting in the PTO give numerous examples of the Japanese failing to change unsuccessful plans or tactics in a given situation . . . and paying the penalty. Examples include an obsession with occupying the high ground, which "was a magnet to Japanese planners", and a stubborn refusal to alter plans even after the secrecy of lines of approach, assembly areas or the advantages of surprise had been hopelessly compromised—usually due to the appalling standards of Japanese security (accounts of valuable intelligence material being found on dead Japanese who should have destroyed it or left it behind before going into battle are legion). Changing a plan was regarded as an admission of error (hence a weakness) which meant loss of "face". As early as 1936, a former Japanese Premier complained that middle-ranking officers lacked objectivity, thus preventing them making rational assessments of events, with a disastrous effect on the battlefield in later years. As these men were, in practice, the teachers and mentors of junior officers (and, potentially, a restraining hand on their excessive zeal) this was doubly unfortunate for the IJA. In the early stages of the Pacific war this Japanese rigidity in tactics tended to reinforce success, despite often being costlier than necessary, and it did at least ensure against an unfavorable result in combat (since success in combat is no foregone conclusion, as *ASL* shows); but in the later stages of the war against seasoned, well-trained and better-equipped foes, such inflexibility merely compounded failure and enabled the Allies to—quite literally—massacre their opponents and inflict wholly disproportionate losses on them. This was a complete reversal of the situation earlier in the war, and the "exchange rates" of 1944-45—running at anything between 10 and 100 (or even more) Japanese for every Allied soldier lost—cannot be explained away just by the Japanese reluctance to surrender. Appalling tactics, like those on Bataan in 1942 to provoke jams or misfires among Filipino MGs and thus capture them by the callous use of human "bait", does.

Fifth, even when Japanese tactics were appropriate (or at least adequate), the advantages of careful reconnaissance and surprise were often thrown away by poor fire discipline or, far worse, by unnecessary noise. Resorting to noisy ruses to generate enemy "jitter" fire, and so reveal dispositions, denies an opponent sleep, generally demoralizes him or causes casualties from "friendly fire" and is a valuable technique and by no means unique to the IJA, but the Japanese tended to persist with such ploys long after their enemy was wise to them—with predictable results. Moreover, the Japanese were also indifferent to (and careless in) the need to remain stealthy when preparing to attack; they would blow bugles, shout, sing, chant, chatter, throw firecrackers or taunt their foes, especially at night. Such behavior was not always due to the need to boost their own morale, but was often caused by drunkenness or the influence of narcotics used to ward off the pangs of hunger. And it

smacked of a profound contempt for their foes (which was, increasingly, unjustified) which the Japanese soldier—on an individual basis—only lost if he was lucky and survived long enough. Japanese troops were initially "disgusted" by the reluctance of Filipino or US soldiers to conduct *banzai* charges on Bataan, while elsewhere it was alleged that Americans suffered from mental derangement, a morbid fear of the Japanese soldier, and thus were prone to nervous breakdowns or even suicide. "The Yankees are cry-babies," claimed the Japanese propagandists, while their own troops were accorded almost supernatural abilities. The British were regarded as lazy, effete and outdated. As early as the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China, the Japanese were contemptuous of the open-order tactics used by British colonial troops; the British military attaché there reported that the Japanese equated a "good fight" with heavy losses among their own men, and during the Anglo-Japanese assault on Germany's Chinese colony of Tsingtao in November 1914, the Japanese complained of the "slow" (and cautious) advance by their allies (which, however, cost them only 74 casualties compared to Japan's loss of 1866 men). Such contempt extended to the highest levels, and the 1944 *Ha-Go* offensive in Burma was a classic example of how the IJA became "hypnotized" by the previously poor performance of Allied troops, whose allegedly poor fighting qualities became enshrined in a creed which preached that Japan would not be defeated for generations (by which time the Allies would sue for peace). Even in 1945 a former Japanese military attaché who had served in the USA assured his men that American troops tended to launch "bold and reckless headlong rushes when the military situation develops badly for them" and urged "a violent surprise attack" in response, illustrating how little the Japanese had the measure of their enemies after nearly four years of war.

Sixth, the lack of personal initiative in Japanese soldiers of all ranks was the product of a very rigid social order in which education (increasingly militarized over preceding decades) taught the individual to "obey without question" almost as a religious directive, while *bushido*'s "obedience" ethic also fostered the concept of paternalistic government rendering the individual dependent on the state—and thus conveniently subservient, readily obedient, apt to shirk responsibility and lacking in initiative. These traits were then reinforced by the brutality to which recruits and even veteran soldiers were subjected by their superiors (horses and weapons got better treatment) in order to keep everyone in their respective places within the military hierarchy. The "system" was far more paternalistic and oppressive than even Britain's regiment system, and at the very least was on a par with the Red Army's or China's. Furthermore, the military itself had a tradition of issuing rigid, over-detailed and binding orders that left little scope for interpretation or changes due to unforeseen developments. Troops were expected to bear hardships and face death stoically without complaint—not make decisions. Allied accounts contain numerous examples, like the human AT mines in Burma who remained in their foxholes passively, making no attempt to defend themselves or blow-up Allied infantrymen because they had been ordered to attack only tanks. When their leaders became casualties, Japanese troops invariably either blindly followed their last orders or noisily milled about in confusion.

Seventh, inadequate training was also a Japanese feature. Pre-war conscripts normally served for two years (later three), but the deteriorating war situation shortened this training period, after 1942, to three months or less before men left for the front. Even in 1941-42, some formations were raw; the 65th Brigade on Bataan had received less than a month's training, and the Imperial Guards Division in Malaya, while expert at ceremonial drill, had last seen action in 1905. Some officers complained of the 65th's low

standards and poor training, observing that their men bunched too close together, moved carelessly down roads, gave insufficient attention to tackling Allied defensive works or to constructing their own. In Malaya, similar complaints were made about poor map-reading, inadequate standards of patrolling and bad artillery-infantry cooperation, together with abysmal leadership and a lack of fighting spirit among both officers and men. Early in 1944, the CO of one division in Burma bemoaned his "passive, conservative and thick-headed NCOs and men . . . badly commanded and controlled". All this is a far cry from the stereotyped view of the Japanese soldier as a highly trained warrior.

Eighth, and partly responsible for this inadequate training, was the ineptitude of the IJA's Personnel Bureau of the Imperial General HQ in placing senior commanders into certain field commands; there was an unfortunate tendency to choose officers who, due to past personal animosities, were incapable of working together harmoniously or effectively—with unfortunate results for Japan. For example, due to such personality clashes, many divisional COs or leaders of lower rank preferred to ignore unpalatable orders. The Imperial Guard went into battle virtually untrained for war not because of a lack of opportunity but because orders to train rigorously had been ignored, and its inferior performance was further matched by its failure to cooperate with other formations in Malaya. Initially this did not prejudice success but did greatly increase the "butcher's bill" for Japan unnecessarily. In Burma, personal rivalries between commanders compounded the already poor liaison between the participants of the 1944 offensive. (This behavior can be likened to that of some British units which nurtured an unhealthy conceit of themselves and took the notion of "independence" in action to extreme, even absurd, lengths.) The abortive attempts to mix elements of two Japanese divisions on Okinawa was a prime example of one formation viewing the other as "weaker", while attempts to launch coordinated attacks with the 44th IMB there also foundered on the rock of organizational arrogance. In Burma, the old IJA/IJN rivalry, so bitter at higher levels, also manifested itself when the 13th Naval Guard Force chose to break out from Rangoon alone (and after the IJA had gone) to demonstrate its independence, but by then all paths were blocked and only three of 1200 participants survived. Similar examples on a larger scale include the return of IJN troops to the Oroku Peninsula of Okinawa rather than stand side-by-side with the IJA elsewhere, and the IJN commander's decision to turn Manila, declared an open city by the IJA, into another Stalingrad at the cost of 21000 men (and Lord knows how many Filipino civilians). In some cases, Japanese units even refused the help of neighboring formations for the sake of "honor" (or "soldier's compassion"), particularly if they had suffered heavy losses in trying to secure some elusive military objective, as at Sangshak in Burma. But Japanese commanders alone were not to blame for this situation, for like the British army the IJA was something of a tribal organization with regional recruiting further encouraging an excessive spirit of competition. Off the battlefield, too, departing Japanese units had a habit of spoiling or destroying any remaining supplies that had to be left behind rather than leave them for the relieving unit, a senseless policy given Japan's profound logistical weaknesses and the resultant mass-starvation and epidemic among troops. As morale disintegrated in 1945, this also manifested itself in undisciplined foraging that left nothing for following units, and formations would not hesitate to steal from one another when opportunity permitted.

Lastly, these negative traits were reinforced by the IJA's enthusiasm for splintering formations and for maintaining a large number of independent units which were thrown together as *ad hoc* forces for one operation as short-lived *kampfgruppen* but possessing

rather selfish, British-style, loyalties rather than a more professional, German, approach to the good of all. Coupled with often poor liaison, bad coverage of unit boundaries and the Japanese habit of throwing reinforcements into battle piece-meal, these characteristics impaired the efficient usage of forces. Armor/artillery/infantry cooperation was not a Japanese strength either. For the foregoing reasons (and perhaps because many Japanese unit were overcome by excitement for the battle at the expense of reason and rationality), the IJA's tactics were extremely wasteful of manpower, relying on the immense courage and individual skills of the Japanese soldier rather than on any innate intelligence; given the above, the specific exclusion of the Japanese from ASL's Field Promotion rules is to be expected. The "Stealth" advantages of Japan's Elite and First Line squads is more a reflection of their ferocity in close combat than for their quiet efficiency on the battlefield; certainly the Japanese could remain silent when they deemed it necessary (e.g. when infiltrating, which they sometimes conducted on a very large scale indeed), and would then take great pains to suppress all noise. Their "+1" Night Recon DRM reflects this and also their ability and willingness to move close to enemy positions, as well as their ruthlessness in sending men in ones and twos to deliberately draw enemy fire (in which role they were deemed expendable).

The "8" morale factor of Japanese Elite squads will doubtless surprise no one, although some readers may wonder why "8" is not more appropriate than "7" for the First-Line and Second-Line squads as well. However, the wide gulf in training, competence, leadership, weapons, physical fitness and diet (combat troops naturally got priority in receiving rations and anti-malarial drugs) did have an effect on morale even among the Japanese. There is little need to dwell at length on the stoicism of their soldiers, and in ASL we would expect them to be exempted from the need to take a PAATC, to be immune from Disruption, from surrender by the RiPh method, and from lowered morale penalties if Encircled. Similarly, the Japanese MMCs' treatment of LLMC as mere LLTC (if not already broken themselves) and their greater tendency to go berserk—with a DRM to "Heat of Battle" dice rolls—need no explanation.

Briefly, the fanatical resistance and resilience under fire displayed by the Japanese stemmed from a number of factors. In the first place, the *bushido* spirit demanded that suffering and hardship be borne bravely without complaint, imposing a form of self-discipline. Secondly, many Japanese believed through persistent indoctrination that the greatest personal fulfillment attainable was to die a hero's death in battle and thus be assured a place in Heaven, linked to the old ethos that death was nothing to fear and preferable to dishonor. Thirdly, the brutal discipline of Japanese military life made retreat (let alone surrender) a crime under the Military Penal Code, and demanded suicide even from Japanese POWs who subsequently escaped and regained their own lines. Fourth, the fact that the Japanese would often kill their own comrades if they attempted surrender was a powerful disincentive to be rational and quit. And, fifth, Japanese education and propaganda (the two were almost synonymous) convinced most soldiers that their foes were racial inferiors—or at least barbarians—and should be resisted "tooth and nail". Lastly, regional recruiting fostered strong regimental loyalty and unit cohesion.

But, although a Japanese soldier on Bataan boasted "We are the peepul [sic] who are not afraid to die by boolets [sic]", this was not always, literally, true. As ASL shows, Japanese morale was not unbreakable and as early as 1937 morale in China was low (albeit somewhat localized and quarantined). On Bataan by February 1942—before reinforcements arrived—Japanese morale was so low that troops were reluctant to enter the jungle and face the Allies without air support. In Burma too, morale collapsed after the

defeats at Kohima and Imphal in 1944 and many units were difficult to control in the retreat. By January 1945, morale everywhere in Burma began to crack, and was completely destroyed by June, when desertions increased significantly. In China and on Okinawa, the fighting indicated that there were limits to even the Japanese soldier's mental and physical resilience, while in the Philippines elements of the former Kwantung Army suffered a rapid collapse in morale when the futility of their tactics was brutally exposed by the Americans' more rational and professional approach to war. All these instances demonstrated that, given sufficient pounding, particularly by heavy bombing, flamethrowers or (ironically) by the use of bayonet charges, even the Japanese would break. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that this process took longer to work against the Japanese than most other troops, and their morale recovered rapidly (as on Bataan or—however briefly—in Burma in late 1944) given time and opportunity.

The popular view of the Japanese soldier's apparently unbreakable morale has been colored by the durability of a comparatively small number of personnel who refused to surrender until well after Japan's own capitulation. The last man (so far) who has come home from the war gave up as recently as 1974. But this has drawn attention away from the other side of the proverbial coin. For all the military zeal of the Japanese, draft-dodging in wartime was not unknown, and there were also desertions, albeit on a smaller scale than those from Western armies. The statistics are incomplete and not directly comparable with those for other armies in that methods of compilation, criteria and dates do not always coincide, but as a rough guide they are interesting. In 1939, the 669 Japanese defections/desertions represented about 9.71% of British desertions; in 1943, 1043 Japanese desertions/defections equated to about 6.59% those for Britain and 1.55% of Germany's. In the first seven months of 1944 there were 2025 Japanese "losses" from this cause, or about 20.55% of Britain's and 1.71% of Germany's (both the latter percentages calculated *pro rata* from the year's figures). US Army figures are unavailable, but overall desertion rates tend to be at least as high as those for the British military.

There is some evidence that, in the long term, the ladder of brutality within the IJA, far from promoting unit cohesion or discipline, actually undermined both. Initially, at least most soldiers accepted this brutal regime and the wanton neglect that many (but not all) senior Japanese officers displayed towards their men, as the rightful prerogative of superior rank. Certainly many NCOs—the main protagonists in the brutalization of Japanese personnel—loved the military life because (in peacetime at least) it offered an escape from the grinding poverty of rural Japan and provided plenty of subordinates to pamper them or act as docile victims on whom they could vent their anger. The latter were conditioned, and expected, to vent theirs on the enemy. But Japan's declining fortunes, the often senseless brutality inflicted on them from above, the fact that when supplies ran low the officers got priority in food while their men starved, and the gradual exposure of Japanese propaganda as a tissue of lies, coupled with the slow realization that Allied military prowess and industrial power had been grossly underestimated, slowly ate away at Japanese morale, breaking down the power of officers and the awe with which their men regarded them. The tense, fragile officer-man relationship gradually changed (also partly due to the decline in officer quality) and fear was often replaced by contempt and the more pressing concern of finding food. Perhaps the nadir of Japanese officer-man relationships was reached on New Guinea when vessels carrying the top brass to safety (well fed while their men starved) threw starving or wounded men overboard during the evacuation by sea. However atypical and localized, such actions scotch the myths about discipline in the IJA.

ASL tries to simulate the realities in that, when a Japanese MMC fails a MC it is flipped to reveal a lower firepower factor with unimpaired morale—the loss of a few men being of little concern to Shintoist warriors in so large a squad. Only further blows will make the unit crack, with the 2nd-Line and Conscript squads suffering reduced morale and other penalties. This need for an opponent to literally chip-away at Japanese MMCs sets them apart from other forces in the game (although its extension to other nationalities in ASL could perhaps be justified). But such treatment is reserved exclusively for the Japanese to capture the “feel” of the howling, seemingly unstoppable groups of self-styled neo-samurai. The high levels of unit cohesion enjoyed by the Japanese for most of the war is reflected in ASL by their -2 DRM to the Battlefield Integrity check DR, while the gradual decline in Japanese ELR simulates their waning fortunes over the period 1940-45 and its effect on discipline and morale (plus the necessity of using less-than-experienced troops). Benefiting from their successes (at least tactically) in China, the high point in Japanese elan and ELR parallels the early successes against the Western Allies in the PTO, but as further victories eluded them and enemy preponderance became increasingly obvious, Japanese arrogance and optimism turned to despair and grim stoicism. By 1944 the forces in China and Manchuria—milked of their best troops—were in a hopeless position to resist the expected Soviet offensive, and the troops knew it. This variation in Japanese ELR values, based on scenario date and location, reflects this terminal decline in Japan’s military fortunes and its effect on the troops in the field.

UNIQUE TRAITS

In ASL’s published scenarios the Japanese forces usually have a higher SAN value than their opponents, and in DYO scenarios the SAN can be raised at half the “normal” cost, to simulate the historical Japanese enthusiasm for deploying snipers (or, more accurately, “sharpshooters” as improvised snipers, for the vast majority were neither trained nor equipped to be true snipers and were merely infantrymen who had infiltrated into or stayed behind in good firing positions to cause trouble). The common “sharpshooter” was often more a nuisance than a danger, as shown by one Japanese soldier at the siege of Kohima in Burma who missed a British battalion CO sitting on a tree-stump in broad daylight from 100 yards, only to be shot with three rounds by a British soldier even though his target was hidden by a tree. The real Japanese sniper was better camouflaged, had a telescopic sight on his rifle (which clarified rather than magnified targets by clearing away haze and other distractions to make objects stand out better), concentrated rations and perhaps even binoculars. This far more formidable individual was much harder to deal with; on Okinawa one sniper killed or wounded 22 Americans before being eliminated, and another, in Burma, shot eight officers over a three-week period and eventually escaped despite vigorous counter-measures. The sniper or sharpshooter was a particularly economical and effective ploy for tying down and eroding the strength of enemy units, as demonstrated to perfection on Bataan in 1942, although the placement of snipers there was found to be “repetitious” and thus enabled the Allies to conduct successful sniper-hunts (even dynamite was used to fell the trees concealing them). Such Allied “victories” could be pyrrhic; on Timor in February 1942, all but 78 of 630 Japanese soldiers parachuted in to snipe at the retreating Australians were killed, but they had delayed their foes long enough for other Japanese units to cut off their retreat and force them to surrender. In Burma too, massed “snipers” were encountered, and in February 1945 over 100 were eliminated in one area between the Welaung and Meiktila roads alone.

The “-2” Concealment DRM and enhanced HIP capabilities given to the Japanese infantry, and the automatic HIP awarded to Japanese pillboxes, simulate the excellent camouflage skills that became a hallmark of the IJA. Positions were nearly always so well concealed as to be completely undetectable even a few feet away. Once in their positions, the Japanese became “invisible” (as a veteran described them). Apparently they learned their concealment skills from the Chinese prior to 1941, who even tied foliage to the tails of cattle to hide them from air attack. The Japanese still used heavy vehicle camouflage despite enjoying almost total air superiority in 1941-42. This flair for camouflage was all the more dangerous given the formidable nature of Japanese pillboxes and other defensive works—the Japanese had the ability to construct almost invulnerable bunkers with interconnecting tunnels deep underground from whatever materials were locally available, and these taxed to the full the Allies’ best efforts in trying to reduce them.

Because Japanese military personnel (and civilians) were not supposed to let themselves be captured, they received almost no instructions in how to behave if this actually occurred. Consequently they usually revealed, willingly, much useful information and only rarely was torture or other “persuasion” needed. A number of Japanese even became, in turn, interrogators for the Allies or otherwise offered their services, and for these reasons non-Soviet interrogations of Japanese prisoners in ASL receive a “-1” DRM. (The less subtle—hence less effective—Russian methods tended to harden captives into further passive resistance, since they confirmed the perceptions gained by the Japanese from their own anti-Allied propaganda.) This no doubt helped assuage the feelings of guilt that a Japanese soldier may have felt for being taken alive. Given that very few of the 500,000 or so Japanese POWs in Soviet hands ever returned to Japan (as late as the 1970s, 300,000 of these we still unaccounted for) the specific exclusion of the Soviets from this modification to the Interrogation rules in ASL appears justified. However, good Allied treatment did not always guarantee meek, submissive Japanese POWs. In New Zealand, 240 Japanese prisoners objected to performing labor duties in February 1943 and attacked their guards with stones, leaving 48 Japanese dead and 74 wounded; at Cowra in Australia, about 1,000 Japanese POWs orchestrated a mass breakout in August 1944 which left 234 of them dead (the rest were quickly recaptured).

Again, the specific inclusion of the Japanese in the No Quarter/Massacre rules needs little explanation, given that they judged the behavior of captured troops by their own, fairly unique, set of values, and that the end was considered to justify the means in acting so brutally (i.e., by winning the war such transgressions from civilized behavior would not have to be punished). There was little real incentive to show compassion, despite *bushido* having also contained a “benevolence” ethic that advocated treating defeated foes chivalrously (this had been conveniently filtered-out of the neo-bushido doctrine of the late 19th and 20th centuries). Various reasons have been suggested to explain Japanese atrocities on and off the battlefield which, for space reasons, cannot be discussed here. Suffice to say that the Japanese behaved well towards their POWs in the 1904-05 war against Russia and against the Germans in 1914-18, and that during World War 2 the Allies reciprocated with sometimes equal cruelty once stories of Japanese handiwork got out. For the sake of balance, it must also be stated that some Japanese personnel—either individually or collectively—treated their captives well; those on a large scale included the POW camp in Saigon (where only two of 2,000 inmates died, both from natural causes) and the good treatment meted out to the wounded members of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade left behind at the battle of Sangshak in Burma in 1944, some of whom were even

hospitalized—a rare “luxury” for most Japanese, let alone their enemies. Moreover, even if the merits of strategic bombing are left aside, the Western Allies (much less the more unrestrained Soviets) hardly emerged from World War 2 smelling of roses; they too upon occasion took hostages, murdered prisoners and—sometimes—civilians. While the Axis certainly behaved appallingly towards conquered peoples, in an anti-insurgency context at least the Allies did too in various places before, during and after WW2 (be it Aden, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, China, Indo-China, Ireland, Latin America generally, or Tibet—to name a few). Although 27% of Allied POWs in Japanese captivity died (compared to only 4% in German and Italian hands), recent revelations about the mass-starvation—through willful neglect in at least some of the cases—of Germans in Allied POW camps after the war ended shows that brutality and indifference to suffering among the vanquished was by no means just a Japanese, or Axis, trait. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that the Japanese treated their own soldiers and civilians little better, for the welfare of the individual (especially those of lowly rank) was considered of little consequence in Japanese thinking.

In view of the comments immediately above, the rules in ASL allowing Japanese personnel to commit *hara-kiri* (or more politely, *seppuku*) and effectively “self-destruct” are also necessary to provide flavor of a fairly unique and striking kind. Wounded troops, especially, were regarded as an impediment to military operations and, just as personnel were often psychologically pressured into joining *kamikaze* units, so there was a battlefield convention of not becoming a burden to others through sickness or wounds. Traditionally, of course, suicide was synonymous with ritual disembowelment (*hara-kiri* meaning “belly slit/cut”). Although more modern methods were usually used in World War 2, Japanese soldiers had few scruples about killing wounded personnel or themselves to avoid capture.

INFANTRY WEAPONS

The extent of Japan’s folly in going to war with the USA (even allowing for the latter’s preoccupation with helping to defeat Hitler first) can be gauged by the fact that in 1944 Japan produced but a fraction of the armaments that America, let alone the entire alliance, manufactured, achieving just 4% of US mortar output, 6.5% of her small arms munitions, 8% of AA ammunition and 4.7% of her tank production. When Japanese weapons manufacture peaked earlier in the war, it barely equalled 10% of American output. Even in peace-time, Japan was self-sufficient only in sulphur, copper, zinc and mica, and depended on imports of everything else (including oil and most of her food). Thanks to the Allied war of attrition against Japanese merchant shipping (for which most credit must go to US submarines), by 1945 her industry was grinding to a halt for want of raw materials, most of the armaments that were produced were either stranded in Japan or littering the ocean floor, and the national diet was well below subsistence level. It is ironic that, whereas IJN destroyer captains escorting Allied convoys in the Mediterranean during the Great War sometimes committed *seppuku* after “losing” merchantmen to U-boat attacks, for most of the 1941-45 war few naval officers showed serious inclination to play “Mother Hen” to vital and vulnerable cargo ships, preferring instead to try to refight the battle of Tsushima with aircraft carriers. In-fighting between the IJA and IJN hardly helped matters, and violent arguments over the allocation of Japan’s inadequate and steadily shrinking shipping resources even led to fist-fights among the top brass! In desperation, the IJA was forced to build and man its own small supply submarines with no help whatsoever from the IJN, an appalling waste of scarce resources. These blunders were compounded by the fact that Japan mobilized less than 10% of the civilian scientists

available to the Allies and, like the Germans, wasted their talents through poor coordination and unnecessary duplication of effort. The net result was that, while each GI in the PTO was supported by an average of four tons of equipment, each Japanese soldier had just two pounds available. Even in the Bataan campaign, Japanese aircraft bombs were sometimes improvised from iron pipe with fillings of scrap farm machinery, clocks or automobile parts—and even rocks or cans were sometimes dropped instead of bombs. Thus, while Japan mobilized more infantry divisions than the USA, the declining quality of available personnel was aggravated by the growing inability of her industries to equip, clothe, feed and supply them; behind the veneer of numbers stood an increasingly ramshackle war machine.

Given their (normatively) large 13 or 15-man infantry squads, the low "4" FP factor of even the best Japanese MMCs in ASL appears to be ungenerous, but in reality the Japanese soldier's fearsome reputation concealed considerable handicaps, and the wonder is that he achieved as much as he did against his better-equipped foes. The absence of any squads with SMGs or automatic rifles (justifying a higher firepower factor in the "5" to "8" range) tells its own story, for even with captured equipment (and, up to 1940, imported European machine-pistols of various types) the Japanese used such weapons in combat only on a limited scale. Japan's own Type 100 SMG models were not particularly good, and poor quality ammunition hardly helped, with only 17500-23000 ever made (sources vary). This was too little, too late, due to Japan's belated appreciation of the SMGs ease of production and suitability for jungle warfare and other close-combat—which made it a worthy and overdue successor to the bayonet. Japanese development of SMGs only began in 1935 and proceeded so slowly, due to a lack of official enthusiasm, that the only large-scale use of SMGs in Japanese hands appears to have been in the parachute operations against the Javan oilfields in 1942 (where they were used to good effect). For this omission from the arsenal of Japan, her troops paid dearly. In the realm of self-loading (i.e., automatic) rifles, Japan was even more deficient; belated attempts to copy captured US M1 Garands were frustrated by metallurgical problems and only a few dozen successful examples existed before the war ended.

Even with conventional rifles the Japanese soldier had problems, and large numbers of captured types had to be issued to augment indigenous stocks. Although small arms ammunition was not usually in short supply, logistical problems were compounded by the change of calibre from 6.5mm to the more powerful 7.7mm in 1939 (at least on paper), so that there were no less than seven Japanese rifles designs in service, spread between these two calibres, with six different (i.e., non-interchangeable) cartridges required for them all. In addition, localized but fairly common use was made of captured British, US, Dutch and Chinese small arms. The typical Japanese Meiji '38, aka "Arisaka", rifles were basically copies of the old German 1898 Mauser, heavy and strong but long and awkward weapons to handle in jungle terrain, and endowed with many poor features—especially the difficulty in conducting rapid fire due to the generally smaller stature and reach of Japanese people compared to Caucasians (the Filipinos had similar problems with Enfield and Springfield rifles), while the carbine versions were muzzle-heavy and difficult to aim. The 6.5mm round, moreover, rarely inflicted fatal injuries (according to Allied sources). Later in the war, some less fortunate, lower-quality, squads received much cruder weapons made from poor materials—which were probably more dangerous to the user than the target. Only Japan's surrender prevented the mass-employment of smooth-bore black powder muskets firing steel balls!

Yet, in some ways, those Japanese soldiers possessing any firearms could count themselves lucky,

for the 3-3-6 MMCs represent the dregs of the manpower available: "pressed" civilians (including females) like the Okinawan *Boeitai* Home Guard, rear area troops, shipwrecked personnel, and hospital patients in varying states of physical integrity summarily turfed out of their beds, all sent into action with little if any training and brandishing whatever "weapons" were at hand. On Guam in July 1944, some "troops" (for want of a better word) faced American artillery and mortars with just hatchets, baseball bats, broken bottles, pitchforks and grenades; in Burma, grenades gradually predominated as supplies of other weapons and munitions dried up. Some Japanese conscript units had only makeshift bamboo spears; at Shuri on Okinawa, the IJN's 37th Torpedo Maintenance Unit (wiped out in May 1945) lacked not only combat training but had only enough rifles for one man in three, while on Luzon a company of raw US troops were broken by the *banzai* charge of just eight men—of whom only two had weapons. The Japanese were, naturally, aware of their deficient infantry firepower. On Bataan in 1942 the men of the 65th Brigade felt that it was the job of the MGs, not the riflemen, to fire on the enemy—resulting in a rather poor volume of fire.

In view of all this, the Japanese obsession with close combat was a necessity as much as a tradition, but even here the Arisaka's weight and great length (with a particularly long bayonet, too) made it unwieldy in a confined space. Nor was the sword an ideal replacement. More than anything else, use of the sword betrayed the medieval origins of, and legacies within, the IJA, for it was still their primary weapon as late as 1853 and it is difficult to overstate the reverence and mystique that this weapon evoked among the Japanese. Some swords were centuries old and had been passed down through successive generations. They were the very soul of the *samurai* and virtually worshipped—illustrating the "uneasy mix of bamboo spear and modern technology" and the "peculiar amalgam of medieval attitudes and modern materiel" that was so characteristic of the IJA. (The retention of regimental colors and the Japanese soldiers' perception of the regiment's flag-staff as the equivalent of a Roman legion's sacred eagle are further examples of this reluctance to discard the old ways.) The swords wielded with so much relish by Japanese officers and NCOs (as on the *COB* cover art) were, alas, two-edged weapons in more than the literal sense. There are accounts of the victims of sword wounds, albeit mortal, disarming their assailants and using the swords against their former owners. But the bankruptcy of using swords in conjunction with not very effective nor reliable pistols, particularly against seasoned Allied troops, can best be illustrated by an incident in Burma when a berserk Japanese officer climbed onto a British tank, killed the commander and got inside. After a lengthy struggle, during which another crewman died, the unwelcome guest was finally dispatched with nine bullets. Had that officer matched his bravery with good sense, he would have carried explosives, hand grenades or even a decent firearm with which to secure a more favorable outcome; the exchange rate of one officer for two (albeit highly trained specialists) was not a good one given that Japanese leaders were an increasingly rare commodity.

Japanese hand grenades, too, were less than ideal and contained poor explosive, thus adversely affecting fragmentation and relying more on noise and blast for effect (except for the "stick" grenade, a cruder but more lethal version of the German "potato-masher" type). Many rifle grenades on Bataan were, moreover, duds, and all Japan's grenades had erratic fuzes, and poor storage hardly improved reliability. Tests by the Allies on captured stick grenades revealed that the fuzes were so erratic due to the age of the components that they often exploded as soon as the fuze was ignited. After 1943 a pottery grenade, similar to the German wooden or concrete *ersatz* late-war types,

was introduced by the IJN to alleviate metal shortages. Others were improvised from woven bamboo or old artillery shells (obviously, little-used). But for one grim purpose Japanese grenades sufficed; they were the preferred method of committing suicide, and Japanese personnel normally kept the last one for themselves and even "shared" one between a few individuals when necessary.

Pride of place among Japan's poorest weapons must go to her machine guns. If Adolf Hitler has been described as the Allies' greatest general, then Colonel—later General—Kiriyo Nambu and his colleagues can be regarded as the Allies' greatest armorers, since their adoption of the already deficient French Hotchkiss mechanism, coupled with their inexplicable refusal to consider better foreign designs, left the IJA and IJN (like their Italian allies) with a range of MGs collectively referred to as an "unprepossessing collection of antiques" and as "some of the most abysmal designs ever to see daylight". Considering that Japan was among the first to use MGs in action with sound tactics, this was rather ironic. To make matters worse, the Japanese used no less than eight different MG cartridges throughout the war, all of which suffered from imperfect machining (by Western standards) during production—"an unwelcome by-product of industrial laxity", since Japan's weapons industry traditionally relied on extensive sub-contracting (with, at the lowest level, use of back-street workshops). Another cause of the high incidence of misfires was the damp of the PTO's climate affecting the powder (which could also cause smoke candles to fail to ignite). Poor packaging and storage was the rule, hermetically sealed boxes were non-existent, and waterproof paper rarely used. Furthermore, many of the components in Japanese munitions, as with the grenades, were simply inferior to their Western equivalents, and in the main were obsolete materials. As even these supplies ran out, the use of substitutes like pig-fat as a lubricant only added to the list of woes, jams and misfires. From a technical viewpoint, Japanese MGs not only looked wrong, but performed badly; the Year-11 Type LMG's complicated feed mechanism could not cope with a high ROF and needed oiled rounds to ensure proper spent-round extraction, and to guarantee even a modicum of reliability the power of its 6.5mm cartridge had to be reduced (such that it could not use the squad's normal, rifle, ammunition except in *extremis*) with a corresponding deterioration in ballistic performance. The "laboratory" mentality of Japanese (among other) designers relying on oiled rounds ensured that under field conditions these became excellent dirt-collectors to further promote jamming and accelerate component wear. Yet the aging Year-11 Type's replacement, the Type 96, never superseded its predecessor as supply never equalled demand—and it still required non-standard, low-powered cartridges (oiled of course). In addition, the low-power telescopic sight and the bayonet were extravagant "extras" of doubtful utility that Japan's ailing industries could have done without having to produce. The bayonet made the weapon resemble a giant can-opener. The Type 96's solitary improvement over the Year-11 Type was the quick-change barrel. The Type 99 LMG finally dispensed with the need for oiled rounds, but was rather heavy for its role and, despite appearing in 1939, was built in relatively small numbers; by default it was Japan's best LMG—but demanded a new, rimless, non-standard 7.7mm round.

With heavier MGs, the old Year-3 Type (aka "Tashio 3") of 1914 vintage was the root of all subsequent mechanical woes in Japanese MGs; a copy of the Hotchkiss, but rechambered for the small, non-tapering 6.5mm round which (unlike the better-shaped French 8mm Lebel round) compounded extraction problems even with oiled rounds, it had a low ROF (hence the Allies' "Woodpecker" nickname) and the 30-round strip-feed (as well as the heavy 122-lb tripod) were bad features. Like the

20mm ATR, at least three men were needed just to move the thing. The 7.7mm version, the Type 92, became the "standard" Japanese MMG—in name at least—with all the Year-3 Type's faults, but with a better long-range performance. To augment this advantage, the Japanese also used a 7.7mm Lewis MG (also styled the Type 92) with, of course, different—incompatible—ammunition to the Type 92 "Woodpecker", and a lighter version of the latter, styled the Type 1, was introduced in 1942 with a changeable barrel but firing the later-pattern 7.7mm rimless cartridge used in the Type 99 LMG. The Type 1, like the Type 92 Woodpecker, only supplemented (rather than replaced) the Year-3 Type. In the HMG category, the 13.2mm Type 93 was a copy of a Hotchkiss AAMG with a 30-round box-magazine. Not surprisingly the Japanese later attempted to copy the US Browning designs to obtain a belt-fed MG; and in due course 7.7mm, 12.7mm and 13.2mm versions appeared (albeit mostly for aircraft use) with a few (officially) available for ground deployment. Consequently, the ever-resourceful Japanese stripped such weapons from wrecked or unserviceable aircraft and improvised mountings for a ground role with, usually, great success. To complete the Japanese quartermaster's nightmare, a host of captured weapons (like the Bren, BAR, Dutch-owned Madsen, Chinese-built Maxim and ZB, and other types) were pressed into service. For all these reasons, the "11" breakdown number of Japanese MGs in ASL should come as no surprise and may even be generous.

Compared to the other participants of World War 2, the Japanese were badly equipped with infantry-held AT weapons, as the "Support Weapons Allotment Chart" for DYO scenarios indicates. Only the emergence (literally) of the Tank Hunter Hero in scenarios set after 1943 partially remedies this major shortcoming. Unlike even the poorly equipped Italians, the Japanese have no "automatic" issue of ATR based on MMC purchases in DYO scenarios, and players must pay for such weapons as if they were large ordnance or vehicles. Apart from its weight, the 20mm Type 97 ATR had a savage recoil, poor sights and shoulder-controlled traverse which made it hard to hit moving targets; so, not surprisingly, it was unpopular and rarely used in action. This was probably just as well, given its inability to deal with even the early versions of the Stuart, let alone the Lee/Grant or Sherman tanks. Despite a ROF at least equal to (sources vary) the s18-1000, the Japanese ATR is penalized in the game with a "1" rather than the former's "2" ROF factor to reflect the adverse effects of the heavy recoil and its other drawbacks. Moreover, it suffers a higher breakdown penalty and a further ROF reduction if manned by a squad or HS rather than a "proper" crew counter, simulating the fact that these weapons were usually manned by specialist troops.

Apart from the ATR and other, improvised, small-calibre weapons used in the AT role, Japan (for want of anything better) relied on a hodge-podge of "hand-held" devices to combat Allied armor—like "Molotov cocktails", the ineffective Type 3 shaped-charge grenade, the somewhat rarer glass cyanide-gas grenades (some improvised from bottles) to incapacitate enemy AFV crews or force them to bail out (which were developed from a rare instance of German cooperation) and the magnetic Type 99 AT mine. More effective were booby-trapped obstacles and the "lunge mine", a large SCW mounted on a long pole and used like a human-powered *panzerfaust*, which on making contact with a solid object would destroy its user too. Unlike many Japanese AT weapons, this last device could destroy any Allied AFV used in the PTO. Less effective were bombs or artillery shells issued to otherwise unarmed personnel deployed in foxholes or bunkers to await an enemy vehicle driving overhead (for a time the Allies attempted to destroy the formidable Japanese bunkers by crushing them from above with tanks), AT shells

stuffed into walls as makeshift AT guns, buried gasoline drums and the human version of the Soviet mine-dog (see the *ASL Annual 1990* for details of the canine type). In desperation, Japanese soldiers with or even without weapons would sometimes swarm over Allied AFVs and attempt to block the vision devices, fire into vision slits or climb inside. Not surprisingly, a typical "exchange rate" for tank hunters against AFVs protected by infantry (as at Meiktila in Burma in March 1945) would be about 200 Japanese losses for six or so Allied tanks.

Comparison of the DYO "Support Weapon Allotment" charts shows that the Japanese player has a significant edge over his opponents only in the light mortar category, which is not surprising, given that the typical Japanese infantry battalion had between 27 and 36 of these weapons—whereas the most generous Allied allocation was 12 (for the British, and then only in the most favored four-company TO&E used by but a few units early in WW2). However, in ASL the margin of Japanese light mortar superiority is still more theoretical than real because the effectiveness of such small-calibre weaponry is at best patchy. At ranges between 60 and 200 yards, the Japanese Type 89 mortar actually fired *grenades* (which, as we have seen, were less than perfect), while at ranges between 130 and 711 yards *shells* were used. The rather peculiar rules in ASL nicely reflect this; the WP round was a grenade (hence the 1-5 hex range) while the smoke round was a shell (range of 3-10 hexes), and the mandatory use of grenades at a 1- or 2-hex range when firing WP or HE is simulated by the lowered ROF, since Japanese grenades were time-fuzed rather than impact-fuzed (and thus had no air-burst capability in the game sense) and required the attachment of a propellant container before firing, both of which slowed down the rate of observed fire. Balanced against its poor features, the Type 89 had an excellent range for its weight compared to its foreign equivalents since Japanese designers had taken pains (including rifling the tube) to give their mortars the heaviest projectile for the lightest propellant charge (only the heavier Polish 46mm and Soviet 50mm types outranged it).

The larger-calibre Japanese mortars included in ASL are the more common, "standard", examples; in the case of the 81mm and 90mm weapons, they represent some of the better (and lighter) members of a larger family. Why both 81mm and 90mm calibres were adopted beggars understanding, and only illustrates the poor coordination and haphazard approach of Japanese weapons procurement. The effects on logistics were, needless to say, unfortunate. The 70mm Year-11 Type was a heavy contraption totally unsuited to the PTO's terrain which offered no advantages over the smaller, newer, and longer-ranged French or US 60mm (or even the British 3-inch) mortars; given that the latter was no paragon, it says little for the Japanese weapon. Not included in the counter-mix also are a few Japanese mortars that saw relatively little use: the 81mm Type 99 intended for para-troop or commando-type actions, the IJN's crudely-made 81mm Type 3 which used baseplates salvaged from 90mm Type 94 or 97 mortars (another instance of non-standardization/cooperation between the IJA and IJN), and the improvised designs of 1945 comprising light smoothbore tubes fixed to wooden blocks (these fired just once, using black powder as a propellant and were as inherently user-unfriendly as they were inaccurate). The Japanese also used whatever captured equipment they could find ammunition for, and although the employment of mortars was restricted to non-dense jungle terrain, their comparative lightness, inherent simplicity, ease of operation and of maintenance made them particularly popular with the Japanese troops. Whereas most armies regarded mortars as fairly inaccurate weapons, the Japanese quickly won a reputation for using them with great skill. Their enthusiasm for mortars (perhaps rivaled only by the Soviets) was just as well,

given the steadily waning artillery, armor and air support available once Allied numerical and qualitative superiority began to make itself felt.

While they are not weapons *per se*, it should also be mentioned here that the BPV of trenches, pillboxes and tunnels (as well as of caves for 1944-45 scenarios) is halved for the Japanese player. This shows their prowess at constructing intricate defenses, while their higher mine and wire BPV reflects the general scarcity of these items (for largely logistical reasons).

ORDNANCE

Like most Italian ordnance, Japanese artillery pieces (almost without exception) resembled, or even were, museum exhibits from the Great War and by Western standards long obsolete, being largely horse-drawn or (in the case the heavier guns) towed by slow unarmored tractors. Japan avoided the time and expense of keeping abreast of foreign design by copying first German Krupp and then French Schneider products which, generally, sufficed for use in the Chinese theater. On the positive side, Japanese ordnance of a given calibre was usually lighter, with a similar or better range than its foreign equivalents—although not necessarily by a margin that was tactically very significant. In addition, Japanese fire control equipment (i.e., sights and range-finders) were of good to excellent quality (AA guns excepted) although in most cases no better than Western types. Most sources praise the remarkable little 70mm Type 92 infantry gun in particular; it was easy to move and conceal, and was one of the best weapons of its kind ever made.

On the debit side, Japanese ordnance retained obsolete features like trail or "driven" spades (flat metal stakes hammered into the ground to anchor the gun), which slowed down position changes and partly offset the enhanced mobility that the relatively low weight of Japanese artillery promised. Japan was also slow to adopt modern features like muzzle-brakes (to reduce the recoil) or split trails (permitting greater barrel elevation), the latter first appearing on the 105mm Type 14 field gun delivered in 1925. Moreover, copying the French Schneider designs was unfortunate, for their sophisticated recoil system demanded higher manufacturing tolerances and standards of maintenance (especially on the 75mm Type 90 field gun) than Japan could achieve. The light construction of Japanese ordnance compounded matters, leading to recoil malfunctions or other failures (as simulated in ASL by the "11" breakdown numbers on the 75mm Type 90 and 105mm Type 92 cannons and the 150mm Year-4 Type howitzer) when firing at extreme range or near the limits of traverse. The IJA's AA guns were obsolete by Western standards (with an inferior performance) because it foolishly refused to adopt the IJN's often better weapons—again a wasteful duplication of effort—and AA fire control systems were out-dated (though irrelevant in game terms).

Japanese guns had lower safety factors than foreign weapons, which partly explains the formers' better performance-to-weight ratios. The 105mm Type 91 field howitzer was crudely finished, while the 75mm Type 88mm gun was "virtually hand-built" from parts that needed extensive machining. Some 70mm Type 92 guns captured by the Americans on Bataan had non-interchangeable small parts, further revealing the patchy quality of Japanese ordnance manufacturing. But perhaps the greatest weakness in Japan's artillery lay in its AT guns, which lacked any penetrative power. Although versatile (the 37mm Type 94 probably saw more action as an infantry support rather than as an AT weapon), these guns were the typical products of designers who assessed their AT requirements on the basis of their own AFVs. The excellent sights on the 47mm Type 1 gun were no real substitute for inadequate performance or its late combat debut and general rarity. The failure to produce something more powerful was a major blunder,

forcing Japanese gunners to attempt deliberate immobilization against the heavier Allied AFVs or the use of suicide tactics "tank hunter" squads. Unlike most foreign AA guns, the Japanese versions were not especially potent AT weapons either, and in DYO scenarios players have comparatively few options open to them in purchasing AT capacity. HEAT (a German technological import) is generally scarce—as reflected in the low depletion numbers—and most guns have only a mediocre AP performance, while the high-velocity 120mm and 140mm naval guns are excellent tank-killers but can be deployed only in certain locations, are static, have no gunshields and are very expensive in BPV.

As with smaller-calibre munitions, the quality of Japanese projectile design and materials used, as well as the storage and packing, was usually inferior to foreign practice. It is therefore no surprise that Japanese artillery was plagued by duds, instances being noted as early as Layac on Bataan in 1942, and as late as on the Myebong Peninsula of Burma in January 1945 (where 19 of 21 shells fired on one occasion were duds). Another major handicap was the shortage of ammunition, due to Japanese logistical weaknesses mentioned earlier and the harsh PTO terrain; again, throughout the war there were serious ammunition shortages in all combat areas, even during the early campaigns when raw materials, transportation and stockpiles were relatively plentiful. In addition, Japanese artillery suffered from poor-quality signalling equipment and emphasis was placed on wire rather than radio communication. Radios were, technically speaking, four to six years behind their Western equivalents and were noted for the complexity of their controls and the difficulty netting them in and keeping them on frequency. Although Japanese telephone wire was lighter and easier to lay in the PTO terrain than Allied wire (and one Chindit officer always used Japanese wire in preference), even on Bataan early in the war such wire was so scarce that reliance was made on the civilian telephone network and on an observation balloon to simplify communications. Moreover, the PTO terrain made wire-laying difficult, just as it and the climate interfered with radio communications. Terrain also made the spotting of targets, one's own fire and the detection of enemy batteries difficult.

As with all forces in *ASL*, a number of weapons have been omitted from the Japanese artillery OB due to their comparatively rare use, including some 21 British 18-pounder field guns salvaged from 43 captured in Singapore and some 18/25 pounders taken in Burma (where the Japanese also used captured 2-pounder AT guns). At Singapore alone, the Japanese acquired about 300 pieces of artillery (excluding mortars and fortress guns). Another 330 or so were taken throughout the earlier Malayan campaign—all being put to good use by the IJA. Japanese-built omissions include the IJA's elderly 8cm (actually 76mm) Year-3 Type AA gun (inferior to the 75mm Type 88), and the IJN's 88mm Type 99. The 105mm Type 14 AA gun saw no action outside Japan, while the IJN's 100mm Type 98 was encountered only in small numbers on Iwo Jima and its performance in *ASL* approximates types that have been included, as does that for the IJN's 127mm Type 89 (also absent). The 70 and 81mm Barrage Mortars were little-used, ineffective, AA weapons with no place in *ASL* because there is no documented account of their downing an aircraft.

Japanese artillery rarely fought in the way reflected by its regimental TO&E, and there was little attempt at controlling the fire of grouped formations beyond two or three adjacent batteries, so that the massing of guns was comparatively rare. Japanese artillery doctrine evolved in China, where heavy preparatory fire was seldom needed, since the mere possession of heavier ordnance was enough to cow Chinese warlords into passivity without the need to actually fire it. The IJA placed great emphasis on using artillery as a direct supporting arm, "shooting-

in" attacks under the direct control of local infantry commanders after a short (if any) initial barrage. Heavy pre-arranged fire was seldom required, and the PTO terrain militated against massed artillery deployment on land. The Allied experience was similar (but not identical), and even the British—ablest exponents of massed fire techniques—were usually unable to concentrate their artillery fire in the way they did elsewhere in the world.

The IJA employed massed and lengthy artillery fire for only a few specific assaults, as on Bataan, Corregidor, Singapore, or in the defensive battles on the Irrawaddy line in Burma—or on Okinawa (where much ordnance intended for the Philippines had accumulated by default due to shipping problems). Okinawa was probably the scene for the IJA's heaviest artillery barrages of the war as a result. Given that Allied counter-battery fire even on Bataan (despite numerous handicaps there) was excellent, this was probably a wise decision by the IJA since concentration invited heavy losses, as on Okinawa.

For all the various above-mentioned reasons, the Japanese OBA accuracy die roll is "1" (despite the fact that for direct fire its ordnance uses black TH numbers) and the Access pile uses a very unfavorable mix of only five black and two red chits. The very high cost in BPV of Bombardments and Creeping Barrages is also explained by these factors.

Although the PTO terrain made sophisticated artillery techniques difficult, the IJA did at least deploy units to detect hostile batteries, although vegetation made flash-spotting or sound-ranging very difficult. Thus counter-battery fire was not an outstanding feature of the IJA. What the IJA was noted for was its ability to move guns often and rapidly in very rough terrain, its enthusiasm for using guns as very close-range direct support weapons (despite the horrendous casualties among their crews that this caused), the willingness of gun crews to launch their own *banzai* charges and, like tank crews, thus sell their lives cheaply, the great skill with which guns were concealed or camouflaged (after some painful lessons learned on Bataan) or quickly moved out of danger into caves, bunkers or back down reverse-slopes, and the sometimes unconventional deployment of guns (like the 5-inch naval guns sited on the second and third stories of a hospital in Manila). Not surprisingly, Japanese troops showed a greater willingness to advance through their supporting fire despite heavy losses than most Western troops (Soviet forces excepted), and commanders would not hesitate to put "friendly" fire down onto Japanese positions regardless of their own casualties therefrom. The Japanese also used their artillery pieces with great cunning and imagination, AT guns usually being cleverly sited in killing grounds (with land sometimes flooded to channel enemy armor onto the guns and/or tank-hunters), and some targets would be deliberately ignored in favor of catching more lucrative victims. The Japanese would often time their artillery fire to land while enemy shells were passing overhead to give the impression that the Allies were themselves victims of "friendly" fire and they often handled guns like snipers; for example, shells would be timed to arrive at meal times when Allied personnel were bunched together, or a few shells would be fired intermittently over a long period (ranging by stealth) to imitate random, nuisance, fire before a heavy barrage was unleashed when a good target presented itself through Allied laxity or when the range to a previously ignored target had finally been found by this method. A few rounds onto unsuspecting targets (before switching fire elsewhere to avoid counter-battery fire) were often more deadly than massed fire that just drove Allied units to seek cover, and suited the Japanese predicament very well in circumstances where the Allies had air and artillery superiority with plentiful ammunition, whereas low Japanese stocks demanded more restrained and astute use.

ARMOR

Of all the nationalities featured in *ASL* thus far, the Japanese vehicles were probably the most frustrating to research; as with Italian AFVs, coverage in the English language is thin and translations out of so uncommon a language as Japanese are fairly rare. The classic Japanese text, for example, has so far only been unofficially (i.e., privately) translated because, as one British expert complained to this writer, even most Japanese—let alone other—armor buffs "do not want to know about Japan's vehicles and find Germany's of more interest". Consequently, information on the dates and places of a vehicle's combat use is often tantalizingly vague or incomplete. One reason for this general lack of interest stems from the often inadequate performance, technically and tactically, of Japanese AFVs, although even here they (like the Italians) had their moments, and the heroism of the crews saddled with such poor vehicles against their usually numerically, technically and tactically superior opponents cannot be overstated. Japanese AFVs were handicapped in three basic areas: weapons, logistical support and tactical doctrine.

Japanese AFVs made poor weapons due to a number of factors. Firstly, size and weight restrictions were significant; most roads in wartime Japan were narrow and, being relatively few in number by Western standards, emphasis was placed on rail movement. Much of the rail network is laid to a gauge of only 3.5 feet, which imposed a severe eight-foot maximum width restriction on AFV designs. This was only relaxed much later, when the Type 4 *Chi-To* (9.5 feet wide) and the Type 5 *Chi-Ri* (10 feet wide) were produced at the eleventh hour. Moreover, Japan's island geography dictated sea transportation to the combat zones, which increased pressures to minimize vehicular weights and dimensions for ease of handling and stowage aboard ship. This was translated into smaller-diameter turret rings than found on many enemy vehicles (e.g., only 44 inches on the Type 97 *Chi-Ha*) which limited the power of the main armament. And, with even half-inch armor plate weighing a hefty 20-lb per square foot, the maximum armor thickness was limited. No Japanese-built tank wider than seven-foot-eight or weighing over 17 tons saw action. Small wonder that a US Marine could disparagingly taunt his enemies on Peleliu by shouting that destroyed Japanese tanks were being used "to pack fish in", or that many Japanese AFVs were vulnerable even to the wretched Boys ATR. Players who bemoan the often quick and fiery exit of their AFVs in *ASL* should remember that a "medium" tank (like the *Shinhoto Chi-Ha*) weighing 16 tons, was the rough equivalent of the average foreign-built light tank (like the 12.5-15.5 ton US Stuart series), and that "heavy" tanks like the 30-ton *Chi-To* or 37-ton *Chi-Ri* were about as heavy as most foreign second-generation medium tanks.

This concern with weight reduction (and the associated benefit of a lower unit-cost) was partly responsible for the small number of 26-ton Type 95 heavy tanks built in 1925, a vehicle 8' 10" wide but armored to 30mm, which might have led to something much better. Instead, Japan neglected this category of AFV for far too long, and then belatedly tried to "short-circuit" procurement (or at least design) by purchasing plans, manufacturing licenses and one example each of a German Panther D and Tiger I in late 1943, but shipping problems prevented delivery. These sophisticated, temperamental and heavy tanks were ever less suited to mass-production in resource-starved Japan than they were in the crumbling Reich (the Japanese 120-ton *Oi* heavy tank never got beyond the drawing board) and the money spent on the German tanks would have been better invested in obtaining samples of the *panzerschreck* and *panzerfaust*.. The resultant absence of more combat-worthy AFVs forced the Japanese to use tankettes or the long-suf-

fering Type 95 *Ha-Go* light tank in roles and situations that other armies tried to avoid altogether.

Second, because the IJA was essentially an infantry force modeled on the German Army circa 1918, tanks were seen as nothing more than tools for infantry support and little was done to give them more important roles (like those that potential enemies were experimenting with) up to 1939. Hence a powerful AT armament, apart from the difficulties of fitting such weapons into the narrow Japanese vehicles, was regarded for too long as an expensive and unnecessary luxury by those responsible for design policy, procurement and, ultimately, use. Linked to this, the perceived threat posed by AT guns or AFVs was considerably underestimated (not to say ignored altogether) due to Japan's experiences in China, where enemy tanks and AT guns were doled out in scarce penny-packets. Japan's drubbing by the Soviets at Nomonhan in 1939 should have pointed the way ahead, but the Japanese response was inadequate; AP ammunition was developed for existing guns and muzzle velocities raised (as much as barrels could safely tolerate), but the introduction of a much higher-velocity 57mm gun (a sort of Japanese 6-pounder) was rejected in favor of mounting the less-potent 47mm AT gun in the *Chi-Ha* for the sake of ammunition standardization with the towed AT weapon. Perhaps the Japanese would have been less complacent and short-sighted if the Russians already had T-34s and KV1s available at Nomonhan, and such a shock might have induced them to upgrade the Type 97 tankette, with its excellent sloped hull front, into something with a nastier bite and a thicker hide. But as it was, the Soviet 45mm guns used against the Japanese at this battle—powerful though they were by contemporary Japanese standards—failed to stimulate Japan into thickening the armor on its AFVs. Nor did the British, Dutch and American vehicles encountered in 1941-42 have such an effect. Even the final Japanese tank designs were little more than scaled-up, and hence more conspicuous and vulnerable, equivalents of Germany's aging PzKfW IVH or IVJ or Hungary's inferior Turan (to which Japan's tanks bore a superficial resemblance). Moreover, production suffered delays due to a bottleneck in gun manufacture, which lagged behind that of the vehicles and indicated poor industrial organization (since in other countries the reverse was usually the case).

But then, certainly in the capture of SouthEast Asia, Japan foresaw little need for better vehicles since the initial Allied OBs were generally devoid of many vehicles capable of giving Japanese AFVs a rough time. And besides, most PTO terrain militated against the bold armored tactics used by the Soviets at Nomonhan—or so the Japanese thought. Her short-war strategy also fostered a myopic view of future requirements and the threat from enemy AFVs in places like Burma, the Pacific islands and even China/Manchuria until it was too late. In the Pacific, airpower and the IJN—not the IJA—were the first lines of defense, while in Manchuria Japan hoped for far too long that the Soviet threat would be eliminated by a German victory on the Russian Front (or at least that the USSR's preoccupation with defeating Hitler would buy time for the Japanese defenses to be strengthened). As a result of this reasoning, light, small and cheap vehicles (in effect armored cars with tracks) were built in far greater numbers than was prudent; although detailed production figures for each type of Japanese AFV are not available, it is reasonable to suppose that at least 3500 of the 6500 or so tracked AFVs built between 1931 and 1945 were tankettes or light tanks, including not inconsiderable production runs of vehicles like the *Ke-Nu* (a modified *Ha-Go*), the *Ke-Ni* and *Ke-To* (further *Ha-Go* developments) which saw little or no action and were a great waste of design facilities, labor, material and time at the expense of fewer but tougher AFVs. Similarly, Japan dabbled with designs for a host of other vehicles of questionable value (given her prob-

lems in matching the growing fleet of Allied AFVs assembling for use against her); these luxuries included various sub-versions of the Type 89 *Chi-Ro* with relatively subtle improvements and sundry mine-clearance and bridging AFVs, amphibious tanks, SP guns of diverse sorts, and APCs. The list is too long to name, let alone describe, them all.

Third, tank and AFV production was accorded a much lower priority (as in Britain) than aircraft production or shipbuilding, and the replacement of merchant ship losses alone or—more accurately—attempts to do so consumed 17% of Japanese steel output in 1943. In terms of steel production, Japan was outmatched by the USA by a factor of 1:13.87. Although tank production, theoretically, gained greater importance in 1945, in practice nothing changed; by then it was, in any case, far too late. Japan was by then no nearer to rationalizing tank design in favor of one or two basic models than she had been a decade before.

Japanese AFVs suffered from a lack of attention to detail that undermined combat effectiveness even further. While Japanese armored cars were, arguably, more useful in patrolling areas like China, Manchuria and other captured territory, their value in combat against the Western Allies was limited, particularly as they were for the most part rather crude truck conversions and not "armored cars" as the term was understood in the West, being neither low-slung nor silent, and lacking all-wheel drive. Their piece-meal production meant that there were eight versions of the Sumida model alone spread between three variants. Other poor features in heavier AFVs included the absence of power traverse, the fitting of shoulder-controlled main armament (like British versions, tiring and even dangerous to use in action), cramped and uncomfortable vehicle interiors, poor crew communication devices (i.e., reliance on voice tubes rather than on an intercom system), poor vision devices (an absence of periscopes—especially in the lighter AFVs), and terrible turret layouts (i.e., one or two-man turrets), all of which are reflected in *ASL* by the RST and LMT classifications. Although their good-quality optical equipment made Japanese gunnery accurate, this was more than counter-balanced by these other poor features; so, although they enjoy black TH numbers in the game, Japanese tanks have problems spotting or acquiring targets quickly, especially if moving, as simulated by the game's gunnery rules. In addition, the absence of a co-axial MG in most Japanese tanks is a serious drawback.

Japanese AFVs suffered from their thin armor, and some Allied troops found HE ammunition, which literally tore Japanese vehicles to pieces, was sometimes more effective than an AP round (which might pass clean through the target AFV without doing much damage). Other deficiencies included an absence of splash protection for vision devices, gun mantlets and turret rings, and little attempt to radically slope armor plates (often leaving ballistic "shot traps" due to its poor arrangement). There was a reluctance to weld armor plate despite the available expertise, and hence the abundance of steel or asbestos rivets to become detached and injure crewmen under the shock of striking projectiles (the asbestos rivets being part of the heat-proof lining fitted into some Japanese AFVs, a rather expensive feature of only limited value).

As if these handicaps were not enough, Japanese AFVs also suffer in *ASL* due to their "+3" ESB DRM, which is more a reflection of the poor logistical support from which all Japanese forces suffered rather than any inherent defects in the vehicles themselves. However, the Type 92 Combat Car and Type 94 Tankette were exceptions to this, having a propensity to shed their tracks, which prevented the latter at least from executing high-speed turns. There were also complaints in 1933 of inadequate standards of crew maintenance during the Jehol campaign, suggesting that these duties were neglected, and the *Chi-Ha* was

certainly more demanding than its erstwhile rival, the *Chi-Ni*, in this respect. The mechanical sophistication of some Japanese AFVs was perhaps incompatible with the harsh environment in which they operated, and this was compounded by the tendency of the IJA to rely on very narrow logistical margins. Japanese officers saw themselves as warriors rather than the managers of stevedores (again a throw-back to the *samurai* attitude towards anything so mundane); "the counter and the abacus were abhorred" by them. But although the men could manage without food and munitions for a time by capturing Allied stocks, the latter held no spare Japanese vehicle parts and probably not much diesel fuel for their engines either, rendering somewhat hollow a Japanese writer's boast (in 1929) that "we can fight with our bare fists if necessary". The IJA was noted (like the Red Army) for its emphasis on "teeth" units at the expense of support functions, and while the Americans put many of their best men into such non-combat roles, the IJA preferred to misuse their skills in battle. In terms of off-road mobility, Japanese vehicles were sometimes inferior to their foreign counterparts (which the *ASL* rules also partly reflect); the first two *Shinhoto Chi-Ha* tanks to see action—at Corregidor in 1942—had to be towed off the steep beach by a captured Stuart tank (though in fairness, it must be mentioned that they were prototype models).

For the sake of balance, the good features on Japanese AFVs must also be mentioned. The bell-crank "scissors" suspension (modified from the British Carden-Lloyd type) was a reliable, simple and relatively inexpensive system compared to, say, the more costly and sophisticated torsion bar system—which also raised a vehicle's height and weight—used on some German, Soviet and US AFVs. Japan also pioneered the use of water-jet propulsion in amphibious vehicles, and also the use of air-cooled diesel power plants in AFVs. A whole range of standardized engines were developed for trucks and AFVs to optimize common parts usage, the stimulus being the problems envisaged with water-cooled engines in China's often arid or sub-zero environment, the superior thermal efficiency of the diesel with a resultant lower fuel consumption, the greater availability of diesel fuel over gasoline and the former's easier and safer storage (not to mention lower evaporation losses). Although crew safety under combat conditions was only marginally improved by diesel engines (since most tank fires were caused by ammunition fires), there was a benefit in using such fuel; one-third of all US tank personnel who suffered burns in World War 2 did so while mishandling gasoline under non-combat conditions. The dangers of this volatile fuel were brought home to the Japanese in 1921 when two British engineers were badly burned when a Vickers Model C tank bought by Japan caught fire during testing.

A number of Japanese AFVs have been omitted from *COB* because they saw little or no combat. These include the French FT light tanks purchased or (later) captured and used in Manchuria, the Renault NC-1 tanks also thus acquired (and used in Shanghai in 1932 where the good 30mm armor proved no substitute for its chronic unreliability), the Vickers-Crossley Type 87 armored cars used in China and Manchuria (and which approximate in game terms the Osaka type), open-topped cargo carriers converted from Type 97 tankettes, and the *Ho-Ha* half-track APC (which bore a superficial resemblance to Germany's sWS series, albeit more thinly armored) on which data about combat use is contradictory. In any case, the notion of the Japanese using these vehicles like *panzer grenadiers* does not quite square with the historical tactics of the IJA. Other omissions include the amphibious tank Type 3 *Ka-Chi*, and the Type 4 *Ka-Tsu* amphibious tracked APC, plus the US Stuarts captured or salvaged on Bataan or in Burma in early 1942, and lastly the various other Allied AFVs (also part of the spoils of war like the Vickers

light tanks, Marmon-Herringtons, White scout cars and host of wheeled or tracked AFVs left behind by the Dutch, Thai, French or the Chinese). In Singapore alone, about 200 British AFVs (armored cars and Carriers), about 100 trucks and 10000 automobiles were captured, while the Allied retreat from Burma in mid-1942 yielded another 126 AFVs or so, 6000 trucks and over 7000 automobiles. The Japanese were continually ordered to make the most of captured equipment, and generally made far less use of trucks than Western armies (their men usually marched to battle).

Japan produced fewer trucks than even the hard-pressed USSR, and the IJA relied on the humble bicycle to transport personnel and supplies in the PTO, each being capable of carrying a man, his weapon and 60 pounds of gear. So highly were they prized that some captured in Singapore were later found on Guadalcanal, and like the Vietcong in a later conflict the Japanese used the bicycle in terrain where motor transport could not go or would not survive long. The bicycle was easy to conceal, repair and needed no fuel. Bicycles were augmented by pack animals, hand- or bicycle-towed carts, and—in Burma alone—20000 ox-carts, plus hired or forced labour, and even Japanese personnel themselves, pressed into service as carriers. When things became desperate, they even resorted (in Burma) to staging a huge cattle-drive to provide meat on the hoof, but most animals died of disease, fell off the steep terrain, or drowned. On logistics, Lt-General Kotoku Sato, a divisional CO in Burma, stated that, "the tactical ability of XV Army staff lies below that of cadets", and described their attitude towards supply as "completely irresponsible". The same could, perhaps, be said of the entire Japanese war machine.

In the realm of tank tactics, the IJA's evolution as an infantry force from the *samurai* armies (which were largely composed of foot soldiers) left no tradition of bold, aggressive cavalry tactics as a model, and no Japanese cavalry units which fought in the PTO appear to have distinguished themselves in action as horse soldiers. Add to this the absence of influential mentors like a Guderian or a Liddell-Hart to plead the case for mechanization and the use of armor *en masse*, and the fact that most senior Japanese officers were infantrymen or gunners by training, and it is no real wonder that Japanese armor remained tightly shackled to the infantry-support role for most of the war. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, among others, advocated modernizing the IJA along German lines in respect of AFVs, signals and military engineering, but Tojo's hostility (for largely personal reasons) ensured that the High Command ignored the advice.

Against raw, demoralized and/or badly equipped forces, Japanese AFVs sometimes achieved devastating results out of all proportion to their numbers, as on Bataan against the Philippine 21st Division in April 1942 and in various locations in the Malayan campaign (especially at Parit Sulong in January 1942) where the "fish-bone" or "filleting" tactics were used to provide flanking fire from the roads at night while infantry moved ahead to either side, and where the lack of undergrowth in the rubber plantations aided the bold use of armor. On Guadalcanal and Goodenough islands, even a handful of Japanese light tanks advancing down jungle paths at night very were effective against badly-armed local militia. However, where the defenders had the necessary equipment (and will), the Japanese usually suffered heavily when using such aggressive tactics, as at Taierchaung in China in 1938, at Bakri in Johore, or Meiktila in Burma, or at Baliaug on Bataan in 1942. But generally, Japanese AFVs remained faithfully subservient to their infantrymen, or conducted half-hearted attacks alone against the Allies, as at Bataan's Orion-Bagan line in March 1942, or acted as mobile pillboxes.

A British writer describes Japanese tank crews as being "clueless" (i.e., devoid of common sense or

logic), and they were prone to panic when surprised by Allied armor, seeking to escape rather than find cover and shoot it out, or even to abandon their vehicle intact upon occasions. Their AFVs would often move carelessly in daylight despite Allied air superiority, and were sometimes lax in the use of camouflage (to their severe detriment), while at night they often blundered about with their headlights on too close to Allied positions and suffered the consequences. Like their infantry comrades, Japanese AFV crews failed to modify or improve their tactics, and the nocturnal mechanized *banzai* charge was, not surprisingly, also the favorite ploy—the classic example occurring on Saipan on 17 June 1944 where, betrayed by their noisy deployment, 32 of the 44 attacking tanks were destroyed by the Americans in a "Turkey Shoot". As with Japanese infantry, such assaults were invariably launched along predictable lines of approach where the element of surprise had been lost.

In such circumstances Japanese AFVs always got short shrift, and although encounters between opposing armored vehicles were comparatively rare in the PTO, when they did occur the Allies nearly always prevailed through better tactics, better vehicles and superior numbers (the "Bungle in the Jungle" scenario being a good example of how painfully acquired experience of tank warfare against the Germans was put to good use by the Allies in the PTO, and of how the Japanese often failed to coordinate their armor, artillery and infantry, enabling their enemies to defeat them in detail). Many Japanese senior commanders had totally unrealistic notions of what armor could, and could not, achieve; in Burma, for instance, one senior officer expected tanks to shoot down aircraft in self-defense, and berated a tank company CO for "cowardice" after he had sensibly withdrawn from a narrow defile where he had suffered needless losses to Allied AT guns. To their cost, the Japanese forgot that many parts of Burma and Luzon had excellent tank terrain, and that even in the hilly parts of much of the PTO the Allies—with enough determination—could, and did, use armor on supposedly "tank-proof" steep slopes.

The tactical handling of Japanese AFVs was not helped by the general absence of radios below platoon-leader level until very late in the war, which partly explains the clumsy and uninspired tactics so similar to Soviet handling of armor early in the war. But by the time that radios were more plentiful, the scope for more imaginative tactics had gone. As their mobility began to dwindle (either due to fuel shortages, unobtainable spare parts or the growing realization by their crews and the more enlightened senior officers that the Allies possessed too many advantages), Japanese AFVs were increasingly used as pillboxes, dug-in with varying degrees of skill. Even where more mobile tactics might have been appropriate, as on Iwo Jima or Luzon, Japanese AFVs usually ended their days in this fashion, while in China and Manchuria (apart from the 1944 *Ichigo* offensive in Honan) the armor was left to vegetate until "milked" to shore up other areas; the residue was "destroyed . . . as if it were made of cardboard" by the Soviets in 1945. ASL simulates the late-war Japanese tendency to turn AFVs into pillboxes in the DYO rules, which permit players who might otherwise be reluctant to use armor in the game (due to its high cost) to purchase AFVs at reduced prices in scenarios set in 1944-45 if setting up entrenched. This provides an excellent incentive for players to deploy Japanese AFVs historically, and is a better solution to the problem of players avoiding the use of AFVs at all; this writer initially advocated the inclusion of some rule to force players to purchase Japanese AFVs in DYO scenarios where there was a historical rationale, but this (happily) was never adopted by Bob McNamara.

Another uniquely Japanese trait is simulated in ASL by the facility whereby players can "convert" Japanese armor leaders to infantry leader counters. When their vehicles were destroyed, immobilized or

otherwise held up, Japanese crews would unhesitatingly dismount and fight as infantry, throwing away their specialist training and any hard-won experience that they had gained combating Allied armor. In Malaya, for example, all eight tanks of one company were destroyed by Australian artillery in January 1942, and their crews were subsequently wiped out to the man while fighting on foot; the award of a unit citation doubtless encouraged other crews to make similar cost-ineffective sacrifices, thus depriving the IJA or IJN of a battle-wise cadre to rebuild the formation.

JUNGLE WARFARE

As the Japanese soldier's fearsome reputation was inextricably linked to his alleged expertise in the jungle, and because COB is the first module of ASL to feature PTO terrain, a brief discussion of jungle warfare seems appropriate. The word "jungle" originates from the Sanskrit word *jangala* (desert or wilderness) and encompasses a whole range of terrain varying in density from region to region. Lighter rainfall tends to produce heavier, denser undergrowth, since the thinner "canopy" of tree tops allows more light through (as in coastal Burma, Indo-China or the West Indies); while some of the thickest jungle, with less undergrowth, is found in Malaya, that in Burma and India being thinner. Secondary jungle (land cleared of all growth but then allowed to grow wild again) has undergrowth that is almost impenetrable, and a rate of advance of barely 100 yards in 60-90 minutes through this was about the norm. In comparison, combat reports state that thick bamboo in the highlands can be penetrated at the rate of about 250 yards in 110 minutes, and on Bataan thick bamboo even deflected .30-cal. MG fire—small wonder that in ASL such hexes can be entered only by Minimum Move. Even without the enemy to contend with, progress through jungle could be very slow; moving just 600 yards up a clay slope in New Guinea required 17 hours. On Guadalcanal, it was estimated that the average speed of infantry on a jungle trail was a mere one mph; if off the trail, using machetes and bayonets to cut through the undergrowth, a rate of half that speed was considered fast. As a result, the movement rates in the game have had to be unhistorically generous. Such movement rates, moreover, apply only to healthy personnel, and whereas troops unencumbered with sick or wounded personnel could cover anything between four and 15 miles per day (depending on the exact nature of the terrain and weather), a similar journey with less healthy personnel could take nine times as long. The use of native guides (employed by both sides whenever possible) could reduce travel times dramatically; with their superior local knowledge of obstacles or short-cuts, Papuan guides in New Guinea, for instance, could shorten a 36-hour journey to as little as 45 minutes!

The absence of landmarks or accurate maps made it easy to, literally, walk around in circles, and the Japanese were as prone to this as their enemies, which ASL simulates with the Straying rules (immunity being granted to local partisan units for obvious reasons). Due to false economics, many British maps were printed in only two colors, whereas their Japanese copies used more for greater clarity and detail; it was difficult to determine where the jungle ended and paddy fields began on the former, or to establish which streams were seasonal and which were not. (This ambiguity led to a serious water shortage at Indaw in Burma, for instance, resulting in its loss to the Japanese.) Navigational problems were also compounded by the limited visibility in the jungle which masked otherwise prominent features; at its worst in New Guinea, the mist sometimes made it difficult to see even one's own hand, let alone an enemy five yards away. In Malaya, visibility could be as little as a yard or at most 25 yards, increasing only in hilly terrain to 50-100 yards. In Burma, visibility around Kohima was about five yards; on Bataan,

about ten. Apart from the vegetation blocking vision, the absence of natural light also proved a problem, and in one particularly vivid description a veteran talks of the "state of semi-twilight", "the nearest to night fighting that troops will get during daylight". Reconnaissance patrols hiking through dark, rough jungle frequently over-estimated the distance they had travelled, leading to many problems in calculating march time for larger combat formations.

The jungle was made all the more unpleasant (not to say terrible) by its natural hazards, which the gloom or total darkness aggravated. Even Pacific beachheads had inanimate dangers like razor-sharp coral or rocks and potentially lethal five-lb coconuts falling 60 feet to the ground, while elsewhere there were cactus hedges, deadly thorns or other plants to inflict lacerations, along with flash-floods, swamps and falling trees (an average of one falling within earshot every 36 hours; one author states that at Cape Gloucester the US Marines lost 100 men to falling trees). There was also parasitic growth to which humans as well as plants were vulnerable, turning an insect bite or a scratch into something potentially lethal. A British officer in Malaya observed that although cuts or bites rarely became infected initially—when new to the jungle—this immunity did not last long. Troops also had to contend with a whole host of unfriendly creatures: amoebae carrying dysentery, ferocious ants, killer-bees, spiders, typhus-carrying mites, malarial mosquitoes, snakes (including Burma's *hamadryad*, which chases and attacks humans) and leeches that attempt to enter any orifice and are able to draw a pint of blood in one feed. Larger horrors include crocodiles, tigers, the aggressive and unpredictable Malayan water-buffalo, and wild elephants.

Mite, jungle or scrub typhus was then incurable and generally fatal, while malaria was a major scourge, even with medicines. Quinine, for example, was scarce; in late 1940 an embargo on supplies to Japan left her with only small stocks, and from January 1942 only front-line Japanese personnel on Bataan received doses (while on Luzon the invaders had but a month's supply). By March 1942 there were thus 13000 Japanese non-battle casualties of Bataan, while US troops there also suffered from a quinine shortage and stocks had run out by 29 March, so that 600 men per day were contracting malaria with a 7-10% fatality rate. Because Java (which soon fell to Japan) was the main quinine source, the Allies also experienced shortages in New Guinea and in Burma; before anti-malarial discipline was enhanced, the annual infection rate reached 84% of army strength in 1943 (even higher among combat troops). For every man wounded by the Japanese, 121 were laid low by disease. During the New Guinea rainy season sickness rates reached 10% of total strength per week! The Allies introduced quinine substitutes like Atabrine and Mepacrine, which was just as well since experience showed that quinine, by suppressing the symptoms of malaria, actually helped spread the disease if a carrier became a blood donor. Mepacrine turned the skin yellow and the Japanese spread rumors about other unpleasant side-effects, but Allied measures to enforce its intake, plus strict rules about clothing, reduced the malarial sickness rate to just one per 1000 in 1945, while the ratio of wounded-to-sick men fell to 1-to-20 in 1944 and to 1:6 in 1945 among British units in Burma. Even so, the XIV Army there had 20000 malaria cases between July and November 1944, compared to just 49 men killed in action. And of the 88500 men on strength, no less than 47000 became sick and required evacuation. During the fighting on the Tiddim Road the British 9th Brigade lost only nine men KIA and 85 wounded to the Japanese, but 507 from sickness.

For the Japanese, things were even worse for, as their logistical system fell apart, great reliance was placed on capturing Allied medicines (and other supplies). The chance destruction of a Japanese medical

dump during their 1944 Burmese offensive had a disastrous effect on the 53rd Division, which suffered the worst incidence of malarial infection of any Japanese unit in this theater. By 1945, 98% of Japan's 28th Army in Burma had caught the disease, complicated by dysentery.

The deep jungle also added to the miseries by rotting food, clothes and shoes, and rusting equipment, and causing foot-rot (which was not always treatable due to a lack of medicines). The Allies' "jungle green" clothing issued in New Guinea was found to cause ulcers by inhibiting air circulation. The fetid, nauseating smell of decay from rotting vegetation added to these discomforts and dangers, while noises from various jungle animals or even from dripping water assaulted raw nerves, especially at night, which "converted" them—with only a little imagination—into gunshots or footsteps (respectively), and these phantoms could terrify inexperienced troops. By degrees, the men had to learn to conquer these terrors, and this applied to Japanese as well as to Allied soldiers; one "green" and jittery Allied unit in Burma fired off all its ammunition in one night in response to such noises, leading to the loss of a critical position by default. During a post-war training exercise in Malaya, a British reserve officer (new to the jungle but still within earshot of a major highway) literally died of fright within an hour of entering the jungle! Allied accounts speak of troops being bewildered by, unnerved in, or terrified of, the jungle . . . and yet others felt quite at home, and safe, in it. Contrary to the myths, even the Japanese could be afraid of it. But in time most men learned to live in the "green hell", realizing that, far from being hostile, it was really neutral and would treat all the ignorant with equal (pitiless) indifference, but would provide the enterprising with welcome cover, bamboo and other growth for water, food, building material, and even tools and weapons. While the damp would rot batteries, it supplied fireflies or luminous leeches which (placed in a flashlight's reflector) made a good substitute; maggots, which eat only dead flesh, could be used to clean wounds. Having eventually grown accustomed to the jungle, many troops felt exposed and vulnerable when leaving its claustrophobic confines, even to cross a rice paddy.

Due to the generally poor visibility in jungle, other senses like hearing and smell became of paramount importance. Silence was vital in order to hear the enemy first, but moving through the jungle was invariably noisy; whereas one veteran observed that the Japanese were particularly so (and a second tells of a Malayan Chinese finding it almost unbelievable that the Japanese could move as slowly, noisily, or clumsily through jungle), he subsequently admitted that other nationalities were too. One US infantryman practiced walking silently in the jungle, much to the amusement of other GIs until his greater survival prospects were demonstrated, but a British enthusiast of this observed that he found it very tiring and that it demanded much practice. To minimize noise and avoid detection by "jitter parties", some Allied units ordered their men never to talk or fire at night, and an American officer on Bataan withdrew all tracer ammunition at night for this reason! Other Allied troops were sometimes instructed to on no account ever leave their positions at night (even if wounded) and to treat all movement observed as hostile. In such circumstances, bayonets and grenades were of much more use, explaining why ASL combat against the Japanese will almost always be hand-to-hand. However, the dangers of grenade-throwing were enhanced in jungle terrain; in a post-war tragedy, a British officer lost one eye when his grenade bounced back off a tree, and a few months later he lost the other eye in an identical mishap. Smell, too, could sometimes mean the difference between success or failure; due to different clothing, materials, food, tobacco and lubricants, it was easy to smell the enemy. Cigarette smoke, especially, lingered in the

jungle. One British guerrilla liaison officer gave up smoking because it impaired his sense of smell. Allied sources refer to the fish-like odor of Japanese rations, the sickly-sweet perfume worn by officers (sometimes to prevent straying at night), and the "pungent fragrance" of their tobacco.

There is no doubt that, initially, Allied units were often terrified of facing the Japanese in the jungle—and the IJA, considered before 1941 to be anywhere between second and sixth-rate by the Western Allies, became an army of supermen almost overnight. It was then thought that Allied troops were less than 50% as effective in the jungle as the Japanese, and even Churchill was moved to observe that entering jungles to fight the Japanese was like "going into the water to fight a shark". The myth was born that all Japanese were jungle-trained, but this was of course not so. In the spring of 1941, some of their troops received such instruction on Formosa or Hainan, but these facilities could never have trained all eleven divisions used against the Western Allies in the time available. The Taiwan Army Research Section on Formosa was only a small unit (created in January 1941) for researching various aspects of jungle warfare, but, as one author argues, if the Japanese had really been experts in jungle fighting "they would not have starved to death while nearby natives ate their fill". Certainly few (if any) Japanese troops in the early Bataan or Malayan campaigns were jungle-trained; and when Japanese logistics all over the PTO broke down (and the Allies no longer left behind supply dumps for their use) Japanese personnel, especially the lower ranks, either starved to death in large numbers and/or ate grass, roots, bark, wood, rotten food, slugs, insects, tree sap and ultimately human flesh to stay alive. Even on Bataan in 1942, the Japanese had to eat their own horses, while in the Solomons by the end of that year 100 men were dying of hunger each day. On Guadalcanal alone 10000 starved to death, and a Japanese veteran of New Guinea observed that in such dire straits, the jungle "was no place for human beings".

Nor did the Japanese have any great love for the jungle. In the PTO, the good food and gentler climate of Java was preferred to Burma, the least popular posting in the IJA. Here even the Japanese found the weather too hot; the British General Slim observed that it had the world's worst climate for at least six months of each year, breeding the world's worst diseases, and it contained some of the world's worst terrain. On Bataan, too, Japanese personnel were unaccustomed to the heat. But where the Japanese differed from the Allies initially was in attitude. For Japan, the jungle was the great "equalizer", "a shield" for her technologically inferior armies which gave them an edge over the nominally more mobile Allied forces possessing greater firepower. To the Allies, the jungle was almost universally regarded as impenetrable, despite some warnings and even limited experiments which cast doubts on the validity of this wishful thinking (based mostly on observations from the rear seat of staff cars). The Japanese had no such delusions and accepted the hardships of the jungle, living on captured or commandeered supplies and travelling as light as possible, mainly on bicycles but also using mules, native labor and even elephants. Motor vehicles were kept to a minimum. The Allies in the early campaigns were often over-equipped with motor transport and over-burdened with too much personal gear for the terrain, and thus were fatally dependent on the few roads in existence. Roads were, in any case, not necessarily a faster means of travel; the Japanese 31st Division took just four days to go through 15 miles of jungle to the Kohima/Imphal battles in 1944 using narrow tracks across steep hills, but then needed another five days to go just 25 miles more by road in captured Allied transport.

Throughout the war the Japanese amazed their foes by the speed they could move through jungle, enabling them to fully exploit their "hook" tactics

(which entailed infiltrating their infantry past Allied positions to cut off lines of supply by means of roadblocks). These blocks forced Allied units to abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment and try to withdraw through the unfamiliar jungle, or face either slow starvation or hastier annihilation from other Japanese forces advancing down the road with (often) armor, artillery and/or air support. The "hook" was less successful against lightly equipped Allied units, like those of the Philippine National Army, which were more able to take to the jungle and so bypass the Japanese roadblocks, which more roadbound formations would almost always try and clear at heavy cost in men and materiel. Later in the war, Allied units with TO&Es revised to dispense with many motor vehicles would simply dig in as a response to such tactics and rely on air support to sustain them, turning the tables on the Japanese who would invariably batter away at the Allied positions in a futile attempt to reduce them. Later still, the Allies even used similar tactics themselves against the Japanese and on occasion, because encirclement and infiltration tactics became "almost . . . dogma" with the Japanese, the Allies exploited this inflexibility by ambushing their foe's road columns and enticing the enemy into prepared ambushes as he tried to infiltrate and outflank the Allied positions. The Australians caught a number of Japanese columns in this manner in Johore in 1942, and throughout the war the Japanese were renowned for their lack of skill in dealing with outflanking movements and for the ease with which they could be ambushed when on the move.

It is also a myth that no Allied units were jungle-trained in 1941, although it must be said that those lucky few who were invariably undertook commando-type roles; the British 70th Division, for instance, was carved up for the first "Chindit" operation behind Japanese lines in Burma. Moreover, this unit (plus a handful of others, some jungle-trained as early as 1938) was but a drop in the military ocean. The Allies then established their own jungle warfare schools in various locations; but, as an example, during the first half of 1942 one such in Australia had the trainees spending 75% of their time constructing anti-invasion defenses rather than preparing for the Japanese and the jungle. The Australian bush was moreover, no real preparation for the "matted wilderness" of New Guinea. After this unhappy start, Australian methods improved so much that General Slim tried to secure the attachment of Australian officers with knowledge of jungle-training to all his units so as to pass on their skills, and the US 8th Brigade—although inexperienced in battle—benefited greatly from their training in Australia when they saw combat in the New Guinea jungles.

Finally, the limited visibility of the jungle, coupled with the communications problems, endemic to the PTO, not only forced the siting of positions much closer together for mutual support than was necessary (or prudent) elsewhere, but also put a premium on good leadership and the exercise of personal initiative. One Chindit officer remarked that, paradoxically perhaps, air force personnel (especially those from the Commonwealth rather than from Britain) were better in the jungle due to greater self-discipline (even though the environment was somewhat more restricted than the wild blue yonder of aerial flight) than army personnel who were often incurably imbued with a herd instinct. In such circumstances, the JJA, as related earlier, was less able to instill these qualities into its personnel and, ultimately, the jungle—far from being a shield—proved to be its grave when it failed to adapt its methods as quickly as most opponents did.

CONCLUSION

In terms of equipment at least, there is no doubt that the Japanese forces were second rate and that they were increasingly forced to compensate for this by exploiting the "spirit" of their troops as a rather

fragile substitute. All soldiers are, to a greater or lesser extent, pawns in the plans and schemes of politicians and generals; but the Japanese soldiers and civilians were perhaps the worst-exploited among the participants of World War 2, even by the cynical Axis or Soviet standards. Japan lost about 2.3 million dead from all causes (sources vary) out of some 704 million enlistments. Outside China and the USSR, rarely have soldiers and civilians been so badly treated or ill-rewarded as those of Imperial Japan. Those Allied soldiers so willing to heap racial abuse upon their Japanese opponents were also, ironically, moved to praise them; one British general stated that "it was honorable to vanquish" such courageous men, while another British officer admitted to his wife that he was "quite proud" of his hard-working, dignified Japanese POWs. Another spoke of the "amazement, admiration and pity" felt by British tank crews on the receiving end of what ASL terms (with justification) "DC Heroes", and spoke of "their anguished looks of determination and despair" as they attacked. Yet another described how Japanese soldiers trapped in last-ditch positions were "often weeping hysterically but fighting desperately to the last". These are not the actions of robots, but of human beings. A number of candidates exist for the title of "best soldier of World War 2", and the Japanese soldier is certainly on the short-list by dint of his tenacious courage and stoicism (rather than for any consistent tactical prowess). With better equipment he would certainly have been even more formidable, and like the German soldier (but unlike the Finnish fighting man) he showed himself adept at fighting a variety of enemies in various kinds of terrain. Unlike the German soldier, his Japanese ally was not so good at teamwork or in behaving rationally to extract the maximum number of casualties from his enemies; he was, however, the most formidable soldier of the war on an individual basis and, like the American Indian, hoped that charms and magic belly-bands (*sennibari*) would protect him from enemy bullets. But such attitudes belonged to an earlier age; pitting mental strength, warrior-like, against Allied materiel could only have inevitable and tragic consequences.

SOURCES

There are many primary and secondary sources on the land forces of Imperial Japan during this war, unfortunately many of them contradictory or simply confusing. Too, due to the high casualties rates among the Japanese participants and the destruction of many of the records, most of the source material comes from the pen of the enemy. However, there are still enough balanced and well-written books and articles about Japanese organization, tactics, culture and weaponry to permit one to amass a respectable reference library.

A number of works would serve as an excellent basis for such a library. For an overview of the Japanese army, Adrian Stuart's *The Underrated Enemy* (London 1987) and Saburo Ienaga's *Japan's Last War* (Oxford 1977) are the best. *Soldiers of the Sun* (London 1991), by Meirion and Susie Harries, is the latest addition to this short list and concentrates upon the psychology and culture that influenced the Japanese warrior. For the more prosaic concerns of organization, I made use of the U.S. War Department publication *Handbook on Japanese Military Forces* (reprint, London 1967). A great deal of information can also be found in the many accounts of specific campaigns and battles in which the Japanese engaged; I would recommend Louis Allen's *Burma, The Longest War* (London 1984) and *Singapore 1941-42* (London 1977), Sir William Slim's *Defeat into Victory* (London 1957), Bryan Perrett's *Tank Tracks to Rangoon* (London 1978), and articles from "Purnell's History of the Second World War". For more detail on the conditions under which the Japanese fought, see *Jungle Warfare: Experiences and Encounters* (London 1989) by J.P. Cross.

A WORD FROM THE EDITOR

The first thing most readers (with the exception perhaps of those who have just joined us) will notice is the theft of this year's offering for the die-hard ASL fan. To make a long story short, I couldn't pack everything I wanted to see in print into a mere 64, so the '92 ASL Annual is 80 pages of the best on wargaming's premier WW2 tactical system.

As the day for final layout approached, I was faced with the unfortunate choice of trimming or eliminating one or more of the fine articles I'd demanded of contributors, or making the unexpectedly lengthy Series Replay a two-parter spanning this year's issue and the next, or dumping a couple of the scenarios and regular features. I'd already delayed the SL "Commando Campaign" for two years and wanted to offer something new to the fans of the original system at long last; and I was equally loath to hold the piece on the Minor Allies (intended for the '91 issue) in my bloated files for another year. These 15 scenarios are the best (don't take my word for it; just ask the playtesters listed in the masthead) thus far offered in the *Annual*. Nor did I wish to eliminate any of the material you have come to expect: the letters, questions/answers, scenario listing, and such. The SR was simply too damn good to deface by splitting it in half and forcing readers to wait a year to see what happened. So I put on my most beguiling voice and convinced our management to let me increase the size of the '92 *Annual*. I would hope this decision meets with everyone's approval.

This does not, however, solve the identical dilemma that already looms concerning the 1993 *Annual*. In effect, I have two options with regard to the future: either plan for a single, 80-page issue each year based on the format herein; or institute two 48-page publications (one for a spring release and one for an autumn) which together will be the "ASL Annual". In the latter case, the extra pages (96 as opposed to 80) will be used for the repetition of standard features—cover, masthead, Debriefing, Signals, etc.—and additional scenarios. Each approach has obvious and distinct advantages for the long-suffering editor, but I'd like to know the readership's opinion. If you've a preference, please drop me a line (c/o Avalon Hill).

While pondering this weighty matter, don't forget to enjoy to the fullest all this issue has to offer. Although not intended, a definite concentration upon the PTO seems to have asserted itself this year. Charles Markuss' excellent article on the Japanese follows in the tradition of his piece on the British during the war. The Series Replay features some of our best playtesters pitted against each other in a heretofore unpublished scenario. Steve Swann offers some "Reference Notes" on ANZAC commandoes, along with another new scenario. However, for those not as fascinated with the fight against the Rising Sun, this issue also boasts the above-mentioned SL campaign game, a consideration of the Minor Allied powers, a look by Mark Nixon at the evolution of a scenario during playtest. And the usual mix of scenarios (15 in all), including a most unusual Japanese-Chinese action for DASL.

Any compliments or congratulations on the continuing success of the ASL *Annual* are due to the contributors and playtesters, especially this year. Take a moment before eagerly flipping more pages of this issue to go back and look over their names on Page 3. Then, offer thanks for their unceasing devotion to this game system.

Rex A. Martin
Managing Editor

TURN RECORD CHART

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



5	3	4	6
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● Add an 8-1 Armor Leader to the British forces arriving on Turn 1.

♣ GERMAN Moves First	♣ 1 6	♣ 2 7	3	♣ 4	5	♣ 6 1 END	7 2	8 3	9 4	10 5	Restart on Turn 11 (1)
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On Turn 2 along north edge of board 4:

2-2-8

						
4 ¹ -6-7	8-1	LONG E 1 3-8	On MTR E 1 3-8	16 1 9PP 37L	16 1 T10 -1/-3*	16 1 15PP NANG -1/-3



On Turn 4 along the north edge of board 6:

2-2-8

 9-2	 7-0	Radio  2  8	☐ 30  T10 9PP
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On Turn 2 along the west edge of board 5:



40L

AFTERMATH: After overrunning an outlying anti-tank section first thrown into the gap, and thrashing a few arriving panzers, the Matildas were finally brought to bay by mixed units responding to Rommel's orders. The key to his success was the timely arrival of an AA section, which rectified the situation in short order by firing at near point-blank range over open sights. The Germans, nonetheless, had discovered to their dismay that their previously-victorious panzers were far from unbeatable.

OP HILL



ASL SCENARIO A41



Near MAWLU, BURMA, 17 April 1944: The second Chindit expedition established a number of "bamboo fortresses" to cut the Japanese supply routes in northern Burma. The most important of these, codenamed "White City", was installed just north of Mawlu to block the vital Rangoon-Myitkyina railway. The Japanese had no immediate reserves, and several weeks passed before Major-General Yoshihide Hayashi and his ad-hoc 24th Independent Mixed Brigade began a series of unimaginative and unsuccessful night assaults upon White City. In the meantime the Chindit fortress was reinforced and several battalions slipped around the Japanese to attack Mawlu from the southwest. Hayashi nevertheless continued his attacks upon White City, concentrating his strength against OP Hill, the defenders' observation post for their troop of 25pdr field guns. On April 17th, in a rare daylight attack, the 24th IMB made yet another desperate attempt to break into the stronghold.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Add two Wire counters to the British OB.
- Add two Full-Strength 3-4-7 squads to the Japanese OB.

35

2

3



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win immediately when they control $\geq$ one level-3-hill hex and no level-3-hill hex contains an unbroken British (including Nigerian) unit, or at game end if they Control the majority of level-3-hill hexes.

TURN RECORD CHART

● BRITISH Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5 [●]	6	7	8	9	10	11	END
● JAPANESE Moves First												



Elements of the 1st South Staffordshires [ELR: 5] set up on/between hexrows oJ and oT (see SSR 3): [SAN: 3]

6-4-8	3-3-8	2-2-8	9-1	8-0	6-14	2-7	5-1 [2-11]	1+3+5	10	14
4	2				2					

Elements of the 6th Battalion, Nigeria Regiment [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 5 along the north edge:

4-4-7	9-1	8-1	7-0	2-7
12				3



Elements of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade [ELR: 3] enter on/after Turn 1 along the south edge; all, some or none may enter each turn: [SAN: 4]

 4'-4-8	 4'-4-7	 3-4-7	 2-2-8	 9-1	 9-0	 8-0	 6-14	 2-7	 5-11 2-11	 10 14	 14 30-1
3	9	8	2				2	4	4	4	

10-2	12
------	----

(see SSR 5)

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with no wind at start.
- PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect, including Light Jungle. Place Overlay 2 on N8-N9, and Overlay 3 on T2-T1. The paddies are Drained. The stream is Dry.
- One Wire counter must be set up in each hex of hexrow oT. The pillbox must be set up at level 3. The British player may Deploy any/all 6-4-8s prior to setup. Wire and Trench counters may use HIP only if set up at $\geq$ level 2.
- Japanese SW may be kept offboard in Cloaking boxes until used, unpossessed, assembled or Transferred. DC may be detonated only in wire/pillbox hexes.
- The Japanese 10-2 leader must enter as Cavalry, and may not voluntarily dismount until adjacent to hexrow oT. While mounted, he may direct a FG using his -2 DRM as if he were a Hero (but regardless of range).

AFTERMATH: Mounted on horseback, Hayashi personally led the attack. The Japanese charged, suicide troops blew holes in the perimeter wire, and the attackers swarmed up OP Hill despite withering fire from the defending platoon of South Staffords. But even as the assault opened, a battalion of the 3rd West African Brigade held in reserve within White City was dispatched to bolster the defense of the hill. As the Japanese climbed upwards, the counterattacking West Africans swept up the other side . . . and soon the whole feature was covered with Japanese and Africans fighting hand-to-hand. At some point in the confused struggle, Hayashi was killed. Aided by the few surviving South Staffords, the Nigerians broke the impetus of the charge. Thrown back, the Japanese were attacked again by forces in their rear, and later that day by U.S. fighter-bombers as well. Having sustained horrendous casualties, the remnants of the Mixed Brigade finally withdrew through the jungle. White City would remain in Allied hands until voluntarily abandoned a month later.



SERIES REPLAY

Scenario A41—OP Hill

Japanese Player: Chuck Goetz

British Player: Perry Cocke

Neutral Commentator: Pat Jonke



Our two volunteers—Chuck Goetz and Perry Cocke—are long-time playtesters here at the Hill, and have proven their ASL abilities in competition ranging from Bill Conner's ASLOK to Jim Stahler's team tournaments. Their fierce competitiveness promises a hard-fought match. Pat Jonke, our Neutral Commentator, is a true ASL grognard—in the best and most complimentary sense of the word. Not only has he designed several of the PTO and ASL Annual scenarios, but he authored much of the errata published in GUNG HO (and some that will be published in the French module) and knows the ASL Rulebook inside and out. To complete the package, he is a keen observer of the pros and cons of various defensive and offensive situations. In short, I have always thought he would make the perfect Neutral Commentator for an ASL Series Replay.

OPENING COMMENTS

Japanese: Perry and I have played ASL many times, mostly in a playtest setting. Our games are, for the most part, very even matches. If we kept track of wins and losses, I suspect that I might have a slight advantage in the "win" column, but not by much. Perry is an excellent defensive player, very sneaky with the placement of his units and fortifications. I think he knows my style of play better than I know his, and there is almost always something in his set-up that takes me by surprise.

Neither of us has played this version of "OP Hill", although Perry has played a few turns of two earlier playtest versions. I am the Attacker, which I prefer, but I am somewhat ambivalent about playing the Japanese in this scenario. The "unbreakable" feature of the IJA forces is very much a mixed blessing. It often enables you to guarantee that a unit can get to a particular location, but the strength of your unit is constantly eroding. If he is not careful, the commander of the IJA will find that by game's end his unstoppable force of samurai has been whittled away by NMCs and IMCs and is now a leaderless crew of half-squads. This is particularly true when, as in this scenario, the Japanese must cross open ground. What is worse, 40% of the IJA squads are second-line, and IJA units have an ELR of "3"; conscripts are sure to make their appearance via unit substitution.

The Japanese, however, are not helpless. First, they greatly outnumber the initial British forces. Second, they are, for the Japanese, fairly well led (it is not often that IJA forces see 10-2 leadership)! Third, they can force an immediate win (in the unlikely event that they control at least one Level-3 hill hex and there are no unbroken British units on the hill top). Finally, they have four Smoke- and WP-capable mortars to help see them safely across the rice paddies. (PP for PP, the light mortar is the best weapon in the IJA arsenal; weighing only 4PP with s7 and WP6, it has an excellent range and a B12—its only shortcoming is its 2ROF.) Thus, counting my blessings rather than my curses, I plan my attack anticipating victory for the Sons of Nippon.

There are two major lines of attack for the IJA—along either the east or west board edges. IJA forces must try to use the jungle and bamboo, in conjunction with mortar-produced smoke and WP, to minimize -2 DRM shots as they move up to the wire, blow a hole

in that wire, and advance past the fortification line to close with the Staffords. I would prefer to make my assault along the west edge because I believe the lines-of-sight are more constrained for the British there. However, Perry appears to have committed the bulk of his forces to stopping a west-edge board-crawl. I hate to do what my opponent wants me to do (i.e., go east instead of west), but I also hate to attack into the teeth of my opponent's forces. I assume, from what I can see, that the British set-up is more or less as follows: 3-3-8 in T8 and T9; 8-0, 6-4-8 and LMG in S7; 9-1, 2-2-8 with HMG in S6; 6-4-8 and LMG in S5; 6-4-8, 2-2-8 and MTR in a Trench in L3; 3-3-8 in the Pillbox. There are several possible locations for the Pillbox. I would guess that it is on or near the front "lip" of the Level-3 hill hexes in order to help deny me a foothold at Level 3. Less likely is a rear placement to deny an early IJA victory if there is a large breakthrough. In any event, I am not too concerned about its location; I will deal with it when it appears. Although I am fairly sure that the 9-1 and HMG are on the front line in S6 due to the possible firelane out to DD0 and the need to get lots of -2 shots at the IJA units as they move across the rice paddies, I foresee a possible alternative placement of those units in L3. Such a placement would allow for long-range shots and avoid the loss of the HMG to an early break result, but suffers from a restricted LOS.

My plan of attack calls for the second-line squads to be my lead units, drawing fire and moving closer to get within normal range of the Brits. Two first-line squads will be deployed into half-squads to man the mortars, making smoke or WP until they run out; then they will probably abandon the mortars and rush forward. Suzuki (8-0) will hang out with the mortar crews to rally any HS that breaks. Kiro (9-1) and the MMG crews will harass the Staffords from maximum normal range (i.e., 8-11 hexes), most likely from DD3 or thereabouts. Hayashi (10-2) will stay out of sight as much as possible in the opening turns of the game to avoid an early morale-check failure and possible death. I do not anticipate using his -2 firegroup-modifying ability unless I can do so without exposing him to anything more than a 2FP attack. Ono (9-0) will lead two 4-4-8s with LMGs as a secondary firebase/assault group. The DCs will be used by DC heroes once the possessing units get within 8MP of the wire. I will use Hayashi to deploy one 4-4-8 in the opening Rally Phase in order to get an additional 8-Morale DC carrier.

I do not expect to win by the immediate Victory Conditions . . . Perry is too good a defender and the IJA has to move too far, too quickly to accomplish such a task before the Nigerians reinforce OP Hill. So I will plan for the game to go 10 or 11 turns. Of course, I certainly won't forego any opportunity for an early victory which presents itself. My basic plan is to spread out across the paddies, using smoke to cover the advance, blast one or more holes through the wire with DC heroes, and run for OP Hill. In the process, I would like to cut off or kill as many Staffords as possible, then send some units around the flanks of the hill, always working to encircle British units (a favorite tactic) and cut off rout routes. I hope to have Control of so many Level-3 hill hexes by Turn 10 or Turn 11 that Perry will be unable to recapture enough ground to prevent an IJA victory.

In closing, I would like to say a brief word about close combat and the Japanese. The Japanese are deadly in CC, as all CC is Hand-to-Hand when the Japanese are the Attacker (and the Japanese enjoy a negative DRM in H-to-H CC). In addition, the elite and first-line IJA units are stealthy, and Defenders of all classes receive a -1 Ambush drm if the Attacker has advanced into jungle, kunai or bamboo. Moreover, an ambushing Japanese Defender attacks on the H-to-H table (with at least a -2 DRM). Thus, a small IJA unit can wipe out much larger opponents, especially if it ambushes the opposing unit(s). Of course, if there is no Ambush, CC is as deadly for the IJA as for their opponents due to the tendency for all Melees to become H-to-H. I will therefore look for CC whenever I can stack the odds in my favor for a likely Ambush or the defending British unit is CX, thus reducing the likelihood of IJA casualties.

British: I'm no Sisler, Nixon, Burk or Conner. If I thought I had to live up to the play of the last two ASL Series Replays done by these Northeast Ohio "sharks", I would not be here. I figure, however, that some merely competent play, without any major blunders, will serve almost as well in introducing the Japanese to the reader. I'm not worried in the least about being humiliated in print, as I plan on burying any major embarrassment. Rex can't print what I don't send him!

Chuck is just the guy to deal out some major embarrassment to the unprepared. An aggressive attacker, he has a knack for maneuvering infantry under fire. I will have plenty of "tough choices" (a favorite phrase of his) to make concerning when to fire and when to wait. I know he will be infiltrating his IJA units, attempting to encircle me and cut off my retreat. My Staffords will have to stay on their toes to keep from being surrounded. We have played each other numerous times in the course of playtesting RB, COB and GH—and even a couple of times just for fun! Chuck's a slightly better player than I am, but I have the psychological edge. Chuck is firmly convinced of my ability to get that one important DR/dr when I need it. He also is inclined to get very dispirited when things go bad. One devastating roll at a crucial moment could force his resignation.

"OP Hill" is a new scenario, not only for the general public but for Chuck and myself, too. Well, mostly new for me. I remember playtesting an early version on Board 2 with 9-Morale Japanese squads. Imagine needing to make a 9M unit fail three different MCs before it will break! Later, shortly before the official COB playtest was mailed out, I played two turns of a version similar to this one. It was then that I discovered the limited LOS available from Hill 615 (known here as "Obscured Perspective" Hill). The inherent terrain of the then Dense Jungle shut down LOS even more than in the current version. My British foe (new to the PTO) set up most of his force on the hill (where he could not see to the Paddies) and only a token force under the Wire in hexrow T. So the other lesson I learned in that match was that the IJA can, after going CX on Turn 1, banzai from hexrow BB to hexrow T on Turn 2 and end up non-CX. This, then, is essentially my first real playing of this scenario. (Chuck is even less familiar with this hill than I am.)

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMENTS

With the tradition of three ASL Series Replays behind us, we saw no reason to alter the format in reporting this match of "OP Hill". As before, the "Serial Event" listing that accompanies each Game Turn records each happening sequentially. Each entry shows the action undertaken, any DR/dm required, any DRM/dm applied, and the result. Dispensed with are mere bookkeeping actions (such as "Remove DM" or "Place Acquisition") which experienced players will perform automatically. Obviously, making use of such a system entails the use of numerous abbreviations. The following "Unit Listings" indicate those used for all the pieces in play; the "Event Listing Legend" offers those used in recording the action.

BRITISH UNIT LISTING:

At Start:	
Type Unit	Designation
9-1 Leader	McNamara ("Mac")
8-0 Leader	Cox
6-4-8	B.A.
6-4-8	B.B.
6-4-8	B.C.
6-4-8	B.D.
3-3-8	b.F.
2-2-8	b.I.
2-2-8	b.2.
? Counter	C.A.-C.H.
Additional:	
Type Unit	Designation
9-1 Leader	Southwell
8-1 Leader	Troha
7-0 Leader	Ross
4-4-7	B.E.
4-4-7	B.F.
4-4-7	B.G.
4-4-7	B.H.
4-4-7	B.I.
4-4-7	B.J.
4-4-7	B.K.
4-4-7	B.L.
4-4-7	B.M.
4-4-7	B.N.
4-4-7	B.O.
4-4-7	B.Q.
3-3-8	b.A.
3-3-8	b.B.
2-2-6	b.J.
4-4-6	B.K.
2-3-6	b.K.
8-0 Leader	Ellis
2-3-7	b.L.
2-3-7	b.G.
2-3-7	b.R.
Hero	Hall
Hero	Richards
? Counter	C.V.-C.Z.



EVENT LISTING LEGEND

B.—	British Squad (letter ID)
J.—	Japanese Squad (letter ID)
C.—	Concealment Counter (letter ID)
b.—	British HS/Crew (letter/number ID)
j.—	Japanese HS/Crew (letter/number ID)
Elim	Eliminated
FPF	Final Protective Fire
HOB	Heat of Battle
H-to-H	Hand-to-Hand
malF	Malfunction
NA	Not Applicable
NE	No Effect
SFF	Subsequent First Fire
TC	Task Check
w/	with or possessing

(All other abbreviations are ASL standard.)

JAPANESE UNIT LISTING:

At Start:	
Type Unit	Designation
10-2 Leader	Hayashi
9-1 Leader	Kiro
9-0 Leader	Ono
8-0 Leader	Suzuki
4-4-8	J.A.
4-4-8	J.B.
4-4-8	J.C.
4-4-7	J.D.
4-4-7	J.E.
4-4-7	J.F.
4-4-7	J.G.
4-4-7	J.H.
4-4-7	J.I.
4-4-7	J.J.
3-4-7	J.K.
3-4-7	J.L.
3-4-7	J.M.
3-4-7	J.N.
3-4-7	J.O.
3-4-7	J.P.
3-4-7	J.Q.
3-4-7	J.R.
2-2-8	j.I.
2-2-8	j.2.
2-3-7	j.C.
2-3-7	j.D.
2-3-7	j.E.
2-3-7	j.F.
? Counter	C.A.-C.H.
Additional:	
Type Unit	Designation
2-3-8	j.A.
2-3-8	j.B.
1-3-7	j.M.
2-3-7	j.O.
3-4-7	J.L.*
1-3-7	j.N.
2-3-7	j.P.
1-3-7	j.K.
1-3-7	j.J.
1-3-7	j.L.
1-3-7	j.O.*
1-3-7	j.L.
3-4-7	J.H.*
1-2-6	j.H.
1-3-7	j.G.
3-4-7	J.Y.
1-3-7	j.K.
1-3-7	j.P.**
3-4-7	J.J.*
1-2-6	j.N.*
DC Hero	Nishii
DC Hero	Kitamura
DC Hero	Sasaki
DC Hero	Pajimoto

* Previous units reduced to lower-quality.

** The need for more than 16 HS necessitated the use of a second j.P.



I envision the battle evolving into a slugfest for hexrow K, and hex K6 in particular, so that is where I have placed the Pillbox and centered my Trench line. If I can hold onto just one of the three Level-3 hexes in hexrow K, along with the six such hexes in hexrows H-J, I will win. The gullies and swamp on either side of the hill are excellent natural barriers and should funnel the attack into the middle and up the path. The path is the quickest way up OP Hill. I would like to bar it with some Wire but that would as easily trap my Staffords as slow down the IJA advance. Therefore, the spare Wire goes into N6, N7 and N8 to help guard, along with the swamp in N9 and O10, my right flank. The HMG and 9-1 (Mac) should cover my left.

I do not want the HMG on the front line where I will have to leave it when I rout away. A unit in L7 can see out to FF6 and points west, with LOS into S8 and R8 and hexrow N. Meanwhile, L4 can see to and east of EE2. Finally, while not at Level-3, hex L3 has a LOS in a wedge shape out to and between EE2 and EE10. This is where Mac, a crew and the HMG will start. The Trench line from there to L5, K6, K7 and L7 will allow easy (i.e., non-CX) advance from L3 to L4, and also allow Mac and the HMG to traverse the front lip of the hill in one turn. Decent LOS (for OP Hill, that is) from L4 and L7 and beneficial terrain in L5 and K6 to slow down the march up the path and to augment the Pillbox round out the advantages of my Trench line. Once the IJA gets into L5 and L7, I'm sure Chuck will demonstrate the disadvantages for the readership.

Everyone else goes on the front line to start wearing down the IJA, including all four British squads. It would be nice to keep a squad with the HMG, but I need that inherent FP up front. I will want to hook up a squad with the HMG later, though, when the fighting gets close-in on the hill. With Mac controlling the left (bore-sighting the Z2 bottleneck at normal range), one-and-a-half squads will guard the front right, taking advantage of the natural TEM in T8 and T9. Most of the FP, however, remains in the center. The Trench line there is designed to allow the Staffords to move and rout behind the hexrow S hindrances before coming out of the trenches. As long as they can rout back to the P6 huts and then to the jungle, at least some of my front line units should survive. I'll be needing those 6-4-8s when it comes to Melee time on the hill. Bore-sighting the mortar comes down to a toss-up between DD3 and DD8.

My Staffords *must* punish the IJA units as they cross the paddies. Slow them down so my Nigerians can get in to position and whittle them down so that there are not Japanese enough left to take and hold the hill. I would like to see some 6-4-8s survive for the end-game, but my first priority is to make the IJA pay for crossing those paddies. I would also like to get in some -2 shots at Hayashi, but I don't expect many (if any) of those. I will be taking whatever pot-shots I can at him and the other Japanese leaders. They are so powerful (no Pin, Commissar *plus* Leader DRM, LLTC instead of LLMC for unbroken unit) and yet so fragile (one chance in three to die on the first failed MC). Whether via the slow but safer route through the paddies or the quicker, more hazardous way across the banks, the Staffords say: "Bring on the IJA." My one major worry in all this calculation: Japanese SMOKE.

Initial Set-Up

British:

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
1 B.A. in T9			
2 b.P. in T8			
3 B.B., b.I w/MTR IN Trench in S7			
4 Cox, B.C. w/LMG IN Trench in S6			
5 B.D. w/LMG IN Trench S5			
6 Mac, b.2 w/HMG IN Trench in L3			
7 Wire in T0 through T10			
8 Wire in N6 through T10			
9 Trench in R5			

- 10 Trench in L4
11 Trench in L5
12 Trench, Pillbox (CA L5/L6) in K6
13 Trench in K7
14 Trench in L7
15 British Sniper in Z1

The HMG has bore-sighted hex Z2, while the MTR has bore-sighted hex D8. Following placement of British Sniper, British player places Concealment counters: C.A. in T8, C.B. in T9, C.C. in S7, C.D. in S6, C.E. in S5, and C.F. in L3.

Japanese:

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
16 J.D., J.K. in obB5			
17 J.L., J.E. w/DC in obB4			
18 Kiro, J.L., J.I. w/MMG(dm), J.2 w/MMG(dm), J.E. w/MTR(dm); J.F. w/MTR(dm) in obB3			
19 Hayashi, Horse, J.C. w/2xDC, J.M., J.N. in obB2			
20 Ono, J.O., J.A. w/LMG, J.B. w/LMG, DC in obB1			
21 J.J., J.P., J.Q. in obB0			
22 J.R., J.H. in obC2			
23 Suzuki, J.C. w/MTR(dm), J.D. w/MTR(dm), J.F. w/LMG, J.G. w/LMG in obC1			
24 Japanese Sniper in R4			

Initial positions are off-board hexes (ob). All Japanese units enter under Concealment counters: C.A. in obB5, C.B. in obB4, C.C. in obB3, C.D. in obB2, C.E. in obB1, C.F. in obB0, C.G. in obC2, C.H. in obC2.

Neutral Commentator: I played "OP Hill" several times during the CODE OF BUSHIDO playtest and, in my experience, the most important factor in the outcome is the amount of early Japanese casualties. If Chuck can succeed in crossing the rice paddies with minimal losses, he should have the upper hand near the end of the game. The Japanese are much stronger than the Nigerians in CC, and the terrain of Overlay #3 lends itself to a lot of close-quarter attacks. The Japanese should approach OP Hill along the west edge of the board, unless the British player gives them a very good reason not to do so (e.g., by placing his entire force on the west side of the mapboard). Perry's set-up is not a good enough reason. The major advantage to a western approach is the extensive palm grove that blocks LOS from units on the hill to units crossing the wire in hexrow oT. The Japanese should clump together in large, multi-hex firegroups; in such a formation, they can place formidable fire into the British front line. By the time the Japanese reach the wire, the British front-line units should have pulled back to the hill (or been smashed in place).

Another factor as important here as in any scenario is a careful examination of the opponent's initial set-up. In analyzing Perry's defense, Chuck recognized the importance of the HMG and the high probability that Lt. McNamara is positioned with it. Therefore, the HMG is most likely located in S6, S7 or L3—because those stacks have three "real" counters (presumably, Mac, the HMG and its manning infantry) beneath the Concealment markers (there are no dummy counters to worry about in the British OB). Given the short range of the British infantry, there must be a SW in L3 or that stack will not be able to fire at the Japanese during the paddy crossing. Since there must be three real counters in L3, the third is either another MMC, another SW or a leader. A second MMC would waste FP that is needed elsewhere. A second SW would concentrate too much FP where it could be lost by a single MC failure or a Sniper attack. Therefore, the mysterious third counter must be a leader. But which leader? The 8-0 is more important for rallying broken unit than directing fire, especially since British elite units do not Cower. A logical place for Sgt. Cox is in or around the front-line trenches where there are a significant number of British MMCs. The only conclusion for the Japanese player here is that Mac, the HMG and a MMC are in hex L3.

Overall, Perry's initial set-up is very flexible, and centrally located so that he can shift force in the direction of the Japanese thrust. The trench system

that enables Mac and the HMG to move across the top of OP Hill is especially well thought-out. New ASL players should also note Perry's careful consideration of rout paths and rally locations for his front-line units.

Chuck's plan of attack is equally well thought-out. Note the importance Chuck places on the light mortars and their SMOKE-generating capacity. If there is one tool that novice players seem to overlook more than any other, it is the utility of SMOKE. Nearly every ASL scenario features some SMOKE-making capability—whether in the form of infantry grenades, the vehicular grenades introduced in WOA, various forms of smoke dischargers, or special ammunition loads. The only problem I foresee for the Japanese is Chuck's assumption concerning the British HMG; he did not carefully consider the contrary evidence. We'll see how much his troops pay for that mistake.

TURN 1

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
25 Wind Change		6	NE
26 TC for J.C. to deploy (J.A. and J.B.)	-2	8	Deploy
Movement Phase			
27 J.K. CX move to CC6			
28 J.L. CX move to CC5			
29 LMG (B.D.) fires on J.L.—1FP		6	NE
30 J.E. CX move to CC5			
31 J.D. CX move to CC6			
32 J.Q. CX move to DD0			
33 J.P. CX move to DD1			
34 J.O. CX move (via DD2 bank) to CC2			
35 J.N. CX move (via DD2 bank) to CC3			
36 J.M. CX move (via DD2 bank) to CC3			
37 J.I. CX move to DD0			
38 Suzuki, J.G., J.F. CX move (via DD1 bank) to CC2			
39 J.A. CX move (via DD2 bank) to CC2			
40 J.B. CX move (via DD2 bank) to CC3			
41 Ono, J.A., J.B. move to DD1			
42 J.D. CX move to EE1			
43 J.C. CX move to EE2			
44 C.C. move to EE3			
45 J.R. CX move to EE1			
46 J.H. CX move to EE2			
47 C.D. move to GG3			
Defensive Fire Phase			
48 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at CC2—1FP	-3	12	malfunction
49 MTR (b.1.) fires at CC3	-2	5	Hit
50 resolve 2FP attack		11	NE
Advance Phase			
51 J.E. into BB4			
52 J.L. into BB5			
53 J.D. into BB6			
54 J.K. into BB5			
55 Suzuki, J.G. and J.F. into BB1			
56 J.O. into BB2			
57 J.B. into BB2			
58 J.M., J.N. and J.A. into BB3			
59 C.C. creates C.A. (Kiro, J.I., J.2); C.A. into DD3			
60 Ono, J.A. and J.B. into CC1			
61 J.P. into CC2			
62 J.J. into CC1			
63 J.R. and J.D. into DD1			
64 J.H. and J.C. into DD2			
65 C.C. creates C.E. (J.F.); C.E. into EE2			
66 J.E. into DD2			
Close Combat Phase			
67 J.B. attempts to conceal		6	NE
68 J.O. attempts to conceal	+1	2	place C.F.
69 J.P. attempts to conceal	+1	6	NE

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
70 Wind Change		8	NE
71 b.2. attempts repair of HMG		4	NE
Prep Fire Phase			
72 MTR (b.1.) fires at DD3	+2	6	Miss
73 LMG (B.C.) fires at CC1—1FP	+1	6	NE
74 LMG (B.D.) fires at CC1—1FP	+1	10	NE
Movement Phase			
75 B.A. CX move from T9 to O6			
76 b.F. CX move from T8 to R6...			
77 two LMGs (J.A., J.B. w/Ono) fire at b.F.—2FP		9	NE

78 b.F. continues to O5			
79 Cox exits Trench, move to R5...			
80 two LMGs (J.F., J.G. w/Suzuki) fire at Cox—2FP	+1	5	PTC
81 Cox takes PTC		7	Pass
82 Cox continues to P6			

Defensive Fire Phase

83 J.1 and J.2 assemble MMGs			
84 J.E. assembles MTR			
85 C.E. assembles MTR			
86 J.C. assembles MTR			
87 J.D. assembles MTR			

Advance Phase

88 b.F. into N5			
89 B.A. into O5			

Japanese: This turn went smoothly. I was caught somewhat off guard by the appearance of Mac and the HMG in L3, but had anticipated the possibility (that's why Ono and accompanying units entered on the far right flank, out of LOS of L3). It was just my good fortune that the HMG broke and Perry was unable to repair it during the British Rally Phase. Hayashi can get pretty much anywhere he wants to go in one turn's movement. I would have liked to hinder the British movement, but on Turn 1 my units don't have the range except for the LMGs, which took what shots they could. Given the low odds, positive DRM, and the low breakdown number of the IJA LMGs, even those shots may have been ill-advised. But I took them to remind Perry that his units can be shot at, and on the off chance of a lucky roll and an early British break. All SW are assembled for the Turn 2 assault. Next turn—Smoke from the mortars and all units advance (especially if Mac can't clear the jam in the HMG).

British: Chuck comes strong to the east. The IJA formation is not quite a "board-edge creep," but not strung out either. Right into the 1FP "teeth" of Mac and the HMG! That 1FP (-3) shot with a ROF3 weapon is actually pretty good, causing a MC with an "average" 7DR and casualties on a "4" or less. Once Suzuki and squads C and F stopped on that Bank counter, I figured they would end up as Mac's targets. Nothing better presented itself as Ono, J.A. and J.B. crept down the board edge, out of LOS. I was happy to have as juicy a target as I did. Unfortunately, Mac directs the HMG's first shot into a malfunction! I had initially rolled a "12" outside of the dice box we are using and heaved a sigh of relief. Who could know that another "12" lurked in the wings? Bummer. Things can go very bad for the British very quickly without the HMG, especially as I fail to repair it in the British Player Turn. At least I did not disable it. If I can get it back for the Japanese Turn 2 Movement Phase, I'll be satisfied. The chances that the long-range LMG shots will inflict any damage are slim, but my Staffords don't Cower and my MGs only break on a "12". That concealed stack in the DD3 jungle was more difficult to hit, but it was too tempting a target for my mortar to pass up. It missed, though, with a "6" that would have hit an unconcealed target (or a bore-sighted location—seems I guessed wrong). B.A. and b.F. run over towards the east to back-stop the center, and Cox pulls back to the huts as planned for future rally duties. He only set up in S6 in order to confuse the IJA commander a little. The Staffords can move fairly freely this turn facing only long-range LMG fire. All the more powerful Japanese SW get assembled this turn, however, which bodes ill for my British.

Neutral Commentator: The LMG shots from both sides were definitely ill-advised. Suzuki would have been a better target for a weak British attack than Ono due to the former stack's lower average morale. The Japanese would be better off with their LMGs still cloaked as per SSR #4 until the extra FP is more meaningful. The British have no shortage of targets, and it will be a more efficient use of their limited firepower to target enemy units carrying support weapons.

ing contact with the enemy? I hate to lose a 4-4-7 to a KIA, but losses had to be expected once Perry repaired the HMG and got some ROF (frankly, I consider myself fortunate not to have lost the DC to random SW destruction). My squad M held up well, considering what was fired at him. Mac's move to a HIP Trench in L4 should not have been unexpected, but I did not anticipate it and it effectively isolates Suzuki and Ono and the units with them. In response, I will try to veer back towards the center to stay out of LOS of the HMG, especially if one or both of the front-line British squads fall to my Turn 3 Prep Fire. The key question for next turn: Does the LOS from S5 to X1 go through the Smoke in hex W3?

British: Status quo with HMG on the Japanese Turn 2 Rally Phase. To make matters worse, down comes the Japanese SMOKE, both Smoke and WP, screening off the eastern flank from my center. Chuck gets ROF with his WP mortar, and then complains of a lack of targets! Kiro and his MMG crews smash almost half my front line. On comes the IJA horde. Once J.L. stepped onto the Bank, squad B should never have fired at him during the MPH—that -2 DRM would most likely still be around during DFPh. Suzuki taunts me by moving with his stack out from behind the Smoke into Hex X0... is the LOS good from S5? Neither of us thinks so without stringing it. B.D. couldn't miss J.D. or J.E. moving hazily, but each shrugs off a 1MC. I never gave a thought to leaving crew #1 to Self-Rally on the front line; B.B. can pick up the mortar and b.l. will have a better chance to rally back with Cox and to lose DM. Sure did miss Mac's HMG with all those IJA units running around in the open. Fortunately, crew #2 repaired the HMG during the British player-turn Rally Phase. Not only is Mac back, but is he hot! The HMG KIA's J.E. and rains MCs down on J.M. But after two 2MCs, a 1MC, and a NMC, enemy squad M merely flips once to become a 2-3-7 reduced-strength squad. The mortar misses its second shot at an Airburst in the jungle and still has no ROF. It better get crackin' before this game passes it by. At least squad C rolled the "12" on his inherent FF shot and not with the mortar. Good thing my Staffords aren't suffering from Ammo Shortage. HS F retreats to hide and prevent an immediate IJA victory. I'm not very worried about that yet, but it's not totally far-fetched either. Kiro gets ROF again in his DFPh, but merely pins B.D., who wasn't planning to advance anywhere anyway. B.B. also stays put to maintain the -1 Acquisition on the jungle in W1 and to try and complicate his Smoke placement a little. Mac advances up to L4 to cut off Ono and Suzuki. Chuck is in a great position after two turns of movement, with hardly any losses.

Neutral Commentator: Chuck used the Paddy Banks to make the most of the situation during the MPH, and then protected his units by advancing INTO the paddies. The Japanese moved swiftly, but prudently. By spreading out into a big blob, the Japanese can form massive firegroups while minimizing the effects of a single successful attack against them. Mac quickly underscored this point by wiping out a squad.

Kiro and the Japanese MMGs should have fired at Sgt. Cox in P6 in order to keep b.l. and B.C. under Desperation Morale. If they're down, keep them down as long as possible. The British squad in S5 can be dealt with next turn using Prep Fire or SMOKE. Smoke should also cover Suzuki and Ono when they move through the HMG's sights; they are not as isolated as first appears.

The British player in OP Hill should always keep in mind the location of the Japanese DCs—right now only three are available—and try to anticipate where they will be used. If squad B.D. in S5 is hit with SMOKE next turn, the Japanese might come right at him by blowing the wire in T4 or T5 and declaring a Banzai Charge with Suzuki et al. In that event, only B.B. in S7 can help out, assuming it survives Kiro's Prep Fire. Perry will be in a good position next turn if

the Japanese mortars cannot get SMOKE placed successfully. The east edge provides no cover from the fire of units on OP Hill.

TURN 3

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
179 Wind Change		7	NE
180 Cox rally b.l.	-1	4	Rally
181 Cox rally B.C.	-1	6	Rally
Prep Fire Phase			
182 MTR (J.C.) fires Smoke into S5	-2	11	No Smoke
183 MTR (J.E.) fires Smoke into S5	+1	5	Hit
184 MTR (J.C.) fires dispersed WP into W2	-2	11	No WP
185 two MMGs (J.L., J.2 w/Kiro) fire at S7—8FP	+1	3	2MC
186 B.B. takes 2MC		5	Pass
187 two MMGs (J.L., J.2 w/Kiro) fire at S7—8FP	+1	9	NE
Movement Phase			
188 J.M. from X5 (via bank) to U6			
189 J.L. from Z5 to X4, CX to recover DC	+1	6	NE
190 J.K. from X6 (via bank) to W6...			
191 LMG (B.C.) fires at J.K.—2FP	-1	7	PTC
192 J.K. takes PTC		5	Pass
193 J.K. continue to U7			
194 J.D. from X7 (via bank) to U8			
195 J.N. from X2 (via bank) to V3			
196 J.J. attempts to place smoke in W2		5	NE
197 J.J. CX from X1 to (via W2 bank) to W3			
198 J.I. from Y3 (via bank) to V4			
199 J.A. attempts to create DC Hero	-1	1	Nishii in X2
200 Nishii from X2 (via bank) to T3, detonate DC		9	NE
201 J.A. from X2 to W4			
202 J.F. attempts to place smoke in W2		4	NE
203 MTR (B.B.) fires at J.F.		10	Miss
204 J.F. from W1 to V0			
205 J.G. attempts to place smoke in W2		5	NE
206 J.G. from W1 to V0			
207 Suzuki assault moves from W1 to V0			
208 J.O. from Y1 to U2			
209 B.A. fires at J.O.—2FP	-2	8	PTC
210 J.O. takes PTC		4	Pass
211 J.R. from Z0 to W2...			
212 B.B. fires at J.R.—2FP	-2	7	NMC
213 J.R. takes NMC		5	Pass
214 J.P. from Y2 (via bank) to W3			
215 J.B. from Y2 (via bank) to W4			
216 J.H. from Z1 (via Y2 bank) to Y4			
217 J.Q. from Z0 to W1			
218 J.C. from AA2 (via bank) to Y3			
219 J.F. CX from DD2 (via bank) to AA4			
220 J.D. from CC2 (via bank) to AA3			
221 J.A. attempts to place smoke in X1		5	NE
222 Hayashi from AA1 (via bank) to V8			
Defensive Fire Phase			
223 HMG (b.2 w/Mac) fires at V0—6FP		7	NMC
224 Suzuki takes NMC		6	Pass
225 J.G. takes NMC	-1	5	Pass
226 J.F. takes NMC	-1	10	Reduction
227 B.C. fires at U6—2FP	-1	4	1MC
228 J.M. takes 1MC		9	Reduction
229 Replace J.M. with J.M.			
230 Sniper Activation		1	Attack to W2
231 Random Direction DR	2/5		SAN:2
232 Target British Sniper in Z1			
233 B.D. fires at V8—4FP	+2	5	NE
Advancing Fire Phase			
234 J.M., J.D., J.K. w/Hayashi fire at S7—2FP		3	1MC
235 B.B. takes 1MC		8	Break
Route Phase			
236 B.B. routs to P6			
Advance Phase			
237 J.D. off bank			
238 J.K. off bank			
239 J.M. into V6			
240 J.L. into V5			
241 J.N. into U4			
242 J.O. into U3			
243 J.A., J.B. into V4			
244 J.P. into V3			
245 J.R. into V2			
246 J.L. into W5			
247 J.H. into X4			
248 J.J. into W4			
249 J.C. into X3			
250 J.E. into Y3			
251 J.D. into Z2			
252 J.F. into Z4			
253 Kiro, J.L., J.2. into CC5			
254 J.Q. into V1			
255 Ono, J.A., J.B. into W1			

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
256 Wind Change		4	NE
257 Cox rally B.B. (DM)	+3	6	NE
258 J.H. attempts recovery of DC		5	Recover
Prep Fire Phase			
259 HMG (b.2 w/Mac) fires at V0—6FP		3	K/2
260 J.F. replaced with J.O.			
261 Suzuki takes 2MC		9	Wounded
262 Wound Severity dr		6	KIA
263 J.G. takes 2MC		4	Pass
264 J.O. takes 2MC		6	Break
265 HMG (b.2 w/Mac) fires at W1—6FP		12	malf HMG
266 B.A. fires at U3—2FP		4	1MC
267 J.O. takes 1MC		9	Reduction
268 Sniper Activation		1	Attack
269 Random Direction DR	3/2		to BB2
270 Target British Sniper in Z1			Elim
Movement Phase			
271 B.C. from P6 to O8			
272 b.l. from P6 to N5			
273 Cox assault move from P6 to O6			
274 B.D. assault move from S5 to R5			
275 J.D., J.K., J.M., J.L., J.A., J.B., J.N., J.P., J.R. w/Hayashi fire at B.D.—20FP	+5	5	1MC
276 B.D. takes 1MC		9	Break
277 b.F. from L5 to K7			
Defensive Fire Phase			
278 two MMGs (J.L., J.2 w/Kiro) fire at P6—4FP	+1	7	NE
279 two MMGs (J.L., J.2 w/Kiro) fire at P6—4FP	+1	9	NE
280 J.G. fires at N4—2FP	+1	10	NE
281 MTR (J.C.) fires at N4		10	Miss
282 MTR (J.D.) fires at N4	+2	11	Miss
283 MTR (J.F.) fires at N4		8	Miss
Route Phase			
284 B.B. routs to N5			
285 B.D. routs to P6			
286 J.O. routs to W1			
Advance Phase			
287 b.F. into L7 Trench			
288 Cox CX into N5			
289 B.C. CX into P8			
290 b.l. into M6			

Japanese: The Smoke in S5 enabled me to shift the assault to the center left. British squad B's first fire at J.R. allowed me to swing Hayashi to the left flank and help out the fire group that broke B.B. with a "3" on the 2FP attack. Unfortunately, my infantry units couldn't find any Smoke grenades and I was unable to extricate Ono, Suzuki and accompanying units from the LOS of Mac and the HMG. In the Advance Phase, I had to decide whether to advance Ono and friends to W1. I did so, hoping that Mac doesn't get any (many?) ROF. I was all set with my advances to form a massive fire group to blow away B.D. in S5; the squad did break, although I did not cause any casualties. Perry did the best he could to increase the DRMs against the attack, but I rolled low and B.D. rolled high. Those Staffords just can't seem to pass a morale check. The HMG blows away Suzuki and a (semi) half-squad, but fortunately again breaks on its next shot. My sniper KIA's his counterpart, leaving me free to fire low-odds attacks I might not ordinarily take. Now that the Staffordshire's entire front line has crumbled, I hope to move some units through the wire next turn (preferably via a DC Hero-created hole, but the old-fashioned way if necessary) and onwards towards OP Hill.

British: B.C. and b.l. came back on schedule. The IJA finds more Smoke, but at least mortar C completely depletes. Kiro directs a "3" at squad B (with, of course, ROF), but he passes the resulting 2MC. The DC heroes will need a "5" or less to blow a hole in the Wire, and will die in the process, so I cannot waste any shots on them. B.B. probably should have fired at J.L. first, then at J.D., knowing that he wouldn't get any better shots. But if I fire early, then the IJA can run around at will. The big stacks in the east try to place infantry Smoke, fail and stay put, intimidated by Mac and the HMG. Hayashi swings around behind the Smoke, out of range, and changes flanks, easily surviving the 4FP (+2) attack (Cavalry

being immune to PTC results). Hayashi's movement enables him to lead fire-group attacks against squad B, who breaks on a lousy 2FP-even attack (as Chuck rolls a "3" after reducing my SAN to "2"), and squad D, who falls to a heavily-modified 20FP attack (sure could have used an average 7DR on either side of that transaction). During my own Prep Fire, Mac takes a lesson from Kiro and engineers a "3" at Suzuki and friends. Just my luck, the already reduced squad suffers the K result! Suzuki fails his 2MC and his Wound Severity dr, but his Morale Level is "7" when he dies, so Japanese squad G doesn't need to take a LLTC, nor j.O. a LLMC. Mac gets so excited about the good shooting that he steps on the ammo belt and jams the HMG. Again! Please, not another IJA Movement Phase without the HMG! Then I roll my second "4" of the game, Chuck rolls another "1" on his Sniper attack, and I am suddenly sniper-less. Ordinarily, I would not mind such a result as I usually miss as many SANs as I catch (e.g., Event 185). Due to the record keeping required by a Series Replay, however, I was sure to catch most of those "3s" (or rather "2s"), but no chance now. B.C. moves out to stem the tide in the west. Cox went to O6 to be in position to advance into either P6 or N5, depending on whether B.B. was forced to rout again. DMed by Kiro, B.B. routs to N5, while B.D. must rout to P6. Sure, I could have left squad B in P6 and brought Cox forward, but P6 is just too far forward. I suspect he will continue to edge back to the rear the rest of the game. Crew #1 and HS F both hide. B.A. is not happy about hanging out in an Acquired jungle hex, but someone needs to exercise some control over IJA movement in the east. Without Mac's help, I fear B.A. will be sorely out-matched.

Neutral Commentator: *Chuck got Smoke into S5, but passed up the opportunity to rush that position and instead prepared his forces for the next turn. The Japanese have not suffered heavy losses and obviously do not feel the need to risk anything. Perry's Brits promptly obliged the enemy by breaking the HMG again, and then knuckling under in the DFPh. White City may be abandoned early.*

However, Perry is in better position than might first be apparent since the Japanese mortars have used up most of their SMOKE capability. Perry is undoubtedly looking into the future, and must take some hope from the knowledge that the Japanese will soon face a lot of unhindered -1 DRM shots in the coming turns. For now, the Japanese will almost certainly shift their focus to the west and try to break through the wire near the Smoke in S5. As anticipated, the palms in hexrow S will block most British defensive fire opportunities from OP Hill. The Japanese caution this turn, coupled with the time required next turn to shift forces west, may put significant pressure on Chuck to take chances.

TURN 4

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
291 Wind Change		9	NE
292 Ono rally j.O. (DM)	-2	8	Rally
293 b.2. attempts repair of HMG		1	Repair
294 Cox rally B.B. (DM)	+3	11	NE
Prep Fire Phase			
295 MTR (j.E.) fires Smoke into S3		6	Hit
296 MTR (j.E.) fires at N4		5	Hit
297 Resolve 2FP attack	-1	6	NMC
298 B.A. takes NMC		4	Pass
299 Sniper Activation		4	NE
300 MTR (j.D.) fires at N5		10	NE
301 MTR (j.C.) fires at N4	-1	7	Hit
302 Resolve 2FP attack	-1	9	NE
303 MTR (j.C.) fires at N4	-2	8	Hit
304 Resolve 2FP attack	-1	10	NE
Movement Phase			
305 J.B. attempts to create DC Hero	-2	5	Kiramura in W1
306 Kiramura from W1 to T2, detonate DC		11	NE
307 j.B. attempts to create DC Hero	-1	4	Sasaki in V4
308 Sasaki from V4 to T5, detonate DC		5	Elim Wire

309 j.B. from V4 (via bank) to S6			
310 J.H. attempts to create DC Hero	-2	5	Fujimoto in X4
311 Fujimoto from X4 to T4, detonate DC		8	NE
312 J.H. CX from X4 (via bank) to T5			
313 J.K. from U7 to T7 onto Wire		4	End Move
314 j.M. from V6 to T7 onto Wire		1	Under Wire
315 J.D. from U8 to T8 onto Wire		1	Under Wire
316 J.I. from V5 onto bank ...			
317 B.C. w/LMG fires at J.L.—4FP		8	NE, Fire Lane
318 J.I. continue to S6			
319 j.A. from V4 (via bank) to S6			
320 J.L. from W5 to U5			
321 J.J. from W4 to U5			
322 J.N. from U4 to T4 onto Wire		1	Under Wire
323 J.O. from U3 to T3 onto Wire		3	End Move
324 J.Q. from V1 to T2 onto Wire		6	End Move
325 J.P. from V3 to U5			
326 J.R. CX from V2 (via bank) to U4 ...			
327 B.A. fires at J.R.—2FP	-2	8	PTC
328 J.R. takes PTC		8	Pin
329 j.F. from Z4 (via bank) to X4			
330 j.O. CX from W1 (via V2 bank) to U5			
331 Ono, J.A. to W2 ...			
332 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at Ono, J.A.—6FP	-3	5	1KIA
333 Random Selection		1/2	J.A. KIA Ono
334 Random SW destruction		2	Wounded Elim LMG
335 Wound Severity dr		4	NE
336 Ono continues back to W1			
337 Kiro, j.I., j.2. from CC5 (via BB5 bank) to X5			
338 Hayashi from V8 to U7, dismounts, to T7 onto Wire		3	End Move
Defensive Fire Phase			
339 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at W1—6FP		6	1MC
340 Ono takes 1MC		7	Pass
341 J.B. takes 1MC		7	Pin
342 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at W1—6FP		8	PTC
Advancing Fire Phase			
343 j.A., j.B., J.I. fire at P6—4FP	+1	9	NE
Rout Phase			
344 B.D. routs to N5			
Advance Phase			
345 j.A. into S7 Trench			
346 j.M. into S7 Trench			
347 J.D. into S8			
348 J.L., j.B. into R5 Trench			
349 J.H. into S6 Trench			
350 J.N. into S4			
351 J.P., J.L. into T5			
352 j.O. into U5			
353 Kiro, j.I., j.2. into W5			
354 j.F. into W4			
355 j.E. into Y4			
356 Ono into X0			
Close Combat Phase			
358 Ono conceals			place C.H.
359 J.H. conceals			place C.A.
360 J.P. attempts to conceal	+1	4	place C.D.
361 J.L. attempts to conceal	+1	3	under C.D.

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
362 Wind Change		7	NE
363 Cox rally B.B.	-1	7	Rally
364 Cox rally B.D. (DM)	+3	5	Rally
365 j.M. attempts recovery of MTR		6	NE
366 j.A. attempts recovery of Brit MTR		5	Recover
367 j.O. transfers LMG to J.I.			
Prep Fire Phase			
368 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at V0—6FP		5	1MC
369 J.G. takes 1MC		4	Pass
370 B.C. fires at S8—8FP	+2	8	NE
Movement Phase			
371 B.D. from N5 to N6 onto Wire		3	End Move
372 B.B. assault move from N5 to M6			
373 B.A. assault move from N4 to N3			
374 Cox assault move from N5 to M6			
375 b.1. assault move from M6 to M5			
376 b.F. assault move from L7 to M7			
Defensive Fire			
377 J.I. fires at N3—4FP	+2	7	NE
378 J.K. w/Hayashi fires at P8—2FP	+2	7	NE
379 J.D. fires at P8—4FP	+2	5	PTC
380 B.C. takes PTC		6	Pass
381 j.A. fires at P8—2FP	+1	5	PTC
382 B.C. takes PTC		8	Pin (NA)
383 two MMGs (j.I., j.2 w/Kiro) fire at P8—8FP	+1	4	2MC

384 B.C. takes 2MC		8	Break
385 MTR (j.D.) fires at N5	-1	12	mal/MTR
386 MTR (j.E.) fires at N4	-1	9	Miss
387 MTR (j.F.) fires at R3		8	Miss
Rout Phase			
388 B.C. routs to N8 onto Wire		4	End Move
Advance Phase			
389 Mac, b.2. w/HMG into L3 Trench			
390 b.F. into M6			
391 Cox, B.B. into M5			
Close Combat Phase			
392 b.F. conceals			place C.H.
393 Cox, B.B., b.1 conceals			place C.F.

Japanese: Once I managed to blow one hole in the wire, I probably shouldn't have used the fourth DC in an attempt to blow up wire; it would have been useful as a threat later in the game, especially once I locate the pillbox. I got lucky with some Wire dr, and several units are now poised to advance past the wire next turn. I made a huge mistake running Ono and squad B out in the open where Mac could gun them down, however. I just plain forgot about the fact that Mac is on Level 3 and can therefore see over the Level-2 Smoke hindrance. The IJA is breaking through the wire line, but the HMG limits my movement in the east, while the N6-N8 wire line, in conjunction with the N9 and O10 Swamp, hinders movement in the west, thereby forcing me to attack the center—where Perry's main force is. I would have liked to DM his squad B, but couldn't really see a way to do it once the mortars missed. Hayashi has dismounted to help lead the troops into the battle for OP Hill proper, but is himself stuck in the Wire. He was going to drag his horse with him in case a moment arose when he wanted to mount up again, but Perry smugly informed me that Horses/Cavalry cannot move through Wire. The first four turns have gone pretty smoothly for me (with the exception of this turn's fiasco with Ono), but I am beginning to worry a little. The IJA units are starting to take their inevitable losses, but have yet to inflict any real harm on the British, merely breaking a lot of units with no casualties. Meanwhile, Cox (aka, the "Rally Machine") has yet to miss a non-DM rally attempt (and rallied B.D. while under DM). Maybe I can isolate squad C and kill him in the next turn or two. I elected not to fire the British light mortar during my Defensive Fire Phase because I did not want to risk a breakdown; I prefer to try for Smoke during the Turn 5 Prep Fire Phase. I also decided to forego a low-odds attack with LMGs against Mac and b.2. because there was a greater chance of breaking the LMGs than hurting Mac or that crew. Kiro came through again with good firing. It would have been nice, however, to have had some ROF to perhaps double-break B.C. and inflict some casualties. His moving Mac and the HMG crew back to L3 doesn't surprise me; I actually expected it sooner. Next turn, the IJA will move all units forward (again), but with an eye towards re-organizing for the first assault on Hill 615.

British: Mac's back, again! For the IJA: more Smoke, more DC heroes, and lots of "1s" to get under the Wire. Kiro has run out of decent targets for the moment and has to move forward. When j.O. skipped through W2, hope sprang up that Chuck doesn't know Mac has a clear LOS to W2. I was patient and waited for bigger fish. Generally, I prefer to take the early, sure shot rather than wait in hopes of a better shot that never comes. In this scenario, however, the Staffords must often pass up what they suspect is going to be their best shot in order to keep the IJA from running around at will. Some intuition told me that Chuck would be moving Ono through W2, though, and I was very gratified to see it unfold as hoped. I just wish Chuck had moved two squads with Ono. I desperately needed to get squad B back during the British Rally Phase. Rallying B.D. was a bonus. Mac tries to work over the units on the east flank some more, but to no effect. Those palm groves block LOS to the whole western half of the board from Level 1. The Staffords can't stay in the N4-N5 jungle crestline in the face of

431 J.G. CX from V0 (via V2 bank) to U5			
432 J.B. CX from W1 (via bank) to W3...			
433 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at J.B.—6FP	-1	5	2MC
434 J.B. takes 2MC		3	Pass
435 J.B. continue to U5			
436 Kiro, J.I., J.2. from W5 (via bank) to R6			
437 J.C. CX from X3 (via bank) to U5			
438 Ono from X0 to X2			

Defensive Fire Phase

439 B.D. fires at O6—12FP	+1	8	NMC
440 J.B. takes NMC		8	Pass

Advancing Fire Phase

441 J.D., J.A. fire at N8—6FP	+2	10	NE
442 J.I., J.L., J.H., J.N., J.P. fire at N3—6FP	+3	7	NE

Route Phase

443 J.B. route to P			
444 B.C., on Wire, route to M10		1	Under Wire

Advance Phase

445 J.P. into O5			
446 J.L. into O6			
447 J.I. into O7			
448 Kiro, J.I., J.2. CX into Q7			
449 Hayashi, J.J., J.K., J.M. into R6			
450 J.R. into R5			
451 J.F. into S6			
452 J.G., J.B., J.C. into T5			
453 J.D. into V4			
454 Ono into X3			
455 J.E. into X4			
456 J.O. into P7			

Close Combat Phase

457 J.F. conceals			place C.B.
458 J.C. attempts to conceal	+1	3	place C.C.
459 J.B. attempts to conceal	+2	3	under C.C.
460 J.G. attempts to conceal	+2	6	NE
461 J.D., J.A. conceal			place C.D.

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
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Rally Phase

(Off Board Set-up)			
462 Southwell, B.Q. w/LMG, B.E. w/LMG, B.F. w/LMG in obFT4			under C.Z.

463 Troha, B.G., B.H., B.I. in obFP5			under C.Y.
464 Ross, B.J., B.K., B.L. in obFP6			under C.X.
465 B.M., B.N., B.O. in obEE6			under C.V.
466 Wind Change		9	NE
467 B.C. (DM) attempts Self-Rally	+4	6	NE

Movement Phase

468 B.D. assault move in N6 onto Wire		1	Under Wire
469 J.I. fires at B.D.—8FP	+1	7	NMC
470 B.D. takes NMC		6	Pass
471 B.A. from N3 to M4...			
472 MTR (J.E.) fires at B.A.	+2	6	Miss
473 B.A. continues to L3			
474 Mac, b.2. w/HMG from L3 to K7 Trench			
475 C.F. creates C.J. (Cox); C.J. from M5 to L5			
476 C.Z. CX move to P4			
477 C.Y. to E5			
478 C.X. to E			
479 C.V. CX move to D5			
480 C.F. assault move from M5 to M6			Merge into C.H.

Defensive Fire Phase

481 two MMGs (J.I., J.2. w/Kiro) fire at N6—8FP	+2	8	NE
482 J.I. FP at N6—4FP	+1	9	NE
483 J.L. fires at N6—6FP	+2	11	NE

Advancing Fire Phase

484 B.D. fires at O7—8FP		6	1MC
485 J.I. takes 1MC		11	Reduction/ELR

486 Replace 4-4-7 with 3-4-7

Advance Phase

487 C.Z. into G5			
488 C.Y. into F4			
489 C.X. into F5			
490 C.V. into E5			
491 Mac, b.2. w/HMG into L7 Trench			
492 B.A. into L3 Trench			
493 C.H. creates C.E. (b.F.); C.E. into N5			
494 C.J. into M5			
495 B.B. into M5			under C.J.
496 B.D. CX into M6			

Close Combat Phase

497 B.D. conceals			under C.H.
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Japanese: HS E. continues to find Smoke shells for his mortar; that's three turns of Smoke and still not depleted. Even better, J.M. finds Smoke shells for his captured British mortar, enabling the IJA assault to move forward under the cover of "+3" Smoke. Mac

gets only one good shot (which is ineffective due to J.B.'s "3" on the 2MC). I certainly can't complain about my morale check DRs. I tried to finish off enemy C by moving adjacent and forcing him to rout off the wire. There was a one-in-three chance that he rolls a "5" or "6" and dies for failure to rout, but he escaped with a roll of "1". J.D. and J.A., however, conceal this turn, which will (hopefully) allow them to finish B.C. off next turn in the Close Combat Phase (assuming B.C. doesn't Self-Rally). As a general rule, I avoid moving through Residual Fire, especially in Open Ground; but I felt it was necessary to risk the 1FP (-2) attacks in order to keep the pressure on. Kiro went into the Q7 bamboo in order to be in position to hit both N3 and N6. I want to force Perry to decide between good attacks at my units or running away to fight another day (or turn). If the Staffords stand firm in order to shoot at tempting IJA targets, Kiro will be in position to hammer 'em. If the Staffords run away, at least nobody is shooting at my units and the IJA is a few hexes closer to the hill. The British reinforcements do not concern me yet, as it will take the lead elements two turns of movement just to reach the rear Level-3 Hill hexes; thus the reinforcements shouldn't impact on the fight for the hill until Turn 7 or later. During the British player turn, that stubborn enemy D survives everything the IJA can throw at him, including MMG fire directed by that samurai master, Kiro, who finally has a turn without an effective attack. Perry masterfully switches Mac and the HMG to his right flank to protect B.C. Unfortunately, my everlasting Smoke mortars are not in position to cover the next turn's advance. Guess the IJA will have to attack without the benefit of smoke (God Forbid!). As previously outlined in my opening comments, I plan to try to infiltrate units around the flanks of the British defenses. I anticipate that my units will soon start to take step-reduction casualties from PBF. Here's hoping that enough survive to be able to advance into CC and eliminate some British units.

British: Here comes the Smoke again. Every other IJA unit moves. B.A. pins J.N. in Q6—and just as importantly places a "1" Residual Fire counter in that hex. The IJA units aren't intimidated, though, and three run right through it unscathed, -2 DRM and all. Mac takes what figures to be his best shot at J.B. on the bank, who shrugs off the resulting 2MC. ROF would have come in very handy, as Kiro takes off immediately thereafter. B.A. accomplished his job of keeping O5 empty during the IJA Movement Phase. I did not want anyone advancing up into hexrow N this turn. The IJA is in no rush, however, with over half the game still ahead. Nice advance by Kiro into the Q7 bamboo to keep the pressure on B.A. and B.D. All and all, it was another bloodless movement phase for the IJA. The Brits are hanging tough, though, and help is on the way. Here come the Nigerians, finally, hustling down the path and up the hill. They will not get into the fight until Turn 7 at the earliest, however. Making a virtue out of a necessity, B.D. assault moves under the Wire while staying in N6. Mac decides it is time to change flanks. B.A. runs back up the hill and the rest of the Staffords hide. Kiro misses for once, and B.D. ELRs Japanese I. with advancing fire. The best British turn yet... and all my units did was move up the hill. In a rare display of bravery, Cox moves back down the hill. He will try and retain concealment through the IJA Advance Phase to give them pause about advancing in onto squad B, who will be firing away.

Neutral Commentator: Chuck continues to extract the maximum SMOKE effect with his mortars, both Japanese and British! There are few ASL experiences more irritating than a captured SW that is more effective for the new owner than it was for you. Despite the good fortune, however, Chuck was cautious again during his MPh and missed an opportunity to disrupt British plans with a well-aimed Banzai Charge. British squad A could have been forced to fight for its

life instead of covering critical hex O5. The Japanese may have suffered more this turn, but now they will certainly take heavy losses if they move against the center of the hill.

Perry's use of Sgt. Cox is an excellent counter-measure against anticipated close combat. Since British Elite and 1st-Line units do not Cover, Cox is not needed to direct the fire of B.B. and may remain concealed. If a Japanese Search or Advancing Fire attack does not remove the "?", it will provide a -2 drm to any Ambush dr in the CCPh. When considered with the +1 drm for an Attacker's advance into jungle, Cox's concealment may even dissuade an advance into M5.

TURN 6**Japanese Player Turn**

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
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Rally Phase

498 Wind Change		6	NE
499 J.D. attempts repair of MTR		6	Elim MTR
500 J.B. attempts Self-Rally		5	Rally

Prep Fire Phase

501 Place Opportunity Fire on J.L.			
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Movement Phase

502 J.O. in T3 on Wire to S3		2	Under Wire
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503 J.P. from O5 to N4			
504 B.B. fires at J.P.—12FP		11	NE
505 J.L. from O7 to N7 onto Wire		3	End Move
506 J.H. from Q6 to P5, attempts to place smoke in O5...		1	Smoke

507 J.H. continues to O6			
508 J.N. from Q6 to P4...			
509 B.A. fires at J.N.—6FP	-2	5	K/2
510 Replace J.N. with J.N.; J.N. takes 2MC		8	Break

511 J.R. from R5 to O5			
512 b.F. fires at J.R.—6FP	+1	8	NE
513 b.F. SFP at J.R.—2FP	+1	8	NE

514 Hayashi, J.J., J.K. from R6 to O5			
515 Residual Fire—2FP	+1	8	NE
516 b.F. FFP at Hayashi, J.J., J.K.—2FP	+1	6	NE
517 b.F. FFP at Hayashi, J.J., J.K.—2FP	+1	5	PTC
518 J.K. takes PTC	-3	6	Pass
519 J.J. takes PTC	-3	6	Pass

520 C.D. creates C.E. (J.A.); C.E. assault moves from O9 to N8 onto Wire		6	End Move
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521 J.D. from O9 to N9			
522 J.B. CX from P6 to O5...			
523 Residual Fire—2FP		8	NE
524 b.F. FFP at J.B.—2FP		4	1MC
525 J.B. takes 1MC		2	HOB
526 J.B. Heat of Battle	+3	6	Berserk

527 J.B. continues to N5			
528 b.F. FFP at J.B.—4FP		4	1MC
529 J.B. takes 1MC		3	Pass
530 Sniper Activation		6	NE
531 b.F. FFP at J.B.—4FP		7	NE
532 B.D. fire at J.B.—16FP	+1	8	1MC
533 J.B. takes 1MC		6	Pass
534 B.D. SFP at J.B.—6FP	+1	8	NE

535 Kiro, J.I., J.2. from Q7 to N6			
536 B.D. w/LMG FFP at Kiro, J.I., J.2.—8FP	+1	11	Break B.D.

537 J.O. from P7 to O6			
538 J.F. from S6 to R4			
539 J.C. from T5 to S4			
540 J.M. from R6 to P5			
541 C.C., J.G. from T5 to P5			
542 J.D. from V4 (via bank) to S			
543 Ono from X3 (via bank) to V4			
544 J.E. from X4 (via bank) to V3			

545 B.B. fires at N4—6FP	+1	4	1MC
546 J.P. takes 1MC		8	Reduction
547 Sniper Activation		1	Attack to CC3
548 Random Direction	3/5		Break b.F.
549 Sniper to N5			mail HMG
550 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at N7—6FP	-1	12	mail HMG

551 b.I. fires at Kiro, J.I., J.2.—4FP	+1	2	2MC
552 Kiro takes 2MC		3	Pass
553 J.I. takes 2MC	-2	7	Pass
554 J.2. takes 2MC	-2	6	Pass

555 Kiro, J.I., J.2. at M6—4FP	+1	8	NE
556 J.B. fire at N5—2FP	+1	11	NE
557 J.P. fire at M5—2/1FP	+1	7	NE
558 J.D. fire at M10—4FP	+1	11	NE

559 J.N. route to P6			
560 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
561 B.C. route to L10			
562 B.D. route to K6			

563 J.N. route to P6			
564 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
565 B.C. route to L10			
566 B.D. route to K6			

567 J.N. route to P6			
568 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
569 B.C. route to L10			
570 B.D. route to K6			

571 J.N. route to P6			
572 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
573 B.C. route to L10			
574 B.D. route to K6			

575 J.N. route to P6			
576 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
577 B.C. route to L10			
578 B.D. route to K6			

579 J.N. route to P6			
580 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
581 B.C. route to L10			
582 B.D. route to K6			

583 J.N. route to P6			
584 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
585 B.C. route to L10			
586 B.D. route to K6			

587 J.N. route to P6			
588 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
589 B.C. route to L10			
590 B.D. route to K6			

591 J.N. route to P6			
592 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
593 B.C. route to L10			
594 B.D. route to K6			

595 J.N. route to P6			
596 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
597 B.C. route to L10			
598 B.D. route to K6			

599 J.N. route to P6			
600 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
601 B.C. route to L10			
602 B.D. route to K6			

603 J.N. route to P6			
604 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
605 B.C. route to L10			
606 B.D. route to K6			

607 J.N. route to P6			
608 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
609 B.C. route to L10			
610 B.D. route to K6			

611 J.N. route to P6			
612 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
613 B.C. route to L10			
614 B.D. route to K6			

615 J.N. route to P6			
616 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
617 B.C. route to L10			
618 B.D. route to K6			

619 J.N. route to P6			
620 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
621 B.C. route to L10			
622 B.D. route to K6			

623 J.N. route to P6			
624 b.F. fails to rout			Elim
625 B.C. route to L10			
626 B.D. route to K6			

Advance Phase

563 J.P. into M4
 564 Hayashi, J.K., J.J., J.R. CX into N4
 565 J.L., J.H., J.O. CX into N5
 566 C.C., J.G., J.M. into O5
 567 J.F. into Q4
 568 J.O. into R2
 569 J.C. into R3
 570 J.D. into R5
 571 Ono into U5
 572 J.E. into U3
 573 J.D. into M10

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
574 Wind Change		10	NE
575 b.2. attempts repair of HMG		1	Repair
576 B.C. (DM) attempts Self-Rally	+4	3	Rally
Prep Fire Phase			
577 B.C. w/LMG fires at M10—16FP	+1	3	K/2
578 J.D. replaced with J.P.; J.P. takes 2MC		7	Break
579 LMG (B.C.) fires at M10—4FP	+1	5	NMC
580 J.P. takes NMC		7	Pass
581 B.A. fires at N4—6FP	+1	2	K/2
582 J.K. replaced with J.K.			
583 Hayashi takes 2MC		11	Wounded
584 Wound Severity dr		5	KIA
585 J.K. takes 2MC		9	Break/ ELR
586 J.J. takes 2MC		9	Reduction/ ELR
587 J.R. takes 2MC		7	Reduction
588 J.K. takes LLMC	+1	7	KIA
589 J.J. takes LLTC	+1	3	Pass
590 J.R. takes LLTC	+1	11	Pin
591 B.B. fires at N4—12FP	+1	10	NE
Movement Phase			
592 Mac, b.2. w/HMG from L7 to L5 Trench			
593 b.1. from M6 to L5 Trench			
594 C.Z. from G5 to I5			
595 C.Y. from F4 to H4			
596 C.X. from F5 to H6			
597 C.V. from E5 to G5			
598 C.J. from M5 to K6			
Defensive Fire Phase			
599 J.B., J.O., J.H., J.L. fire at M5—20FP	+2	6	2MC
600 B.B. takes 2MC		7	Break
601 J.R., J.J. fire at M5—8FP	+2	8	NE
602 J.P. fire at M5—4FP	+1	5	NMC
603 B.B. takes NMC		2	HOB
604 B.B. Heat of Battle	-1	5	Hero (Hall)
605 MTR (J.F.) at L3	+3	3	Hit
606 Resolve 2FP attack	+2	6	NE
607 MTR (J.F.) fires at L3	+2	6	Miss
608 MTR (J.C.) fires at L3	+2	6	Miss
609 MTR (J.E.) fires at L3		3	Hit
610 Resolve 2FP attack	+2	8	NE
611 MTR (J.E.) fires at L3	-1	12	malfunction MTR
Advancing Fire Phase			
612 Hall fires at N4—1FP		6	NE
Rout Phase			
613 B.B. routs to K6			
614 J.P. routs to N10			
Advance Phase			
615 B.C. into L9			
616 B.A. into L4			
617 b.1. into L4			
618 Hall into L5			
619 C.Z. CX into I5			
620 C.Y. into I5			
621 C.X. into I6			
622 C.V. CX into I4			
Close Combat Phase			
623 Hall, Mac, b.2. conceal			place C.H.

Japanese: What a disastrous turn. It started out OK. As usual, Kiro was the hero. His fire-base attacks broke key British units early in the game, then he runs to the front lines when B.D. Subsequent First Fires (SFF) at the Berserk J.B. and leads his troops through a 2MC. Plus, B.D. broke on a FFP against Kiro and malfunctioned his LMG. What a man! (Wish I could say the same for Hayashi, but I'll address that catastrophe in a minute.) Mac breaks the HMG for a third time! All IJA units are in bliss as the troops advance onto OP Hill. I disliked having Hayashi become CX, but I felt I had to move as many troops as possible into contact with the Staffords before the Nigerians can move up. Moreover, from N4, Hayashi and his boys can hit M5, L4 and L3, all possible hexes for British units to be in or to move through. The main push was




Figure 3: Situation at the end of Japanese Player-Turn 6.

to be with Hayashi in the middle while flanking units infiltrated to whatever extent possible (or at least enough to make Perry worry about the mischief they can cause). The British half of Turn Six did not start auspiciously for me as his squad C self-rallied. To make matters worse, B.C. then single-handedly wiped out the west-edge flanking move with a "3" on a 16FP (+1) attack. Then B.A. blows away Hayashi with a 2DR on a 6FP (+1) attack, completely wasting the IJA units in N4. British B broke from IJA defensive fire, but refuses to double-break—and even creates a Hero with his Heat of Battle. Fortunately, B.B. did not Battle-Harden nor go Berserk, or he would still be in action. And, of course, crew #2 repairs the HMG on the first try. Finally, the only IJA mortar with Smoke

left malfunctions. What a half-turn for the British. The IJA was finally in position to make hay . . . and the British get key rolls to devastate the first IJA assault. I frankly don't see how the IJA can win this one given the casualties this turn. Especially grave is the loss of Hayashi, who only directed two fire attacks in the entire scenario. In true *bushido* fashion I will, however, push on and hope to make something good happen.

British: Squad B fires at the first unit into N4. No one figures to move into M4 or N5 this Movement Phase. B.A. takes the first shot of the game at an IJA unit moving in the open within normal range and makes

the most of it. HS F wakes up after J.H. places smoke in O5 and decides he will FPF as often as possible, first at Hayashi, then at j.B. (who goes Berserk). B.D. should never have subsequent-fired at the berserker, but he got caught up in the excitement I guess. Kiro alertly takes advantage and moves adjacent to B.D. After five FPF shots by b.F., the well is dry when B.D. tries; and then b.F. pays the price as well when the Japanese sniper comes in and breaks him with nowhere to rout. Mac rolls his third "12"—unbelievable! Immediately followed by a snake eyes from b.I. who drops concealment, since Kiro and crews are stuck on the Wire and can't advance. Not a fair trade, however, as Kiro and company pass the 2MCs without breaking a sweat. The concealed Sgt. Cox keeps J.P. from coming in on squad B (I suspect), but Cox wasn't planning on having anyone to rally back in K6. The British Rally Phase went great as the HMG came back online yet again and B.C. self-rallies under DM. It was now or never for squad C, who continues to show his mettle by changing J.D. into a broken second-line half-squad. Couldn't polish off the IIS with the LMG's ROF, though. Then B.A. steps up and throws an "eyes" at Hayashi. His squad J ELRs, J.R. flips, J.K. is totally obliterated, and, most importantly, Hayashi fails both his 2MC and subsequent Wound Severity dr. The fragility of IJA leaders is driven home with a vengeance. Squad B tries to further reduce J.J. and J.R. but misses, and then himself breaks from IJA defensive fire. Chuck goes for a double-break on my squad B, who creates a Hero in the Heat of Battle but rolls too low to rally via Battle-Hardening himself. Behind the front lines, Mac takes up position on the Level-3 crest line; b.I. joins him; Cox heads to the rear; and the Nigerians struggle up the hill some more. In the Advance Phase, Hall joins Mac while b.I. splits off, and squads A and C pinch in on the flanks of hexrow L. Chuck was ready to concede after Hayashi bought the farm, but he kept going for the sake of this replay. If I can hammer him some more while he's down, I can crush his spirit and end this game quickly. (If only I was good at "mind games".) Chuck may be down, but I don't expect that to interfere with his play while he keeps going for the victory. He will quit before his play deteriorates.

Neutral Commentator: What a roller-coaster! Chuck takes every advantage of a sudden whim of the dice (the creation of berserk HS j.B.) to swamp the center of the thin British line. The single most important and often-used Japanese tactic (in ASL) is a point-blank approach to the enemy with the objective of breaking enemy units with encircling Advancing Fire (or their own FPF) and eliminating them for failure to rout. The Japanese player must be alert for opportunities to surround the British and force them to use Final Protective Fire. Any enemy unit that is marked with a Final Fire counter should draw the attention of the Japanese. Chuck is feeling increased pressure on his forces, and so he gambled a few squads in his player turn.

Perry did his best Rocky Balboa imitation during the British player turn and bounced up off the canvas, decking Hayashi and his entire entourage in the process. Not much can be said about tactics when movement is restricted and the fight is at close range... may the best dice rolls win! What will make a difference now is the reaction of each player to the outcome in the middle of the board. Despite the heroics of B.C., the British are still weak on the west side and cannot place Defensive Fire into M7 or M8. Kiro and the other Japanese units on that side should occupy M7 and gain Concealment in the next Japanese turn. Concealment is now crucial, since it blunts PBF and enhances Ambush possibilities. Movement is so restricted on OP Hill that many units will use Assault Movement by default rather than choice.

Chuck needs a break at this point in the match—either a simple stroke of luck (how about another Sniper attack) or a mistake by his opponent. Perry should play very conservatively, but his comments

suggest he might go after the Japanese in an attempt to finish them off for good. The British outnumber the Japanese 17.5 to 15 in squad-equivalents, and many of the Japanese MMC are Step-Reduced. The biggest disadvantage of the Japanese lies in the fact that they cannot bounce back from a bad turn with a good Rally Phase. If a side is defending and has such an advantage, it should sit tight and let the attacker take the risks.

TURN 7

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
624 Wind Change		10	NE
625 J.E. attempts repair of MTR		6	Elim MTR
626 J.N. attempts Self-Rally		7	NE
627 Cox rally B.D.	-1	6	Rally
628 Cox rally B.B. (DM)	+3	9	NE
Prep Fire Phase			
629 MTR (J.C.) fires at L4		4	Hit
630 Resolve 2FP attack	+1	5	PTC
631 b.I. takes PTC		3	Pass
632 B.A. takes PTC		11	Pins
633 MTR (J.C.) fires at L4	-1	8	Hit
634 Resolve 2FP attack	+1	7	NE
Movement Phase			
635 J.R. from N4 to M5			
636 J.B. (lose Berserk) from N5 to M6			
637 J.P. CX move from M4 to K2			
638 J.J. assault move from N4 to M4			
639 B.A. fire at J.J.—6FP	-1	6	1MC
640 J.J. takes 1MC		9	Reduction
641 J.J. replaced with j.J.			
642 J.G. from O5 to N4			
643 J.A. from N8 onto Wire		4	Under Wire
644 J.I. from N7 onto Wire...		1	Under Wire
645 B.C. FPF at J.I.—8FP		8	NMC
646 J.I. takes NMC		10	Reduction
647 J.I. replaced with j.I.			
648 Kiro, j.I., j.J. from N6 onto Wire		3	Under Wire
649 J.O. from N5 to M5			
650 J.H. from N5 to M			
651 J.L. from N5 to M5			
652 J.B. from O5 to N4			
653 J.M. drops MTR, from O5 to N3			
654 J.O. CX move from R2 to N2			
655 J.D. from R5 to O5			
656 J.F. drops MTR, from Q4 to N5			
657 J.E. CX move from U3 (via bank) to R5			
658 Ono from U5 to S6			
Defensive Fire Phase			
659 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) fires at M5—12FP		9	NMC
660 J.L. takes NMC		7	Pins
661 J.O. takes NMC		11	Break/ELR
662 Replace J.O. with 2nd-line J.O.			
663 J.R. takes NMC		9	Reduction
664 Replace J.R. with j.L.			
665 HMG (b.2. w/Mac) and Hall fire at M6—12FP	-1	8	1MC
666 J.H. takes 1MC		10	Reduction/ELR
667 J.B. takes 1MC		5	Pass
668 b.I., B.A. fire at M5—6FP	+1	9	NE
Advancing Fire Phase			
669 j.J., J.B., J.G. fire at L4—8FP	+2	9	NE
670 j.L., j.L. fire at L4—2FP	+2	11	NE
671 J.H., J.B. fire at L5—FP	+2	8	NE
Rout Phase			
672 J.O. routs to N5			
Advance Phase			
673 J.B., J.H. CX into L5 Trench			
674 J.L. CX into L4 Trench			
675 J.J. CX into L4 Trench			
676 J.I. CX into L7 Trench			
677 J.A. CX into M8			
678 J.F. into M6			
679 J.D. into N5			
680 J.P. into J2			
681 J.O. into M2			
682 J.M. CX into M3			
683 Kiro, j.I., j.J. CX into M7			
684 Ono into R5			
685 J.E. into Q5			
Close Combat Phase			
686 Attacker Ambush in L5	+1	4	NE
687 Defender Ambush in L5	-2	5	NE
688 Attacker 1:1 CC in L5		5	all KIA
689 Defender 1:1 CC in L5	-3	11	NE
690 Attacker Ambush in L4	+2	1	NE

691 Defender Ambush in L4	+1	1	NE
692 Attacker 1:4 CC in L4		11	NE
693 Defender 2:1 CC in L4	-1	5	all KIA
694 J.P. conceals			place C.C.
695 J.O. conceals			place C.A.
696 Kiro, j.I., j.J. conceal			place C.B.
697 j.P. conceals			place C.D.
698 j.D. conceals			place C.E.
699 j.E. conceals			place C.G.
700 Ono conceals			place C.H.
701 j.A. attempts to conceal	-1	5	place C.K.

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
702 Wind Change		6	NE
703 B.D. attempts repair of LMG		3	NE
704 B.A. attempts recovery of Jap LMG		6	Fail
705 Cox rally B.B. (DM)	+3	12	Casualties
706 J.B. attempts recovery of Brit HMG	+1	4	Recover
Prep Fire Phase			
707 B.D. fires at L5—12FP	+2	7	NMC
708 J.B. takes NMC		7	Pass
709 J.H. takes NMC		11	Reduction/ELR
710 Replace J.I. with j.I.			
711 B.A., b.I. fires at L5—16FP	+2	11	NE
Movement Phase			
712 B.F. from J5 to K5			
713 HMG (j.B.) fires at B.F.—12FP	+1	7	1MC
714 B.F. takes 1MC		9	Breaks
715 C.Z. creates C.H. (B.E.); C.H. assault moves from J5 to K6			
716 C.Z. creates C.J. (Southwell); C.J. assault moves from J5 to K6			Merge into C.H.
717 B.C. CX move to K8			
718 J.A. fires at B.C.—2FP	+1	6	NE
719 j.I. fires at B.C.—2FP		8	NE
720 B.Q. from J5 to K6...			
721 j.I. fires at B.Q.—2FP		2	Cover/NE
722 HMG (j.B.) sustain fires at B.Q.—6FP		6	1MC
723 B.Q. takes 1MC		8	Breaks
724 Ross, B.J. CX move from I6 to K7			
725 j.I. fires at Ross, B.J.—1FP	+1	10	NE
726 C.X. from I6 to J6			
727 C.Y. creates C.N. (B.I., B.H.); C.N. from I5 to K4			
728 C.Y. from I5 to J5			
729 C.V. creates C.U. (B.N., B.O.); C.U. from I4 to J5			Merge into C.Y.
730 C.V. assault move from I4 to I5			
Defensive Fire Phase			
731 MTR (J.C.) fires at L4	-2	8	Hit
732 Resolve 2FP attack	+1	10	NE
733 J.G., J.B. fire at L4—12FP	+2	7	NMC
734 B.A. takes NMC		9	Break
735 b.I. takes NMC		7	Pass
736 J.L. fires at L4—6FP	+2	11	NE
Advancing Fire			
737 B.C. fires at M8—4FP	+1	9	NE
738 B.E. w/Cox fires at L5—6FP	+3	6	NE
Rout Phase			
739 B.F. routs to J5			
740 B.A. low crawl to K4			
741 b.B., B.Q. rout to J5			
742 j.H. voluntary break; rout to M7			
Advance Phase			
743 B.J. into L7 Trench			
744 C.X. CX into K7 Trench			
745 B.D. transfer LMG to Cox			
746 C.H., B.D. into L5 Trench			
747 C.N. creates C.F. (B.I.); C.F. into L3 Trench			
748 C.N. CX into L4 Trench			
749 C.V. into I4			
750 B.E. into K6 Pillbox			
751 C.Y. creates C.K. (B.G., B.N., B.O.); C.K. into K6			
Close Combat Phase			
752 Attacker Ambush in L9	+2	6	NE
753 Defender Ambush in L9		4	Ambush
754 Defender 1:4 H-to-H CC in L9	-3	6	all KIA
755 Attacker Ambush in L5	-2	6	NE
756 Defender Ambush in L5		1	Ambush
757 Defender 1:4 H-to-H CC in L5	-1	4	all KIA

Japanese: With IJA units step-reducing, breaking and ELR'ing left and right, the Sons of Nippon desperately charge up the hill into close combat with the British defenders of hexes L5 and L4. No ambushes for either side, but HS B and squad H wipe out Mac and his pals with no loss to themselves. The attack in L4 didn't go as well, but the units lost weren't very valuable. Frankly, I was just hoping to make something (anything) happen by trying to create some British casualties, even at the cost of several IJA

units. I was on the verge of conceding due to the cumulative effect of the loss of Hayashi, escalating erosion of IJA strength, and the arrival of fresh Nigerian reinforcements. Taking out Mac, Hall and b.2. with no IJA losses, and the consequent capture of the L5 trench and British HMG, gave me and my warriors new spirit. I had HS B attempt to recover the HMG because I believe that his higher morale will be more important than squad H's ability to fail two morale checks before breaking. During the British player-turn, the IJA losses were kept to a minimum while several British units broke. Even better, Perry threw two squads and Southwell into CC with Japanese half-squads, promptly proceeded to get ambushed in both attacks, and lost all three units to the bayonets of the IJA! Maybe this game isn't lost after all. Next turn, Kiro and the MMG crews will assault hex L7 and squad D will move into L6, while other units in the center will assault hexes L5, L4 and L3. C.C. will try to surround the broken B.A. Assuming HS P self-rallies, he will work around the west flank towards B.C. HS C will hope his mortar can do some damage to the enemy units in L4. The IJA got some good breaks during Turn 7 (including the loss of both 9-1 British leaders), but I will need some more "breaks" in Turn 8 or I fear the Nigerians will tip the game Perry's way.

British: It's nice to see mortar A gone for good. No more Smoke and none of that nasty HE like mortar C brings down. British A and C each take a First Fire shot, and each reduced-squad target becomes a HS. Mac works out some more, first alone, then with Hall (who drops concealment to bump the attack up a column). Mac and Hall have a net "-3" drn in Ambush even without Concealment. As I feared, J.H. and j.B. came up the hill into L5. What a disaster! First no Ambush; then the IJA units kill all my guys in L5 while my return attack misses. Now Chuck has the HMG. Taking out the two HS in L4 is of little benefit for me. If only I had been able to man the HMG with a squad instead of a crew, perhaps the firepower could have held the IJA off. My only consolation is that a squad would have died in that CC just as quickly as b.2. did—though a squad would at least have taken someone down with him. During the British player-turn, Cox botches B's rally and j.B. recovers the HMG by virtue of being in the trench (where the jungle's "+2" drn is NA). That HS may be elite, but he can break, so everyone within LOS opens up. Enemy squad H ELRs again, but j.B. is unscathed. B.F. uses 4MF to get into K5 and draws the HMG's fire. He breaks, but the mission is accomplished. Southwell and B.E. move in (concealed) to K6. Squad Q takes off for K7, overstacking through K6 and paying the price. I think j.B. must have gone to Oxford before the war as he sure knows how to use that Vickers. I could have moved Q first, but I did not want Southwell and B.E. to move through residual fire where their concealment would not help. Since B.Q. didn't make it, I tap Ross and B.J. for the western assault, regrettably CX. B.E. drops concealment for a shot at pesky HS B. Cox directs, as the second-line Nigerians are subject to cowering, but the shot misses by virtue of being overstacked. Cleverly, Chuck voluntarily breaks j.H. to get his conscript and Pin modifiers out of the way. Southwell is tapped to lead the HMG recovery team against j.B. I also advance B.J. into L7 to kick j.I. out of the trench; as long as any IJA unit controls the trench, Kiro can slide into it from Level 2 (F8.6), and I want to keep Kiro and his MMGs out of the trenches as long as possible. Unfortunately, I roll two "6s" in Ambush and lose Southwell, B.D. and B.J. without even getting a chance to attack! More heartbreak for the good guys. More spiritual sustenance for the IJA. And my boys in K6 sure weren't counting on the IJA manning the HMG for another turn.

Neutral Commentator: Chuck takes a desperate gamble in the middle, and all the sacrifices and arcane rituals that he performed before this turn

really paid off. Only supernatural forces can explain the outcome of this turn. Consider the Japanese advance into L5. Just how big a gamble was it? With a net Ambush drn of -3 in favor of Perry, the Japanese will be ambushed 58% of the time. If they are indeed ambushed, the probability that they Japanese will be completely eliminated is 60%. Therefore, the net probability that the Japanese will not get an attack against the British is surprisingly only 35%. Strike one for the "supernatural forces". Chuck likely didn't know exactly what the odds were in this instance, but good ASL players have an innate feel of the odds for or against them. Chuck needed an opportunity where the dice could really help him, and he made one happen. If the dice had failed him, though, it is doubtful that the Nigerians would allow a second chance.

One significant error in the play mars an otherwise "perfect" game—the berserk half-squad j.B. should not have lost his berserk status at the start of the Japanese player turn, since he had an LOS to an enemy unit in M5 during the previous turn. It should have charged into hex M5, and then into L5. The ramifications are uncertain, since j.B. (with a berserk morale of "10") might even have survived Mac's defensive fire.

Perry made all the right moves to recapture the HMG. Its First Fire was lured away before Concealed units were moved adjacent. Chuck's use of Sustained Fire with the HMG might seem unwise, given the high probability of breakdown, but he realized he was in a no-lose situation. If the HMG DR was "7" or less, the IFT result would have been at least a NMC; if the DR were "8" or more, the British would be unscathed, but they could only recapture a malfunctioned SW. Needless-to-say, events turned out well for Chuck.

On the other hand, Perry's moves in the west left much to be desired. Instead of massing four squads in K7/K8 capable of placing 36FP into L7, he rashly advanced into CC with Japanese half-squad I. Any advance against the Japanese in which the Attacker's net Ambush drn is greater than zero cannot be called conservative. The British must now have a good Rally Phase, or they will remain very weak on the east side—where most of the full-strength Japanese squads reside. If J.D. moves into K3 next turn and Chuck can maintain someone in the HMG position, all of the British units in L3/L4 will have nowhere to rout when (not "if") broken.

TURN 8

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
758 Wind Change		10	NE
759 j.P. attempts Self-Rally		6	Rally
760 Kiro rally j.H. (DM)	-3	5	Rally
761 b.1. attempts recovery of Jap LMG	+2	2	Recover
762 Cox attempts repair of LMG		3	NE
763 Trocha rally b.B. (DM)	+2	3	Rally
764 Trocha rally B.Q. (DM)	+2	6	NE
765 Trocha rally B.F. (DM)	+2	8	NE
Prep Fire Phase			
766 MTR (j.C.) fires at L4	-2/0	6	Hit
767 Resolve 2FP attack	+1	9	NE
768 HMG (j.B.), J.L. fire at L4—16/8FP	+3	7	NMC/NE
769 b.1. takes NMC		10	Breaks
770 Place Opportunity Fire on j.I.			

Movement Phase

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
771 J.P. from J2 to J3			
772 B.M. fires at J.P.—8FP	+1	7	NMC
773 J.P. takes NMC		6	Pass
774 B.M. SFP at J.P.—4FP	+1	9	NE
775 C.B. assault move from M7 to L7 Trench			
776 B.C. fires at C.B.—8FP	+3	4	1MC
777 Sniper Activation		2	Attack
778 Random Direction	3/6	to T8	
779 Sniper to L4	4/6	Pin B.H.	
780 Kiro takes 1MC		5	Pass
781 j.1. takes 1MC	-2	11	Reduction
782 j.2. takes 1MC	-2	7	Pass
783 B.C. SFP at Kiro, j.1., j.2.—6FP	+3	5	PTC
784 j.1. takes PTC	-2	7	Pass
785 j.2. takes PTC	-2	5	Pass

786 B.L., B.K. fire at Kiro, j.1., j.2.—16FP	+2	6	1MC
787 Kiro takes 1MC		2	HOB
788 Kiro Heat of Battle	+3	7	Berserk
789 j.1. goes Berserk			
790 j.1. takes 1MC	-2	7	Pass
791 j.2. takes 1MC	-2	8	Pass
792 Kiro continues to K8			
793 B.C. w/LMG FFP at Kiro—12FP	+1	4	2MC
794 Sniper Activation		2	Attack to L3, Pin B.I.
795 Random Direction	1/1	10	Wounded
796 Kiro takes 2MC		4	NE
797 Wound Severity dr			
798 J.A. assault move from M8 to L8			
799 j.M. from M3 to L2			
800 B.I. fires at j.M.—4FP		5	1MC
801 j.M. takes 1MC		12	KIA
802 C.A. assault move from M2 to M3			
803 J.B. from N4 to M5			
804 B.H. fires at J.B.—4FP	+1	7	NE
805 J.G. from N4 to M5			
806 Residual Fire—1FP		4	NMC
807 Sniper Activation		1	Attack to K3, place B.A.
808 Random Direction	6/1	4	Pass
809 Sniper to K4			
810 J.G. takes NMC			
811 C.D. assault move from M6 to M7			
812 C.E. assault move from N5 to M6			
813 C.G. from Q5 to N5			
814 C.H. from R5 to P6			
815 J.Q. CX move from T2 to P2			
816 j.P. CX move from N10 to L8			

Defensive Fire Phase

817 B.H. FFP at M5—2FP	+2	10	NE
818 B.K., B.L. FFP at L7—8FP	+2	6	NMC
819 j.1. takes NMC		7	Pass
820 j.2. takes NMC		5	Pass
821 j.1. takes NMC		8	Pass
822 B.E. w/LMG fire at L5—12FP	+2	5	1MC
823 j.B. takes 1MC		6	Pass
824 Cox, B.G., B.N., B.O. fire at L5—24FP	+2	9	1MC
825 j.B. takes 1MC		8	Break

Advancing Fire Phase

826 j.P., J.A. fire at K8—4FP	+2	9	NE
827 j.1., j.2., j.I. fire at K7—4FP	+2	5	PTC
828 Ross takes PTC		6	Pass
829 B.K. takes PTC		6	Pass
830 B.L. takes PTC		7	Pass
831 J.G., J.B. w/LMG fire at L4—12FP	+2	5	1MC
832 b.1. takes 1MC		10	KIA
833 B.H. takes 1MC		4	Pass
834 Sniper Activation		5	NE
835 J.O. fires at L3—2FP	+2	3	NMC
836 B.I. takes NMC		12	ELR & Reduction

837 Replace B.I. with b.J.

838 J.P. fires at L4—2FP	+1	6	NE
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Rout Phase

839 J.B. routs to M6			
840 b.J. routs to K2			
841 b.A. routs to K5			

Advance Phase

842 J.G. transfers LMG to J.L.			
843 J.P. CX into J4			
844 J.O. into L3 Trench			
845 J.G. into L5 Trench			
846 C.E. CX into L5 Trench			
847 C.D. CX into L6			
848 J.H. CX into L6			
849 J.A. into K8			
850 J.P. into K9			
851 J.B., J.L. CX into L4 Trench			
852 C.G. into M6			
853 J.Q. into O3			
854 j.C. into Q4			

Close Combat Phase

855 Attacker Ambush in L4	+1	3	NE
856 Defender Ambush in L4	+2	2	NE
857 Attacker 3:2 H-to-H CC in L4	-1	5	all KIA
858 Defender 1:4 H-to-H CC in L4		3	all KIA
859 Attacker Ambush in K8	+2	6	NE
860 Defender Ambush in K8	+1	5	NE
861 Attacker 1:2 H-to-H CC in K8	-2	7	KIA
862 Defender 2:1 H-to-H CC in K8	+1	6	KIA

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
863 Wind Change		8	NE
864 Cox attempts repair of LMG		1	Repair
865 b.A. (DM) attempts Self-Rally	+4	7	NE
866 Trocha rally B.P. (DM)	+2	8	NE
867 Trocha rally B.Q. (DM)	+2	5	Rally
868 J.G. attempts recovery of Brit HMG		3	Recover
869 Ono rally j.N.	-1	10	ELR
870 Replace j.N. with Conscript j.N.			
Prep Fire Phase			
871 B.K., B.L. fire at L7—16FP	+2	7	1MC
872 j.1. takes 1MC		5	Pass

873 j.2. takes 1MC	2	Pass
874 j.I. takes 1MC	4	Pass
875 B.E., LMG fire at L5-6/2FP	+2	9 NE
876 B.O., B.N., B.O. w/Cox fire at L5-12/24FP	+2	8 PTC/1MC
877 J.G. takes 1MC	12	Break/ELR/Reduction
878 Replace J.G. with j.G.		
879 j.D. takes PTC	8	Pin
880 Troha, B.Q. w/LMG, b.B. fire at J4-16FP	10	NMC
881 J.P. takes NMC	2	HOB
882 J.P. Heat of Battle	+4	5 Berserk
883 B.M. fires at J4-8FP	+2	9 NE
Defensive Fire Phase		
884 two MMGs (j.1., j.2.), j.I. fire at K7-16FP+2	+2	3 3MC
885 Ross takes 3MC	5	Break
886 B.K. takes 3MC	8	Break/ELR
887 Replace B.K. with Conscript B.K.		
888 B.L. takes 3MC	3	Pass
889 two MMGs (j.1., j.2.) fire at K7-16FP	+2	8 NMC
890 Ross takes NMC	8	Wounded
891 Wound Severity dr	5	KIA
892 B.K. takes NMC	11	Break
893 Replace B.K. with b.K.		
894 B.L. takes NMC	9	Break
895 two MMGs (j.1., j.2.) fire at K7-16FP	+2	2 Coward/3MC
896 b.K. takes 3MC	8	KIA
897 B.L. takes 3MC	2	HOB
898 B.L. Heat of Battle	3	Hero (Richards)
899 J.P. fires at J5-4FP	+1	9 NE
900 J.O. fires at K2-2FP	+1	3 1MC
901 b.J. takes 1MC	7	KIA
902 j.D. fires at K6-2FP	+3/4	7 NE
903 j.H. fires at K6-2FP	+3/4	4 NE
Rout Phase		
904 b.A. eliminated for failure to rout		
905 B.L. routs to J6		
906 Troha, B.P. rout to J6		
907 j.G. routs to N5		
Advance Phase		
908 Cox transfers LMG to B.G.		
909 Cox into Pillbox		
910 B.N., B.O. into L5		
911 b.B. into J4		
912 B.M. CX into L5		
Close Combat Phase		
913 Attacker Ambush in J4	+1	1 Ambush
914 Defender Ambush in J4	+2	5 NE
915 Attacker 3:2 CC in J4	-1	9 NE
916 Defender 1:2 CC in J4	+1	7 Melee
917 Attacker Ambush in L5	+1	5 NE
918 Defender Ambush in L5	+2	1 Ambush
919 Defender 1:8 H-to-H CC in L5	-1	7 NE
920 Attacker 4:1 H-to-H CC in L5		5 all KIA
921 Troha conceals		place C.Y.

Japanese: Sometimes I hate this game. Kiro is a true samurai, passing all his morale checks, but then rolls a "2"—certain Berserk status for IJA units. What is worse (maybe) is that j.1. and j.2. cannot go Berserk (but at least they don't abandon their MMGs), while j.I. does go Berserk but cannot charge this turn because he has Opportunity Fired. Meanwhile, Kiro charges into K8 only to fail his 2MC and wound. I wish I knew how to roll "4s" and "5s" like Perry. Close Combat Phase during the IJA player-turn was bloody all around. I had assumed I would lose Kiro and j.A. (hopefully in an exchange with B.C.), but losing both J.B. and J.L. hurt a lot more. I felt I could afford to lose one of the two (assuming B.H. also bit the dust) but not both, as IJA strength is swiftly melting away. The only thing that saves the player-turn is my good rolls on morale checks, SAN, and Advancing Fire attacks. Perry, as usual, seemed to roll low when he had to. Well, I need three more hexes to control a majority, but then must hold on until the end of Turn 11. It looks dicey, but I'll have a decent chance if Perry's Prep Fire is not too devastating. But, of course, it was deadly against hex L5, causing J.G. to ELR and casualty reduce and pinning j.D. (which prevented him from withdrawing when he later ambushed B.N. and B.O.). J.P. is probably better off berserk due to the increased morale and loss of CX status, but will suffer a "+2" penalty on his Ambush dr until he loses his Berserk status. Fortunately, the MMG crews survived the British Prep Fire and then hammered hex K7, my only disappointment being that their last "2" IFT roll covered the hot MMGs and created an enemy Hero. I left j.D. in L5 to force Perry into CC if he wanted the hex and the HMG. Unfortunately, j.D. could not do any harm even though he

ambushed the advancing Nigerians. Back in J4 it's a Melee, but I could not expect much else. All-in-all, it was a very frustrating game turn, filled with highs and lows. The IJA did well during my Movement Phase, despite Perry's great IFT rolls. Then I had better-than-average advancing fire, but suffered higher than expected losses in CC. The L5 units got blown away by British prep fire, while the IJA MMG crews worked over the Brits in K7. The IJA still has a theoretical possibility to pull this game out, but I believe too many units and too much firepower have been lost. I will persevere through one more turn. To make matters worse, I forgot to put concealment on eligible units; this will undoubtedly come back to haunt me.

British: Ross didn't direct B.L. and B.K. as they fired at Kiro in order to avoid the CX "+1" DRM, gambling that the squads wouldn't cower. Kiro and both crews passed a 1MC, then Kiro went Berserk. Unfortunately, Kiro didn't lose his leadership modifier until after he had helped the crews pass another 1MC. Later, j.I. passes a NMC thanks to being Berserk. The IJA sniper pins both B.H. and B.L. before they fire and reduces B.A. to a HS. IJA advancing fire eliminates crew #1 and reduces squad I to a broken and green HS. In return, I wound Kiro, eliminate j.M. and break j.B! Chuck may be bemoaning my "devastating fire", but I must have missed the devastation. As hot as I was, he was hotter. The IJA passed five NMC, seven 1MC and fail two 1MC and a 2MC. Then everyone dies in CC. A bloody player-turn. Entirely too much of my force is either broken or staring down the barrels of machineguns manned by the IJA. I had hoped j.1. and j.2. would miss Kiro, but both crews and j.I. pass 1MCs as B.K. and B.L. elect to duke it out. Kiro who? The MMG crews don't need him as they smash Ross, B.K. and B.L. all on their own. Squad L creates a Hero, sure, but once again the British roll too low to Battle-Harden. At least the IJA squad manning the HMG "twelved" out. HS J's death rounds out another grim exchange of fire phases. I pondered long and hard about my advances. Richards stays put to try and slow the onslaught and maybe ambush some IJA attackers next turn. B.N. and B.O. both advance into L5 to ensure the recapture of the HMG. HS B goes into hex J4 alone to tie up J.P.; I did not want to CX anyone or risk B.Q. For a change, none of my guys dies in CC and the British regain L5. A bloody, back-and-forth battle. My British still have the edge, but the IJA is pulling the noose tighter and tighter. I hope Troha can rally some troops next turn as I am sure they will be DMed again if they don't.


Neutral Commentator: Chuck lost all three of his full-strength squads this turn, and I share his pessimism about a Japanese victory. The British should have seven Good Order squads after the next Rally Phase, compared to just two for the Japanese (one of which is already Step-Reduced). Perry still controls the majority of level-3 hexes, and will regain the HMG barring an unlucky Recovery dr. Too, Chuck hurt himself this turn. The Japanese disadvantage in manpower should have made him think twice about advancing two squads into Hand-to-Hand CC against the pinned B.H. The probability of Ambush was only 28%, given the net DRM of +1 in favor of the Defender. One of those two squads would have been better off reinforcing the HMG position.

TURN 9

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
922 Wind Change		6	NE
923 j.O. attempts Self-Rally		6	Rally
924 Ono rally j.N.	-1	5	Rally
925 B.N. attempts recovery of HMG		1	Recover
926 Troha rally B.F. (DM)	+2	5	Rally
927 Troha rally B.L. (DM)	+2	12	Casualties
928 Replace B.L. with b.L.			
Prep Fire Phase			
929 two MMGs (j.1., j.2.) fire at K7-16FP	+2	8	NMC
930 Richards takes NMC		10	Wounded
931 Wound Severity dr		3	NE
Movement Phase			
932 j.H. assault move from L6 to L7			
933 j.I. from L7 to K7			
934 Richards fires at j.I.-2FP		9	NE
935 B.F. w/Troha fires at j.I.-12FP		4	3MC
936 j.I. takes 3MC		10	KIA
937 j.P. from K9 to J8			
938 C.D. assault move from L6 to L7			
939 J.Q. from O3 to M4			
940 J.O. from L3 to K4			
941 C.G. assault move from M6 to M7			
942 j.C. drops MTR, from Q4 to N5			
943 j.N. CX move from P6 to N5			
944 C.H. from P6 to O5			
Defensive Fire Phase			
945 B.N. w/HMG, B.O. fire at M6-24FP	+1	7	2MC
946 j.B. takes 2MC		5	Pass
947 HMG (B.N.) fires at M6-12FP	+1	2	K/3
948 Richards final fires at L7-1FP	Q/+1	8	NE

Figure 4: Situation at the end of Japanese Player-Turn 8.



Movement Phase

1056	B.Q. from I6 to J5, attempts to recover LMG...	+2	3	Recover
1057	B.Q. continue to K6 Trench			
1058	B.N. from K6 to J5			
1059	b.R. Minimum Move from K5 to L5 Trench			
1060	J.Q. w/LMG, J.Y. w/LMG, j.C. fire at b.R.—24FP	+2	9	1MC
1061	b.R. takes 1MC		4	Pass
1062	Sniper Activation		3	NE
1063	Cox, B.E. exit Pillbox into K6 Trench			

Defensive Fire Phase

1064	J.Q., J.Y., j.C. final fire at L5—8FP	+3	7	NE
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Advance Phase

1065	B.Q. transfers LMG to Cox			
1066	B.N. into I6			
1067	B.Q. into K7			

Close Combat Phase

1068	Attacker 1:1 H-to-H CC in K7		8	NE
1069	Defender 1:2 H-to-H CC in K7	-1	7	Casualties
1070	Random Selection		3,4	b.G. KIA

Japanese: The IJA was able to eliminate Ellis and B.F. for failure to rout, but the Japanese bayonets have gone dull. Both Perry and I fire into melees this turn, and both times my units had the initial advantage (i.e., higher morale). The Brits, however, come out on top both times. I can't believe my *samurai* had two rounds of hand-to-hand CC and failed to knock out either of the two Nigerian squads that advanced into K5 and K7 during Turn 9. What a time for the IJA to lose its CC edge. It definitely sucks to still be stuck in melee with my killer MMG crews, but what can I do? I am reluctant to reinforce the melee and risk the very real possibility of having everyone wiped out by a lucky (or merely average) British CC roll. After all, I only have six squad-equivalents left! The British survivor of the K5 melee, b.R., incredibly survives the 24FP (+2) and 8FP (+3) attacks that come its way. The game is very close right now, despite the IJA's slight advantage; the Brits continue to hold on, even if it is by the skin of their teeth. I currently control five Level-3 hill hexes and need seven to win the game, which I feel confident I will have by the end of the next Japanese player turn. But Perry will be able to strike back during the bottom of the 11th. Let's hope he can't self rally B.M. and doesn't win the K7 melee.

British: A breeze springs up, too late for drifting Smoke. Ellis needed to rally this turn. I pay for his failure to do so, and for M's failure to stack with Ellis, when the Berserk J.P. moves in on B.M., cutting off retreat for Ellis and B.F. and forcing their elimination. B.M. routs to I4 (as his only other alternative was F4 and out of the picture). The scattered remains of the IJA slowly converge on the hilltop for the final melee. The upcoming melee looked grim for b.G., so B.N. fired into K7 but without accomplishing much. Squad O makes out fine when Chuck tries the same trick with the K5 melee and reduces J.O. instead. Chuck and I trade half-squads in K5 and "11s" in K7. Couldn't really expect B.M. to self-rally, although his failure to do so probably dooms him. B.Q. picks up the LMG left behind when B.F. died, and then essentially trades places with B.N. who lugs the HMG over to try and stop enemy P's forthcoming charge with superior firepower. Apparently b.R. acquired Berserk status from his prior melee with j.K. and charges up the hill into the trench in L5. A desperate move that I hope will pay off. Cox and B.E. finally emerge from their bunker. B.Q. hands off his spare LMG to Cox before reinforcing b.G. in the K7 Melee. Alas, HS G's turn has come and only B.Q. is left to lock the enemy MMGs in Melee.

Neutral Commentator: Perry made a serious mistake by not prep-firing into K7 with the HMG and B.N., given that he intended to advance squad Q into the melee. With average luck, the result would have been a 1MC and the Japanese CC FP in hex K7 would have been reduced to three or less. With good (but not great) luck, the Japanese would have been reduced to two CC FP. British B.Q. should then wipe out the rest, and regain control of the hill Location, risking only a

1:2 or 1:4 attack in return. Perry was concerned about the potential movement into H7/I7 of the Japanese half-squads in hex J7; but the British HMG would not be in a position to stop them once berserk J.P. charges into its location anyway. he should have maximized the potential of a Turn 11 counter-attack by refusing to offer a target for that berserk squad. Since the last enemy units seen by J.P. were Ellis and B.F. in hex I6, it must charge into that hex if no other unit is in LOS at the start of the next turn. J.P. would be forced to end its MP and lose its berserk status if no enemy unit was visible from I6. A Good Order J.P. is far less formidable than a berserk J.P. I predict that it will be a big thorn in the British side next turn.

TURN 11

Japanese Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
1071 Wind Change		6	NE
1072 j.C. attempts recovery of LMG		4	Recover
Prep Fire Phase			
1073 J.Y. w/LMG, J.Q. w/LMG fire at L5—20FP	+3	8	NMC
1074 b.R. takes NMC		9	Break
Movement Phase			
1075 J.P. from HS to I6			
1076 B.N. w/HMG fire at J.P.—30FP		8	3MC
1077 J.P. takes 3MC		7	Pass
1078 HMG (B.N.) fires at J.P.—16FP		8	1MC
1079 J.P. takes 1MC		7	Pass
1080 B.N. w/HMG SFP at J.P.—12FP		6	2MC
1081 J.P. takes 2MC		11	Reduction
1082 Replace J.P. with j.P.			
1083 j.C. CX move from L4 to J4			
1084 C.A. assault move from H7 to I7			
1085 C.C. assault move from Crest INTO J7			
Advancing Fire Phase			
1086 j.P. fires at B.N.—1FP	+1	7	NE
Rout Phase			
1087 B.M. routs to H4			
1088 b.R. eliminated for failure to rout (in J5)			
Advance Phase			
1089 C.C. CX into J6			
1090 j.C. into I5			
1091 J.Y. into L5 Trench			
1092 J.Q. CX into K5			
1093 j.N. CX into L6			
Close Combat Phase			
1094 Attacker 1:1 H-to-H CC in K7	-1	9	NE
1095 Defender 1:2 H-to-H CC in K7		7	NE
1096 Attacker 1:4 H-to-H CC in I6	-1	4	all KIA
1097 Defender 4:1 H-to-H CC in I6		6	all KIA

British Player Turn

Serial Event	DRM	DR	Result
Rally Phase			
1098 Wind Change		9	NE
1099 B.M. (DM) attempts Self-Rally	+4	9	NE
Prep Fire Phase			
1100 B.E. w/LMG fire at L6—12FP	+1	6	Cover, 1MC
1101 j.N. takes 1MC		8	Break
1102 Cox w/LMG fire at L5—2FP	+2	3	NMC
1103 J.Y. takes NMC		5	Pass
Defensive Fire Phase			
1104 j.H. w/LMG at K6—4FP	+3	7	NE
1105 J.Y. w/LMG, J.Q. w/LMG fire at K6—20FP	+3	5	2MC
1106 Cox takes 2MC	+1	8	Break
1107 B.E. takes 2MC	+1	6	Break
1108 British Player concedes			

Japanese: Half-squad R was effectively eliminated when it broke over my Prep Fire as it had no place to safely rout. I sent j.C. to DM B.M., planning to have him advance into J5. I had forgotten, however, that the unit's CX status would keep it from making an advance versus difficult terrain. My berserk J.P. survived the vicious first fire and ROF from B.N. and the HMG, only to fail a 2MC during B.N.'s subsequent FF. Luckily, both units wiped each other out in CC. All other IJA units advanced to control as many Level-3 hexes as possible. I would have advanced j.E. into L6 along with N, but I couldn't be sure of the outcome of the K7 melee; I wanted L7 to be covered if B.Q. survived at the end of Japanese Turn 11. At the

end of my turn I had Control of nine Level-3 hill hexes, which meant Perry had to recapture three of those to prevent an IJA win. I figured his chances were slim unless B.M. could self-rally. When B.M. didn't, I felt the Japanese victory was solid—although Perry was not going to quit just yet. Fortunately for me, the Japanese encircling fire broke both Cox and squad E. Perry resigned the game.

British: Chuck held j.C. out from the Prep Fire at b.R., the difference between a NMC and 1MC. The NMC, though, was enough to punch b.R. out of the game. Enemy HS C runs off to make B.M.'s situation desperate. J.P. weathers a hail of fire to make it in onto B.N., although in a reduced state. My HS R dies in the Rout Phase and the noose tightens into a veritable stranglehold, as the IJA now controls nine of the 13 Level-3 hexes. Losing B.N. in CC is a deadly blow. I will surely miss him and his HMG as I try and recapture three hexes with only two Good Order units. My plan was to break j.N. and reduce J.Y. with Prep Fire, then have Cox advance in to control L6, then B.E. advances in on J.Y. Both B.E. and B.Q. must win in CC without being eliminated themselves. Japanese HS N cooperates but J.Y. does not. His squad Y then combines with J.Q. to shoot-up Cox and B.E. in the Defensive Fire Phase. The 2MC (effectively a 3MC due to Encirclement) is too much and I resign. The British are left with no Good Order units in play. The plan was hopelessly flawed anyway, since only MMC can Control a hex; even toting his LMG, Cox doesn't quite fit that profile.

Neutral Commentator: Not much left to be said about the final turn. Perry should have deployed squad E into two half-squads so that he could have advanced into three different locations during his player turn. If all three British units had survived until the APH, Perry could have advanced one HS to J6, one into L6, and Cox into K7 to help out squad Q. With a little luck, j.H. is eliminated at 2:1 (-1) odds and j.F./j.I/j.J. at 1:1 in Hand-to-Hand CC. Unfortunately, the Japanese Defensive Fire deflated any hopes for a British come-back. Besides, Chuck had prudently positioned his few remaining troops so as not to offer Perry a single juicy target and, more importantly, to limit the British movement possibilities. A broken half-squad is just as effective a barrier to enemy movement as a Good Order 4-4-8.

CLOSING COMMENTS

Japanese: For the most part, IJA strategy worked well, especially crossing the paddies. One hates to have units hanging out in "-2" DRM terrain (i.e., on a Bank counter), but I think it was worth giving the Staffords shots in order to gain the extra forward movement. Things might have been different if there had been less IJA smoke or a functioning HMG on my Turn 2, but such are the fortunes of war. Given the placement of the HMG, I probably should have avoided the east board edge. As it was, I got a few units stuck in the W1 jungle and shot up by Mac as they tried to escape. Fortunately, I was able to recover and push through the middle, taking advantage of the blocked LOS created by the S5-S7 palm trees. SW utilization was generally mistake-free, although (as noted in my comments above) I might have held onto the last DC to use against the pillbox. As planned, the mounted Hayashi stayed out of sight, only exposing himself to a 4FP (+2) attack in order to lead two massive firegroups against front-line Staffords. Then he moved forward with the troops and promptly failed a 2MC and subsequent Wound Severity dr. (Japanese leaders are a real enigma to me. They can do a great many things well when they lead from the front, but they are so vulnerable to death due to morale check failure. I confess that I often find myself in a bind as to how best to utilize IJA leaders.)



PIGI-PIGI

Reference Notes for ASL

By Steven C. Swann

"Pigi-Pigi" was a native term in vogue with the Australians of the Independent Companies meaning "to go on patrol". That best describes most of the missions conducted in the South Pacific by the commando units of Australia and New Zealand. Mention the term "commando" and most gamers immediately think of the famed British forces operating in Europe during World War II. But the word can describe many types of military, paramilitary and non-conventional units that practice the irregular style of warfare popularized in dime novels. Among these, the men of the Australian Independent Companies and of the New Zealand South Pacific Scouts were historically some of the most effective.

Independent Companies

A British training team arrived in Australia in November 1940 with orders to introduce the new, commando-style warfare to Australian volunteers. Even though Australia already had four divisions serving under British command overseas, and even though the potential and potent Japanese threat from the north loomed large, her government became the first Commonwealth ally to adopt this new method of warfare. The first four "Independent Companies" were organized and trained during late 1940 in a remote national park some 100 miles southeast of Melbourne.

Officers and NCOs for the formations were volunteers drawn from regular army units. They began their six weeks of training before the companies were formed. The men who would form the enlisted ranks were all volunteers, mostly of the rough sort who had spent their lives in the Australian outback. As such, they were already self-reliant and highly independent. Being used to surviving in the Australian wilderness, they adapted readily to the commando training with its emphasis on action and improvisation. After the officers and non-coms had completed their own training, they then joined their assigned companies. The entire unit then went through another six weeks of training.

The original plan had been to use the Independent Companies as a raiding force in the Middle East (hence the desire for volunteers from the outback), but the growing Japanese threat changed that. After training was completed, the 2/1 Independent Company was deployed as a series of small detachments spread amongst the islands that formed the line guarding the northern shore of the continent. Units were established from the Admiralty Islands (Manus) across to New Ireland, Bougainville (Buka), the New Hebrides (Villa) and along the Solomons to Tulagi. By this foresighted move, the Australian High Command received advance warning when the Japanese began their sweep southward into the "Southern Resource Regions" in December 1941.

[During World War I, the Australian military units shipped to Europe were titled the "First

Australian Imperial Force" (1st AIF). When Australia began mobilizing troops during World War II, its units became known as the "Second Australian Imperial Force". Since these companies were originally intended for use in the Middle East and hence were members of the "2nd AIF", the number "2" is used as a prefix to their company numbers. In fact, even though not normally written, all Australian military units throughout World War II should be designated in this manner.]

By providing this invaluable service of acting as forward scouts, the tough Australians put their lives in extreme peril; many died giving these warnings. In the Amboina Islands, for instance, the men of the 2/1 Independent Company that were not killed in the initial attack were later massacred by their SNLF guards. But some did survive. The men on the islands of Manus and Buka were able to escape into the hills and evaded Japanese patrols until rescued later in the year. The remnants of the 2/1 were used to replace losses in the 2/3 Independent Company, as there were not enough survivors to reconstitute the original formation.

The 2/2 Independent Company had been assigned to assist other Australian (the 2/40 Battalion) and Dutch units on the island of Timor, just northeast of Darwin. This island was split between the colonial administrations of Portugal and Holland. On 20 February 1942, Timor was invaded by Japanese forces. The 228th Regiment of the 38th Infantry Division landed on the north shore of Portuguese Timor, while on the south shore the Dutch colonial troops faced the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF (Special Naval Landing Force) and a small (630 men) Japanese parachute detachment. Following the defeat of the regular military forces on the island, the men of 2/2 Independent Company—along with a few Dutch—took to the hills and carried on eleven months of guerrilla warfare until finally relieved. During the summer of 1942, they were reinforced by the arrival of the 2/4 Independent Company. Both formations were withdrawn in January 1943. By then, the activities of these Australian commandos had been so intense that they contributed substantially to the deception that led the Japanese command to believe the Allies would strike back at the Netherlands East Indies first. This, in part, aided the U.S. Marines when they landed at Guadalcanal in August 1942, catching the enemy by surprise.

While the first two companies were fighting for survival, the men of the 2/3 Independent Company shipped out for the islands of New Caledonia. Here they served as a garrison for the first eight months of the war until relieved by American troops. Next they were air-transported to Wau (New Guinea), coming under fire even as they landed. A few days later, they joined with the 2/5 (the first of a second group of companies trained as commandos).

After completing their training, the 2/5 Independent Company was infiltrated in small groups into the area along the north shore of New Guinea

near the Japanese bases of Lae and Salamaua. For 13 months the Australians were able to shadow the Japanese, reporting their movements to Allied HQ in Australia. They also conducted commando-style raids, such as the one on the Salamaua base in 1942. Here a detachment slipped within the confines of the base without detection, attacked and wiped out the Japanese HQ (gaining much invaluable intelligence information), and fought their way out without a single casualty.

During the Buna Mission campaign (autumn 1942), the 2/6 Independent Company fought alongside American troops from the 32nd Infantry Division. It was even placed under the command of the American general, who had high praise for the Australians. But at the end of December, all Australian Independent Companies reverted back to Australian control.

After a rest and refit, the 2/2 and 2/4 companies were attached to the 2/6 and 2/7 to become the Australian Commando Squadron. Taking part in the American advance up the Ramu valley in north-eastern New Guinea (September 1943 through April 1944), they acted as assault companies in the lead of regular forces. Here, with the Australian 7th Division, a part of "Alamo Force" under U.S. General Krueger, they served well in the destruction of the Japanese 18th Army during the westward drive.

By the end of 1942, ten Independent Companies had been raised, trained and shipped out, while one had been dissolved after battle casualties (the 2/1). The Australian commandos performed their most heroic and unheralded work in the grim first two years of the war—patrolling Japanese-controlled islands, gathering information for Allied HQ, and conducting the occasional raid. As the war progressed, the Independent Companies became assault formations that often led the way in attacks by Australian and American regular forces. Their services as scouts and trailblazers were legendary. By late 1944, each Australian infantry division in the theater had one or two Independent Companies attached to it, for use as the divisional commander might deem fit.

South Pacific Scouts

When war broke out in the Pacific, there were many ad-hoc defensive measures taken by the colonial administrations and far-flung outposts on an emergency basis to stem the tide of Japanese advance. Often, as in the case of New Zealand, these did not follow conventional "wisdom" or established military guidelines. Where most of the British Commonwealth nations formed and trained commando units drawn from existing military formations or volunteers of European descent, the government of New Zealand turned to its native islander population for the troops to defend its northern approaches.

In the Fiji islands, three "Southern Independent Commando Companies" were raised by Captain C.W.H. Tripp (DSO) to provide a self-defense force

for the area. Each New Zealand-sponsored company was commanded by 44 New Zealand officers and NCOs, while 200 Fijian volunteers served as the line troops. These units were charged with the defense of the island group until the America-New Zealand-Australia line of communications and supply was secure. During April 1942, the Fiji commandos were formalized with the creation of the 1st and 2nd "Fiji Commando Guerrillas" from the three independent companies.

On 23 December 1942, the 1st Fiji Commando shipped out to assist the Americans still fighting on Guadalcanal. Here the Fijians were joined by the Solomon Island Constabulary. Together, they provided deep jungle reconnaissance south of Henderson Field. Occasionally they were used as guides and scouts for U.S. Marine and Army patrols. During the early summer of 1943, the seven-man sections of the Fijians on Guadalcanal were reorganized into 15-man patrols (squads). Following this period of rest and refit and reorganization, the 1st Fiji Commandos—known to the Americans as the "South Pacific Scouts"—were ordered to prepare for combat operations in the New Georgia island group.

On 2 July 1943, elements of the 1st Fiji Commandos began clearing several small islands of the New Georgia group bordering the Roviana Lagoon. Using small arms only and travelling in native canoes, the Fijians completed their mission in time to assist the American 43rd Division in its assault on Munda airfield. During the Munda operation, the Fijians were committed along the Bariki River to cover the right flank of the American forces. While moving along the river and seeking high ground for a HQ and observation post, they came

under attack by Japanese outposts. Using native jungle-craft and rifles, the 1st Fiji Commando pushed the Japanese back over two miles while firing only 500 rounds. The 1st Fiji also operated in conjunction with the U.S. 172nd Infantry Regiment during its approach to Laiana beach. And later the 1st Commando moved to Vella LaVella to aid in the hunting down of Japanese survivors wandering in the hills and jungle.

The 2nd Fiji Commando Guerrillas, commanded by Major P.G. Ellis, were moved from Fiji up to the Northern Solomons in time to take part in the assault on Bougainville Island. Once again their superior jungle skills came into prominence, for the Fijians provided long-range patrolling from the Empress Augusta Bay lodgement. They remained in place to aid, again, in hunting down Japanese survivors and insuring that these did not conduct guerrilla operations against the forces of occupation.

After loyal service for 29 months, the Fiji Commandos were disbanded on 31 May 1944, with all personnel returned to their home islands or parent units. While these two formations took their name from the Fiji Islands, it should be noted that natives from the Tongan and Solomons islands also served in them. Combining their native skills with the tactical expertise and weapons-training offered by their New Zealand officers, the Fiji Commandos provided a very effective scouting force for the Allied efforts in the struggle for the Solomons.

Fitting Independent Companies into ASL

An Australian Independent Company (see Table 1) was composed of a company HQ and three infantry platoons. The company HQ had a staff section

of three officers and 14 ranks, a Service Section of 28 men, a Sapper Section of one officer and 17 men, and a small medical staff (one doctor and four medics). One man served as the company armorer, charged with repair and maintenance of the weapons. Vehicles were assigned to the company for use in rear areas, and later for use during the regular campaigns late in the war. During the first year, vehicles were not taken into combat, since the operations of the Independent Companies took place in jungled and mountainous regions with no roads.

Each infantry platoon was comprised of four officers and 62 enlisted men, divided into a platoon HQ and three rifle sections. Each platoon HQ numbered an officer and eight men, while each of the three rifle sections had an officer and 18 men (divided into a section HQ and over-strength squad). Each platoon was equipped with LMGs and light mortars.

Outfitting this unit with ASL values was enjoyable, but presented some tough decisions. The easy part came from the fact that these were small formations, and the decision on counter types was uncomplicated. The SMCs could all have -1 values, except the company CO (9-2) to reflect the rugged independence of the outback Australian. (As usual, the SMCs and SWs are shown in their respective HQ sections.) At the platoon level, the leader would be a 8-1 or 9-1 SMC selected by random 50-50 die roll. The platoon LMG and 2" mortar are shown in the HQ section, even though they may be assigned to any personnel counter. Only in late 1944-45 should other SW be added, as per the British SW Allotment Chart (on page 171 of the rulebook).

The over-strength rifle squad was the hardest to

TABLE 1: Table of Organization—Australian Independent Company, 1942

Unit	Manpower*	ASL Equivalent
Company	17/250	
Company HQ	5/64	
HQ Staff	3/14	9-1 SMC 2×2-4-8 HS MMG (after 12/42) Motorcycle** Jeep**
Service Section	28	2×4-5-8 MMC 2×Mule (Timor only) 30-cwt Lorry**
Sapper Section	1/17	4-5-8 MMC 2-4-8 HS 3×DC
Medical Staff	1/4	No Equivalent
Armorer	1	No Equivalent
3 Platoons (each)	4/62	
Platoon HQ	1/8	9-1 or 8-1*** 2-4-8 HS LMG 2" MTR
3 Sections (each)	1/18	
Section HQ	1/2	2-4-8 HS
Rifle Squad	16	4-5-8 MMC +2-4-8 HS

TABLE 2: Table of Organization—Fiji Commando, 4/42—5/43

Unit	Manpower	ASL Equivalent
Commando	173	
Cdo HQ	23	9-2 SMC 3×2-3-7 HS
2 Companies (each)	75	
Company HQ	9	9-1 or 8-0*** 2-3-7 HS
3 Platoons (each)	22	
3 Sections (each)	15	3×2-3-7

TABLE 3: Table of Organization—Fiji Commando, 6/43—12/44

Unit	Manpower	ASL Equivalent
Commando	173	
Cdo HQ	23	9-2 SMC 4-4-7 MMC 2-3-7 HS
2 Companies (each)	75	
Company HQ	11	9-1 or 8-0*** 2-3-7 HS LMG
2 Platoons (each)	32	
2 Patrols (each)	15	2×4-4-7

*—Officers/Enlisted

**—Not taken into combat until 1943

***—See article for explanation

TABLE 4: Standard ANZAC Commando OB

To allow comparison, the following shows the ASL composition of a single Australian Independent Company or Fijian Commando.

Independent Company	Fiji Cdo 4/42—5/43	Fiji Cdo 6/43—12/44
9-2 SMC	9-2 SMC	9-2 SMC
3×9-1/8-1 SMC	9-1 SMC	9-1 SMC
13×4-5-8 MMC	8-0 SMC	8-0 SMC
13×2-4-8 MMC	23×2-3-7 HS	9×4-4-7 MMC
3×LMG		3×2-3-7 HS
3×DC		2×LMG
3×2" MTR		

TABLE 5: ANZAC Commando Capabilities

	Ind Co.	Fiji Cdo
Morale:	Normal	Underscore
ELR:	5	5
SAN:	4/5	2
Stealth:	Yes	Yes
Cower:	No	Yes
Commando:	Yes	Yes
Sappers:	Yes	No
Concealment:	No drm	-1 drm

represent, given standard ASL organization. There is no British MMC counter that can quite represent the 16-man rifle squad (which would need a 7-5-8 to do it justice). The best compromise I could devise was that each "squad" have a 4-5-8 and 2-4-8 HS in it for game purposes. As can be seen (Table 4), this makes for a company that is rather heavy in small-arms FP. But it is justified I think, given their performance. Since many of these troopers came from a region where hunting was a way of life, the SAN of any Australian independent company should always be high, in both defense and offense. Depending on the action, the SAN should be either "4" or "5", and if undetermined from historical sources let it be determined by random die roll.

Being commando-trained, all personnel are Elite and entitled to all Commando benefits (H1.24). All enlisted personnel are shown with the "8" morale of British elites. Morale is *not* underlined, but the Australians would receive the "No-Cowering" benefit (A25.45), as well as being Stealthy per the ANZAC rule (A25.44). Since these commandos were originally trained to operate in a desert environment, they do not receive any movement benefits in the jungle. A single squad and a single HS may be designated before each game as Sappers (H1.23).

DYO scenarios featuring the Australian Independent Companies should all be placed in the Netherlands East Indies or New Guinea areas, therefore PTO Terrain (G.1) will always be in effect. Once the American command began its Philippines offensive, the Australian and American forces fought separately. During the early years (1942-43), 12 factors of AP mines would be allowed the Australians in each scenario. There would be no OBA allowed to the Independent Companies in any scenario representing their raiding or scouting activities, but may be used in scenarios that occurred during the latter part of the war when these were attached to regular Australian divisions.

Scenarios representing the action on Timor (off the northwest Australian coast) would feature some further differences. After the fall of the Dutch garrison, a small band of Dutchmen were able to link with the 2/2 Independent Company in the hills. Thus, a few Dutch (Allied Minor) squads and a Dutch LMG could be part of the Allied OB here. Since these were long-time residents, heroic in their resistance, and survivors of the fighting, the MMC of choice would be the 4-5-8; but because of the fall of their base, the only SW allowed these Dutch would be the LMG. Any Dutch SMC should be rated "8-0" or "8-1". Transport and resupply in the jungles of Timor proved a tough task. All Allied SW should be under the "Ammo Shortage" rules (A19.32), unless animal-packed (G10.7). Add an appropriate number of "Mule" counters.

Fitting the Fiji Commandos into ASL

Each Fiji Commando (see Table 2) had a headquarters unit of 23 men and two companies of 75 men each. Three platoons of three seven-man sections made up the strength of each company. These native troops were armed with the British .303 bolt action rifle, and had no organic squad or heavy weapons. Late in the operations in the Solomon chain, they did manage to acquire a few light machineguns.

For DYO use, the Fijian formations can be represented in actions during the Central Solomons (New Georgia) campaign. This would be the only place that they fought in numbers large enough to represent in ASL play. Scenarios that serve to represent the mop-up activities on Vella LaVella should not involve more than one company at a time, and not last longer than four or five game turns. The small craft counters (E5.121) can be used to nicely represent the native canoes employed by the Fijians; due to their expertise with these craft, allow them four MPs. For operations as scouts for Allied

forces, a single individual squad and SMC could be added to other scenarios taking place in the Solomons and on Bougainville.

The twin problems of low squad size and being only rifle-armed makes the ASL MMC selection for the South Pacific Scouts rather a puzzle. Through the summer of 1943, the seven-man squad is best represented, I think, by the use of the British 2-3-7 HS. After reorganization in 1943 into 15-man "patrols", the MMC of choice would be the British 4-4-7 counter. Since the leadership is New Zealand, British SMCs are used to represent the officers. Each company in the commando would have a different SMC: the 1st company a 9-1 (who acted as Executive Officer), while the 2nd would be led by an 8-0. (In the event that a player may wish to use a Fiji Commando force in a scenario with the Australians that fought in the New Georgia islands, make use of Russian counters and institute the rules for allied forces.)

These native troopers had a high morale, and easily rate an ELR of "5" with their morale underscored. Due to the small unit size and limited firepower, the SAN should always be "2" and never higher. However, the Fijians proved quite adept at jungle-craft. Like the Muslim guerrillas in Scenario 64, they receive a -2 drn to their Concealment dr, do not add two to their Search dr (G1.63), and have their Inherent MF allotment increased by one. In addition, the Fiji Commandos would receive all commando benefits (H1.24), with adjustments as listed above. Finally, Fijian MMC may not "Battle Harden" beyond their 4-4-7 values, but are allowed to gain or be assigned "Fanatic" status.

The only squad weapon normally used by the ASL Fijians would be the British LMG. Since the Fijians never underwent any formal military training, they would *not* be allowed use of any captured weapons until after the reorganization of May 1943, and then only the Japanese LMG and 50mm MTR (grenade launcher). On the other hand, presence of a New Zealand SMC (officer) in the same location would permit such use of any captured weapon as per the ASL rules.

While stacked with any allied MMC, that MMC can receive the movement bonus of the Fijian Commandos, but not the Concealment bonus. A Fiji commando unit may not assist the Concealment nor Search DR of any allied MMC. Usual rules concerning allied units apply (A10.7), including those situations where other Commonwealth troops may be present in the scenario.

While not much has appeared in print about the Australian and New Zealand commando forces in the United States, it should be noted that without their help and sacrifice, the Allied drive through the Southwest Pacific by General MacArthur would have taken longer at a heavier cost in American lives. Their contribution as scouts and trailbreakers, as raiders and assault troops, are unmeasurable. Later, they served to help cover the Netherlands East Indies flank during the American liberation of Manila. They represent some of the very best and most effective troops that the Commonwealth fielded.



THE SQUAD LEADER'S GENERAL

Together with the ASL Annual, the following articles comprise the growing body of literature on the system to date. All have appeared in recent issues of *The GENERAL* (available for \$4.00 each, plus shipping, direct from Avalon Hill). For each, the entry gives: title, author, issue, type, pages. Type of article is indicated by a letter-code: A=analysis; D=design; P=play; SR=series replay; V=variant. Too, many scenarios—both remakes and originals—have seen print in our pages (see the "Chronology of War" elsewhere in this issue).

- Assault on Round Top (Charles Kibler) Vol. 22, #5 (V) 42-44.
First Impressions: Infantry Training (Robert Medrow) Vol. 22, #6 (A) 5-14, 16.
Squad Leader Clinic: "I Met My Old Lover..." (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 22, #6 (P) 15-16.
Design Analysis (Don Greenwood) Vol. 22, #6 (D) 17-18.
First Impressions: Armor Training (Robert Medrow) Vol. 23, #2 (A) 5-15.
Squad Leader Clinic: Point Defense (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 23, #2 (P) 16-17.
Series Replay, ASL Scenario 8 (Don Chappell, Jim Bick, Charles Kibler) Vol. 23, #2 (SR) 18-24, 43.
Squad Leader Clinic: Reserves (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 23, #3 (P) 21-22.
Series Replay, ASL Scenario 8 (Don Chappell, Jim Bick, Charles Kibler) Vol. 23, #3 (SR) 20-26. [Cont'd from previous issue.]
Squad Leader Clinic: How to Kill Tigers (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 23, #3 (P) 43-44.
Going All Out (Greg Scheninger & Charles Kibler) Vol. 24, #1 (V) 5-9.
Series Replay, DASL Scenario 1 (Darryl Burk, Bill Connor, Mark Nixon) Vol. 24, #1 (SR) 10-18.
Squad Leader Clinic: Night Moves (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 24, #1 (P) 19-20.
First Impressions: Offboard Artillery (Robert Medrow) Vol. 24, #2 (A) 5-9.
Series Replay, DASL Scenario 1 (Darryl Burk, Bill Connor, Mark Nixon) Vol. 24, #2 (SR) 10-15. [Cont'd from previous issue.]
Squad Leader Clinic: 1987 ASL Tournament (Joseph Suchar) Vol. 24, #2 (P) 16-17.
ASL Armor Studies (Lorin Bird) Vol. 24, #4 (V) 23-25.
Squad Leader Clinic: Armed & Armored Halftracks (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 24, #4 (P) 43-44.
Squad Leader Clinic: No Hollow Threat (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 24, #6 (P) 25-26.
Coming Attractions: The Last Hurrah (Rex A. Martin) Vol. 25, #1 (D) 51, 55.
Squad Leader Clinic: Achtung Minen! (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 25, #2 (P) 47-48.
Squad Leader Clinic: Guns versus Tanks (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 25, #3 (P) 27-28.
Guzzled-Up in the Desert (Mark Nixon) Vol. 25, #3 (P) 29-33, 34.
Darby's Rangers (Steven Swann) Vol. 25, #5 (A) 27-29.
Tommy Atkins at War (Charles Markus) Vol. 25, #6 (A) 6-12.
Desert Winds (Mark Nixon) Vol. 25, #6 (P) 13-21.
Broken Swords (David Meyler) Vol. 25, #6 (V) 22-23, 24.
Coming Attractions: Red Baricades (Charles Kibler) Vol. 25, #6 (D) 23-24.
Squad Leader Clinic: Man versus Tank (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 25, #6 (P) 25-26.
Desert Sands (Mark Nixon) Vol. 26, #1 (P) 37-45.
Squad Leader Clinic: Mortars (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 26, #1 (P) 53-54.
Desert Winds (Steven Swann) Vol. 26, #2 (A) 34-37.
Squad Leader Clinic: Massed Armor Assault (Jon Miahcon) Vol. 26, #2 (P) 39-40.
With Friends Like These (David Meyler) Vol. 26, #4 (V) 53-55.
Red Devils (Steven Swann) Vol. 26, #5 (A) 31-35.
Alpine Hunters (Steven Swann) Vol. 27, #1 (A) 35-40.
Pulling Old Chestnuts from the Fire (Jim Stabler) Vol. 27, #2 (A) 38-40.
Pulling Old Chestnuts from the Fire, Part 2 (Jim Stabler) Vol. 27, #3 (A) 49-51.
Semper Parati (Andrew Hensby) Vol. 27, #5 (A) 20-23.

Subscriptions to the bi-monthly, 64-page *GENERAL* are \$15.00 for one year; \$24.00 for two years. (Canadian/Mexican subscribers must add \$15 to a one-year run and \$30 for a two-year run to cover 1st-class postage; overseas, \$25 and \$48 respectively.) For up-to-date news on releases for the expanding system, information about conventions and changes, calls for playtesters, and the latest scenario, any true ASL fanatic will want *The GENERAL* on his game shelf.

COMMANDO HUNT



ASL SCENARIO A42



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win if at game end they have amassed Casualty VP $\geq$ the number amassed by the Australians.

In the RAMELAU MOUNTAINS, TIMOR, 22 September 1942: Since the February invasion, the Japanese occupation forces had been subjected to a constant series of raids, ambushes and small firefights by the Australian 2/2nd Independent Company. Increased Japanese patrols and reinforcements proved ineffective. The successes of the 2/2 brought more troubles for the enemy in the form of the fresh 2/4th Independent Company in August 1942. The resulting increase in commando activity finally led the Japanese Area Command to call in their own specialists—the highly trained, elite *Yugeki Chutai* ("Commando Company"). Trained in stealth, jungle survival and irregular warfare like their Australian counterparts, the *Yugeki* were sent into the Ramelau Mountains to hunt down and disperse the Australians. Word having reached them of this new threat, the Australian commanders set out to do the same to these Japanese. In a series of vicious actions spanning several weeks, the commandos clashed in the jungles of Timor. Typical of these was the firefight that resulted when two strong dispersed sweeps bumped into each other.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Add two "?" to the Australian OB.
- SSR4 is NA.



TURN RECORD CHART

● JAPANESE Moves First	1 [●]	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	END
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Elements of the *Yugeki Chutai* [ELR: 4] enter on Turn 1 along the north edge (see SSR 2): {SAN: 4}



 4 ⁺ 4-8	 10-1	 8-1	 LMG 2-6	 de NTH 5mm	? 7 morale
10		3	3	6	

Elements of the 2/4th Independent Company [ELR: 5] enter on Turn 1 along the south edge (see SSR 2): {SAN: 4}




 4 ⁺ 5-8	 9-2	 8-1	 LMG 2-7	 de NTH 5mm	? 7 morale
10		3	2	6	

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moist, with a Mild Breeze from the northeast at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect.
- Units not entered on the first Game Turn are considered eliminated. At the conclusion of the first friendly APh, no MMC may be in/adjacent-to the same Location as any other friendly MMC. With the beginning of Turn 2, this restriction is lifted.
- Despite ELR, both Japanese and Australian units are Commandos (H1.24).
- Australian squads may Deploy without leadership by rolling $\leq$ their current morale level on their Deployment NTC. Australian HS do not require a Good Order leader to Recombine (A1.32).

AFTERMATH: The Japanese took the worst in this confused action, which degenerated into a welter of close combats and no-quarter ambushes. Over the course of several hours, almost half the Japanese force was lost—although Australian casualties were also heavy. As the season progressed, the Japanese commanders learned that if base defenses were strengthened and a vigilant lookout maintained, the combat antics of the Australians could be curtailed. Eventually, attrition among the ranks of the Independent Companies caused the Australians to become "static", with their mission gradually devolving into one of merely keeping an eye on Japanese troop movements. In December, it was decided that the presence of these highly-trained troops on Timor had become counter-productive and the 2/2nd Independent Company was withdrawn for a much-needed rest and refit. A few weeks later, the 2/4th and all Dutch survivors attached to it were likewise taken off the island and returned to Australia.



THE COMMANDO CAMPAIGN GAME

A New Challenge for SL Players

By Rex A. Martin

"A steel hand from the Sea"—Winston Churchill's apt description of the British commandos. For they plucked at the enemy in his seaboard defenses in the early days of World War II, and later became—with their offspring, the US Rangers—the spearhead in amphibious assaults. Throughout their existence, these elite formations were controversial, with arguments against the concentration of talent in special forces. But in the early 1940s their daring operations heartened their fellow countrymen through England's darkest hours. The discomfort and disruption these raiders caused to their enemies is seen in the history of the German dispositions along the coasts of Europe and the violent Japanese reactions to Pacific raids. Commandos probed the German defenses north of the Arctic Circle, fought alongside partisans in the Balkans, rowed or swam ashore for hazardous missions on the enemy-controlled Atlantic and Mediterranean and Pacific beaches, and were in action in almost every theater of war.

Trained to fight without the support of artillery or other traditional heavy weapons, the commandos depended entirely on their own resources and skill with small arms. As the nature of the warfare changed from small coastal raids to continental campaigns, the role of the commandos became that of special task forces, seizing or destroying key objectives behind enemy lines in the forefront of major Allied offensives. The fighting skills of these superb light infantry are renowned. The following campaign is dedicated to the courage and tenacity of all who have served with special forces, and to the defenders of the beaches—some gallant, all honorable in their resistance to the commandos, best of the British fighting forces.

PRELUDE:

In April 1940, one Colonel Holland of MI-R (Military Intelligence—Research) proposed the formation of "Independent Companies" for use in Norway. These companies were to be small, flexible, highly-motivated combat formations operating apart from the normal chain of command. Holland envisioned these to be ship-based forces, slipping ashore to harass German communications and to sever the supply line of Swedish iron ore. Ten Independent Companies, each with 20 officers and 270 ranks, were formed from Territorial Army volunteers. But the Independent Companies, never intended to take the role of regular infantry, were squandered in Norway in hopeless assaults and desperate rearguard actions near Narvik.

Even as the remnants of the ten companies were enroute back to England, a refinement of the concept of independent forces was taking shape. On 4 June, the day the Dunkirk evacuation ended, Churchill raged at his Chiefs-of-Staff: "if it is so easy for the Germans to invade us . . . why should it be . . . impossible for us to do anything of the same kind to him?" That

evening, Lt-Colonel Dudley Clarke drafted a series of notes on the subject of raiding parties carried by ship to the French coast. Aware of how 25000 Boer farmers avoided defeat by ten times their number for three years (1899-1902) using brilliant hit-and-run tactics during his childhood in South Africa, Clarke was able to excite the interest of his superior, Sir John Dill (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), in the possibilities of such a force. Sir John put the idea before the Prime Minister. A few days later, on 8 June, the scheme was approved by the War Cabinet, on two conditions: no unit was to be diverted from the essential defense of the British Isles; and the new force must make do with a minimum of weaponry and equipment. War Office Section M09, under Lt-Colonel Clarke, came into being that afternoon and immediately took steps to raise a special force of "commandos" (named after the tactical organization of those Boer farmers). On 23 June, led by Dudley Clarke and Captain G.A. Garnons-Williams (RN), 115 commandos landed along a 20-mile stretch of French coast around Boulogne to probe the German defenses. For the following five years, the commandos would be in the fore of the fight with the Wehrmacht.

It is August 1940. Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France have all fallen to the Nazi blitzkrieg. England, stripped of her allies, faces the greatest crisis of her long history. M09 has raised nine Commandos of volunteers drawn from regular and reserve formations, trained and equipped these over the course of the long summer. Now *YOU* have been offered command of one of these elite units. Over the period of the next few years, you must lead your men on a series of desperate, dangerous missions culminating with a final assault deep in the heart of Germany itself.

RULES:

1. THE CAMPAIGN

1.1 The campaign is designed for two players: one assuming the role of the Commando CO; the other, the role of the German opponent. (More players, of course, may be included during play of the scenarios to fill the roles of individual Troop COs, subordinate German officers, transport QMs, etc., at the discretion of these two players.)

1.2 The campaign is played out over the course of thirteen (13) scenarios.

1.21 Each scenario will represent a specific commando mission carried out at a certain date during the Second World War. Each scenario (date and mission) must be played once; no scenario may be played more than once.

1.3 There are seven separate and distinct *Stages* to the completion of each of the thirteen scenarios:

- Stage #1: Selection of Mission
- Stage #2: Allocation of Forces
- Stage #3: Determination of Variables
- Stage #4: Play of the Scenario
- Stage #5: Determination of VP Award
- Stage #6: Roster Reorganization
- Stage #7: Replacement

1.31 First, the Commando CO must select one mission (Mission A through Mission M) for play and announce his selection to his opponent (3.42).

1.32 Next, the Commando CO must select and secretly record the Troop(s) he will commit to the mission and may allot equipment and/or transport from the Commando Headquarters (HQ Cdo) to this force (3.91). His German opposite may, utilizing the point value given in the specific mission rules to be played, compose and secretly record his force, within the limitations of date and any limitations placed upon his selection by the specific mission rules (3.92).

1.33 Then, the German opponent will resolve all variables (i.e., Weather, Wind Direction, Night, River Current and Depth, Tide, etc. as noted by the specific mission in play) in a manner compatible with the *SQUAD LEADER* system (3.8). The determination of all such variables must be announced to the Commando CO.

1.34 At this point, the two (or more) players will play the scenario to conclusion.

1.35 Immediately upon conclusion of the play of the scenario, the number of victory points (VP) the Commando CO and his German opponent obtained in the course of play are awarded and logged (3.7). These are determined by the conditions of victory in the specific mission rules and/or (in the case of the German) by destruction or capture of commando infantry and vehicular units.

1.36 The Commando CO may now reorganize, within certain limitations, the roster of his surviving available forces (2.3).

1.37 The Commando CO determines the quantity of his replacements and allocates these on the roster (5.1).

1.4 Each scenario, once played, will yield a number of victory points for the Commando CO and/or the German opponent. At the conclusion of the campaign (i.e., when all 13 distinct missions have been completed), these VP must be totalled for each of the two players.

1.41 The player with the highest total number of VP has won the campaign.

1.42 If, at the end of any Replacement Stage, the HQ Cdo, the Heavy Weapons Troop, or any Troop of the Commando has no squads or crews on its roster, the campaign immediately ends in a German victory.

1.5 All rules of the *SQUAD LEADER* system, at the discretion of the two players, are in force for the campaign except: Battlefield Integrity (93.), Field promotions (115.), Gliders (140.), Paratroop Drops (99.), Ski Troops (114.), Sniper Generation (144.1).

2. THE COMMANDO OB

2.1 The Royal Army Commando order-of-battle varied greatly from period to period, from theater to theater. (For example: the 1940 OB calls for a Commando composed of ten Troops, each of 50 men plus officers, and a 48-man HQ.) For simplicity's sake, the one utilized throughout is the Spring 1943 Standard Special Services II40 Brigade OB.

2.11 The RA Commando numbers 461 men (all ranks) divided into a HQ Cdo (92 all ranks), Heavy Weapons Troop (39 all ranks) and five Troops (66 all ranks each). Each Troop, the Heavy Weapons Troop and the HQ Cdo is displayed in organizational format on the "Commando OB Sheet".

2.12 The HQ Cdo is represented by five leaders, two squads and five half-squads (121.4); attendant personnel are crews of assault craft and drivers of vehicles.

2.13 The Heavy Weapons Troop is represented by three leaders, a 3" Mortar Section (five crews) and a MG Section (four crews).

2.14 Each Cdo Troop is represented by five leaders, one sniper and six squads.

2.2 The Commando OB Sheet provides a convenient method of recording the current personnel roster of each Troop and the HQ Cdo. [Readers are urged to photocopy the page for use in their play of the Commando Campaign.] It also provides a listing of the maximum number of support weapons/equipment of each type available and the current number of vehicles (with inherent drivers) of each type available.

2.21 For each leader on the roster, list his name and/or current morale/leadership modifier values (for example: "Martin/9-1"). The number of leaders may never exceed the number of spaces allotted for each Troop or the HQ Cdo.

2.22 For each sniper on the roster, list his current Sniper DRM value. The number of snipers may never exceed the number of spaces allotted for each

Troop (i.e., one for each of the five Troops).

2.23 For each squad/half-squad/crew on the roster, list its letter/numeral designation. The number of squads, half-squads or crews may never exceed the number of spaces allotted for each Troop or the HQ Cdo.

2.24 For each type of vehicle with an inherent driver, list the current number of units available for use. The current number of units may never exceed the maximum number of units allowed, shown by the numerals within parentheses immediately preceding each vehicle type. For example: "(17) Sturmboat" means that no more than seventeen sturmboats may ever be available for use by the Commando.

2.25 For each type of support weapon/equipment in the depot, the maximum number of units allowed, represented by the numerals immediately preceding each item, is the current number of units available for use. For example: "4 LMG" means that no more than, no less than, four LMGs may be available for use by the Commando.

2.3 Within certain restrictions, the Commando CO has the option to reorganize the roster after the conclusion of each scenario but prior to the Replacement Stage.

2.31 Support weapons, equipment and vehicles may never be transferred among the Troops and/or the Cdo HQ. Such units must remain on the roster of the assigned Troop or the HQ Cdo unless lost in action and not replaced.

2.32 Smoke capabilities may never be transferred from one squad to another.

2.33 Leaders, snipers, squads and crews may be freely transferred among the Troops and/or the HQ Cdo. However, the listed spaces for each unit type may never be exceeded due to roster reorganization. For example: if #2 Troop has five leaders listed on its roster on the Commando OB Sheet, no leaders may be transferred into this Troop until a leader has been KIA, transferred out, or is recovering from a wound (i.e., is no longer listed on the roster).

2.34 It may occasionally occur that play of a scenario will result in the survival of one or more commando half-squads (121.4). However, half-squads may not be carried on the roster of any Troop, nor may half-squads be drawn as replacements.

2.341 During the Roster Reorganization Stage, all surviving half-squads must—if possible—be combined with other surviving half-squads to form commando squads, which may then be assigned to a Troop or the HQ Cdo.

2.342 Should there be no other surviving half-squads, the half-squad must—if possible—be combined with a half-squad from the roster of the HQ Cdo to form a commando squad, which may then be assigned to a Troop or the HQ Cdo.

2.343 Should there be no half-squad available to combine with to form a commando squad, the half-squad must be transferred to the HQ Cdo.

2.4 Due to advances in technology, as well as the tactical practicalities of commando-style warfare, the equipment roster available for the Commando underwent several changes. Certain items in the Support Weapon/Equipment Depot, designated by asterisks on the Commando OB Sheet, are available to the Commando CO only during certain time frames of the campaign.

2.41 The Boys ATR, while a useful defensive weapon for infantry in the early stages of the war, was quickly found to be too cumbersome for the specialized "in-fighting" of the commandos. Heavy and awkward, inefficient and with low penetration effect (one German flak tower at Dieppe absorbed 60 hits from ATRs assigned to #3 Commando—without any impairment of its operation), the ATR was adjudged to create more problems (due to the necessity to carry ammunition for it and its own considerable weight) than it solved. Thus, after June 1941, ATRs are to be eliminated from the roster of the Commando (i.e., the current number of ATRs is reduced to zero, and no ATRs may be drawn as replacements for the duration of the campaign).

2.42 To compensate for the loss of the relatively ineffective ATR, commandos quickly accepted and adopted the British development of the PIAT to their peculiar brand of warfare. Indeed, the prototype PIAT was first field-tested under combat situations by #40 (RM) Commando in the Mediterranean. The PIAT provided the raiders with a mobile, hard-hitting weapon with armor-piercing capability, as useful against fortifications and buildings as against enemy vehicles. Prior to the Replacement Stage of February 1943, no PIAT may be listed on the roster of the Commando, nor may any PIAT be drawn as replacements. However, following the February 1943 mission, the Commando CO may add eight PIAT to the roster for the duration of the campaign.

2.43 Not until the Allied campaigns of 1944, when the emphasis of the commando missions shifted to *seizing and securing* key objectives, did utilization of the bulky British flamethrowers become popular among the officers corps of the commandos. Therefore, prior to the Replacement Stage of July 1943, no flamethrowers may be listed on the roster of the Commando, nor may flamethrowers be drawn as replacements. However, after the July 1943 mission, the Commando CO may add two flamethrowers to the roster for the duration of the campaign.

2.44 Appealing to the commando temperament and elan, many Commandos listed, once available, a store of ATMs on their roster. Some Troops even formed "flying squads" specially trained for anti-tank operations. The ATM represents only one weapon in the arsenal of commando explosives (Limpet MkII, Bangalore torpedoes, "flower pot" bombs, pole charges, "808" plastic explosive, etc.). However, unlike the other explosives (represented in the campaign by unplaced mine factors and Demo Charges), the ATM was not available until 1944; prior to the Replacement Stage of May 1944, no ATMs may be listed on the roster of the Commando, nor may ATMs be drawn as replacements. Following the May 1944 mission, and for the duration of the campaign, six ATMs may be added to the roster by the Commando CO.

2.5 The Commando commences the campaign with a full complement of trained officers, snipers and troops. Attrition, replacements, promotions and transfers will—over the course of the campaign—alter the OB of the HQ Cdo and the various Troops.

2.51 The HQ Cdo commences the campaign with one (1) 10-3 leader, two (2) 9-2 leaders, one (1) 9-1 leader, and one (1) 8-1 leader listed on the roster. In addition, the HQ Cdo should have the full number of squads, half-squads and all vehicle types.

2.52 The Heavy Weapons Troop commences the campaign with one (1) 9-2 leader and two (2) 8-1 leaders listed on the roster. In addition, the Troop should have the full number of crews.

2.53 Each Troop of the Commando commences the campaign with one (1) 9-2 leader, one (1) 9-1 leader, one (1) 8-1 leader and two (2) 8-0 leaders listed on the roster. In addition, each Troop should have the full number of squads and one (1) -3DRM sniper.

2.6 Both commando leaders and commando snipers have the potential for promotion and, hence, improved tactical abilities. Squads, crews and vehicles enjoy no such potential and may never be improved.

2.61 The actual promotion of individual leaders and snipers is based on the accumulation of *Elan Points* gained during the play of the scenarios.

2.62 Commando leaders obtain *Elan Points*—and *Cowardice Points*—as in the *SQUAD LEADER* Campaign Game (p. 29)—and promotion (or demotion) is based upon these as in the *SL* Campaign game. It will therefore be necessary to maintain a separate file on each commando leader during the course of the Commando Campaign Game. (For ease of reference, the current "Performance Total" may be entered within the parentheses following each leader listed on the Commando OB Sheet.)

2.621 Upon obtaining the requisite Performance Total of ten (+10) for promotion, replace the leader with a leader of the next higher value (for example: a 10-2 leader with a 10-3 leader). This substitution takes place during the Roster Reorganization Stage only.

2.622 Usually, the most experienced officers were—if they survived—promoted and transferred from the Commando to take a role in the Brigade II40 Plan-Ops (Operations Planning and Intelligence) Section. To reflect the ever-present dread of the Commando CO that his best officers would be transferred, the *theoretical* 11-3 leaders is now possible.

2.623 Any 10-3 leader must, upon obtaining the requisite Performance Total of +10 for promotion, become a 11-3 leader. Such an 11-3 leader is removed from the roster immediately and automatically replaced with a 8-0 leader.

2.63 Commando snipers obtain *Elan* and *Cowardice* points in a manner similar to leaders. It will therefore be necessary to maintain a separate file on each commando sniper during the course of the Commando Campaign Game. (For ease of reference, the current "Performance Total" may be entered within the parentheses immediately following each sniper listed on the Commando OB Sheet.)

2.631 *Elan Points* for snipers are awarded as follows:

for each enemy leader KIA	+5
for each enemy leader WIA	+3
for each enemy sniper KIA	+5
for each enemy sniper WIA	+3
for each enemy squad/crew suffering a MC	+1
for each enemy vehicle KIA	+3
for each enemy CE AFV KIA	+3

2.632 *Cowardice Points* for snipers are awarded only when a sniper fails to pass any MC; deduct one (-1) for each attempt to pass a MC which fails.

2.633 Upon obtaining the requisite Performance Total of ten (+10), replace the sniper with a sniper of the next higher DRM (for example: a -3DRM sniper with a -4DRM sniper). This substitution takes place during the Roster Reorganization Stage only.

2.634 Snipers may never be promoted beyond a -4DRM level. Once this level is reached, no further promotion is possible regardless of *Elan Points* accumulated.

2.7 It may occasionally occur that play of a scenario will result in the survival of leaders and/or snipers which have suffered one or more wounds (122.).

Snipers are wounded in a manner similar to leaders (122.1 and 122.4). Such wounded leaders and snipers are required to be hospitalized upon conclusion of their current mission.

2.71 Non-combat personnel (i.e., medics) were rarely carried on Commando rosters. Instead, all commandos were trained in first aid, and casualties were cared for—as best possible under the circumstances—by their comrades. Wounded leaders and snipers are *not* required to pass a Desperation Morale MC (in contrast to 122.1) and are never evacuated to an "aid station". Instead, they are withdrawn (3.62) normally.

2.72 Effects of wounds on leaders are as listed (122.2). A wounded sniper, for the duration of the scenario in play, suffers a reduction by one (-1) of his morale factor and sniper DRM value (to a minimum of -1DRM).

2.73 Each wounded leader or sniper which survives the scenario receives three (3) *Elan Points*, regardless of the number of wounds received.

2.74 Wounded leaders and snipers are temporarily removed from the roster of the Commando. Such wounded leaders and snipers are considered hospitalized and may be available for return to active duty upon recovery.

2.741 During the Roster Reorganization Stage, hospitalized leaders and snipers must be entered at the bottom of the Commando OB Sheet and the number of wounds suffered entered within the box immediately following the entry.

2.742 During each subsequent Roster Reorganization Stage, the Commando CO may roll two dice to randomly determine the recovery of each wounded leader and sniper. The dice roll determines recovery as follows:

2-6 =full recovery, return to duty
7-10=no change, remains hospitalized
11-12=invalidated out or died of wounds

A cumulative DRM of one (+1) is applied for each wound suffered beyond the first (for example: a dice roll of "9" for a leader wounded three times in the course of a mission results in his loss).

2.743 If the dice roll results in full recovery, during the immediately following Replacement Stage the leader or sniper (with all morale values and DRMs restored) is returned to the Commando roster.

2.744 If the dice roll results in no change, the leader or sniper remains hospitalized and may not yet be returned to the Commando roster.

2.745 If the dice roll results in invalid/death, the leader or sniper is stricken from the Commando OB Sheet and will never be returned to the Commando roster.

2.75 Wounded leaders and snipers are considered combat losses and may be replaced normally during the Replacement Stage (5.3-5.4).

2.751 Should a wounded leader or sniper recover and be returned to the roster during a Replacement Stage, such units are in addition to any randomly-determined replacement leaders and/or snipers.

2.752 Should a wounded leader or sniper recover and be returned to the roster, it may be assigned to any Troop or the HQ Cdo. Should all available positions for the recovered unit be occupied, the Commando CO may choose to replace any leader/sniper currently listed on the roster with the recovered unit. The excess unit is now permanently removed from the roster (transferred to another Commando) and may not be replaced.

3. THE SCENARIOS

3.1 The Commando Campaign Game is played out over the course of 13 scenarios.

3.2 Each scenario is composed of two elements: a *date* (for example: "June 1941") and a *mission* (for example: "Mission B—Operation Bristol").

3.3 The sequential order of the dates is rigidly chronological. The scenarios must utilize the given dates in the given order; no date may be ignored, and no date may be repeated.

3.31 The dates, in sequential order, are as follows:

November 1940
June 1941
September 1941
October 1941
March 1942
August 1942
February 1943
July 1943
May 1944
June 1944
August 1944
October 1944
April 1945

3.32 The date of the scenario determines limitations placed on equipment available to the Commando CO, and to his German opponent. All use of equipment, vehicles and support weapons in the scenario must conform to rules

on availability and utilization in the period in which the date falls.

3.33 Further, determination of certain variables for the scenario (i.e., Weather, River Depth, Kindling DRM, etc.) must be made in relation to the appropriate month/season, as indicated by the date. For campaign purposes, the seasons are:

Spring—March, April, May
Summer—June, July, August
Autumn—September, October, November
Winter—December, January, February

3.34 Also, determination of other variables during play of the scenarios (for example: type of German Air Support) must be made in relation to the appropriate year, as indicated by the date.

3.4 The order in which the missions are played is determined, within certain limitations, by the Commando CO. However, the scenarios must utilize the complete list of missions; no mission may be ignored, and no mission may be repeated.

3.41 The missions, with codenames, are as follows:

Mission A—Operation "Ambassador"
Mission B—Operation "Bristol"
Mission C—Operation "Claymore"
Mission D—Operation "Dryad"
Mission E—Operation "Easter 3"
Mission F—Operation "Forfar Love"
Mission G—Operation "Gauntlet"
Mission H—Operation "Huchabuck"
Mission I—Operation "Iota One"
Mission J—Operation "Jubilee"
Mission K—Operation "Kiwi"
Mission L—Operation "Lauenberg"
Mission M—Operation "Montana"

3.42 Prior to the play of each scenario, the Commando CO must select a mission to match the date. The mission may not be one which has been played previously during the current campaign game.

3.421 The final four missions (i.e., Missions J-M) may not be selected for any date prior to May 1944. However, following the July 1943 mission, the Commando CO must add these four missions to the one remaining unplayed mission from which he may select.

3.422 The Commando CO may select *only* one mission. Never may more than one mission be played (in conjunction or otherwise) for any date.

3.423 Immediately upon making his decision, the Commando CO must announce the mission selected to his German opponent. The designation of that mission should be recorded next to the appropriate date on the "Mission Log Sheet".

3.5 Each mission includes a brief fictional introduction, board configuration, potential VP awards, a listing of variables to be resolved, and parameters for the composition of the German forces and initial deployment.

3.6 The length of each scenario is variable, but may never exceed a maximum of thirty (30) game turns.

3.61 During the course of any mission, the Commando CO may withdraw his forces from play. The moment that there are no *unbroken* commando infantry units (leaders, snipers, squads, half-squads, crews or scouts) in play, the scenario is immediately considered concluded.

3.62 Any unit, British or German, may withdraw from play simply by exiting from any whole hex on any mapboard off the playing area. Such units, once withdrawn, may not reenter play during the current scenario.

3.63 If the scenario is concluded by withdrawal prior to the 30th Game Turn, all commando equipment and vehicles and all broken commando infantry units still on the playing area are considered captured by German forces—regardless of whether any German units actually remain in play.

3.64 If the scenario is concluded by withdrawal prior to the 30th Game Turn, all commando units which have exited any board edge other than that specified as the entrance edge by specific mission rules are considered captured by German forces—regardless of whether any German units actually remain in play.

3.7 Victory Points (VP) are awarded to the Commando CO and/or to his German opponent upon conclusion of each scenario. The total VP for the scenario for each player should be entered in the appropriate column on the Mission Log Sheet.

3.71 Ten Missions (i.e., Missions A-I and Mission M) require that commando forces carry out a raid and *withdraw*. For the Commando CO to obtain VP for such missions, the scenario in play must be concluded by withdrawal (3.61) prior to the end of the 30th Game Turn. Beyond the loss of VP for the Commando CO for that scenario, *all* British units (infantry, equipment and vehicles) on the playing area at the conclusion of the 30th Game Turn are considered captured by German forces.

3.72 Three Missions (i.e., Missions J-L) require that commando forces seize and *hold* certain terrain features. For the Commando CO to obtain VP for such missions, the scenario in play must not be concluded by withdrawal prior to the end of the 30th Game Turn. Beyond the loss of VP for the Commando CO for that scenario, no other penalty appends.

3.73 In addition to any potential VP that may be awarded to the German player for fulfilling certain defensive requirements of the specific mission, following every scenario he may obtain VP for the destruction or capture of commando units during the course of play of that scenario.

3.731 For each commando squad or commando leader KIA during the course of play of a scenario, the German player is awarded five (+5) VP. In the event of capture of these unit types, he is awarded twice this value.

3.732 For each commando crew, half-squad or sniper KIA during the course of play of a scenario, the German player is awarded three (+3) VP. In the event of capture of these unit types, he is awarded twice this value.

3.733 For each commando vehicle destroyed *or* captured during the course of play of a scenario, the German player is awarded two (+2) VP.

3.734 No VP are awarded to the German player for the destruction or capture of commando support weapons/equipment during the course of play of a scenario.

3.8 The German player, prior to the commencement of each scenario, must determine the variables specified by the mission rules to be played. The determination of all such variables must be made in a manner compatible with the *SQUAD LEADER* system (EXC: Night and Tide, see below). The determination of all such variables must be announced to the Commando CO.

3.81 The commandos truly were "demons of the darkness"; the vast majority of their actions took place at night, or in the hour after dawn. To reflect this fact, the chance of Night Rules being in effect is altered; a die roll by the German player of "3-6" now results in a night action. All rules for Night (49.) are put into effect.

3.82 In scenarios in which the river boards (#7 and #8) are to represent coastal areas, current and depth are not variables to be determined by the German player. In all such situations, there is no current (126.3) and the water is deep (126.4).

3.821 However, the actual topography of the coastline varied with the tidal surge; most commando missions were timed to take advantage of either the flood tide or the ebb tide. Therefore, prior to each such scenario, the German player must determine the tide by a single die roll: "1-2" represents low tide; "3-4" represents normal sea; "5-6" represents high tide.

3.822 When the tide is normal, no alterations are made in the terrain of the mapboards. When the tide is low, treat all marsh hexes as -1 level brush (145.) hexes. When the tide is high, treat all marsh hexes as *shallow* water hexes.

3.83 All other variables for the scenario (Smoke Candles for German AFVs—64.8; Weather—111.; River Current—126.3; River Depth—126.4; Wind Direction—102.5; Wind Force—102.6; German Offboard Artillery Module, if radio purchased—45.2; Optional Armament—pg. 61) may be resolved in any order the German player desires.

3.9 Immediately following the selection of the mission but *prior* to determination of variables, each player will simultaneously select and *secretly* record the forces he will commit to the scenario.

3.91 The Commando CO may select any forces from his roster, within certain limitations, he feels sufficient to accomplish the objective of the mission. He may then allocate specialized equipment and transport to these forces from the Support Weapons/Equipment Depot as he desires.

3.911 The Commando CO must commit a minimum of one (1) regular Troop to the mission. If a Troop is committed to a mission, *all* leaders, squads, sniper and equipment currently listed on the Commando OB Sheet for that Troop *must* enter play onboard. (However, once onboard, elements of any Troop or the HQ Cdo may be withdrawn from play as per 3.62.)

3.912 The Commando CO may commit *all* Troops, if he so desires and if transport and/or topography allows. [*Commitment of more than two Troops may require two complete sets of British counters.*]

3.913 The Commando CO may commit either or both sections of the Heavy Weapons Troop. If only one section of the Troop is committed, one leader from the Troop with one radio must also be committed; if both sections of the Troop are committed, *all* leaders and both radios of the Troop must also be committed. If a section of the Heavy Weapons Troop is committed to a mission, *all* crews and equipment currently listed on the Commando OB Sheet for that section must enter play onboard.

3.914 In addition to the commitment of Troops and sections of the Heavy Weapons Troop, the Commando CO may be allowed or required to commit the HQ Cdo. The HQ Cdo may *not* be committed if only one Troop has been selected for the mission; it may be committed if two or three Troops have

been selected; it *must* be committed if four, five or six (should the entire HW Troop be committed) Troops have been selected. If the HQ Cdo is committed to a mission, *all* leaders, squads, half-squads and equipment currently listed on the Commando OB Sheet for the HQ Cdo must enter play onboard.

3.915 After selection of the forces to be employed, the Commando CO may allocate equipment from the Support Weapons/Equipment Depot and/or vehicles from the HQ Cdo. Allocation of such equipment and/or vehicles is strictly temporary; upon completion of the scenario in play, all equipment/vehicles which have survived the mission are immediately returned to the appropriate roster during the Roster Reorganization Stage. Except for limitations placed by date and number available, there are no restrictions on allocation of equipment or vehicles.

3.92 The German player, meanwhile, may select any infantry, equipment, vehicles, fortifications and/or air support possibility—within certain limitations—he feels will successfully counter the commando attack. The German player selects his force by utilizing the Point Value “purchase” system (pg. 60 and 96, Ordnance and Armor listings).

3.921 Each mission will list a maximum number of points for the German player; these he may expend, within certain limitations, to fashion a German OB. The total point value expended by the German player may *never* exceed the listed allowable maximum.

3.922 Each mission will list any specific restrictions on German point value expenditures. Conversely, some missions may list additional units which *must* be added to the final German OB.

3.923 All German point value expenditures must be compatible with the date of the scenario to be played.

3.924 In addition to restrictions placed by specific mission rules and by date, the German player may never “purchase” the following: Paratroops, Ski Capability, Gliders, Concealment Counters.

3.93 Upon conclusion of the scenario in play, either player may request to see the secretly-recorded selection of forces of the other. Should either player have exceeded the selection of forces he recorded, or should the selection be invalid for any reason, that player will forfeit all VP obtained for that scenario and enter zero (0) VP in the appropriate column on the Mission Log Sheet, and the other player will be granted an award of one-hundred (+100) VP.

4. INITIAL PLACEMENT & OFFBOARD RESERVES

4.1 All forces to be utilized in a scenario commence play either offboard or onboard.

4.11 Commando forces may *never* commence play onboard. All British units must begin each scenario offboard and are brought to onboard play during the course of the scenario.

4.111 The Commando CO, during the Allocation of Forces Stage, may divide his selected force in any manner. To each such element of his force, he must assign and secretly record a turn of entry and a point of entry.

4.112 The turn of entry may be any game turn prior to the 30th Game Turn, and either the Friendly Movement Phase or Advance Phase may be designated. The point of entry must be any whole hex on the board edge(s) indicated by the specific mission rules.

4.113 Neither the turn of entry nor the point of entry for commando elements may ever be varied.

4.114 If the scenario concludes by withdrawal (3.61), commando units scheduled to enter play after the final turn do not enter.

4.115 If the point of entry is occupied by enemy units, commando units scheduled to enter play on that hex on that turn may enter instead on any whole hex within ten hexes, inclusive, of the designated hex on the *same* board edge.

4.12 The German player must place a minimum of 75%, and any specific additional units (i.e., Mission G—German trucks; Mission I—German ordnance and crews; Mission M—British prisoners), of the allotted point value maximum on the board. Any remaining German forces (a maximum of 25% of the allotted point value maximum) constitute the offboard reserve.

4.121 Specific mission rules will indicate the parameters for initial German placement.

4.122 All German units initially placed on the board may commence the scenario hidden and/or concealed at the discretion of the German player (EXC: scout/sentry units *must* be placed onboard unconcealed). Such initial hidden/concealed placement requires no point value expenditure by the German player.

4.123 German units not initially placed onboard become the German offboard reserve and are brought to onboard play during the course of the scenario if desired.

4.2 Each player may have potential offboard reserves available as reinforcements. Each player may bring these reinforcements onboard during play; the arrival of reinforcements for each player may occur only once during the course of a scenario. Should a player decide to call for reinforcements, several

requirements for their arrival must be fulfilled.

4.21 To call for reinforcements, radio contact must be established (46.11) or maintained (46.12) during the player turn in which the request is made.

4.22 Once the request has been made, the opposing player must be informed of this fact—but no details of composition or arrival need be revealed.

4.23 Once the request has been made, the player must secretly determine and record turn of entry and point of entry for his reinforcements.

4.231 Turn of entry is determined in a random manner; the number of game turns, inclusive of the current turn and of the turn the reinforcements actually enter, is determined by a roll of two dice: the number rolled is the number of game turns until entry. (For example: a dice roll of “2” will mean the reinforcements enter on the next game turn; a dice roll of “8” will mean the reinforcements enter on the seventh game turn from the current one.)

4.232 Only one point of entry may be recorded, secretly, for the reinforcements. For the Commando CO, this may be any whole hex on any board edge previously entered by commando forces; for his German opponent, this may be any whole hex on any board edge *not* previously entered by commando forces. If the point of entry is occupied by enemy units, the reinforcements may *not* enter *until* the point of entry is cleared of such enemy units; once this occurs, entry of reinforcements may not be voluntarily delayed.

4.24 To insure the arrival of reinforcements, radio contact must be maintained until, and inclusive of, the actual turn of entry. Should radio contact be lost, the entire procedure to receive reinforcements must be repeated (with another determination of turn of entry and point of entry).

4.25 The Commando CO may select, as reinforcements, any one Troop or any one section of the Heavy Weapons Troop not previously committed to the mission; the HQ Cdo may never be selected as reinforcements. Equipment for commando reinforcements may be allocated from the Depot roster *only*. The German player may select, as reinforcements, any or all units from his original point value “purchase” not initially placed onboard (i.e., any or all units of his offboard reserve).

4.26 For each squad, half-squad, crew or vehicle (AFV or otherwise) which enters play as reinforcements during the course of a scenario, deduct one (–1) VP from the appropriate player’s total VP accumulated during play. Do not deduct any VP for leaders, snipers or support weapons/equipment.

4.3 Sentries: The commando ideal was to strike swiftly, without warning. Many commando missions owed success to the element of surprise, the sudden attack catching the enemy unprepared. To artificially recreate this, many missions incorporate the following rules:

4.31 In certain missions, German units initially placed onboard may engage in no activity (i.e., move, fire, establish radio contact, place smoke, attempt entrenchment, etc.) until “aware” of the commando attack. The German forces become “aware” of the attack only when German units (EXC: scout/sentries) are engaged in combat or when alerted by their sentries.

4.32 All restrictions on German units are lifted *immediately* should any German unit (EXC: scout/sentries) be attacked by commando direct/indirect fire or engaged in close combat. German units may now function normally.

4.33 German scouts are utilized to take the role of “sentries”. In addition to all rules for scouts (116.) being in force, special rules reflect the use of scouts as sentries.

4.331 Sentries may not move until and unless LOS to any British unit (infantry or vehicular) is established. Once LOS is established, movement by the scout/sentry is conducted normally (116.5).

4.332 Once allowed to move, sentries will immediately attempt to report to a German officer in order to alert the German forces to the commando attack. All restrictions on German units are lifted *immediately* should any German scout/sentry enter any hex containing a German leader. German units may now function normally.

4.333 Sentries are eliminated in the same manner as scouts (116.41); however, commando attacks on German scout/sentries do not release the other German units from the severe restrictions listed above (4.31).

4.334 Initial placement for German scout/sentries is given in the specific mission rules. Such initial placement may never be varied.

5. REPLACEMENTS

5.1 It was inevitable that, in the accomplishment of their missions, the commandos suffered casualties—at times, extremely heavy casualties. Yet throughout the war, the commandos also suffered from a lack of qualified (intelligent, physically-hardy and highly-motivated) volunteers. There are numerous references in British documents to commando troops operating at one-half or even one-quarter listed strength. Following each mission, a Commando CO could only hope to be able to replace recent losses among officers, ranks and drivers. The following rules reflect the severe handicap that all Commandos faced in obtaining replacements, and in accomplishing difficult assignments with understrength rosters.

5.2 The commandos were always extravagant with equipment and support weapons, often abandoning these as they withdrew following a raid. Given top priority in obtaining replacement equipment, the Commando CO was never forced to worry about shortages of weaponry or munitions or supplies. Thus, during each Replacement Stage, the current number of each type of support weapon/equipment should be made equal to the maximum number of such units allowed on the Commando OB Sheet (dependent, of course, on the time frame of the scenario just concluded—2.4).

5.21 Although ready enough to adopt and adapt German tactics when warranted, the commandos generally disdained German support weapons. Therefore, German support weapons/equipment and/or vehicles captured during play of a scenario may *not* be added to the roster, nor used in any subsequent scenarios. Use is limited to the current scenario in play only.

5.3 As noted above, the difficulty lay not in obtaining replacements for lost equipment, but in obtaining replacements for dedicated volunteers trained in commando usage of this equipment. To simulate this difficulty, during each Replacement Stage the Commando CO will randomly determine the *percentage* of recent losses (KIA, WIA and captured) which may be replaced in each of six "categories": leaders, squads, crews, snipers, sturmboats, and trucks.

5.31 For each "category" in which the Commando has incurred losses in the scenario concluded immediately prior to the current Replacement Stage, the Commando CO may roll two dice. The result of this dice roll takes the form of a percentage. This percentage is applied to the number of units of that "category" lost; this results in a number (all fractions are rounded down) which is the *actual* number of that type of unit which the Commando CO may now assign to any appropriate roster on the Commando OB Sheet. The various dice rolls result in the following percentages:

- 2-4 = 0%
- 5-6 = 25%
- 7 = 50%
- 8-9 = 75%
- 10-11 = 100%
- 12 = 125%
- 13 = 150%

Thus, as an example, if a Commando has lost nine 6-3-8 squads on a 1943 mission, a dice roll during the Replacement Stage of "3" would result in no replacement squads being available; a roll of "5" would result in two replacement squads; a roll of "7", four replacement squads; of "9", six; of "11", nine; and of a roll of "12", 11 replacement squads!

5.32 The replacement dice roll may be modified, depending on the *date* of the scenario just concluded:

- 1940/41 = -1 DRM
- 1942/43 = 0 DRM
- 1944/45 = +1 DRM

5.33 It is possible to obtain (from March 1942 onward) more replacement units than lost during the course of the recently completed mission. These surplus units must be placed on rosters on the Commando OB Sheet (i.e., assigned to any Troop, the Heavy Weapons Troop or HQ Cdo). However, since unit types may never be exceeded (as per 2.33), units in excess of roster limitations are lost; such excess units may not be hoarded.

5.4 The dice roll for each "category" (i.e., for leaders, for squads, for crews, for snipers, for sturmboats, for trucks) is separate and distinct from all other replacement dice rolls. Only similar unit types may be utilized to fill the number of replacements determined for each "category".

5.41 All commando leaders entered on the roster as replacements commence play as 7-0 leaders, regardless of the level of the leader(s) being replaced.

5.42 All commando squads entered on the roster as replacements are 6-3-8 squads.

5.43 All commando crews entered on the roster as replacements are 2-3-8 crews.

5.44 All commando snipers entered on the roster as replacements commence play as -1DRM snipers, regardless of the level of the sniper(s) being replaced.

5.45 All commando sturmboats entered on the roster as replacements are inherently-crewed sturmboats (128.1).

5.46 All commando trucks entered on the roster as replacements may be of any of the three types available. The actual number of truck replacements may be divided in any manner determined by the Commando CO and may exceed the number of a distinct type of truck which began the campaign; however, the sum total of all trucks listed on the roster may never exceed the total number of trucks allowed (i.e., 29) for the Commando.

6. SPECIAL COMMANDO ABILITIES

6.1 The elite of the Royal Army and the "daring darlings" of the Fleet Street press, the commandos were—along with their American counterparts, the Rangers—the most ruthless, motivated and professional of the soldiers the

German military faced on the continent of Europe. To reflect this reality, the commandos are represented by the best counters available: British 6-3-8 squads and 2-3-8 crews.

6.2 The high level of motivation—at times bordering on fanaticism—the commando trooper brought into combat is legendary; their "coolness" under extreme situations equally so. For these reasons, commando units are *not* subject to Desperation Morale (14.6); they rally with a dice roll equal to their morale (plus any leadership modifiers in effect) regardless of their current state.

6.3 The "ruthlessness" demanded by commando tactics proved to be the primary reason for many recruits' failure to complete training programs. (It takes a special "type" of individual to knife a sentry in the back in cold blood and a high level of training to do so in total silence!) The German press often accused the commandos of committing war atrocities and, undoubtedly, they were as ruthless as any adversary the Germans faced on the Western Front. Therefore, commando units may always execute enemy prisoners at will during any friendly Fire Phase (89.3).

6.4 Training demanded that each commando be extremely familiar with—and adept at repair of—British *and* enemy weaponry and equipment. Thus, commando units may repair malfunctioning British support weapons with a die roll of "1" or "2", and may repair *German* support weapons with a die roll of "1".

6.5 All commando infantry units may man flamethrowers and place demolition charges.

6.6 Although perhaps awed in the face of enemy armor occasionally, there is no historical record of any commando troops fleeing their positions upon attack by German AFVs. All rules pertaining to pre-1942 infantry with regard to armor (105.) are ignored for commando units.

6.7 The commandos were extremely fond of explosives of all types and highly trained in their use. All rules for sappers (136.8) apply to commando squads.

6.71 The 100 mine factors listed on the Depot roster are considered unplaced explosives. Any number of these may, in turn, prior to play (during the Allocation of Forces Stage), be converted to unplaced booby trap factors (136.1) or unplaced AT factors (136.7). Such unplaced factors may be used in accordance with the rules for sappers (136.81).

6.8 All commando squads have the ability to utilize smoke grenades (24.2). However, only certain squads, designated by the Commando CO, may actually make use of this smoke-making capability.

6.81 At the commencement of the campaign, the Commando Co may designate any six (6) squads as having smoke grenades assigned. During play of the scenarios, only such designated squads may place smoke. Signify this ability on the Commando OB Sheet by placing an asterisk (*) following the specific letter designation of the appropriate squad.

6.811 Smoke capability may never be transferred from one squad to another.

6.812 A squad retains the ability to place smoke until the unit is lost during a mission (surviving half-squads have lost the ability). During the Replacement Stage immediately following the scenario in which the squad was lost, the Commando CO may designate any squad to assume the smoke-making capability.

6.82 Due to the limitations imposed by the realities of what could be carried during a raid, each smoke-capable squad may place smoke only six (6) separate times during the course of play of a scenario (i.e., each designated squad has a smoke depletion number of S6).

6.821 Following each scenario, the smoke-depletion number is, regardless of the number of times smoke was actually placed, restored to six for each designated squad—just as all lost commando equipment is automatically replaced.

6.9 It was not uncommon that commando snipers were commissioned officers, who volunteered for the hazardous duty. Therefore, during any Reorganization Stage, any commando leader with a -2 or -3 leadership modifier on the Commando OB Sheet may be replaced by a -1DRM sniper, who must then be immediately assigned to any Troop which does not currently carry a sniper on its roster.

6.91 Such snipers function normally; all benefits and responsibilities of a leader are lost.

6.92 Leaders converted to snipers are not considered lost when determining replacements (5.3) during the ensuing Replacement Stage.

7. COMMANDO VEHICLES

7.1 The original role of coastal raiders envisioned for the commandos demanded certain skills of seamanship. Thus, throughout the war, Royal Navy volunteers were also inducted into the ranks of the Commandos. These volunteers formed the crews of the dories and surfboats assigned to a Commando, and often fought alongside their comrades ashore.

7.11 The sturmboats on the roster represent the 20-foot SN6, a surfboat

powered by the excellent 8hp Stuart Turner 2-cylinder engine and with a capacity estimated at 1.9 tons (8-10 men with equipment and the crew of four). All rules for sturmboats (128.) are in force for the commando SN6 boats.

7.12 For silent approaches to hostile shores, commandos utilized a variety of inflatables of British and American design. All rules for paddled boats (128.) are in play for the commando inflatables.

7.121 Should the commandos be entering by land, all pneumatic boats must enter play deflated, by truck or carried by the units, and must be inflated (128.9) prior to launch.

7.122 Any paddled boats containing only broken units will attempt to withdraw automatically (3.62).

7.13 All boats are governed by the rules regarding withdrawal (3.62 and 3.71) and hence, once withdrawn, may not re-enter play during the current scenario.

7.14 Sturmboats which are lost during the course of a mission are replaced only by random percentage (5.3). Inflatables, considered equipment, are automatically replaced if lost (5.2).

7.2 Each Commando was assigned a variety of trucks, and the exact composition of the motor pool varied from Commando to Commando. Three makes of British-built trucks are listed on the Commando OB Sheet. The actual number of each distinct truck type may be exceeded by replacements (5.46)—but may never exceed the total number of trucks allowed—to reflect the differing philosophies of different Commando COs.

7.21 The 5cwt Truck is capable of transporting 5pp/1s and has 26MP (as per the British "Ant. Lt. Truck").

7.22 The 15cwt Truck is capable of transporting 10pp/2s and has 24MP (as per the American "2&1/2 Ton Truck").

7.23 The 3-ton Truck is capable of transporting 12pp/3s and has 19MP (as per the British "Bedford QLT Lorry").

7.3 The ubiquitous Jeep was one of the first items of Lend Lease equipment obtained from the United States arsenal. Utilized to carry advance commando mortar teams and scouting patrols, every HQ Cdo listed at least a couple of Jeeps on their roster. The two Jeeps listed on the commando roster are considered equipment and are automatically replaced if lost (5.2).

7.4 Throughout the war the commandos were given collapsible bicycles as standard issue, although instances of their use are rare in the annals of

commando missions. However, every Commando CO had available a store of such collapsible bicycles, lightweight and easily assembled.

7.41 Collapsed bicycles are considered to be worth 1pp when transported by vehicles (including boats) or carried by infantry units.

7.42 Each collapsed bicycle counter requires one complete Game Turn by one squad to assemble it for use. (This time span is tripled for enemy units assembling captured commando bicycles.) During such game turns, the squad may engage in no other activity. Should a squad assembling a collapsed bicycle be eliminated, broken or engaged in close combat during the game turn, the bicycle is not assembled and the entire procedure to ready it for use must be repeated.

7.43 All rules for the use of bicycles (132.) are in force once collapsible bicycles are assembled.

7.44 Bicycles are considered equipment and are automatically replaced if lost (5.2).

The COMMANDO OB SHEET (Rule 2.2) is located on the back cover (Page 80) of this issue for ease of photocopying by the readers. Permission to copy for personal use is granted without reservation by The Avalon Hill Game Company and the author.

This "campaign game" for SQUAD LEADER has been laying around for more years than I care to remember. When I came to Avalon Hill a decade ago, this was one of the many items in my files I hoped to see into print for The GENERAL. Then, along came ASL, which knocked it all into a cocked hat. Two years ago, after yet another round of playtesting and proof-reading (the initial effort had been completed by the Helena Gaming Association), it was scheduled for the second ASL Annual. But layout considerations and a wealth of excellent material on the newer system caused me to again put off publishing the "Commando Campaign Game", as similar circumstances did last year. With the expanded format, I am finally able to find the 14 pages demanded; I would hope that for the die-hard fans of the original SL, it proves to be worth the wait.

Obviously, the many who now play ASL to the exclusion of all else will be disappointed with the space spent on this effort. However, I believe that the "Commando Campaign Game" can be readily converted to play for that system with minimal effort. Many of the "make-do" expedients crafted for this campaign are, unlike before, covered by existing ASL rules. No doubt some of you clever fellows are already at work. I look forward to seeing the result.

Mission A

OPERATION "AMBASSADOR"



VP Awards:

A.21 The object of the exercise is the capture of enemy units, especially leaders, from whom information on new troop dispositions may be obtained. Therefore, for each German leader captured and brought offboard as a prisoner (89.), the Commando CO is awarded 30 VP; for each German squad or crew captured and brought offboard as prisoners, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP. No VP are awarded for captured snipers or scouts.

A.22 Since, to transport the prisoners offboard, it will be necessary to utilize boats, prisoners may be brought offboard only on commando sturmboats; paddled boats may not be utilized to evacuate prisoners. Since sturmboats have an inherent crew, it is only necessary that an unbroken British leader or sniper be aboard to "guard" prisoner squads or crews (thus negating 89.6) while these prisoner units are on the boat. Should any British unit fail its morale or be KIA while guarding enemy prisoners on a boat, the prisoner unit is automatically removed from play (it is assumed to have escaped overboard), and no VP are awarded to the Commando CO for that prisoner unit.

A.23 Since the mission is to be accomplished with a minimum of force, VP are deducted from the Commando CO's total VP accumulated during play depending on commando forces committed. For each commando Troop and for each section of the Heavy Weapons Troop committed, either initially or as reinforcements, deduct 10 VP; however, no VP are deducted for commitment of the HQ Cdo. Any such deduction of VP are in addition to deduction of VP for entrance of reinforcements (4.26).

A.24 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

A.25 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 50 VP if no German unit is taken prisoner and evacuated offboard by the Commando.

Briefing: Reports have reached British Military Intelligence from French underground sources confirming massive German troop movements into the coastal regions. However, all Allied attempts to obtain detailed information on the new enemy divisional positions and zones of occupation have been costly failures. It has proved impossible for the Wehrmacht to fortify every mile of occupied coast as yet. Taking advantage of this reality, a last major effort to obtain information on enemy dispositions has been mounted. Over the course of the next few weeks, a series of small-scale commando raids will strike the French coastline. The object of these raids will not be destruction of enemy installations, but rather the capture of enemy officers and soldiers, and their return to England for interrogation by the SIS. In this manner, by the use of methods subtle and unobtrusive, it is believed the information required by the High Command can be had. But first, prisoners must be taken. Your Commando has been assigned a stretch of the French coast near Omanville and ordered to mount such a raid, using the minimum force necessary for success. The tactical details of the landing, attack and withdrawal of the raiding party have been left to the Commando CO; the only specific order: "to bring as many Nazi bastards back as possible."

Topography:

A.11 All land hexes north of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

A.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are in play; the actual topography of these islands will depend on the tide.

A.13 The hex 12U5 is a third-level building hex.

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Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

- Night (3.81)
- Weather (1.11.)
- Wind Direction and Force (102.5-6)
- Tide (3.82)
- German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Forces and Initial Placement:

A.31 The German player is allotted 900 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 500 points for German infantry units (EXC: 8-3-8 and 6-5-8 squads may not be selected); he may not purchase vehicles of any type nor fortifications of any type.

A.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 7AA5, 7L3, 8X4 and 8J9.

A.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building hex(es) on Board 12 and/or Board 13 and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other onboard German units must be placed in any whole hex on Board 12 and/or Board 13.

A.34 Commando units must enter play on the north edge, by boat, of the playing area.

Mission B

OPERATION "BRISTOL"



VP Awards:

B.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of the enemy communications installation. Therefore, for each hex of the building centered on 6N4 which is on fire or rubble at the conclusion of play, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

B.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

B.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 40 VP if no hex of the building centered on hex 6N4 is rubble or on fire at the conclusion of the scenario.

Briefing: It has been learned that the major communications center linking Ob.d.H. (*Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres*) Paris with all German coastal commands from Dunkirk to Ushant is located in a requisitioned French chateau near Courcelles. The solid, old chateau lies only a few hundred yards from cliffs overlooking the sea. Destruction of this installation would sow confusion and disarray among the German coastal commands, and be very costly for OKH to replace the equipment and communication specialists concentrated there. Since, due to the high concentration of flak defenses in the region, pinpoint daylight bombing by the RAF would prove extremely costly—with no guarantee of success—the job has been assigned to Brigade 1140. In turn, your Commando has been ordered by Brigade HQ to undertake this mission to cripple German command control on the northern coast. German security in the area of the chateau is tight; it is difficult for Plan-Ops to provide more than a rough estimate of the troops that your force will face. Suffice to say that the communications center is heavily guarded. But, regardless of opposition, your raid is to destroy that center.

Topography:

B.11 All land hexes west of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

B.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 do not exist; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

B.13 The large building centered on hex 6N4 is of stone construction; all other buildings on Board 6 are of wooden construction.

B.14 The hexes 6N5 and 6O4 are third-level building hexes.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Weather (111.)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5.-6)

Tide (3.82)

German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

B.31 The German player is allotted 1000 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase MT, HT, AG, TD nor SPA.

B.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 8DD2, 8L4, 8G4 and 3L4.

B.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building or fortification hex(es) on Board 6 and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other on-board German units (including fortifications) must be placed in any whole hex on Board 6.

B.34 Commando units must enter play on the west edge, by boat, of the playing area.

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Mission C

OPERATION "CLAYMORE"



Briefing: The High Command is planning a major divisional-sized assault to sever the iron-ore route near Haugesund. However, other than dated Royal Navy outline maps, information on the topography of and enemy presence in this remote region of Norway is lacking. To obtain this intelligence, commando landings on unpatrolled sections of the coast around the port are to take place over the next fortnight. Each landing is to develop into a reconnaissance in force. From the German reaction to the raids, debriefing of the surviving commando officers should enable Military Intelligence to devise a fairly complete estimate of Wehrmacht positions in the region. Further, each commando officer is to take note of fortifications, major terrain features, landmarks, and the general "lay of the land"; the survivor's reports will be culled and assessed to provide tactical maps. Your Commando has been assigned a landing point in a fjord north of Haugesund. The mission is considered extremely hazardous, as neither the terrain nor the enemy forces the Commando may encounter can be known beforehand. Indeed, this is your mission: "to stick your head in the mouth of the lion, count his teeth, and see if your head is bitten off."

VP Awards:

C.21 The object of the exercise is the discovery of terrain and, as a function of such discovery, the revealing of enemy units. Therefore, for each board (EXC: Boards 7 and 8) entered by a commando leader with a functioning radio, the Commando CO is awarded 20 VP.

C.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

C.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 30 VP for each board numbered 1-6 not in play at the conclusion of the scenario.

Topography:

C.11 All land hexes north of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

C.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are in play; the actual topography of these islands will depend on the tide.

C.13 The actual configuration of the boards (and indeed, the number of boards in play) will be determined by the actions of the commando units.

C.131 Until all boards numbered 1-6 are in play, whenever any British infantry unit exits the current playing area to the south, the German opponent will randomly determine the board to be placed in the position the unit is moving to.

C.132 Quite simply, before the British unit continues its movement, the German player will roll a single die and immediately place the corresponding board (for example: a die roll of "2" means that Board 2 will be placed) with the numbered edge to the east. Should the board corresponding to the number rolled be already in play, the roll must be repeated until a board not currently in play is placed.

C.133 Should the last of the six boards be placed, no further boards may be brought into play; the playing area is now defined. Commando units may now exit the playing area only under the provisions of withdrawal (3.71).

C.134 Should the playing area prove not to be a rectangle (for example: should there be two boards south of Board 8 and four boards south of Board 7), the non-uniform—or blank—region is considered impassable mountainous terrain. No unit, neither British nor German, may enter or leave the playing area via the board edges which border this region. LOS/LOF may not be traced across this blank region. This restriction, however, may not be invoked until—and unless—all six boards are in play.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Weather (111.)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5.-6)

Tide (3.82)

Allotment of German "Points" (see C.31 below)

German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

C.31 The German player is allotted a variable number of points, determined randomly prior to commencement of the scenario, to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 500 points for German infantry units.

C.311 The exact number of points allotted is determined by the roll of two dice, and the result is secretly recorded by the German player. The exact number of points are determined as follows:

2-5 = 800 points

6-7 = 900 points

8-9 = 1000 points

10-11 = 1100 points

12 = 1200 points

C.32 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), each German unit must be assigned to any one of the six boards not yet in play. The units assigned to each board must be secretly recorded by the German player prior to the commencement of play.

C.321 If a board comes into play, any and all German units assigned to that board must immediately be placed, concealed, on any whole hex on that board within five hexes of the southern board edge.

C.322 German units assigned to a board may perform no action until an enemy infantry unit enters the board they are assigned to and the board is thus placed in play.

C.323 The German offboard reserve, if requested as reinforcements, must select a point of entry (4.233) only on boards currently in play and may not alter this point of entry even if other boards come into play, unless radio contact is subsequently severed. Should a board come into play adjacent to the point of entry before the reinforcements arrive onboard, such reinforcements must enter play at the first opportunity—but on the corresponding point of entry of the new board. (For example: the point of entry 3C1 has been selected and recorded for the German offboard reserve to enter on five turns from the current turn; if Board 6 is placed to the south of Board 3, the German reinforcements will enter play on hex 6C1 on the next German turn.)

C.34 Commando units must enter play on the north edge, by boat, of the playing area.

N

	8
6	6

[DESIGNER'S NOTE: The special circumstances of a variable German point value necessitates that the German Allocation of Forces Stage (2.92) occur following the Determination of Variables Stage for this mission. While this may present the German player with some minor disadvantages in composing his force, it is more than offset by the uncertainty of when (and if) such forces will enter play.]

Mission D

OPERATION "DRYAD"



Briefing: The invasion is to take place at dawn. It is known that to the south of the invasion beaches elements of the 10th SS Panzer Division are refitting and on training maneuvers. Should the SS panzers reach the Canadian beachhead within a few hours of the landings, the entire operation could be in jeopardy. Only one major coastal roadway leads north from the area in which the 10th SS is concentrated towards the planned landing sites; all other possible routes represent a lengthy detour which would delay the arrival of the enemy armor for some time. Near the village of Eletot, the coast road crosses a number of stone bridges. Destruction of these small bridges would effectively close the coastal roadway, and the shortest route for the 10th SS Panzer Division. It is known that at least one battalion of German infantry, possibly supported by armor, is stationed in the region to guard the bridges and other installations. This then is the mission: elements of your Commando are, in conjunction with the Canadian landings, to come ashore near Eletot and—regardless of loss—destroy as many bridges as possible to sever the coastal road.

Topography:

D.11 All land hexes west of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

D.12 Only the small island centered on hex 8DD6 is in play. The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6 and 7K4 are not in play; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

D.13 The hex 12U5 is a third-level building hex.

7	8	
	4	12
9		13

N

VP Awards:

D.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of the small bridges. Therefore, for each bridge destroyed (80.411), the Commando CO is awarded 20 VP.

D.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

D.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 60 VP if a route of contiguous road hexes exists from hex 5A5 to either hex 13GG5 or hex 12A5.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)
Tide (3.82)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

D.31 The German player is allotted 900 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 500 points for German infantry units; he may not purchase HT, TD nor AG.

D.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 8K5, 8DD2, 4Y9 and 4D9.

D.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building or fortification hex(es) on Board 12, Board 13 or Board 5 and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other German units (including fortifications) must be placed in any whole hex of Board 12 and/or Board 13.

D.34 Commando units must enter play on the west edge, by boat, of the playing area.

Mission E

OPERATION "EASTER 3"



Briefing: The German occupation force in the Netherlands has, for some time now, been untroubled by the attentions of the commandos. Due to this, German formations once stationed in Holland have been shifted to other coastal zones. To rectify this, to tax the German command's manpower resources by forcing them to protect every mile of coastline from Norway to Greece, a series of raids will take place during the upcoming holiday season. All of these raids will be directed at military targets in Holland. Your Commando, due to its past record, has been assigned one of the most difficult and dangerous. The Commando will, under cover of darkness, penetrate up the River Maas for a distance of five miles; there your forces are to assemble at a disused warehouse. The following day, whenever you judge the time to be appropriate, elements of your command are to proceed upriver another two miles and effect a landing at Biesbosch, where several military installations are located. In Biesbosch, the commandos are to strike at the barracks, a small exclusive military hospital for officers, the regional Gestapo headquarters building, an OKW map depository, a Luftwaffe communications center, and other targets of opportunity. As Biesbosch is also a transportation center for OKH, expect strong resistance by disparate elements of various German formations. However, success of this audacious raid will, hopefully, cause the German command to overreact and shift troops from other—and for us, more strategic—coastal sectors.

Topography:

E.11 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are in play; the actual topography of these islands will depend on the depth of the river.

E.12 A two-lane stone bridge extends from hex 8I3 to hex 8I10; another two-lane stone bridge extends from hex 8Q2 to hex 8Q9. A one-lane wooden bridge extends from hex 7AA5 to hex 7AA9.

E.13 The following hexes are third-level building hexes: 14L5, 1M5, 1U3, 1X5 and 8F3.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)
River Current (126.3)
River Depth (126.4)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

E.31 The German player is allotted 1500 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 500 points for German infantry units; he may not purchase HT, TD nor AG.

E.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 7F2, 7Y9, 14W6 and 8O8.

E.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building hex(es) on Board 1 and/or Board 8 or within three hexes of hex 14J7, and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other German units must be placed in any whole hex of Board 1.

E.34 Commando units must enter play on the west edge of Board 7, by boat, between hexes 7A4 and 7A7 inclusive.

VP Awards:

E.21 The object of the exercise is to damage as many military installations as possible. Therefore, for each hex which is part of a building centered on 8B2, 14L5, 1M7, 1X4 or 127 which is rubble or on fire at the conclusion of the scenario, the Commando CO is awarded 5 VP. Further, for each bridge from which at least one span has been destroyed, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

E.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the west edge of Board 7 (either via water or land hexes) by commando forces.

E.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 60 VP if no hex of any building on Board 1 or on Board 8 is rubble or on fire at the conclusion of the scenario, and is awarded 20 VP if no span of any bridge has been destroyed.

	41	
	1	
7		8

N

Mission F

OPERATION "FORFAR LOVE"



VP Awards:

F.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of enemy units. Therefore, for every increment of 100 German points (rounded down) destroyed or captured at the conclusion of the scenario, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

F.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

F.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 10 VP for every increment of 100 German points (rounded down) onboard and in play at the conclusion of the scenario.

Briefing: At Onival on the French coast, a crucial commando raid on a German-staffed research laboratory will be carried out in a few days; the mission's objectives are the capture of blueprints and/or prototypes of a new German airborne radar system and the death or capture of the German scientists engaged in developing it. To delay and disperse enemy military reaction to the raid, a diversionary operation will take place three hours earlier, 30 miles away. Your Commando has been assigned the task of engineering the diversion. Your men are to come ashore near the village of Biville and engage the enemy troops quartered there. Attempt to kill as many enemy as possible, to destroy as much equipment as possible. If the German commandant in the region is convinced that your activity is a major raid, he will commit forces that would otherwise react to the raid on Onival. It is imperative that you draw these forces to Biville; it is equally important, however, that your force be withdrawn before their arrival and that your losses be kept to a minimum.

Topography:

F.11 All land hexes north of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

F.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are not in play; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

		8	
		7	
5			6
4		13	

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Weather (111.)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)

Tide (3.82)

German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Forces and Initial Placement:

F.31 The German player is allotted 1000 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 600 points for German infantry units; he may not purchase AFVs or fortifications of any type.

F.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 7Z8, 7K9, 3DD2 and 13K6.

F.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building hex(es) on Board 3 and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other German units must be placed in any whole hex of Board 3.

F.34 Commando units must enter play on the north edge, by boat, of the playing area.

Mission G

OPERATION "GAUNTLET"



VP Awards:

G.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of the enemy convoy. Therefore, for each German truck destroyed or captured at the conclusion of the scenario, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

G.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

G.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 5 VP for every truck on board and in play at the conclusion of the scenario, and 15 VP for every German truck which has exited offboard from hex 15A6 by the conclusion of play.

Briefing: In four days time, a British convoy with a heavy escort is to depart Gibraltar bound for embattled Malta, laden with food and munitions absolutely vital for the continued survival of the island garrison. The Allied convoy will be under intense enemy aerial and naval attack from the moment it leaves port, but the Admiralty is willing to accept as high as fifty percent losses to resupply Malta. However, a new report has raised grave concern for the success of the operation. RAF Intelligence sources on the continent report the departure of a truck convoy from Marseilles transporting stocks of the new German magnetic torpedo. The German convoy is bound for the airbases of Kampfgeschwader 39 west of the city. If these new torpedoes are fitted to the Heinkels of KG39, it is possible—even probable—that the entire convoy with its escort could be wiped out in the confining waters off Cape Teulada and Pantelleria. After a hasty evaluation of options, it has been found that the route of the German convoy will pass, in two days time, close to the coast through a region of hills near the town of St. D'Hieres. It is feasible that a finely-timed commando raid could ambush the convoy. The Prime Minister has authorized the risky venture; your Commando has been selected to carry it to conclusion.

Topography:

	15		6	1
		2		
8		7		

G.11 All land hexes south of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

G.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are in play; the actual topography of these islands will depend on the tide.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Weather (111.)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)

Tide (3.82)

Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

G.31 The German player is allotted one Kubelwagen, four Bussing-NAG trucks and eight Opel 6700A trucks; further, the German player is allotted 900 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase trucks, MT, HT, AG, SPA or TD nor fortifications of any type.

G.32 The German offboard reserve (4.2) may contain no trucks.

G.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), all German units must enter play during the first three game turns on hex 1A6 in convoy (84.); however, the Kubelwagen and its passengers and any motorcycles/sidecars and their passengers need not be considered part of the convoy.

G.331 Unless and until any German unit has LOS to a commando unit, no element of the convoy may detach itself and maneuver independently (84.7).

G.332 The German Opel 6700A trucks, considered to be loaded with torpedoes, may not transport any units of any type. All other elements of the convoy, including the Bussing-NAG trucks, may transport troops and equipment normally.

G.34 Commando units must enter play on the south edge, by boat, of Board 7 or Board 8.

Mission H

OPERATION "HUCKABUCK"



Briefing: Near the mouth of the River Seine lies the chateau of St. Valery-en-Caux, "acquired" by Reichsmarshal Goering in August 1940. The *Kommandeur der Luftwaffe* utilizes the chateau as his residence during his semi-frequent trips to inspect the OKL commands stationed along the French coast. The chateau holds many French art objects pirated by Goering, and a private airfield nearby houses his personal collection of vintage aircraft. The airfield is also used by Goering and his staff during their conferences at St. Valery-en-Caux. An attack on Goering's "Kleine Karinhall" would be of immeasurable propaganda value; and, as a secondary benefit, a commando raid on the complex would make "Fat Hermann" very cautious in its use afterwards, severely handicapping the OKL command structure in occupied France. It has been adjudged by Plan-Ops that the chateau itself is too heavily guarded for any conventional raid to be other than futile. However, the airfield and Goering's collection of WW1 biplanes lie outside the grounds of the estate, and are less-closely protected. Therefore, a raid on the St. Valery aerodrome has been planned and assigned to your Commando. Provided that no alarm is raised prematurely, the actual attack should prove relatively easy. But once the attack is in progress and the chateau garrison consequently alerted by the sounds of battle, withdrawing your force from the fray with minimal losses may prove less so.

Topography:

H.11 All land hexes north of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

H.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6 and 7K4 are in play; the actual topography of these islands will depend on the tide.

H.13 The hex 14L5 and all hexes of the building centered on hex 6N4 are third-level building hexes.

H.14 All buildings on all boards are of wooden construction.

N

7	4
13	15
6	14

VP Awards:

H.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of the airfield. Therefore, for each building hex of the airfield (hexes 14L5, 14L7, 14L9, 14K8, 14I7, 14I9 and 14H9) which is on fire or rubble at the conclusion of the scenario, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

H.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the north edge of Board 7.

H.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 70 VP if no building hex of the airfield and no hex of the building centered on hex 6N4 is on fire or rubble at the conclusion of the scenario.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Tide (3.82)

Weather (111.)

German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)

Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

H.31 The German player is allotted 1000 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase MT, HT, AG, TD nor SPA.

H.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 4O6, 4X1, 4CC6 and 6X9.

H.33 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all German infantry units must be initially placed in building or fortification hex(es) on Board 6 west of hexrow Q and/or within three hexes of hex 14J7, and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack. All other German units (including fortifications) must be placed in any hex on Board 6 and/or Board 14.

H.34 Commando units must enter play on the north edge, by boat, of Board 7.

Mission I

OPERATION "IOTA ONE"



Briefing: H-Hour is 0715. At that time, on the extreme left flank of the British landings, the troops of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Queen's Own Pioneers and Forfar Yeomanry will come ashore on a narrow strip of beach. Just to the north of this planned beachhead lies a series of hills, near the water, which dominate this stretch of the coast. Somewhere in these hills a German battery of 149mm artillery has recently been moved into position. These guns could totally disrupt the waves of LCAs and LCVs, pin the British infantry at the water's edge, and halt the exploitation inland. While the actual landing site is held only by a Wehrmacht penal battalion, the support of this single strategically-placed battery could stiffen their resistance and check our airborne attack, bringing chaos to the entire Allied invasion. Therefore, at H-2, elements of your commando will land at the foot of these hills, locate and put the enemy battery out of commission, and then withdraw to link with the advancing British infantry ashore. The crews of your assault boats are meanwhile to withdraw their craft southward along the coastline to offer all protection possible to the landing craft. Obviously, it is unnecessary to stress the importance of this mission; quite simply, you must succeed.

Topography:

I.11 All land hexes west of the river are open sea; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

I.12 The small islands centered on 7R4, 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 are not in play; treat all such hexes as water hexes.

N

7	8
13	15
4	2

VP Awards:

I.21 The object of the exercise is the destruction of the enemy battery. Therefore, for each German 149mm/L55 K18 field gun destroyed, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP; for each German crew KIA or captured, the Commando CO is awarded 5 VP.

I.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the southern edge of the playing area by commando forces.

I.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 25 VP for each German 149mm/L55 K18 gun on board and manned by an unbroken German crew at the conclusion of the scenario.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)

Weather (111.)

Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)

Tide (3.82)

German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)

Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

I.31 The German player is allotted six 149mm/L55 K18 ART units and six 2-4-7 crews; further, the German player is allotted 800 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase ordnance of any type.

I.32 German scouts, acting as sentries (4.33), must be placed in the following hexes: 13K6, 8O8, 8C9 and 8X4.

I.33 All German 149mm ART units must be initially placed on third-level hexes of any one hill mass on Board 2 or Board 15 (hill mass 621, 783 or 714). Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2) and the German scouts, all other German units must be initially placed in any whole hex on Board 2 and/or Board 15 and may not perform any activity until aware (4.31) of the commando attack.

I.34 Commando units must enter play on the west edge, by boat, of the playing area.

Mission J

OPERATION "JUBILEE"



VP Awards:

J.21 The object of the exercise is the occupation of the commanding terrain. Therefore, for each unbroken British infantry unit (not support weapons or vehicles) on any first-level hill hex at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns, the Commando CO is awarded one VP; on any second-level hill hex, two VP; on any third-level hill hex, three VP; and on any fourth-level hill hex, five VP.

J.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must not be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) by commando forces.

J.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 15 VP for each major hill mass (i.e., those numbered 522, 498, 547, 534, 714, 783, 621 and 538) on which there are no unbroken or uncaptured British infantry units at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns.

Briefing: Across the fields of the Vire valley from the sector held by the Canadian 4th Armoured Division lay a series of hills. In two days, the 4th Armoured will launch a limited offensive, aimed at breaking through the valley and the hills beyond into the central plain. To gain a foothold on the commanding ground in the center of the planned thrust and disrupt the German defensive line, the Canadian command has requested a commando operation. The British RA Staff has agreed to honor the request, and your Commando—being the only available in this sector—has been tagged for the mission. On the morrow, at a time determined by the Canadian HQ as suitable, your force is to dash across the valley and seize as much high ground as possible, clearing the enemy from it. Although the exact composition of the enemy forces you will face is unknown, the unexpected nature of your move should present the opportunity to reach the hills and dig in. The Commando is then to hold its positions until dawn of the next day, when the Canadian armor is scheduled to pass through your force and exploit the gap you have opened.

Topography:

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N

2		3
6		15
	12	5

J.11 The hex 12U5 is a third-level building hex.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-6)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

J.31 The German player is allotted 1200 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 500 points for German infantry.

J.32 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), all German units must be initially placed on hill hexes on any or all board(s) in play.

J.33 Commando units must enter play on the south edge of the playing area.

Mission K

OPERATION "KIWI"



VP Awards:

K.21 The object of the exercise is the clearing of the village of enemy units. Therefore, for each hexrow on Board 12 between L and Y inclusive which contains no unbroken German infantry units and no undestroyed German AFVs at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns, the Commando CO is awarded five VP.

K.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must not be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) by commando forces.

K.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded five VP for each stone building on Board 12 occupied by unbroken German infantry units at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns.

Briefing: A local, limited German counterattack has retaken the village of Venraij. Normally, with the fluid situation at the front, this setback would pose little inconvenience. However, the only supply route to the 7th U.S. Infantry RCT and the 39th U.S. Infantry RCT runs through the streets of this village. These Yank formations are locked in combat with Waffen-SS units several miles east of Venraij, and any attempt to break off the action could prove disastrous. It is vital that the supply route be quickly restored. While it is unfortunate that your command must return to battle so soon after the last mission, it is imperative that the village be retaken and the German infantry and armor thrown back. Artillery of the U.S. VIII Corps has been ordered to support your assault on Venraij. Utilize whatever methods seem suitable, but that road through the village must be available by dawn tomorrow.

Topography:

K.11 The hexes 12U5 and all hexes of the building centered on hex 12P3 are third-level building hexes

↑
N

	2
4	
13	
	4

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-6)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

The Commando CO must determine prior to play:

American Artillery Modules (K.34)

Forces and Initial Placement:

K.31 The German player is allotted 1200 points to "purchase" his force. He must expend a minimum of 400 points for German infantry and a minimum of 400 points for German vehicles.

K.32 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), all German units must be initially placed on any whole hex of Board 4 and/or Board 12.

K.33 Commando units must enter play on the west or south edge of Board 14.

K.34 The Commando CO has a randomly-determined number of 155mm American artillery modules as support. Immediately prior to play, during the Determination of Variables Stage, the Commando CO must roll one die and secretly record the result; the resulting number is equal to the number of 155mm artillery modules available to the Commando CO for use during the course of the scenario.

Mission L

OPERATION "LAUENBERG"



VP Awards:

L.21 The object of the exercise is the capture of the stone bridges or, failing this, their destruction. Therefore, for each stone bridge intact and under British control (see L.211) at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns, the Commando CO is awarded 30 VP. Alternatively, for each stone bridge from which at least one span has been destroyed, the Commando CO is awarded 10 VP.

L.211 Control of a bridge is defined as having an unbroken squad with functioning MG in any hex adjacent with each end of the bridge and having no unbroken enemy infantry nor undestroyed enemy AFVs on any span of that bridge.

L.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must not be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) by commando forces.

L.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 25 VP for each bridge (including the footbridge) intact and under German control at the conclusion of 30 Game Turns.

Briefing: In a fortnight, the Eighth Army will launch a major offensive, designed to leap three major rivers and shatter the German defensive lines of their Ninety-third Army. A decisive victory could bring Nazi Germany to its collective knees, ending the war within weeks. For the British armor to cross the rivers, key bridges must be secured intact—daring *coups de main* have already been planned for this purpose. Bridges over the two furthest rivers will be seized by glider and parachute elements of the 6th Airborne Division. And, to provide a broad base for the initial penetration, two Commandos will seize bridges seven miles apart over the River Bitterraij and establish secure bridgeheads on the east bank. Near the village of St. Brandon-sur-Aliex lies a pair of concrete and steel suspension bridges; these are the objective of your Commando. The mission of your force and of your sister Commando—#43(RM)—are identical: to slip across the "no-man's land" between the two armies during the hours before midnight; to take up positions in the hills west of the river; to assault and capture the assigned bridges at H-4 hours; to establish a defensive perimeter on the far bank. A few hours later, the advance elements of the Ulster Hussars will make contact with your troops. If it should prove impossible to take the bridges, your demolitions experts are to drop them into the Bitterraij to prevent a German counterthrust over them into the flank of the Eighth Army. Plan-Op estimates strong enemy resistance can be expected at your target; regardless though, the bridges at St. Brandon-sur-Aliex must either be secured or destroyed by nightfall on D-Day.

Topography:

L.11 The small island centered on hex 7R4 is in play; the actual topography of this island will depend on the depth of the river. The small islands centered on hexes 7M6, 7K4 and 8DD6 do not exist; treat all such hexes as open water.

L.12 A two-lane stone bridge extends from hex 7Q10 to hex 7Q3; another two-lane stone bridge extends from hex 7AA9 to hex 7AA5. A wooden footbridge extends from hex 8Y1 to hex 8Y5.

L.13 The hexes 12U5 and 12V4 are third-level building hexes.

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)
River Current (126.3)
River Depth (126.4)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:


L.31 The German player is allotted 1100 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase fortifications of any type.

L.32 Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), all German infantry units must be initially placed in any building hex on Board 7, Board 8, Board 2 and/or Board 12. All other German units may be placed in any whole hex of the playing area.

L.33 Commando units must enter play on the west or south edge of Board 4.

Mission M

OPERATION "MONTANA"



VP Awards:

M.21 The object of the exercise is to free the Allied prisoners. Therefore, for each 4-5-7 squad exited west off the playing area, the Commando CO is awarded five VP.

M.22 For any award of VP to the Commando CO to be valid, the scenario must be concluded by withdrawal (3.71) through the board edge initially entered by commando forces.

M.221 The scenario is not concluded so long as any unbroken British 4-5-7 squads remain in play.

M.23 In addition to VP awarded for destruction or capture of commando units (3.73) or deducted for entrance of reinforcements (4.26), the German player is awarded 10 VP for each 4-5-7 squad which is held prisoner at the conclusion of play.

Briefing: Word has reached SHAEF from the leading member of the German resistance in the OKH—codenamed "Amber"—that 150 Allied officers are being held by the Wehrmacht a few miles from the front lines. Under pressure from Himmler, the OKW has agreed to turn these POWs over to the SS tomorrow at 1800 hours. Once in the clutches of the *Sicherheitsdienst*, it is doubtful that these prisoners will ever be seen again. SHAEF has ordered that an operation be mounted at once to free these officers. Even with such short notice, Brigade HQ has assured the Prime Minister that the mission can be accomplished by the commandos. Your Commando has been volunteered for the effort. Sometime in the next 24 hours, your force is to burst through a thinly-held sector of the enemy line near Gravelin, racing eastward ten miles. There the Allied officers are being held in a temporary camp in an open pasture. The commandos are to overwhelm the guards, avoiding losses among the POWs, and then escort the freed officers back to the Allied lines. The mission calls for flexibility and verve, attributes your men have displayed magnificently in the past—although not always with success. SHAEF expects not to be disappointed this time.

Topography:

M.13 The hexes 6N5 and 6O4 are third-level building hexes

Variables: The German player must determine prior to play:

Night (3.81)
Weather (111.)
Wind Direction and Force (102.5-.6)
German Artillery Module (if purchased, 45.2)
Smoke Candles (64.8)

Forces and Initial Placement:

M.31 The German player is allotted 15 broken 4-5-7 British squads as prisoners; further the German player is allotted 800 points to "purchase" his force. He may not purchase SS units of any type.

M.311 The British 4-5-7 squads must commence play as broken prisoner units; therefore, all rules for prisoners (89.) are in force.


M.32 Initially, the broken British prisoner squads must be placed in any whole hex on Board 4 west of hexrow Q. Except for any German offboard reserve (4.2), all German units must be initially placed in any whole hex on Board 4 and/or Board 6.

M.33 Commando units must enter play on the west edge of the playing area.

PROBING LAYFORCE



ASL SCENARIO A43



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Germans win if they have ≥ 20 VP (Good Order friendly SMC/MMC only) on board 9 on/west-of hexrow Q at game end.

BABALI HANI, CRETE, 28 May 1941: First Norway, then France; then Greece and now Crete. Once again British forces had suffered defeat and were in retreat, streaming towards the beaches at Sfakia and evacuation by the Royal Navy. But the pursuing German mountain troops were pressing hard, and had to be checked. Already lead elements of the German 5th Mountain Division had overrun the weakened 2/8th Australian Battalion. The commandos of Layforce were ordered to stop and act as a rearguard, even though too lightly equipped to operate as regular infantry. Lt.-Colonel Young of D Battalion, Layforce, decided to make his stand where the only road over the White Mountains dividing Crete into north and south passed through a narrow valley thickly covered with olive groves. And he had even been promised armor support. But the enemy arrived first.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



BALANCE:

⊖ Delete one LMG and one 50mm MTR from the German OB.

+ Delete two Sangars from the 2/8th OB.

2	51	6

TURN RECORD CHART

⊖ BRITISH Sets Up First [169]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	END
+ GERMAN Moves First [228]											



Battalion D, Layforce [ELR: 5] sets up on board 15: {SAN: 5}

6-4-8	9-2	9-1	2-7
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8

2

3

Armor from the 7th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment sets up on any board 9 road hex:



Remnants of the 2/8th Australian Battalion [ELR: 4] set up on board 9:

4-5-8	2-4-6	8-1	4-12	2-7	Sangar 15 or less OBA: +3+ Other: +1+
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4

5



Elements of Bataillon II, Gebirgsjäger Regiment 85 [ELR: 4] enter on Turn 1 on/between hexes 2X0 and 2Z0: {SAN: 3}

4-6-8	2-4-8	9-2	8-1	8-0	3-8	3-8	3-8	1-12	1-12	Radio 8
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16

4

2

2

5

2

2


SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with no wind at start.
- All buildings are stone, with no upper levels (EXC: buildings 15R8 and 15H5). All woods are Olive Groves (F13.5). All grainfields are Vineyards (F13.6). The only road runs 2Y1-2Y2-2U2-2U7-15Y2-15R9-9R3-9A5/6; all other roads are Tracks (F9.).
- The British AFV is confined to the road; movement into any non-road hex results in immediate Bog.
- All Entrenching Attempts receive a +2 DRM.
- The Germans receive one module of 80+mm MTR OBA, which can fire HE and Smoke.
- British 6-4-8 MMCs are Commandos (H1.24).

AFTERMATH: Despite the limitations of their equipment, the commandos put up a stiff resistance. Under heavy mortar fire, the British—and remnants of the 2/8 Australians co-opted by Young to guard his rear—withstanding several German probing attacks. Meanwhile, Lt. J.F.G. Terry in his surviving Matilda (the others having been destroyed as they were abandoned en route to Babali Hani) arrived in the valley and positioned himself on the road, "firing at everything that moved" on the slopes above. Towards evening, the Germans, frustrated at the delay, at last mounted an encircling swing on the left. The Australians, in the failing light, managed to hold off this thrust long enough for the commandos to withdraw; then they too fell back in the darkness, passing through defensive lines established by the 4th New Zealand Brigade. Although casualties among the *Gebirgsjäger*s had been heavy, the commandos had lost but 15 men. The respite was only temporary, however; the next day, the weary Commonwealth troops continued their retreat.

BLOCKING ACTION AT LIPKI

ASL SCENARIO A44



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Russians win immediately when they have Exited ≥ 15 VP off the west edge between 4Q1 and 4Y1, or at game end if they have amassed ≥ 15 Casualty VP more than the Germans.

Near **BORISOV, RUSSIA, 3 July 1941:** During the opening stages of *Barbarossa*, the first great pincer movement on the Central Front occurred between the cities of Bialystok and Minsk. As a result of the encirclement of four Soviet armies in the pocket, the Soviet high command was forced to commit whatever units were available in an effort to form a new defensive line. Time became the prime objective the Soviets were fighting for. To gain more, a crack unit—the 1st Moscow Motor Rifle Division—was sent to intercept Guderian's 18th Panzer Division as it struck towards Smolensk. If Smolensk were to fall, Moscow would be no more than 230 miles behind the front line. The enemy had to be slowed if they could not be stopped, no matter what the cost. A little more than six miles east of Borisov, near the village of Lipki, the two armored spearheads met in a series of clashes.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



	5	
4		91

BALANCE:

- ★ Substitute a 37L Pak 35/37 for the 28LL sPzB 41 in the German OB.
- ✚ Russian AFV crews are Inexperienced (D3.45).

TURN RECORD CHART

★ RUSSIAN Moves First	1✚	2	3	4✚	5	6	7	8	END
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Reinforced Elements of the 1st Moscow Motor Rifle Division [ELR: 2] enter on Turn 1 on hex 16I10 or 16Y10, having already expended one-half (FRD) of their vehicular MP allotment: {SAN: 2}



8	2	2	2	4
4-4-7	8-1	8-2	8-10	8-12
152*	76	45L	21	
2/4	2/4	-/4	T4 20 PP	



Spearhead of Panzer Division 18 [ELR: 4] enters on Turn 1 on hex 4Q1 or 4Y1: {SAN: 2}



4	2	2	2	4
4-6-7	2-2-8	8-2	8-1	8-12
50	37L	15PP AANG	28	AT
3/5	1/1	1/1	T7 21PP	1M12

Reinforcements enter as per SSR 2:

2
75*
3/5

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with no wind at start.
- Commencing on Turn 4, the German player may roll once per friendly RPH for reinforcements. Following a Reinforcement dr ≤ 3 , the German reinforcements enter in the following MPH on hex 4Q1 or 4Y1.
- Grain does not exist; treat such hexes as Open Ground.

AFTERMATH: When the T-34s and KV-2s first loomed in sight, the advancing German units were struck with momentary terror at the size of the Soviet tanks. Up until that time, they had encountered only the smaller T-26 and BT models. But the Germans were quick to recover. Soon the light Russian support tanks were aflame, and the German gunners, by employing superior fire and movement, managed to score hits against the tracks and other "soft spots" of the T-34s and KV-2s. Like so many other Russian counterattacks that summer, the futile one near Lipki collapsed.

A black and white photograph showing a group of soldiers in a dense forest, working together to move a large, heavy object, possibly a tank or a large piece of equipment, using ropes and pulleys. The soldiers are positioned around the object, some pulling ropes, and the scene is set in a wooded area with many trees.

TURN RECORD CHART

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

- Exchange one 3-4-7 for one 4-4-8, and add one 1+3+5 pillbox.

	OC1	OC2	OC3
35	Be4	Be5	Efl Be6
37	1	5	
34			

☆ AMERICAN Sets Up & Moves First [125]	1	2	☆ 3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	END
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On/adjacent-to 37A5:



2



2



On/adjacent-to 37oM6:



3

Elements of the 1/128th Infantry and of Company B, 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)
enter on Turn 3 along the west edge of board(s) 35/37 (entry as a Rider is NA):



5

2

2



Elements of the Coastal Attack Force, 41st Infantry Division [ELR: 3] set up in Hinterland hexes east of stream 37oW1-34W10 (but not in the same hex as a U.S. unit); no hidden/concealed unit may set up adjacent to any U.S. unit; [SAN: 4]



3

6

9

2

3

2

16



3

10

1. EC are Wet, with a Mild Breeze from the north at start.
2. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect. The 37A5-GG5 road does exist, but the bridge remains a Ford and the road rate/bonus (B3.41/B3.4) is NA.
3. Place Overlay **1** on 37D2-D1, and **5** on 37W9-W10. Place Overlay **Be4** with 401-402 on 35L9-L8, **Be5** with 501-502 on 35X9-X8, **Be6** with 601-602 on 519-518, **Ef1** on 610-603, **OC1** with 1012-1013 on 475-474, **OC2** with 2012-2013 on 575-574, and **OC3** with 3001-3002 on 676-675. Beach Slope is Slight.
4. The Americans receive one module of 100+mm OBA that can fire HE and SMOKE.

AFTERMATH: The GIs east of the stream fell back to the cover of its banks while the following platoon deployed along the west bank and opened fire. The 1st Battalion's armor support—a platoon of M10 tank destroyers—soon arrived and began blasting the Japanese positions, but the enemy gunfire was so intense that one TD was quickly put out of commission. The remaining armor withdrew even as further American reinforcements arrived, and the fierce firefight continued unabated. Finally, field artillery was zeroed in on the Japanese and, one by one, Major Hoshino's guns fell silent. With no heavy weapons remaining in action, the Japanese retreated, and the 1st Battalion resumed its advance to the Drimor.

THE DOOMED BATTALIONS

The Allied Minors in ASL

By Charles Markuss

ADVANCED SQUAD LEADER without the minor Allied forces is like reading only the last half of a book; to understand the Axis successes of 1939-41, one must also understand their opponents. *THE LAST HURRAH* ushers the revamped Allied Minor forces onto our cardboard battlefields, bringing new challenges and—one of the great selling points of *ASL*—yet more variety. Except for Poland, the armies of the Allied minors are generally dismissed in histories of the war with a few paragraphs (at best, pages), tending to remain grey, shapeless forces with no particular national traits and usually cast in the role of cannon-fodder or live dummies for the Axis military to experiment upon. This article attempts to color-in the Allied Minors, explain the reasons behind their particular game characteristics, and briefly outline their involvement in the war—hopefully showing that the traditional view of these forces is too sweeping and simplistic. As with the article on the Axis Minors in the last *ASL Annual*, any discussion of their armor and ordnance is premature, and therefore outside the scope of this piece.

Although the Axis leadership had contempt for their eventual enemies, the larger Allied powers were, despite the myths, equally indifferent to the interests and plight of the minor Allies and put their own cynical desires to hamper or weaken the Axis forces above the consequences for their (often reluctant) new "allies". The Western Allies did nothing to help Poland (when German western defenses were weak), and had already allowed Hitler to bloodlessly destroy the only democracy in central Europe (Czechoslovakia) and her superb army. Their meddling in Norwegian affairs provoked a German invasion. British encouragement of the anti-Axis coup in Yugoslavia brought the latter disaster. When the Greek dictator Metaxas refused British help, Churchill observed "one cannot force little dogs to eat mutton" and his envoy later gave the dictator's successor an exaggerated notion of potential British aid. Yugoslavia's Prince Paul would complain, with good reason, "You big nations are hard. You talk of honor but you are far away."

On the other hand, the minor Allies did little to help themselves, neglecting their own defenses and stubbornly pursuing neutrality because the best option—collective security—had been discredited in 1914 when entangling treaties dragged nation after nation into the private feud between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Also, like the minor Axis powers, the minor Allied powers were not necessarily on friendly terms with one another and there was little military cooperation between neighbors like Belgium and Holland, between Greece and Yugoslavia, or between Poland and the surrounding states (the Polish government alienated potential Balkan allies with strident nationalistic policies which provoked rather than placated Hitler). Norway, like a certain movie actress, just wanted to be left alone.

For reasons of space, Denmark and Luxembourg will not be discussed in detail here. With an army of just two divisions, the 3.5 million Danes were quickly conquered by stealth on 9 April 1940, losing between 13 and 26 dead (sources vary). Luxembourg's 150,000 citizens were protected by 438 regular soldiers, 270 policemen, and some citizen-guards who were outwitted more than outfought by German troops disguised as "tourists". To avoid reprisals, no organized resistance occurred, although seven Luxembourgers were wounded in skirmishing on 10 May 1940.



BELGIUM

After the devastation of the Great War, Belgium concluded various defense agreements with Britain and France while maintaining a 12-division army until 1923. But growing increasingly neutralist (and poor), the government reduced these forces in 1926. By 1934, King Leopold III (CinC of the armed forces) felt that treaties with foreign powers were detrimental to Belgian interests, and Anglo-French impotence over Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 led Belgium to revoke all such treaties and declare permanent neutrality. Now self-reliant, increased funds were allocated for fortifications and the motorization of some units, but the demographic consequences of the 1914-18 war had reduced the potential intake of recruits into the armed forces—to the extent that Belgium's army of 650,000 men represented 46% of the adult male population (a huge commitment for a nation of only eight million people).

The army comprised six active and 12 reserve infantry divisions: two of *Chasseurs Ardennais* (one motorized just before the war), two of cavalry, plus two *Gendarmerie*, two Frontier Guards, two Fortress, two AA and five artillery regiments, a battalion of "Frontier Cyclists", a five-battalion Special Fortress unit, eight engineer battalions, 45 "Static" battalions to guard communications and bases, nine territorial battalions and sundry support/training units. The whole force, defensively organized and equipped, was incapable of fighting outside Belgium in the mobile war about to engulf it due to a plethora of heavy equipment and unrealistic training. What little armor Belgium had was no match for the panzers; the reserve divisions used obsolete weapons; and the AA guns in service were too few to protect her installations (for instance, those deployed at the airfields were badly sited in open fields and already pin-pointed by Abwehr intelligence).

To defend the country, reliance was placed on canal defenses and fortresses (the latter regarded, in 1940, as the most formidable of their kind in the world) with the hub at Eben Emael. But the latter, built in 1932-35 mainly by German contractors, belied its reputation as it neither commanded the surrounding terrain, the neighboring canal bridges, nor the nearby (Dutch) town of Maastricht and could never have halted the *blitzkrieg* even if tenaciously defended. The revised German plan of attack through the Ardennes reduced it to a strategic backwater, albeit of great propaganda value when captured. All Belgian fortresses were manned by "fortress troops"—a euphemism for older, unfit men unsuitable for front-line duty. Why, Eben Emael even lacked defensive trenches to protect the gun embrasures, mines, barbed wire and AA guns. Elsewhere too, Belgian defenses were more symbolic

than real: many firing positions were unusable due to vegetation overgrowth, while the harsh winter hampered construction and left many trenches and fortifications in a bad state. Natural camouflage was inadequate, and barbed wire largely absent because the farmers complained about the hindrance it caused their operations.

These weaknesses were compounded by Belgian neutrality, quickly reaffirmed when Poland was invaded, which frustrated all Anglo-French attempts to plan a joint defense until it was too late. Even in May 1940, some Belgians obstructed the "uninvited" entry of British troops into Belgium. Meanwhile, the lack of Belgian-Dutch military cooperation compromised the defenses of both countries (see below under "Holland"). Belgium's neutralist stance appears to have been partly due to the influential General van Overstraeten (King Leopold's personal military advisor), who had no confidence in the French army, whatever its reputation elsewhere.

Only in March 1940 did Belgium finally discuss joint defensive plans with representatives from Britain and France, from which meetings the "Dyle-Breda Plan" emerged. The main defense line (still incomplete when Germany attacked) ran from Antwerp to Namur, deep inside Belgium, but depended on the Belgians holding forward positions on the Albert Canal for five days until the Allies could move into Belgium, and the plan made no allowance for a simultaneous enemy attack on Holland. Unfortunately, German paratroopers landed between the first and second echelons of Belgium's 7th Division guarding this waterway and, with Luftwaffe support, quickly penetrated the Belgian defenses to form two secure bridgeheads fed by previously-captured bridges. These vital links over the Meuse were ready for demolition, but the engineers allotted to this task were given little discretion. The NCOs in charge of the detachments were reluctant to display any initiative following the repercussions of an accidental explosion in Liege in 1939, relying instead on direct orders from their HQ in Lanaken. Before it could order the destruction of these critical bridges, the HQ itself was destroyed by the Luftwaffe on 10 May, and so the Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven bridges were captured intact by the invaders.

Despite numerous warnings of a pending German attack, Belgium only "invited" Allied forces in to help some hours after the invasion and much (avoidable) confusion ensued, to their common detriment. The Belgian General Michiels, doubtless influenced by false alerts in April, had granted his troops leave on 25 April and 9 May, despite the evidence of German troop movements along the border. The German use of Allied uniforms at Maaseik and elsewhere, plus the deployment of German airborne troops behind the Allied lines and governmental warnings about "fifth columnists", helped produce a psychosis that distracted many Belgian soldiers at the expense of fighting the Germans at the front, thereby exhausting them in the fruitless pursuit of innocent civilians and guarding unthreatened installations.

Moreover, the Belgians (like the French) had neglected the Ardennes. Although the *Chasseurs Ardennais* staged some token resistance there and even delayed the Germans in some places, most of the defense was entrusted to just seven battalions of *Chasseurs* with almost no reserves. French preparations to cover the sector were even more minimal. The *Chasseurs* were to retreat northwards once the fight began, conducting a rear-guard action, and re-

join the rest of the Belgian army, leaving the French (supposedly) to seal-up the area while the Belgians concentrated around the country's population centers. Described by Petrarch 600 years earlier as a region of "savage and inhospitable forests", the defensive value of the Ardennes was vastly overestimated in 1940 despite the lessons of history. Many successful 16th and 18th century offensives had been launched through it, but French commanders remembered only their costly offensive of August 1914, which had failed and established its "impenetrable" reputation. French maneuvers in 1938 confirmed that the high Ardennes plateau was excellent tank country, but the information was suppressed in case it "upset the troops".

Commencing on 11 May, four days earlier than planned, the Belgians began to withdraw under German pressure to the Dyle line; the next day they ceased to fight as an independent force as they came under direct French command. Some fortress garrisons in the Liege area remained at their posts however, and the Belgian troops also bravely resisted Rommel's crossing of the Meuse (although their counterattacks failed). Unfortunately, the German breakthrough at Sedan now rendered the Dyle plan obsolete; on 16 May the withdrawal of all Allied forces from Belgium to a new line along the Scheldt was implemented, leaving the Belgians very bitter since this effectively doomed their country. To add insult to injury, their allies then proposed another withdrawal to the Yser to gather enough forces for the 21 May Arras counterattack. The Belgians refused since their army was now too weary for such retreats to the unprepared Yser position, and the move would undermine the flagging morale of the Belgian troops. Indeed, though the *Chasseurs* were engaged in bitter fighting along the River Dendre, some formations were already disintegrating.

By 24 May, the Belgian army was spread precariously in a 95-mile arc stretching from Medin to the sea with a defensive line running along the Lys (a shallow river some 20-30 meters wide, with many curves and dykes to complicate the defense) over which the Germans had a height advantage from their side. Early on 25 May the Germans broke through at Deynze, forcing the Belgians back to a line from Roulers to Menin, and even a spirited counterattack by the weary *Chasseurs* failed. By evening two Belgian pockets around Courtrai and Deynze had been formed, which the Germans settled in to reduce the next day. Appeals for reinforcements led to *ad hoc* elements of the 3rd Reserve Division being thrown in, but understrength and without heavy weapons, it achieved nothing but slaughter. On 27 May, the Belgian center near Tielalong ruptured along a five-mile stretch, placing what was left of the army in a hapless position. But to give their allies more time to retreat and regroup, the Belgian surrender was delayed another day. Although unjustly condemned for allegedly "deserting" their allies, the latter were now doomed anyway; too, any earlier Belgian capitulation—which would certainly have saved lives—would have caused even more problems. The Belgian forces had fought well for over two weeks, despite handicaps, until almost all of Belgium had been overrun. The tenacity and stubborn spirit of Belgian soldiers surprised the Germans. Belgium's short war "began as a fiasco and ended in tragedy", costing her some 23350 casualties (of whom 7500 were killed in combat).

GREECE

Greece had been a traditional foe of Turkey (from whom independence was won in 1830) for generations, but it took a British invasion of Greece in 1915 to bring her into the Great War against the Central Powers. The subsequent peace terms revealed considerable British duplicity towards

Greece, since several islands claimed by the Greek government were given to Italy (as pay-off for joining the right side in the war) while Britain herself failed to return Cyprus to Greek rule. Turkey, being a defeated power, was also unhappy with the terms, but when a revolution followed there, Greece lost no time invading to safeguard her territorial claims. However, early and easy Greek victories were her undoing when Greek nationalists pressed for further hostilities to grab even more land. By 1922, things went seriously wrong; Greece lost her Anglo-French support and in August a Turkish counter offensive mauled the Greek army badly. The influx of about a million refugees brought Greece more economic problems and violent political strife, and a short-lived coup was an ominous portent in 1925. The growing recession and ever-changing governments precipitated another in 1935, and in August 1936 General Metaxas seized power. He and his followers were pro-German anglophobes who regarded Bulgaria as Greece's greatest potential threat, and so constructed the strong "Metaxas Line" in north-west Greece to meet this apparent danger.

But the real threat came from Fascist Italy. Mussolini, initially coveting Yugoslavian holdings, had been thwarted by Hitler's veto of any Italian invasion in case it destabilized the Balkans and so jeopardize *Barbarossa*. *Il Duce* chose Greece as a target instead and tried to first provoke war (to "pay" Hitler back, he told the Germans nothing of his intentions). When the wily Metaxas ignored the provocations, Mussolini took this as a sign of weakness and declared war on 28 October 1940. Metaxas preferred, like Spain's Franco, to remain a sympathetic neutral power and Hitler (who had some sympathy for Greece in turn) was most annoyed and embarrassed. Now Greece's large merchant fleet, especially the tankers, and air bases would greatly assist the Allies. Metaxas, in turn, declined British offers of help in case such should provoke German intervention.

The Italians had chosen the wrong opponent at the wrong time, attacking when the mountain passes from Albania to Greece were snow-choked. The essentially road-bound Italians, over-equipped for the steep terrain, soon were bogged down by mud, swollen rivers, snow, and the fierce Greek resistance. The Greeks soon infiltrated their positions and in local counterattacks pushed the Italians back with some 30000 casualties. An *Alpini* division was wiped out and 5000 POWs taken. The Italian air force failed to delay Greek mobilization and within two weeks the Italians were outnumbered 5-to-2 as 13 more reserve divisions helped the Greek army carry the war back into Albania. Having been given just two weeks' notice of Mussolini's plans, the logistical system of the under-supplied Italians collapsed in December when he doubled its forces to 16 divisions. Reports came that apparently 40 Italians froze to death daily during that winter. But Greek logistics also collapsed, halting their offensive, and about 10% of their estimated 60000 casualties were probably frost-bite amputations. Nevertheless, by the end of 1940, 25% of Albania was under Greek occupation; early in 1941, 14 Greek divisions were still pushing back 19 Italian ones. The destruction of three Italian divisions brought national humiliation. Hitler could now no longer ignore Mussolini's appeal for help. Soon, German plans were made to occupy Bulgaria and then deal with Greece and Yugoslavia.

In 1940, the Greek army had about 430000 men in six infantry and nine mountain divisions, four mountain brigades and a cavalry division. By March 1941, it numbered 540000 men (of whom approximately 50 thousand had received just one month's training) comprising five infantry and 14 mountain divisions, an infantry brigade, a "motorized" division, and one of cavalry. But expansion compromised quality as always; fighting Italy was one thing, but resisting German forces quite another

since Greece lacked motor vehicles, mobile artillery, AFVs and aircraft. Most of her artillery was of Czech, French or German manufacture, and once ammunition stocks were exhausted only small amounts (from the USA) would be available. Britain agreed to supply captured Italian weapons (the only AT guns were "souvenirs" from Libya). Many Greek divisions existed in name only, and even the motorized division consisted of just 2000 newly-conscripted garage laborers, a few British and Italian vehicles, plus some civilian cars and motorcycles along with 24 Dutch and Italian tankettes. Of the four cavalry regiments, only one had any armored cars, and all had just one four-gun battery of artillery in support.

Metaxas died in January 1941, and his successor Alexandros Koryzsis reluctantly sought British help (in exchange for bases on Crete) after Germany occupied Bulgaria in March. The Greek army meanwhile defeated yet another Italian offensive in Albania. Some 50-62 thousand men (sources vary) were sent by Britain to help defend this hard-fighting new ally, arriving just before the German invasion on 6 April. But even with this help, Greece's ability to resist this onslaught was undermined by the Yugoslavian-Greek failure to mount a joint defense to optimize the area's geography. Too, of no help was the Greek insistence on deploying most of her men on the Albania front and by her reluctance to abandon the port of Salonika, which allowed the largely irrelevant Metaxas line defenses to soak up troops at the expense of the shorter but more crucial Aliakmon defensive line.

Italy launched a new offensive to exploit the changed situation and (sensing that their position was hopeless with Germany in the war) some Greek commanders vainly advocated immediate surrender. The Germans quickly capitalized on the extended Allied deployment in Albania, Eastern Macedonia/Thrace and on the Aliakmon river/Axios plain. Although the Greek forts in Thrace stubbornly resisted the Stukas, demo charges and flame-throwers, the fortresses at Ekhinos and Nymphaea were taken on 8 April and that at Kelkayia the next day after its defenders were (literally) smoked-out. Moving from Skopje in Yugoslavia, the Germans quickly penetrated the Salonika defenses to turn the Greek flank and overrun northern Greece. The Metaxas line fell on 8-9 April after what the Germans themselves admitted had been heroic resistance, and Greece's East Macedonia army surrendered when Salonika was taken on 9 April.

The planned Greek offensive in Albania was cancelled when German units reached Prilep in nearby Yugoslavia on 8 April and approached the Monastir gap to threaten the Greek rear. The next day German units moved through this pass to cut off all Greek forces in Albania; all Allied resistance on this front ended on 23 April when the Germans captured Ionnina and the 300000-man Greek force disintegrated. Greece's northern flank collapsed on 16 April, and wholesale surrenders ensued (some Greek troops even firing on their own dissenting officers), prejudicing any hopes of a prolonged Allied stand in the mountains of central Greece. The sudden collapse amid evidence of treachery in government circles drove Koryzsis to suicide. The fighting degenerated after 18 April into a series of violent, brave but futile, blocking actions until the remaining Allied formations had nowhere left to retreat. On 21 April, King Georgios II was advised to end the carnage. He and his government fled to Cairo three days later, as the Axis carved up their country. The Greek forces had suffered some 15700 casualties during the German invasion, with 270000 of their soldiers briefly POWs.

But, as in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, defeat did not mean an end to the struggle. With a long tradition of resistance to conquest, the Greek partisan movement would bedevil the Axis occupation forces right through 1945.



HOLLAND

Since the final defeat of Napoleon, Holland had been a neutral power and had benefitted considerably (in economic terms) from non-participation in the Great War. So, when Europe lurched towards another, the Dutch were again convinced that the destruction would pass them by, even though they had refused (in 1939) a German request to allow occupation of certain strategic locations in Holland. Initially German plans for invasion of the West had excluded Holland, but the Luftwaffe commanders wanted Dutch airbases to enable their short-ranged bombers to attack Britain, so the country was added to the list of victims. Despite having a larger population (11 million in 1940) than Belgium, Holland's army was smaller due to strong neutralist sentiments stemming from the observed horrors of 1914-18. There was little interest in, and great reluctance to spend money on, defensive measures even when the economic recession receded and clear signs of a looming European war emerged. The army was a distasteful conversation topic in polite Dutch society. By the late '30s, that army was badly run-down and poorly equipped; the substantial funds spent on it in the period 1938-40 came too late.

The *Landmacht* was organized, militia-fashion, with a potential annual intake of 20-60 thousand men serving for 11 months, and then receiving refresher courses over the next six years. But although 73000 men were declared liable for military service in 1938, only 19500 were inducted. When Holland's forces were mobilized in April 1940, there were 270000, including reservists (far fewer, proportionally, than Belgian commitment), available in a home defense force of limited versatility, with a professional cadre of just 6500 officers and 6500 men. The rest varied in age from 20 to 40. With the extra two divisions added in 1940, Holland fielded just 11 divisions grouped into four corps (based at Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Arnhem and Breda) each of two infantry divisions and three artillery regiments. There was also a light division (of two bicycle regiments), four cavalry regiments, two of "motor cavalry", the corps motorized artillery, a coastal artillery regiment, an engineer brigade, plus specialist engineer and AA formations (sources vary on their exact titles and duties). The AA and AT capability was token and wholly inadequate, while the armored forces were purely nominal with just 24 armored cars (another 12 newer ones never saw action) and seven tanks. Indeed, there were more AFVs in the Dutch East Indies than there were "at home".

Holland, like the other minor Allied powers, refused to allow her future allies to know her war plans or inspect her defenses, even though the only option open was to hold out until Allied aid came should Nazi Germany invade. This non-cooperation left a large gap between the Dutch army and their allied neighboring forces when Holland withdrew her troops north of the Waal-Meuse in late February because Belgium refused to guard the southern flank of the Peel defensive line. Repeated warnings from sympathetic German officers between November 1939 and the very eve of invasion that Germany would indeed attack were ignored too.

Dutch forward defenses comprised the Yssel and Meuse, Grebbe and Peel-Raam lines to screen "Fortress Holland" (the continuum of William of Nassau's 16th-century defense against the Spanish), comprising all Holland northeast of the River Lek running south from Muiden on the IJsselmeer near Amsterdam in an "S" shape to Breda and then along the Waal from Gorinchem to the sea at Dordrecht. Rotterdam, the hub of Dutch communications, the Hague and Amsterdam all lay within its confines; the forces deployed as a forward screen outside this area were to fall back into the "fortress" and hold it to the bitter end with the reserve divisions stationed therein. To augment this strategy, the Dutch command relied upon the destruction of bridges over the extensive waterways and on the flooding of lowlying lands south of the Grebbe line.

The OKW, aware that defensive flooding might impede the German advance, gave the invading forces the smallest tank element in the entire *Fall Gelb* OB, but allocated 4000 of the 4500 paratroopers available to support the attack by seizing key bridges at Maastricht, Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Moerdijk behind the Dutch defensive lines. At a cost of 180 casualties, these objectives were all captured, but plans to also land troops in the Hague and capture the Dutch government, High Command and Royal Family (plus three nearby airfields) failed due to navigational problems and some fierce opposition (especially by the 3rd Grenadiers at Ypenburg). The Hague gambit was abandoned and the German survivors joined in the attack on Rotterdam. But even these tactical set-backs caused much confusion detrimental to the Dutch efforts by fueling rumors about "fifth columnists" or Germans in disguise running amok in rear areas (as did the subterfuge at Gennap and elsewhere), spreading out the already tired Dutch troops and preventing their more profitable use in other places.

The speed and fury of the German assault and the ruse of employing troops in Dutch uniforms to capture the important Gennap bridge caught the Dutch on the wrong foot (even though they knew that the Germans had previously stolen such uniforms from them). In effect, the Germans cut Holland in two before Allied help could arrive, while their speedy establishment of air superiority was decisive. On 10 May many Dutch troops were caught asleep at Waalhaven airfield and suffered heavy losses because earlier warnings about careless deployment without regard for the Luftwaffe's abilities were ignored. But the bitter fighting around the Willems Bridge in Rotterdam showed that the Dutch could fight, even if their tough Marines (who had narrowly escaped pre-war disbandment) failed to dislodge the Germans. With reinforcements, the hard-pressed Germans occupied southern Rotterdam and still held small enclaves on the north side of the river on 11 May. Repeated air strikes that day began to undermine the poorly-armed and trained Dutch reservists, but all attempts to reach the north bank failed. More German reinforcements, landed at Waalhaven, continued to reach the area around the bridge and by evening of 13 May elements of the 9th Panzer Division arrived in the city, but still the Dutch held the north side of the river.

Elsewhere in Holland, the position was desperate by 12 May, and negotiations for an armistice began on the 14th. The Luftwaffe was due to attack Rotterdam that afternoon in support of another attempt to reach the trapped Germans on the north side, but when the Dutch commander in the city stalled for time, the deadline for a surrender was supposedly delayed until 6PM that day. Tragically, frantic attempts to recall the now airborne bombers were only partially successful, and 57 aircraft attacked the Dutch defenders along the north bank, as well as a margarine factory by mistake. The ensuing blaze killed 981 civilians, and rumors that up to 30000 had perished, together with German plans to give the Dutch defenders of Utrecht the

same treatment, induced the Dutch government to surrender six hours later (although units in Zeeland resisted until 17 May). Considering their handicaps, the Dutch fought well—even if the quality of resistance was patchy (outside Rotterdam, most defenses crumbled quickly). After the war the Dutch High Command was roundly blamed for the *Landmacht's* poor showing, even though the Germans had expressed surprise at the tenacity of some Dutch units. In the fighting, 2900 military personnel were killed. At best, Holland might have delayed, but not prevented, her defeat.

The Dutch East Indies lasted as an independent entity somewhat longer. These islands (whose oil and minerals the Japanese coveted) were protected by just 1000 officers and 34000 men, of whom 28000 were native troops, largely territorial guards with rudimentary training, organized notionally as a division plus several independent units. The best were the 400 Dutch Marines on Java certainly. There were, theoretically, also a few dozen light wheeled AFVs of varying origin, but according to the Australian intelligence reports not all were serviceable and, together with 16 British light tanks, were to be used as infantry support or as airfield security on Java. Overall, the Dutch defenders (and the Australian and British troops deployed there in support after the fall of Holland) did not compare with the hardened Japanese veterans of the China campaign that were to descend. Moreover, the Allies were thinly-spread over a huge area and constrained in movement between locations and islands by the enemy air and naval superiority when the invasion came.

Thus the Japanese enjoyed local numerical advantages (defeating the Allies in detail), as well as considerable local support (absent in Malaya and the Philippines) since the native population regarded the Japanese as liberators. Japan had carefully cultivated such sentiment beforehand by infiltrating local nationalist groups, whereas the Dutch administrators failed to exploit any anti-Japanese feelings created by the invasion and arrogantly expected the native islanders to rally round them. Indeed, so violent were nationalist attacks on prominent Dutchmen that the Japanese had great difficulty restoring order in Java and elsewhere after their victory.

A chronology of Japan's conquest of the Dutch East Indies cannot be given here, but against largely ineffectual resistance, the area was overrun in three months (whereas the Japanese themselves had estimated six). To be fair to the Dutch and their allies in the Pacific, some did resist bravely: at Tarakan in January 1942 and in a subsequent 12-month guerrilla campaign there; on Ceram in February a four-day battle was fought before the Allies surrendered; on Timor, the Australians with some Dutch fought on as guerrillas for nearly a year after the invasion; while on Sumatra, Dutch colonial troops resisted fiercely for two days against Japanese paratroopers until four battalions of sea-borne reinforcements arrived to help subdue the defenders.

NORWAY

Norway severed its union with Sweden in 1905 and remained neutral through World War I even though her large merchant fleet suffered heavy losses in Allied service. Continuing over a century of tradition, most Norwegians between the wars subscribed to the catch-phrase "we want no foreign policy"; their governments displayed an "obsessive concern with neutrality", preferring the "power of international law" to pursuing either foreign policy or a defense program worthy of the name. The army's CiC, General Laake, was noted more for agreeing to spending cuts than for his military abilities; and, while Norway's socio-economic achievements were most impressive, her defenses were not. The population of 3 million was

protected by an army of just 7000 (in theory, 30000 in six divisions). Most ironic, the 1933 defense budget's proclaimed intention was to equip the cavalry with tanks, but it took years to save up to buy even one "so that the . . . soldiers could at least see one sample in their lifetime." Neither the worsening international situation nor the army's efforts to enlist support for their plight changed anything in Norwegian policy.

But then, an invasion of Norway hardly seemed inevitable. As early as 1934, Hitler had expressed a willingness to occupy Sweden rather than "abandon" the Scandinavians to British or Soviet influence, but Norway was excluded from his plans even though Admiral Raeder wanted Norwegian bases for the *Kriegsmarine* (and from 1938 onwards tried to change the dictator's mind on the subject). The British, French and Germans had no special interest in Norway, and were so ignorant of the country that all were forced to hurriedly buy tourist guides when the fighting started. Norway was sucked into the maelstrom because of the perceived importance of her position astride a crucial German supply route; obsessed with reducing her imports of iron ore as a quick way to defeat Germany, British and French leaders were prepared to use force to interrupt these shipments from Sweden through Norwegian territory/waters if diplomatic methods failed (which they did). Up to 75% of German iron ore imports did come by this route, and Allied plans to mine Norwegian waters were made in late 1939 (albeit, initially rejected by the Chamberlain government). The Soviet invasion of Finland then gave Allied planners the idea of occupying Sweden's ore mines in a military expedition ostensibly intended to help the Finns against the Russians, but the "hare-brained" British and even more absurd French plans were luckily pre-empted by the Finnish surrender. The whole sordid tale of Allied plotting, wrangling and bungled intervention in Norwegian affairs cannot be related here, but suffice to say that Norwegian neutrality was completely undermined.

When the Norwegian Jonsson Quisling sought Hitler's support for a coup by his *Nasjonal Samling* party during a visit to Germany in December 1939, he received a promise that German troops would occupy Norway only if evidence of an Allied attempt to do so emerged, but Hitler would prefer Norwegian neutrality to committing large numbers of troops there at the expense of an imminent showdown with France. Low-priority invasion planning was begun, however, and as this matured indications were received that the Allies did indeed intend to land in Norway "en route" to Finland. The *Altmark* incident especially (when Norwegian warships did nothing to stop the British from boarding a German ship in Norwegian waters on 16 February 1940) stung the German command into action, and Norway's protests to Britain impressed no one in Berlin. Norway had shown that she would not enforce her neutrality, and with further evidence of Allied intentions coming from other sources, the Germans quickly completed plans for an invasion set for 9 April.

Despite various warnings (all ignored), Norway was unprepared. At worst, a limited German reaction to a British minelaying sortie in Norwegian waters on April 8 was expected, and the Norwegians seemed hypnotized by the prospect of a British landing thereafter. As late as 8 April nothing more warlike than a report on the estimated costs of mobilizing the four brigades in southern Norway was sanctioned, and when the government did decide to mobilize two of these no urgency was shown in informing the military. Even as the Germans landed in droves, no Norwegians were, officially, mobilized until 11 April because (in effect) "partial and secret" mobilization had already been implemented—which entailed notifying men by mail at 48 hours notice—in the absence of any machinery for the hastier "general" mobilization.

Only a fortunate, and erroneous, reference to the latter in a radio broadcast led many Norwegians to enlist on their own initiative. In Oslo this occurred just hours before the Germans arrived, while in many cities it continued in front of the German troops!

The loss of the Germans' campaign staff on the cruiser *Bluecher* delayed German capture of Oslo, while Colonel Ruge's improvised defenses around Midtskogen bought time for the Norwegian government to escape capture—even though it still professed to prefer negotiating with the invaders to resisting them. Governmental inertia was mirrored at military headquarters; General Laake was "struck dumb" by news of the invasion, and when recovered advocated surrender. To quarantine such defeatism, the King replaced him on 11 April with Ruge, but two precious days had been wasted. Of course, the necessarily hasty evacuation of the army's HQ to Rena, then to Oyer hardly helped; and Germany's seizure of the radio stations on 10 April also delayed the issue of mobilization orders. The usual hysteria about "fifth columnists" and disguised Germans also hampered the efforts of some of Ruge's liaison officers.

The Germans quickly established themselves in Norway despite suffering some heavy losses at Fornebu airfield near Oslo and in Oslofjord. Some Norwegian units were simply engulfed, as at Sola airfield near Stavanger. But those at Bergen had time to react and withdrew inland unmolested. Meanwhile the defenders of the old fort at Hegra east of Trondheim came to epitomize Norwegian resistance; here 50 (later 260) Norwegians, a typical mixture of soldiers (remnants of the scattered 3rd Artillery Regiment) and civilians, beat off many determined assaults using weapons salvaged from the fort to augment the few brought with them, and even sent out ski patrols and conducted reconnaissance. Hegra did not fall until 5 May when the food situation became critical, and had come to symbolize national defiance.

However, the *ad hoc* mobilization and swift German assault caused the rapid demise of the Norwegian divisional TO&Es when the six divisional headquarters, scattered throughout Norway, were overrun; those officers who eluded the Germans had to use their own initiative to improvise forces in the absence of any orders from above. Only the 6th Division at Harstad in the Lofoten Islands remained substantially intact, mobilizing undisturbed under the determined and aggressive General Fleischer, although at Narvik an elderly officer disobeyed him and surrendered the 450-man garrison precipitously. Only half of these could be extricated (by bluff) to fight on by Fleischer. He also lost one of his best battalions in costly counterattacks between 23 and 25 April at Gratangen and Lappaug; thereafter the division was reorganized into two battalions. Elsewhere the divisional TO&Es became academic. For instance, the "2nd Division" was merely the nucleus of the 2nd Field Brigade Group with second-line and garrison troops filling out the units, at most 10000 men divided into four groups known either by the name of their CO or the district in which they fought. Like guerrilla forces, formations changed rapidly as conditions dictated, and manpower fluctuated as volunteers joined or sub-units were shed. The largest had, at best, two battalions (with perhaps some ski troops), a few guns and some engineers. Occasionally heavier weapons for small units were scrounged from the British or French to support them.

Thanks to Ruge's improvisation and superb organizational skills, the Norwegians managed to resist until Allied help arrived, even though the largest number of Norwegian personnel available to him at any time was 25000, and in all there were just 40000 (from the 100000 theoretically on hand). Moreover, organizational changes of 1 April meant that many so-called soldiers were actually just raw

recruits. With these, Ruge sought to restrict the Germans to the south coast long enough to permit an orderly mobilization in Norway's interior, gradually fighting a retreat to the northwest and trading space for time. But his hopes were dashed when the heavily-reinforced Germans pushed north, west and east from Oslo on 13 April and swept aside his makeshift roadblocks manned by ill-armed and worn-out soldiers and volunteers. Attempts to stabilize the front line from Randsfjord and Lake Mjøsa's eastern shore were aided by the rough, wooded terrain favoring the defenders who used small blocking forces deployed in depth. Ordered to hold their positions until vastly superior enemy forces were in contact, they would then retreat to new positions while massive demolitions were carried out to impede the German advance. This strategy worked well until 17 April, when the improved weather facilitated Luftwaffe support for the ground troops, whereupon Ruge was forced to continually thin his forces to block new German threats. However, the overconfident Germans were sometimes punished severely, as at Dombas where 200 German paratroopers were forced to surrender on 20 April after temporarily cutting Norwegian communications, while at Narvik the Germans remained bottled-up for most of the campaign.

From 14 April the arrival of British and French forces changed the Norwegian role in the war to one of giving their allies generous support, despite being badly treated by them in return. Ruge was deliberately excluded from Allied planning sessions, and Norwegian advice was usually ignored (with lamentable consequences for the British). His forces were left largely to their own devices because he had great difficulty persuading suspicious British officers (many of whom behaved "with the arrogance of Prussians") to cooperate with Norwegian objectives, even though the Anglo-French forces were almost immobile in the country without Norwegian help. The Norwegians were soon frustrated by the Britons' inability to operate in deep snow, and these inadequately equipped and untrained allies had to be given snow camouflage, snow shoes and skis by the Norwegians—in return for which almost no weapons nor ammunition were supplied despite numerous British promises. Ruge's forces were thus prevented from fulfilling their true military potential, and their allies displayed a wholly unjustified low opinion of their training and methods.

Despite having ammunition for just one day's fighting, the 5th Norwegian Brigade gave their "allies" valuable tactical support in the Steinkjer/Verdal area (including their trucks and ski troops) and at Kjorem—until the British decided to evacuate, without telling them! Even then the Norwegians transported them back 100 miles and provided flank protection for the withdrawal. At Dombas too, Norwegian ski troops and artillery helped the British run back to their Andalsnes base. Around Lake Snaasa the Allies left the 5th Brigade in the lurch by retreating so stealthily that the Norwegians continued the agreed-upon advance on Steinkjer, unaware that their flanks were now unsupported; by the evening of 2 May the Norwegians were alone with their flanks and rear infiltrated by the enemy, and it says much for these "amateur" troops that they extricated themselves. But on reaching Namsos, the 5th Brigade found their supposed allies had sailed away, leaving much sabotaged equipment behind. Out of supplies, the 5th Brigade surrendered the next day (3 May), as did all Norwegian forces south of Trondheim.

Around Narvik there had been no progress since the 24th of April save the Norwegian capture of Gratangen, and their commander (like Ruge) was furious at the lack of British cooperation. In fact, the Allied attack on Narvik was the only successful allied venture in Norway. The 6th Norwegian Division and the French *Chasseurs d'Alpins* attacked

Bjerkvik to win a great tactical victory (even though the Norwegians were low on ammunition); and Norwegian troops further distinguished themselves fighting alongside the French Foreign Legion on Orneset beach and in storming the fiercely-defended Hill 457, being the first to enter Narvik's suburbs after the Germans broke out of the encirclement.

But such triumphs were by now academic. On 24 April the British decided that the defense of Norway was a lost cause, and events in western Europe after 10 May strengthened their resolve to evacuate. The French were consulted at once, but the Norwegians were informed only at the last possible moment (officially, at least) in June. On 1 June the evacuation began, and King Haakon and his cabinet accepted an offer of asylum in Britain, leaving on 7 June. No weapons were to be left behind for the Norwegians to use to fight on, on strict War Office instructions, although authority to leave behind 3000 rifles and ammunition for them was granted on 8 June—after the Allied ships were already at sea! The gallant 6th Division was disbanded the next day, and an armistice declared the next.

The stalwart Norwegians had lost 1335 killed, the British some 1869 casualties of all types (plus more at sea), and the French forces 533 men—although the Norwegians had borne the brunt of the fighting for a longer period of time. German losses amounted to 1317 men killed on land, and 2375 at sea or otherwise missing. Ironically Hitler's wish to avoid keeping large numbers of troops in Norway was (over the next four years) not to be.



POLAND

The Kingdom of Poland was founded in 1024 and gained considerable prestige until successive wars with Russia, Sweden and Turkey eroded its power over the centuries; the rise of Austria, Prussia and Russia ended its independent existence. Napoleon ostensibly improved Poland's fortunes when he forced Prussia to disgorge Polish territory in 1807 and created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. By 1813, however, the re-emergence of Prussia and Russia as continental powers doomed Polish self-determination until the Great War, when Russia declared Poland independent in 1916. The peace treaties confirmed this, but the Poles had to expel foreign troops first, and in doing so bred resentment to poison relations with otherwise natural allies like Czechoslovakia and Lithuania (in 1386, for a time, amalgamated with Poland) through petty territorial disputes. Instead Poland allied herself closely with remote friends like France.

The forced expulsion of foreign troops greatly enhanced the prestige of the army and its CinC Josef Pilsudski, the architect of victory, but his peacetime activities were less impressive. He remained aloof from civilian affairs while content to exert influence in the military alone. By 1926, political immaturity and factionalism had undermined the establishment of a democracy and Pilsudski, tired of the growing anarchy, staged a coup to remain Head of State until his death (although, in effect, he restricted himself to running the Polish armed forces). Much persecution (albeit unofficial) of political parties and ethnic minorities ensued.

The funds spent on Poland's army, its pride and joy, while huge by the standards of her weak (largely

agricultural) economy or in comparison with contemporary European levels generally, were paltry when measured against German or Soviet spending. So weak (from foreign exploitation) was Poland's economy that an armored division cost more than the annual defense budget, and all the funds spent on defense in 1935-39 represented just 10% of the 1939 Luftwaffe budget.

In 1939, Poland had an understrength 1918-style army of 30 infantry and 11 cavalry brigades, plus a mechanized brigade (with another still incomplete), two of engineers and 11 of artillery. By August 1939, there were 500 thousand men in uniform, with a potential pool of 2.5 million, of whom 80% were reservists. Even an efficient mobilization would have left her outnumbered 2-to-1 by Germany. But, thanks to Anglo-French pressure that month, that mobilization was delayed in case it "provoked" Hitler; Poland went to war with less than 50% of her forces mobilized and only 25% fully-equipped and in position. Worse still, the war caught her active divisions dispersed at the end of their 18-month training cycle, with only two-thirds of the men fully trained and the rest with less than six months' instruction. The (mostly) better trained Germans had over four times the aircraft, 40 times the motor vehicles, twice the troop strength, and 10 times the naval strength of their enemy. Whereas German infantry divisions had their horse-drawn transport augmented by 942 motor vehicles and 452 motorcycles, their Polish equivalents had four motor vehicles per regiment. Polish infantry battalions had only four guns apiece; even the French and Soviet formations had eight, and against the Germans this inferiority was even more pronounced since the latter's outraged the aged Polish ones. Generally speaking, Polish units had only about 50% of a comparable German unit's "combat power".

Although Poland had broken some of the *Enigma* codes in 1933, her military leaders (largely untrained in staff work) thought that the assessments of German plans and troop strengths made from this source were inaccurate and grossly overestimated the Wehrmacht's capabilities. In Poland at the time, tank formations were objects of derision by the military, whose unhappy experiences with their own little tankettes gave no clue as to what the panzers could accomplish; too much was made of the logistical weaknesses of armor. Pilsudski himself was no friend of modernization, and his army's complex organizational "channels" at high level stifled several attempts to bring the military up to date. German re-militarization had goaded Poland into forming a commission with this task in 1936, but few of its findings were implemented in time. For example, just four cavalry brigades were to be mechanized—by 1942. No funds were provided to begin the hasty tank, artillery, AA and AT gun production programs advocated. Thus, Poland struggled to build 50 tanks annually while Germany produced over 1000 in 1938 alone. When the war began, the Polish army had 887 light tanks, 574 small tankettes (many in poor condition), and 100 armored cars dispersed among the cavalry and infantry formations; Germany had some 3449 tanks concentrated in a few divisions.

Poland's political leaders, fully aware of the looming conflict with Germany, had vainly sought French participation in a pre-emptive strike against Hitler in 1934. In the event of war, they hoped to hold out until Britain and France intervened, clinging to their assurances that they would launch a major offensive in the West within two weeks to take the pressure off Poland. Given the huge disparity in forces, Poland had few other options and no hope of defending her long borders even with an army three times as large. Thus Poland left her border with the USSR largely undefended. All this was compounded by the absence of natural or man-made obstacles in the flat terrain and the fact that most Polish rivers were easily fordable in summer.

Such a "river defense" would, in any case, have entailed the abandonment of much of her population, most coalfields and military stockpiles. So Polish forces were centered opposite the likely German objectives in border areas with the intention of fighting a retreat which would "naturally" help concentrate Poland's forces to their tactical advantage. In reality, this deployment dispersed her army beyond safe limits.

The Poles were still mobilizing when the Germans attacked on 1 September 1939 from three directions: in the north through the disputed Pomeranian Corridor, in the center towards Lodz, and in the south heading for Krakow. Contrary to the myths, Polish cavalrymen did not knowingly charge German armor (this was the product of Italian war correspondents with some German embellishments after the action at Krojanty); although there were some clashes between German and Polish cavalry, the latter normally fought dismounted. German combat "expertise" was another myth, as many of their untried units initially behaved badly when under fire and all the initial attacks on Polish positions, clumsily executed, were bloodily repulsed. Only a series of repetitions brought success. Unfortunately, however, the Polish stoicism cost them dearly too, when their often exposed flanks caused them to withdraw on all fronts by 3 September. Many heroic actions were fought those first days, but the pattern and outcome never varied much; regrouping Polish forces proved impossible in daylight due to the Luftwaffe, while the mandatory night marches gave the infantry little rest to the detriment of their combat performance. The few fresh Polish reinforcements available had to push against the tide of refugees and stragglers.

By 3 September, the Germans were through the Pomeranian Corridor, ready to strike at Warsaw. The Polish defenses now contained many large gaps due to troop shortages and the strategy of withdrawal; the invaders drove deep into Poland thereafter and by 7 September were approaching the capital, where clumsy German tactics were again in evidence during the fighting in the suburbs. Here the Poles destroyed 57 of the 120 panzers sent against them by the 9th as a result. But the government fled the city for the Rumanian border to avoid capture, ordering its shrinking forces to rally here and defend a bridgehead into this sympathetic neighbor. Only the Polish counterattack at Bzura brought some—temporary—relief from the depressing series of disasters, when on this occasion the outnumbered Germans were caught completely off-guard. The drive to Warsaw was delayed to deal with this threatened flank and, as elsewhere, Germany's superiority in communications and mobility facilitated a fast reaction. After a week's fighting, the eight divisions of Poland's Army Poznan (plus various stragglers) were surrounded, and although some troops did fight their out of encirclement to reach Warsaw, the Poles lost some 25% of their entire army here.

Even worse, instead of the promised French offensive in the West, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and drove deep into their rear, threatening the Polish escape routes into Rumania and Hungary. Ironically, the Poles initially believed that the Russians had come to their rescue. With the situation now hopeless, Poland's government crossed into Rumania on 18 September (the next day) and ordered its forces to follow in the hope of reforming the army in France later. Savage fighting followed as Polish units pushed their way south from Lublin; indeed, the largest tank battle yet now occurred near Tomazow Lubelski, and daily German casualty-rates soared to their peak. Nazi and Soviet troops met on the 21st, while Lwow surrendered to the Russians the next day. Warsaw still held out, despite heavy air raids, until mounting civilian casualties brought its capitulation on 27 September, while the small garrison on the Hel

peninsula resisted until 1 October and fighting at Kock in eastern Poland lasted until 5 October.

The Germans would testify to the stubborn bravery of the "common" Polish soldier with good reason; of 1.1 million Poles mobilized, 66300 were killed, 133700 wounded, and 587000 taken prisoner. Another 200 thousand became Soviet prisoners (of whom 20000 were murdered), and 20000 died fighting the Russians. Some 100000 Poles escaped by various routes to the West to fight again. In exchange, Germany saw 16000 killed, 32000 wounded, and the loss of 674 tanks and 319 armored cars (of which 457 were repairable). The Soviets, coming into the conflict against a disintegrating foe, suffered about 900 killed in action.



YUGOSLAVIA

Officially entitled the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" until 1929, Yugoslavia was—like Frankenstein's monster—a crudely-assembled composite. All its constituent peoples had in common was their Slavic ancestry. Sixteen different languages were in daily use, and its 12 million inhabitants were split into Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians (former citizens of Austro-Hungary) on the one side and Serbs plus Montenegrans (i.e., former enemies) on the other. The Serbs had their own separate state in 1913 and, having lost 1.5 million dead (30% of the population) in the Great War, mistrusted their new fellow citizens, with good reason. With their King as head of the Yugoslav state, the Serbs saw themselves as the dominant ethnic group and strongly favored a monarchist government centered in Belgrade. But the Croats had nurtured aspirations for a semi-autonomous Slav state since the 19th century and therefore desired a federal Yugoslavia, the very antithesis of the Serbian model. This basic difference would underlay all of Yugoslavia's complex political turmoil, fueled by ethnic socio-economic rivalries, profound religious and cultural differences, plus chronic agrarian and economic problems.

With German and Italian support, the Croats used violence and a boycott of the Serbian-dominated parliamentary system to try and win independence between 1921 and 1928; thereafter King Alexander suspended the constitution following the assassination of several Croat politicians. The ensuing dictatorship was even more detrimental to Croatian interests, and although constitutional rule was restored in 1931, Serb-Croat hostility continued unabated, eventually claiming the king himself in a Croatian *Ustashi*-inspired bombing in 1934. The anglophilic Prince Paul became Regent, and in effect ruled the nation as a moderate dictator, attempting to keep Yugoslavia neutral when war broke out (despite his detestation of Nazi Germany) because the rapid Allied defeats left his country with no natural allies or markets for its foodstuffs and raw materials except the Axis states.

Hitler, seeking to expand his collection of Balkan satellites for the protection of the southern flank in the coming invasion of Russia, applied strong diplomatic pressure and threats to force Yugoslavia to join the Axis Tripartite Pact. Despite much stalling, Yugoslavia had little choice but to consent on 24 March 1941 in exchange for various "guarantees"

of their sovereignty. Obliging Hitler may have been a necessary evil, but a group of Yugoslav officers disagreed, staging a coup on 27 March to depose Prince Paul, sack his government, and put Prince Peter on the throne (with the air force General Simovic as Prime Minister). Amid much popular rejoicing, the new government tried desperately to mollify Hitler with promises to respect the Yugoslav commitment (while secretly negotiating with Britain and Greece for military aid), but he was not fooled and took the coup as a personal insult. To insure his policies, *Barbarossa* was delayed, and on 6 April Axis forces invaded from the north and east as the Luftwaffe made "punishment" raids on Belgrade which claimed 17000 lives.

Operation *Punishment* consisted of a thrust towards Skopje to cut Yugoslavia off from Greece, another towards Strumica and the lower Vardar, and one to capture the Greek port of Salonika. Two days later, more German units with the Bulgarians in support headed for Nis and then Belgrade, while others from Austria and Hungary moved into Slovenia and Croatia. Militarily, this was a sledgehammer used on a rather small nut, and so greatly had Hitler overestimated the Yugoslavs that only 24 of the 32 divisions in the German OB were actually needed. Moreover, other Axis powers had old scores to settle, and General von Mellenthin described the campaign as "virtually a military parade", with good reason. The Croats declared their independence on 10th April and actively helped the invaders, while the next day 16 Italian divisions moved slowly on Ljubljana and others advanced down the Dalmatian coast to Split and, by 17 April, Dubrovnik. Four Hungarian divisions moved into the Drava-Danube-Tisza "triangle" and by the 14th had occupied the Vojvodina region with just 65 casualties in the face of sporadic resistance from armed civilians. The invaders eventually included 458 thousand Germans, 340 thousand Italians, and 80 thousand Hungarians.

The Royal Yugoslav Army had a peacetime strength of 148000 men, and 1.4 million if all reservists were mobilized. But in the event, only about 400000 badly-trained and equipped draftees were deployed, of whom just five infantry and two cavalry divisions saw combat against the invaders. Yugoslavia had 28 infantry and three cavalry divisions, with 32 artillery and six engineer regiments for support, plus some small armored units. Hardware like AA and AT guns, motor vehicles and communications equipment was lacking; ox-carts were the main source of mobility since (in the words of one Yugoslav general), "they didn't run out of petrol". The high command deployed its forces well forward near the borders (despite the example of Poland) and all crossing places were defended, spreading the army thinly along the winding frontiers served by poor roads and fewer railways. Exploiting the defensive nature of the terrain was not attempted, enabling the Germans (in particular) to optimise their superior mobility. And, in a last-minute attempt to placate Hitler, the Yugoslav government did not mobilize until 12 hours after the Germans invaded, while later in the campaign matters of comparative triviality absorbed governmental attention at the expense of running the war. The Axis also boldly exploited the lack of military cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia, while the latter overestimated the help that the overstretched and distant British or the still neutral USA could provide. Indeed, the British government could only advise the Yugoslavians to invade Albania and capture as many Italian weapons as possible for their own use.

In some places, individual Yugoslav formations fought well—such as Pirot and Novi Sad. But elsewhere their army usually fell apart quickly, a microcosm of the flawed, factionalized nation itself. Certainly the Croats, ethnic Germans, Italian and Hungarian minorities welcomed the Axis as liber-

ators and numerous violent acts by "fifth columnists" helped them. But recent Yugoslav analyses indicate that many senior Yugoslav officers (mostly Serbs) ran away first. The onset of snow on 8 April came too late to hinder the Axis advance, and by 10 April the demoralization of the Yugoslav forces was so complete that the drive on Belgrade met little resistance. That day two Croat regiments defected to the Axis (another later), while in Zagreb 15000 Yugoslavian troops surrendered. Belgrade capitulated on the 12th and was formally occupied the next day while the king and his government fled to Athens. Officially, the surrender was concluded on 17 April, and a brutal foreign occupation began as the Axis carved up Yugoslavia.

No sources give the Yugoslav toll in the 1941 campaign, and the number of POWs varies between 90 and 343 thousand. But given the light German casualties (558, of whom just 166 were killed or missing) and the large numbers of prisoners taken by the Axis, it can be assumed that Yugoslav battle losses were light too, allowing thousands of former soldiers to join the partisans and fight on one side or the other for their particular concept of freedom.

ASL TREATMENT

The revamped counters in *LAST HURRAH* now give the Elite squad a "4" smoke exponent. The 1st line squad has its range factor increased from "4" to "5", while the erstwhile 2nd Line squad has been reclassified as "Green" with its FP factor raised to "4" and its range lowered to "3". The net result is that even the worst Allied Minor squad remains the equal in firepower to the best-rifle equipped squads in *ASL* of any nationality, and superior to the Axis Minor equivalent. This reflects the general (but not universal) advantage that the minor Allies had over them in having a comparative abundance of small arms; countries like Belgium, Denmark and Poland exported such arms, whereas all Axis powers (large and small) were purchasers or reliant on captured stocks. Although Greece, Poland and (especially) Yugoslavia used whatever was available and so amassed a veritable quartermaster's nightmare of "bargains" and "hand-me-downs", the minor Axis powers were even worse off when the Axis short-war strategies lay in ruins and long-term procurement problems arose. Hence the Axis Minors' conscript squad has a lower FP rating than the Allied Minor Green squad.

But the fact that even the best Minor Allied squad only merits a "4" FP reflects the general absence of SMGs, and the few that they had were mostly reserved for NCOs. Belgium built some German MP 18/1 and 28/11 types under license. Denmark acquired some of the excellent Finnish m/31 *Suomi* SMGs (heavy, well-made, and accurate at long range) and German MP 34/1s, while Norway also used *Suomi* models. As did Poland (who also manufactured their own version, the Mors wz 39), and also had some US Thompsons. Yugoslavia, a collector of diverse weapons, only used the long-barrelled version of the German Erma MP. Polish use (or misuse) of the SMG perhaps typifies the Minor Allied experience with this weapon; the Thompsons went to the Frontier Defense Corps rather than the army proper, and the Finnish SMGs to a Military Police detachment. Just 50 or so of the Mors type appear to have seen combat and, like the deployment of a few American USDC M1942 SMGs by Holland in the Dutch East Indies, were incapable of making much impact.

While not as generous as British, German or American support weapon allocations as shown on the charts, we can expect the Allied Minors to be better equipped than their Axis counterparts. Certainly in LMGs the minor Allies usually had more, even if their choice of weapon adopted was sometimes bad (as reflected in their LMG counters hav-

ing a poor "6" range factor and a "B11"). Strictly speaking, Belgian, and most Polish, squads in *ASL* should have no LMG counters at all since they adopted the US BAR for this purpose, a most unsuitable weapon for this role although, in fairness, never designed as such. Although some Belgian models had a quick-change facility for overheated barrels, this in no way compensated for its other weaknesses, especially as many Belgian BARs had the ROF restricted to the lower 300-350 RPM setting. Even the two BARs allotted to each *Chasseurs Ardennais* squad (except in the motorcycle companies) were not a substitute for a decent LMG. Elsewhere, the better LMGs tended to be used by those minor Allies who saw the least fighting; Denmark, Holland, Norway and Yugoslavia all used the Danish Madsen in various forms (as did many others), although most of Norway's were probably captured by the Germans when they so quickly overran the Norwegian depots, and Yugoslavia was too poor to equip her forces throughout with such an expensive LMG when plenty of cheaper ones were available. They therefore also had some Czech LMGs in various versions (all being well-made, accurate, reliable and popular) and the French Darne M1922, an efficient yet cheap weapon. Less successful were the old Bergman M15s still in Polish 2nd Line use, and various French Hotchkiss models in Greek service, which had no sustained-fire capability due to the peculiar "strip" feed system. Some Belgian and Polish reserve units even used the wretched French Chauchat (see my "Forgotten Legions"), as did the Greeks and Yugoslavs.

Happily, the situation was better concerning the heavier machineguns, even though the Allied minors had a bewildering assortment with, as usual, the Yugoslavs having the greatest diversity. Despite their often great age, the weapons were of good quality generally, the worst being the French St. Etienne M1907 MMG and the Italian Fiat M1914 HMG (both in Yugoslavian service, with some of the former also used by the Greek army). The St. Etienne was poorly designed and unreliable despite modifications, while the Fiat relied upon oiled cartridges to assist extraction—a magnet for dust and dirt. (The Yugoslavs probably bought them because they were inexpensive.) The rest of the MGs were much better, if heavy, like the Austrian Schwarzlose, the venerable Maxim in numerous versions, the Hotchkiss, Colt-Browning, Vickers and the newer, superb US Brownings. As a result, the Allied Minors' HMG and MMG suffer no penalties like their Axis Minor equivalents do.

The few Allied Minor mortars, however, were not especially good, as evidenced by the fact that the Germans appear to have made little use of captured pieces (more the exception than the rule for Nazi Germany). The little Polish 46mm wz 30 and 36 types had an excellent range of, respectively, 700 and 800 meters. The Belgian 50mm DBT was complex and fired a small bomb, even by the poor standards of all such small-calibre mortars. Coupled with their poor logistical back-up, their "11" breakdown number in *ASL* is not surprising.

The Allied minors were also deficient in ATR. Holland used the Swiss 20mm Solothurn s/8-1000 (a fairly average, simple but heavy semi-automatic with a ROF sufficiently high enough to warrant a "2"). Poland had the excellent Ur wz 35, a truly "secret" weapon hidden away in sealed boxes ready for the looming war with Germany, which pioneered the use of sub-calibre tungsten carbide ammunition and a high penetration for so light an ATR (although the propellant used did greatly shorten barrel life). The other minor Allies generally had no ATRs, doubly unfortunate since German AFVs of the 1939-41 era were for the most part thinly armored, even on the front aspect. And, of course, many of these minor Allies were also woefully deficient in AT guns (Norway and Yugoslavia appear to have had none at all in their armies).

As for their OBA, the poor ratings for the Allied Minors reflect their largely obsolete ordnance and 1914-18 doctrines, inflexible logistics (due to the emphasis on railways and horses, rather than trucks, to move and feed the guns), and the often primitive or inadequate communication equipment in use. The latter is evidenced by the "7" radio contact value for the Allied Minors, albeit something of a generalization (but then, the rules are sufficiently flexible to permit exceptions). Polish signalling equipment was rudimentary, for instance, because Pilsudski was reluctant to invest to modernize communications and the belated attempts to rectify this were overtaken by events. Much use was therefore made of the civilian telephone network, as in Norway. A German division had seven times as many radios as the Polish; the French and Soviet divisions four times as many. Poland put the cream of its personnel into field gun formations rather than into medium or heavy artillery, and relatively few trucks went to the artillery (or any other combat formation), but to the medical, field kitchen and mobile workshop units and the like. The Yugoslavians were firmly wedded to the obsolete French doctrines of 1914-18, in which the Serbian army's achievements would later act as an obstacle to modernization, and were also pitifully equipped in this branch. Belgium and Holland too aped French practice, while Norway's artillery (where not captured by the Germans) was doled out at battery level or below and the absence of any pre-war exercises severely affected performance. Greece and Yugoslavia were probably even worse off than Poland with regard to communications and transport, and their difficult terrain further hampered logistics. Even Belgium, among the more industrialized of European states, relied heavily on horses to tow heavy mortars and most artillery, save the AA, AT and very large caliber pieces; even her radios and field phones were very unreliable.

In range factors, the Allied Minor MMCs do very well in *ASL* and remain superior to most Axis squads and equal to many Elite ones. However, the 4-5-8 Elite Allied Minor squads will be comparatively rare in scenarios, representing that small percentage of personnel who received exceptionally good training or possessed above-average initiative. Examples include the pick of the Belgian *Chasseurs Ardennais* ("Green Lions" to their German foe), the Royal Dutch Marines ("Black Devils" in German soldier-slang), the Greek *Evzones* Royal Guard, or the Norwegian 6th Division's ski troops (a remarkably well-trained formation). The "5" range factor reflects the fact that in training, tactics and personal initiative, the best Allied Minor squad (while usually inferior to its German equivalent) was no worse than the typical British, French or Soviet squad—showing that even among the relatively well-educated Belgians there was little personal initiative. Their superiority over the Axis Minor squads is due to usually superior education and the more enlightened approach to discipline compared to the armies of the Balkans and eastern Europe. In tactical training too, the better Allied minor formations were probably more receptive to changes made in the light of combat experience; certainly the Poles and Norwegians gave the Germans a tough time even late in their respective campaigns. The rapid defeat of the minor Allied powers does limit the data compiled on their combat performance, but some of the examples cited earlier show that upon occasion they were no push-overs on the tactical level.

The position regarding the more numerous lower-quality Allied Minor squads is less flattering. The low three-hex range simulates poor unit cohesion and training among the reservists; if so-called "Elite" units like Belgium's *Chasseurs Ardennais* (formed as late as February 1940) gave their motorcycle battalions little firearm or tactical training, what could the "unimportant" reserve formations expect? The Belgian military had requested

a 24-month training period, but strong political pressure reduced this. Hence, most Belgian troops were incapable of making long, grueling marches, and the MG and mortar units got the least physical training of all yet, in the war of maneuver that ensued, were burdened with the heaviest loads. In Norway, the Fort Agdenes garrison had received just 48 days training—in 1930! Many of Ruge's units were distinctly makeshift; this mixture of soldiers, volunteers and raw recruits were incapable of maneuver and almost worthless in the attack, but fought well defensively and—unlike most British and French troops in the theater—could at least ski. Poland's National Guard units were similarly limited in usefulness due to almost no training . . . but then, barely a third of Poland's active divisions were fully trained. Dutch training was at best "moderate", and usually poor. Yugoslavia relied on untrained reservists and laurels won in the Great War. Finally, linguistic differences in Belgian, Polish and Yugoslavian units also affected performance adversely. Together with outdated doctrines, this deprived such units of the ability to disengage or adapt in unfavorable combat situations. Although the Poles did emphasize night fighting and maneuver in doctrine, their reliance upon "improvisation" (solving problems only as they occurred) in effect surrendered the initiative to the enemy. For all these reasons, the 4-3-7 counters should predominate in any scenario featuring "typical" Allied Minor forces unless a specific historical incident justifies otherwise.

In terms of morale, the Allied Minors do very well; their Green squad's rating is better than that of any low-quality unit in *ASL* so far, while the Elite and 1st Line squads are on a par with most foreign MMC of equivalent class. This reflects their stubborn traits in defending their homes and families against invaders noted for their ruthlessness and/or distasteful ideologies. Certainly the people of Belgium and Poland had good reason to expect a re-run of their previous experiences. The problems for the Allied Minor squads center on their broken-side morale values (even though the Greek and Yugoslav MMC receive a "+1" benefit in combat against the Italians, reflecting their profound contempt for the prowess and behaviour of the latter). This fragility is due to the general ignorance of what *blitzkrieg* actually entailed; the Poles, for instance, put excessive faith in their AT weapons as a result of the "lessons" of the Spanish Civil War but overlooked other developments.

And her fate did little to forewarn the remaining Allies it seems. Their subsequent rude awakening did little for the morale of their troops. The unexpected use of paratroopers and gliders in Holland, of shaped charges and attacks on the ventilators and elevator shafts at Eben Emael, of flamethrowers and smoke generators against the Greek forts, all contributed to the undermining of morale, which was already weakened by rumors. The deficiencies in training, equipment and doctrine (not to mention leadership) also compromised the fighting spirit and produced a fatal sense of inferiority. Decades of unarmed neutrality and pacifism nurtured the view among many of the troops that war was a futile exercise. Ethnic rivalries took their toll on morale; why should a Croat risk his life to defend Serbian hegemony? And the "Phoney War" with its false alerts, mobilization and demobilization, and ever changing plans was hardly conducive to steadfast morale. Thousands of tons of earth in Belgium was excavated and defenses prepared, only to be abandoned when the troops were redeployed elsewhere to begin all over again—all, of course, at the expense of weapons and tactical training.

Belgium's regional recruiting system (along linguistic lines) in so small a country did little to improve morale when units were posted away from their home depots, breaking up otherwise good

formations by mixing diverse regiments together. Norway's mixed, improvised units were also brittle in combat due to their hasty formation and poor sense of unit identity. Lastly, the continuous retreats, particularly in Belgium, Poland and Yugoslavia, and the inability to rotate units due to remorseless enemy pressure also damaged morale. Greek units, for instance, were not rotated because of shortages of reserves of any quality and probably typified the armies of the Allied Minors. For the same reasons, the Allied Minors suffer from a poor "3" ELR rating and, given the lack of AT weaponry or training, suffer an adverse "-1" PAATC in common with the Axis Minors.

The "7" LG factor in *ASL* is inferior to all other nationalities included so far save three, reflecting the poor quality and leadership. The drastic, post-1918 demobilizations pushed even some career officers into civilian life, where rewards and prospects were greater. Although many ex-officers remained in the reserves, they were by 1939-40 (if Belgian officers were typical) often in poor physical shape and lacked aggressiveness, bringing with them outdated tactical doctrines. Only in 1937 were the consequences of the poor rewards and low social standing of professional Belgian military service revealed. In September 1939, 80% of Belgian officers were drawn from the reservists corps, and the special schools for their continued training had closed in 1926 when regional recruitment was introduced; thereafter standards were relaxed, further compromising performance. Regional recruitment tended also to concentrate former friends and neighbors together in units, so that officers and NCOs remained too familiar with their subordinates, which undermined discipline and authority. The CO of the Belgian 6th Infantry Division described his officers as 25% good, 25% barely adequate, and the rest useless; the CO of the 5th Division complained loudly of his officers' lack of authority and initiative. Given that a Belgian reserve officer spent just six days in uniform every six years, this is not surprising. The promotional ladder in Belgium was rigid, so that only 20% of aspiring leaders became officers or senior NCOs while the rest (regardless of merit) remained embittered juniors in the system—even though many vacancies for officers went unfilled in the Walloon formations. Generally, Belgium's regional recruitment favored those units based in cities, who had a glut of reserve officers to choose from, while those in rural areas had to take what they could get.

In Norway too, those officers who saw action were not always the best, being an assortment from the various branches of the armed forces and not necessarily well-trained for the tactical situations they faced. These included mere cadets in some cases, "green" leaders fresh from military schools, retired officers, and some—like Ruge's predecessor—completely "out of touch with reality". Dutch officer quality was equally poor, and their experience wholly inadequate for the demands made of them, given that they had never seen combat (except, perhaps, as observers abroad). In Greece, officer quality suffered as a result of political interference in 1935, when Metaxas dismissed over 600 officers with republican sympathies and banned them from re-enlistment. In Poland too, the increasing politicization of the armed forces after Pilsudski's death in 1935 distracted the officer corps from their duty as leaders, while ethnic tensions also lowered efficiency. The best officers in Poland were skimmed off into the cavalry at the expense of the rest of the army. The Yugoslavian army, on the other hand, was full of "dead wood", with 165 generals alone on the active list (or one for every 9000 troops), and all were badly schooled and unfit for modern combat according to Yugoslavian sources. The army's bias there for men of Serbian extraction (only four of these many generals were non-Serbs) and their harsh treatment of their subordinates under-

mined leadership and the loyalty of men who were from ethnic minorities. Finally, the absence of radios as a leadership tool adversely affected the performance of all the Allied minor armies and served to compound these weaknesses in quality.

CONCLUSION

The minor Allies' contribution to final victory is difficult, often painful, to assess. Probably more of their citizens (imbued with strong anti-Communist or successionist sentiments) served the Axis than the Allies after their armies were defeated, except for Poland and parts of Yugoslavia. But this is not to judge them or assert that their sacrifices of 1939-41 were in vain. Poland emerged as the fourth largest Allied contingent in Europe (after the USSR, UK and US), while Yugoslavia under the leadership of an ex-Austrian soldier of Croat extraction (Josip Broz, alias "Tito") re-emerged as an independent nation capable of defying even Stalin.

In 1939-41, the Allied minors did as well as the unfortunate circumstances that their enemies, their allies, their pacifism of earlier years, and the various blunders that they made allowed; and however disproportionate their losses were to casualties inflicted on the Axis enemies, they at least began the process later finished by their larger allies (who had learned so much from their sacrifice): the defeat by slow attrition of the Axis powers. The rapid defeat of the likes of Poland, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia and Greece also served to make the ill-organized Axis powers overconfident, plunging them into a long war where Allied industrial superiority was bound to prevail. And in this wider conflict, many ex-soldiers of the Allied Minors, deciding to fight on, would play an important part.

SOURCES

There are many excellent sources for information on the organization, equipment and actions of the armies of the minor Allied powers; unfortunately, the best of these are not in English. For American readers, Andrew Molloy's *The Armed Forces of World War Two* (London 1987) is a good starting point. For a general view of the campaigns against them, see *The Forgotten Allies* (Vol. 1, London 1985) by J. Lee Ready. Charles Whiting, in his book *The Poor Bloody Infantry 1939-1945* (London 1987), supplies many details about their weaponry and organization and tactical training. Turning to the separate nations and the campaigns that saw their defeat, many periodical articles from various publishers (notably "Purnells History of the Second World War") were used in my research. As for specific recommended works of some length: for Poland, use was made of Steven Zaloga's *The Polish Army* (London 1978); for Norway, Jack Adams' *The Doomed Expedition* (London 1989) and Francois Kerdaudy's *Norway 1940* (London 1990); Greece and Yugoslavia, McConville's *A Small War in the Balkans* (London 1986) and Vladimir Velebit's *Yugoslavia in the Second World War* (Belgrade 1987). There are any number of fine studies of the invasion of the West by German forces in 1940, all of which touch upon the fighting in Holland and Belgium. These are but a few of the many sources reviewed by this author, and there are doubtless many more which offer the student of *ASL* even more insights into the basis for its treatment of the Allied minor forces.



PRESS

A sure barometer of the health of any hobby is, to me, the quality and quantity of amateur publications devoted to it. Unbound by the limitations that govern the professional publishing industry, the amateur periodicals serve as a forum for the exchange of comments, news and ideas. In the world of *DIPLOMACY* (a multi-player game perhaps familiar to some readers), amateur publishing in toto is called the "Press". The now-extensive *DIP* press is partly responsible for the game's immense popularity and long life (some three decades), drawing new players into the fold and serving as a proving ground for writers and designers to hone their skills. In turn, the spread of the game feeds the ranks of the amateur press itself, bringing new editors/writers and readers, and allows a variety of approaches to the hobby to flourish by opening its umbrella to cover all. I am quite tickled to bear witness to the growth of an *ASL* "Press". Over the past four years the independent offerings for *ASL*ers have become steadily more polished and professional in both appearance and content, with divergent editorial styles offering something for each shade of fan. For those who may be unaware of this growing "brotherhood", permit me to introduce a few that have caught my eye over the past year.

The *Route Report* will never be accused of being a serious *ASL* publication, but is instead "mostly a quick and largely random shot of info for the happy fanatics of The Hill's best little marriage-breaker." As such, it is great fun. After two years of keeping to a regular schedule, it appears that this bi-monthly foolishness may be around for quite some time. The *Route Report* is an off-shoot of DAGGER ("Detroit *ASL* Guys Gunning Eagerly with ROF"), defined in their own words as a kind of non-organization with a vagrant board of directors and inconsistent staffing. However, despite the irreverent tone, there is much excellent information (especially on conventions) to be found in each issue. It is, in effect, a fanzine for *ASL*—and a marvelous look at what fellow gamers are saying. For information on content or subscription, contact its editor, Kurt Martin (514 Gardena Avenue, Royal Oak, MI 48067).

A more serious approach is taken by Marc Hanna's superb *At The Point*. Intended for the hard-core, it is devoted to analysis of the play and tactics of the *ASL* system. Fanzine-style reportage is kept to a minimum. A gifted player and writer himself, the editor has also managed to coerce some of the best in our hobby into offering up their thoughts and tricks in the pages of *ATP*. As an example of the contents, recent issues have featured the "Point Crossfire", wherein two respected players independently tender their thoughts on strategy for one nationality in a popular scenario, and later critique their "opponent's" approach. A lively and extensive letter column provides for on-going debate and analysis of the game system, its rules and scenarios. *At the Point* is published ten times a year; for more information, write Mr. Hanna (at 6601-206 Roundstone, Raleigh, NC 27613).

Latest in the growing list of *ASL* publications is *Fire For Effect*, a new bi-monthly periodical "Committed to the Progress of *ASL* and its Players". With but two issues in circulation, it is nevertheless a most impressive effort. A strong point is the graphics and bonus features; the second issue offered new AFV Data Cards, for instance. Curt Schilling and Robert Wolkey hope to make the 'zine the clearing-house for news of the competitive side of *ASL*, with player profiles, tournament information and after-action reports, tactical tips, and reader surveys on a variety of game-related topics. Contact Mr. Wolkey (E6208 6th, #D1, Spokane, WA 99212) if interested in *FPE*.

One of the longest-lived amateur publications is *ASL News*, the work of Philippe Leonard (28, Av. Seghers, B-1080 Bruxelles, Belgium). Dating back to September 1987, when the first issue was mailed, the hallmark of this quarterly 'zine has always been the several intriguing new scenarios offered each time. Well researched from sources close to hand, and heavily playtested by the European *ASL* fraternity, these are always unique and challenging. Some have even found their way into these pages, and no doubt will again. The *ASL News* is also, as expected, full of information on hobby events in Europe—as well as brief articles on tactics and strategy. Originally published in French, recently M. Leonard has converted the format to English to attract a broader readership.

These are only a sampling of the *ASL* press. Other 'zines have come and gone already. But I'd hope to see new efforts drift across my desk. The "Press" is, after all, the "cutting edge" of our beloved hobby.

RATTLE OF SABRES



ASL SCENARIO A46



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Germans win immediately if they have Exited ≥ 12 VP off the west edge, or at game end if they have amassed ≥ 12 Casualty VP more than the Poles. (Prisoner VP are not doubled at game end.)

East of MŁAWA, POLAND, 2 September 1939: As its role in "Case White", the German 3rd Army was to thrust southwards from East Prussia toward the Polish capital. While the infantry of the 1st Corps launched its attack on the west flank to break the Polish line along the border, the "Wodrig" Corps—a battlegroup of infantry and cavalry formations—was to capture the stoutly defended city of Mława. At Mława, the Polish 20th Infantry Division, ensconced behind extensive fortifications and minefields, was able to repulse the first frontal assault. Under pressure from OKW to eradicate this obstacle quickly, General von Kuechler ordered the 1st Cavalry Brigade to outflank the Polish defenses and encircle the city. Crossing the Ułakowka River east of Mława, the brigade had turned west and was attempting to slip past the trenches there when the horsemen encountered their Polish counterparts, the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Add one 7-0 SMC to the Polish OB.
- ♣ The German SAN is "4".



5
32

TURN RECORD CHART

■ POLE Sets Up First [204]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	END
♣ GERMAN Moves First [211]								



Elements of the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade [ELR: 3] set up and/or enter as indicated (see SSR 2); {SAN: 3}



 4-5-8	 8-2	 8-1	 8-0	 4-11	 1-12	 12
17					2	17



Elements of Kavallerie Brigade 1 [ELR: 4] enter Mounted on Turn 1 along the east edge (see SSR 3); {SAN: 2}



 5-4-8	 2-2-8	 8-2	 8-1	 8-0	 3-8	 3-8	 12
15	2			2	2	3	17

SPECIAL RULES:

1. Weather is Overcast and EC are Moist, with no wind at start.
2. At least one, but no more than five Polish squads (or equivalents, along with any/all SMC/SW and their Horses), must be set up onboard on/west-of hexrow U; of these, two squads (or equivalents, along with any/all SMC/SW and their Horses) may use HIP. All remaining Polish units enter Mounted on Turn 1 along the west edge.
3. German units must enter Mounted. Both German MMG enter being Animal-Packed (G10.) and must be assigned to a specific Horse (i.e., Mule) counter. All rules for such apply, except that one 2-2-8 is considered as a Rider of each Horse counter being used to Animal-Pack a dm-MMG. To unpack the dm-MMG, the Rider must be dismounted.
4. Use of Smoke, Assault Fire and Spraying Fire while Mounted are NA.

AFTERMATH: The clash between the two brigades is one of the rare examples of cavalry-versus-cavalry combat during the Second World War. As the Germans pressed west, they encountered Polish pickets in camouflaged positions. With the eruption of the firefight, nearby elements of the Mazowiecka Brigade rode to the scene. The battle soon spread along a wide front, as the cavalymen on both sides sought an advantage. While most of the fighting took place dismounted, there were, it seems, a number of small saber clashes when mounted troops blundered together in the forest. After an afternoon of confused fighting, the Mazowiecka Brigade was forced to withdraw that evening due to growing pressure upon its over-extended flanks. Although Polish Lt.-General Przemysław Przemysławski held Mława for three days in the face of increasing enemy superiority, on the 3rd he was forced to order a withdrawal towards Modlin.

WHITE TIGERS



ASL SCENARIO A47



NINGTHOUKHONG, INDIA, 7 June 1944: In early March, the Japanese 15th Army launched Operation U-GO to capture the highland town of Imphal, a vital British base in Assam. As part of the offensive, Lt.-General Yanagida's veteran 33rd Infantry Division, known as the "White Tigers", attacked north along the Tiddim Road. By mid-April its advance had ground to a halt about twenty miles southwest of Imphal, where for the next few weeks it exchanged blows with the 17th Indian Division over possession of several villages along the road. One of these, Ningthoukhong, changed hands twice as both sides committed armor over ground now saturated by the breaking monsoon rains. On June 7th, the Japanese threw the last of their tanks into the battle for the village.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Gurkha reinforcements enter on/after Turn 4.
- Japanese ELR is "4".



3	
X6	
5	
05	02
27	22

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win immediately at the end of any Game Turn if they currently Control ≥ 12 multi-hex buildings, or at game end if they currently Control ≥ 10 multi-hex buildings.

TURN RECORD CHART

● BRITISH Sets Up First [152]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	END
● JAPANESE Moves First [326]											



Elements of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles [ELR: 5] set up on/north-of hexrow D: {SAN: 4}

6-4-8	4-5-8	2-4-8	2-2-8	0-2	0-1	0-0	6-14	4-12	2-7	5-1 [2-1]	?	40L
2	6	6	2				2	2	3	2	12	2

1/7th Gurkha Reinforcements enter on/after Turn 5 on/adjacent-to hex 37GG5; all, some or none may enter on each such turn:

6-4-8	4-5-8	10-2	0-1	0-0	1-4-8	2-7	8-3
5	4					4	2



Elements of the 33rd Infantry Division and 14th Tank Regiment [ELR: 3] enter on/after Turn 1 along the south edge; some, all or none may enter each turn: {SAN: 5}

4-4-8	4-4-7	2-2-8	10-1	0-1	0-0	0-1	4-11	2-8	50-1 [1-10]	30-1	?
12	8	3	2		2		3	6	4	2	8
8-1	14-1										
	57										
	5										


SPECIAL RULES:

- Weather is Gusty (E3.4), Overcast (E3.5) and Mud (E3.6; hence EC are Mud). It is raining, but there is no wind, at start. A Wind Change DR of ≤ 3 does not stop the rain; instead, its intensity returns to (or remains) normal.
- PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect. The 22A5-P2-R1-T2-Y2-37GG5 road (including the 22K2 stone bridge) does exist; however, the road rate/bonus (BB3.41/B3.4), as well as mud's extra MF/MP cost and Bog effects, are NA when crossing a road hexside. All Single-Story houses on board 22 are rubble hexes (wooden or stone as per the building type). No multi-hex building has an upper level. The stream is Flooded (B20.44); Swimming is NA. Entrenching Attempts are NA.
- Place overlays as follows: 3 on 37DD8-DD9; 5 on 37K2-K1; 02 on 22F5-G6; 05 on 22F4-F3; and X6 (see G.9F) on 37Q8. The paddies are Drained.
- All British unit are Gurkhas (A25.43), but their -1 CC DRM applies only in Hand-to-Hand CC. Gurkhas go into Hand-to-Hand CC in the same manner as Japanese (G1.64).

AFTERMATH: The Japanese attack quickly eliminated one of the defenders' anti-tank guns, but another destroyed two CHI-HA tanks and forced the other three off the road, where they mired in the soggy ground. They still had good fields of fire, however, and began to blast Gurkha positions with cannon and machineguns. This enabled the Japanese infantry to secure a foothold across the rain-swollen creek that bisected Ningthoukhong. As the Gurkhas gave ground, reinforcements arrived—including Rifleman Ganju Lama, a PIAT gunner who the previous month had been awarded the Military Medal for his tank-hunting exploits. Singlehandedly, Lama proceeded to stalk the bogged tanks. At 30 yards, he slammed a round into the first one, then killed its crew with grenades. Loading another projectile, he crawled on to destroy the second. By this time, he had been wounded three times and his left arm was broken. Undeterred, he went after the third tank; but the surviving AT gun, manhandled to a new position during his actions, claimed it first. Taking heart from Lama's heroism, the Gurkhas surged forward and drove the Japanese out of Ningthoukhong for good. Rifleman Lama was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross, one of four won by his division during its epic defense of the Tiddim Road.

BEST-LAID PLANS

ASL SCENARIO A48



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Germans win immediately when they Control *all* buildings (excluding lumberyards) on board 24 on/south-of hexrow V; or at game end if they Control ≥ 13 of those buildings (≥ 15 if Partisan reinforcements entered on Turn 3; ≥ 17 if they entered on Turn 4).

TURN RECORD CHART

PARTISAN Sets Up First [148]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	END
GERMAN Moves First [313]		②	④	⑥								

LESKOVIC, ALBANIA, 27 June 1943: ELAS ("National Popular Liberation Army", the Greek-Communist guerrilla organization) had learned that the German 1st Mountain Division was moving from Serbia to Greece, with its route passing through the village of Leskovic high in the mountains along the Greek-Albanian frontier. The commanders of ELAS decided to use the village as the base for a surprise attack on the Germans. Upon arrival there in force, the guerrillas removed the civilian population and placed their own men in the buildings along the main street. The plan was to allow the German advance guard to pass through, then ambush the main body at close range as it moved through the town. In the meantime, a second force of partisans would descend from hiding places in the nearby hills to complete the rout.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Add two 5-2-7 to the initial onboard Partisan OB.
- ✚ Exchange one German 8-0 for another 9-1.

15	2
	24



ELAS Partisans [ELR: 5] set up on board 24 on/south-of hexrow V; {SAN: 4}

16	6					2	4		20

ELAS Reinforcements enter along the east, west or south edge (as per SSR 3):

6	18	2			2	4



Elements of Gebirgsjäger Division 1 [ELR: 4] set up on board 24 on/north-of hexrow BB, and on boards 2 and 15 on/north-of hexrow T in Locations at $\geq$ level 2: {SAN: 3}

14	8	3	3	3		2	3		2	6		3

3	2	3

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moist, with no wind at start.
- All buildings (not lumberyards) are Stone. All woods are Brush (paths still exist).
- During his initial setup, the Partisan player must secretly record one "entry zone" for his reinforcements (Zone 1: 2A1-2Q1; 2: 2Q1-2GG1; 3: 2GG1-24A6; 4: 24A5-15GG10; 5: 15GG10-15Q10; 6: 15Q10-15A10). Beginning with his Turn 2 RPh, he makes a dr for these to enter; if the dr is $\leq$ the circled number indicated on the Turn Record Track for the current turn, the reinforcements must enter during the current Player Turn in the pre-recorded zone.
- 5-2-7 squads (and their HS) retain their printed Strength Factor [EXC: treat their morale # as underlined], Broken morale level and BPV, but otherwise are treated as Partisans in every way (including Replacement by two 2-2-7 HS for exceeding ELR). Partisans use Russian SW, but without Captured-use penalties. Partisans may not Deploy in the RPh, nor may they form multi-Location FG or make Entrenching Attempts.

5. The Germans receive one module of 70+mm OBA with Plentiful Ammunition, directed by an Offboard Observer at level 4 in hex 24GG5. The OBA can fire HE and Smoke.

6. German guns may not set up Emplaced.


7. Kindling Attempts are NA.

AFTERMATH: The officers of the 1st Mountain Division were veterans, wise in the ways of war . . . and they had their own plan. Instead of marching blindly into Leskovic, the Gebirgsjäger enveloped it on both flanks, which caused some of the guerrillas to open fire prematurely. The Germans replied by shelling the village, then launching an infantry attack. The thick stone walls of the buildings provided considerable protection to the partisans however, and they resisted fiercely, forcing the Germans to fight for every house. Suddenly, the ELAS forces in the hills sallied *en masse* to aid their comrades, but were devastated by accurate German artillery fire. Eventually, though with heavy casualties, the Gebirgsjäger succeeded in flushing the guerrillas out of every building in town. For ELAS, it was a shocking defeat with sobering implications. Prior to this debacle, the Communists had engaged mostly in sabotage and small ambushes of Italian occupation troops. Now the total inadequacy of its training and equipment versus a well-armed, aggressive and experienced foe was obvious. As a result, guerrilla operations in Greece diminished significantly for quite some time.

DELAYING ACTION



ASL SCENARIO A49



West of LIBAU, LITHUANIA, 26 October 1944: After failing to halt the onslaught of Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front, scattered units of the Grossdeutschland Division were ordered to fall back to the northwest and regroup. One evening during the course of this retreat, some 300 of its men were surprised by a cautiously advancing Russian infantry regiment. After a short firefight, the Russians proceeded to dig in for the night, and initiated their renewed attack at dawn by advancing a column of tanks from a newly-arrived armored unit. The Germans, however, spotting the tanks, immediately withdrew, leaving only a small delaying force to cover their retreat.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



BALANCE:

- ✚ Add one 2-4-8 HS to German OB.
- ★ Delete two PF from the German OB.

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Russians win by Exiting all seven AFV off the north edge; however, each German SMC, as well as each German HS, eliminated is considered the equivalent of one Russian AFV successfully Exited.

TURN RECORD CHART

✚ GERMAN Sets Up First	★ 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	END
★ RUSSIAN Moves First								



Elements of Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland [ELR: 4] set up on/north-of hexrow Z using HIP (if in Concealment Terrain): {SAN: 2}



(See SSR4)



Elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army enter on/after Turn 1 along the south edge; all, some or none may enter on each turn: {SAN: 0}



SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start.
2. Roads do not exist.
3. Place Overlay M2 in U8-V7. During his setup, Overlay M1 is secretly recorded by the German player as occupying any hex on/north-of hexrow F; this overlay is revealed instantly whenever a Russian unit enters a hex ADJACENT to it, or at any point prior to that at the German player's discretion.
4. Use optional rule C13.311 for recording possession, and usage, of the PF listed in the German OB. No other (i.e., normally Inherent) PF are available.
5. No Russian AFV may expend more MP than half of its printed allotment

during the MP of the turn of its entry.

6. During the APH, a hidden unit may retain its HIP status while moving from a woods/building hex to an ADJACENT woods/building hex if that move is made across a woods/building hexside. [EXC: if this is into Difficult Terrain (A4.72), its HIP is lost.]

AFTERMATH: The rearguard set up three ambush points; straight into them rumbled the tank column, without supporting infantry. Each group knocked out several tanks, but there was never any doubt as to the eventual outcome of the one-sided encounter as each German group was successively (and literally) overrun. A few terrified survivors were shortly thereafter rescued by a counterattack against the Russian flank spearheaded by two SS panzer regiments, which inflicted heavy losses and recaptured the area for a few days. Afterward, the retreat to East Prussia resumed.

AND HERE WE DAMNED WELL PLAYED

The Playtest of Scenario A50

By Mark Nixon

My first encounter with the scenario "... And Here We Damned Well Stay" (hereafter, "AHWDWS") was during the playtest for *WEST OF ALAMEIN*. As published here, it is quite different from what we initially faced. (Headed by David Sisler, our playtest group also included Bill Sisler, Rick Troha and Norm Richards.) In addition to the efforts of the other *WOA* playtest groups around the country, the changes were due, in part, to the weight of reports generated by our 16 playings of "AHWDWS". Indeed, as late as the post-*WOA* stages of production, Bob McNamara informed us that this scenario would have been dropped for good except for our own persistence; we were bucking the majority opinion of the other playtesters concerning its worth, something one doesn't do very often and expect to be successful. Since we have invested more effort in this than any other *WOA* encounter, it is gratifying that Bob stuck with us (or maybe he was stuck with us), especially since he takes the heat whenever buyers respond to a finished product with negative judgements. (Anyone wishing to express anguish over this scenario might drop me a line; I'll be delighted to put you in contact with others in the group here!) I felt that it might prove enlightening to describe our experiences with this scenario, and so give the readers an idea of what it is like to playtest an *ASL* module—as well as introduce a rather unusual scenario. Although my personal opinion of "AHWDWS" runs high for various reasons, it remains something of a pariah despite all our attempts (and those of the other *WOA* playtesters) to balance it.

MARCH 1988: The First Round

The most important differences in the initial version which we started playing in March (see box) were the inclusion of the half-boards 26 and 29 butted to the west edge, the overlays H2 and H6 in the western portion, the six-turn length, the British Hero beginning onboard, the two German 9-1 armor leaders (rather than a 9-1 and 9-2), and the fact that the Germans could win immediately with eight mobile AFVs on/east-of hexrow M. In addition, the sand overlays were arranged such that the Germans could move to a win without ever having to pass a Bog Check. Unfortunately, we quickly found that this allowed the MkIIIs to remain in motion shrouded by vehicular dust and sD smoke, and to easily move to victory on Turn 3—fulfilling the "immediate" victory requirement during their third MPH before the British ATGs had ample opportunity to kill anything with (mostly) frontal shots. The Germans ran right up the middle into the horseshoe created by the surrounding sand, and did not have to present many side-shots to those ATGs. The British infantry had practically no chance to do much of anything except run across the open at the tanks, while the British commander screamed, "Bloody Murder!!" Based on such tactfully worded reports, the ever-astute Mr. McNamara promptly revised and re-issued the scenario.

APRIL 1988: The Second Round

Because we felt the original scenario had been so flawed, we did not even try to play it with "homegrown" revisions (a common practice when playtesting) prior to receiving the official changes. After all, we had ten other scenarios to test, and our time was much better spent on those than on guessing what might make "AHWDWS" work.

When the revisions arrived, our morale was low as we sat down to play it, for we expected another massacre. At that point, at first glance, our collective opinion was that the alterations wouldn't help much. But we had not comprehended the magnitude of those seemingly simple changes.

Most notably, boards 26 and 29 had been deleted, as had overlays H2 and H6. The German tanks now entered the west edge of the full boards (instead of 17 hexes further west), but they had lost the cover provided by two of the hillocks; and the line they needed to cross had been moved from hexrow M to U... all of which amounted to a net decrease of eight hexes to traverse, as the crow flies. But this time the sand overlays had been rearranged so that the MkIIIs were forced to take Bog Checks to get around or through to the victory area, which also meant that they would have to move adjacent to potential enemy HIP infantry locations. If the panzers stopped to fire probing shots at suspect locations, they would be sitting ducks for the British ATGs. Equally as important, the panzers had to either go through the sand (a poor move if you roll Bog Checks like I do) or maneuver around the sand, taking the less dangerous "accessible-to-sand" checks but presenting plenty of side and rear facings to the enemy. Everything else aside, this slowed the assault, what with all the turning and the use of indirect routes to the victory area.

Even more telling, the German player now had to meet the VC at the end of a player turn; doing it during a MPH would no longer bring an immediate win. Now those tanks had to survive British Final Fire, and maybe even the rare instance of Close Combat. The most significant ramification of this "innocuous" change in VC, however, was that it allowed the British ATGs to hold their Intensive Fire shots until Final Fire, when they would have opportunity to use that desperate fire on tanks in the victory area which were already acquired, instead of being forced to make them on that eighth tank which was attempting to enter the victory area (which was likely not acquired and perhaps not even within the gun's CA, as so often seemed to happen previously). Should the German not attempt to move that last tank in for the win, the British could now forego Intensive Fire entirely, preserve their ATGs, and feel reasonably secure they could wreck enough tanks to still be in the game come the next German MPH.

As it turned out, the changes bolstered the British so much that we recorded three British wins in four games (the single German victory benefitting more from two ATG malfunctions than from any display of superior tactics). So now we had another sort of problem. The changes made to this scenario were already among the most extensive seen during a playtest. Changes are usually only minor adjustments at this stage, and yet we had gone from an adjudged 85% pro-German rating to a 70% pro-British one. Balance had been improved, but was still too far off to allow us to call the thing "balanced". (Personally, I consider anything up to 55% as "balanced", and 60% is acceptable—although I might be a bit alone in that particular assessment.) Had our initial reports of British defeat been excessive to the point of convincing Bob to give them too much help? Were we missing some vital rule or interpretation of the desert game (a worry all too common when testing new, complex rules). Bob was probably wondering what we were trying to do to him. "What kind of tom-foolery were those yahoos in Cleveland up to, anyway?"

Beyond the fact that we were gaining a lot of desert experience and continuously revising and improving our understanding and application of the *WOA* rules while the playtest progressed, we were also accumulating a wealth of information about this scenario. Some of our comments in the playtest reports sent to Bob mentioned the impressive British ATG ROF (impressive, at least, when they remained in action). We looked at those guns and it was immediately apparent that they should average six shots per fire phase—make that nine shots if all three used Intensive Fire! This gave them the potential to kill enough MkIIIs in a single fire phase of just average ROF to secure a win. Of course, no one expects the kind of luck required on the TH and TK rolls to attain that result, and anyone consistently relying on Intensive Fire will soon be short a gun or two (especially with Ammunition Shortage in effect). But in the first two turns, before the Germans are in position to bring effective return fire on the ATGs, this translates to an average (without considering gun malfunction) of 24 non-Intensive Fire shots. That's 12 normal shots and 12 more due to ROF. Since many of these will be at acquired targets (usually in motion but also often presenting side target facings), we recognized the potential for a great many tank losses. We felt these facts explained the sudden British success. But, in response, part of the reply from Bob made mention of several matches played elsewhere in which the British rolled no ROF. "Ha-ha, what a joke," we thought. That must have been exaggeration. Imagine three British 57Ls, each with ROF of "3", and rolling no ROF! But Bob responded that it was true; several games had been played with absolutely no ROF.

This was incredible. Of course, the British should lose under those circumstances. We had to wonder whether those particular British players had even remembered Intensive Fire, for they would surely need it in such dire straits and must then simply hope for the best with the malfunctions. But that question went unasked and unanswered (and is immaterial anyway), for Bob confessed that it was his hand that threw one of those ROF-less games. We were shocked and stunned! We were filled with wonder. McNamara, that heroic 9-1 who had singlehandedly held off the German onslaught for two turns in "Point of No Return", who had shot up German after German with his HMG in "Khamsin" and had stormed "Rachi Ridge" time and again, had rolled poor dice? We took immediate action. We selected a pair of dice from Dave "Dr. Eyes" Sisler's personal hoard, tested them in a dry run of "AHWDWS" in which six German AFVs were burned in a single fire phase, and agreed that these were some "hot dice". These dice, we knew, would revitalize the Mac attack. We processed them so that UPS would accept them (they won't ship material which is "glowing") and sent them off to Baltimore. [Where they reside in a place of honor on the wall in his office.]

But now we had to return to reality and consider the scenario from this new perspective. So far we had merely reported the results of our games without speculating that the British might fail to roll any—or at least near average—ROF and, extending that logic, that they might also roll excessive ROF. How many ROF they must attain to equal the probability of rolling zero ROF in a five-turn game I leave to the statisticians in our hobby; but I do know it would be an extraordinary number. Add to this the fact that the German player might roll no Bogs or might roll an overabundance (we once registered seven

Truly Critical Hits

Critical Hits on Infantry Target Types are not what many *ASL*ers seem to think. If you are in the habit of applying all your TH modifiers inversely to the Basic TH number in order to determine if your DR matches this phony TH number, you have been generating inaccurate CHs. In a nutshell, you are getting too many when firing with a cumulative positive DRM, and too few when you have a negative DRM. This is a very easy trap to fall into, for in the old game (I think it changed with *G.I.*) one had to roll "snake-eyes" for a CH anyway. It became common practice to simply add up all the numbers before throwing the dice in order to see what value had to appear on the dice for a hit. From a psychological standpoint, it is a perfectly understandable desire for a gamer to want to anticipate the number he must see on the dice so he can enjoy the instantaneous satisfaction of knowing when he hits. Besides, for normal hits, this is a fine system, and against vehicle and area target types it doesn't matter how the DRM are factored into the equation. But this is the wrong way to determine Critical Hits against infantry targets.

The only modifiers which alter the Basic TH number are those found in Table C3. All the modifiers listed in C5 and C6 (those from A through R) are *not* applied to the TH number, but are added to the roll of the dice to obtain a modified DR. Thus, a CE tank firing at a non-moving infantry target in an adjacent stone building applies the following modifiers to its TH DR:

Example 1: The TH# is "8":

DRM:

- 2 Case L (Point-Blank Range)
- +3 Case Q (TEM)

A cumulative +1 DRM added to the TH DR must yield a modified DR less than half of the TH number for a Critical Hit. In this case, the DR must be "2" for a CH. Thus, with "eyes" bringing an automatic CH, there would be no chance for an Improbable Hit. Had the inverse of this DRM been incorrectly applied to the Basic TH number of "8" such that an erroneous TH number of "7" were obtained, it would appear to many players that a DR of "2" or "3" would result in a CH. But that is where the error lies. Modifiers A-R are *DR modifiers*, not Basic TH number modifiers—and the CH occurs only when the modified DR is less than half of the TH number—or on an Improbable Hit dr of "1".

Comparing the correct method with that bad old habit, you will find it tougher to score a CH when modifiers A-R cumulatively yield a positive DRM, but easier when they yield a negative one. This is because applying DRM to the DR is roughly comparable to applying double that DRM to the Basic TH number for infantry-type CH purposes. For another example, consider the following:

Example 2: An acquired squad using non-assault movement adjacent in the open is fired upon by a CE tank's Ordnance MA. The TH# is "8":

DRM:

- 2 Case L (Point-Blank Range)
- 1 Case J³ (FFNAM)
- 1 Case J⁴ (FFMO)
- 2 Case N (Acquired Target)

-6 DRM! Since a CH is scored on a modified DR of "3" or less, this -6 translates to a CH on any DR of "9" or less, an 83% chance!

In contrast, had we used that inaccurate technique of applying those modifiers inversely to the Basic TH number and obtained a false TH value of "14", it would appear we needed a DR of "6" or less for a CH, only a 41% chance. Quite a difference!

Example 3: An acquired squad using non-assault movement in the open is fired on by a British 40L ATG at a range of 27 hexes. The Basic TH# is "4", to which the following are added: +1 for the L Gun; -2 for ≤ 57mm; -1 ≤ 40mm. Thus, -2 for a modified TH number of "2":

DRM:

- 1 Case J³ (FFNAM)
- 1 Case J⁴ (FFMO)
- 2 Case N (Acquired Target)

A CH will be scored on a DR of "4" or less. Notice that the British 40L ATG can only fire AP, so this translates to a resolution on the 4-IFT (double the normal AP equivalency 2-IFT); but don't forget that both FFFAM and FFFMO also apply to the IFT roll of a CH, so you have another -2 DRM there (C3.71).

Ever wonder why your opponent is able to rush your guns with his squads and live to do it again and again? If you have been calculating your CH wrong, the above should give the reader some insight towards at least a partial answer.

age and/or imposing an arbitrary ROF on the ATGs) might have been an easy "fix" and allowed a simplistic method to balance "AHWDWS". But I think it to Bob's credit that he did not allow us to adopt any ahistorical "quick-fix" type of SSR.

In one interesting variation to the VC, only an *eliminated* gun could be deducted from the number of German tanks needed for a win; if the gun only malfunctioned, it left the number at the higher level. Thus, the British player with a broken gun faced a very tough decision every RPh. If he tried to repair the gun, he might eliminated it with a dr of "6" and then make the German task easier. But if he declined the repair attempt, the German might win due to the silence of that gun. A fascinating game of nerves resulted, but it was dropped after this version.

Still present in the scenario, however, is the British dilemma with Intensive Fire and Overrun Prevention shots. If he uses these, he might make his enemy's job easier by breaking his ATG. If he avoids these tactics, the enemy might well win for lack of enough lead in the air about his tanks. Other than continued reports of exceptional ROF (or lack thereof) and the give-and-take of guns breaking and being repaired (there is nothing more exciting in *ASL* than a long-malfunctioned gun suddenly rolling back into service near the end of a close match), our remaining effort concentrated on determining just how the victory conditions should read in the final version.

Action Report

As the battle develops in "AHWDWS", the central theme is the rush of MkIIIs towards the victory area and the fire of the British 57Ls trying to stop them. It might be as simple as that, although there are certainly other options available to both sides; neither is forced to play as though only a

casual bystander. For one thing, the initial combination of vehicle dust, sD smoke, Motion and range make those MkIIIs very difficult to hit. This begins to improve for the British on Turn 2 as those panzers move closer and must present side and rear shots as they work their way through the gaps in the sand. Should the German charge directly through the sand in order to run straight at the ATGs, one can expect many more bogs, and an even slower advance due to the sand MP costs.

Should the German opt to hang back and duel with the ATGs, he will likely lose—for this five-turn game does not allow them ample time to acquire, hit and kill those guns/crews and still reach the victory area. This is due, in part, to the muffling effect of the sand (which halves HE), the fact that the guns can hit and kill motionless tanks much easier than the reverse, the ever-present dust dr, and the perturbing fact that even when the first ATG crew is finally broken, some foolhardy bloke will jump up to Hero status and man the gun on his own! In addition, other British infantry will be nearby, available to serve as *ad-hoc* crews if necessary. It is very difficult to subdue those guns with firepower beyond point-blank range. Still, leaving a few MkIIIs HD behind the hillock (like, maybe, the leader-commanded ones CE) while the rest drive for the victory might have some merit, although this is not as productive as bringing those leaders in to overrun and CC the ATGs (see below). But then, the British 50mm mortar is usually boresighted on the hillock and, with luck, can shroud the area with drifting smoke to effectively screen such tanks out of the fight.

The first plan we tried with the Germans was to charge straight up the middle of the board in five platoons, three tanks abreast. This presented the British with a "flying rectangle" target three wide by five deep. All the vehicles stayed in motion and everyone behind the front row was shrouded by at

least one dust counter, while any of those on the front row who missed the sD rolls were naked to the enemy and faced a "-2" acquisition in a hurry. But by angling the attack from the northwest, even any such front-row tanks could be covered by drifting smoke from the coming enemy Prep Fire if those behind them succeeded with their own smoke rolls. Of course, those lead tanks were the MkIIIs, the ones with the best chance of survival due to their superior frontal turret armor. Platoon Movement had been instituted for two reasons. Gamewise, it was faster than moving one tank at a time . . . and we wanted to experiment with the effects of three VD clouds moving together across a battlefield. In this latter, the benefits were not substantial in this encounter due to the fact that the platoons must disengage in order to maneuver around the sand in a workable manner—but the practice and insight gained would be put to good use in later scenarios.

One thing was certain. Between this scenario and "Point of No Return", we knew we had to have Vehicular Dust counters in *WOA*. The original draft called for smoke counters to be used to depict VD; but this created mass confusion when VD from Motion and stopped vehicles, whose VD are removed at different times, became intermixed with actual smoke counters. With the publication of the module, we not only got VD counters to remedy that dilemma, but also Motion VD counters to distinguish between the different types and eliminate the need for a separate Motion counter.

In most matches we played, the British ATGs were deployed with one in the center rear and the others on each flank behind dunes. They all were boresighted on gaps in the sand, and began firing immediately in order to attain "-2" acquisition quickly, their only reasonable chance to score any early hits. On Turn 2, if the panzers drove up the middle, those flanking ATGs both had side shots. If they headed for one gun in an attempt to over-

whelm it, the other 57L will see plenty of side and rear shots, while the Overrun target gun fires at close range, possibly sees an underbelly hit, and even rolls Overrun Protection should the MkIII continue that far. Opting to take the Overrun Protection shot itself might be a tough decision, however. Fear of a gun malfunction and the slim chance of actually hitting a moving target in the same hex with Intensive Fire (+6 DRM total, plus the dust dr and minus any acquisition, but with a Low Ammo number of "9") make this risky business indeed. After all, once the enemy armor are to this point there are plenty of tactical options at their disposal. This is where the British player needs to have some infantry nearby if he wants to save this particular gun.

Additional enemy tanks might charge in to remain in the hex. The ATG could then fire only at the in-hex target, and if that tank actually stops in the hex and survives through the initial round of CC, the gun crew would be locked in Melee, not


even able to fire the gun in its ensuing Prep Fire Phase. Another option: a MkIII might forego shooting (perhaps a tank with malfunctioned weaponry) and run through the gun hex to shoot off its sD. Should it fail that roll, it could then opt for Bounding TPBF with whatever armament it does have available. If it manages to place smoke in the hex, the gun will be stuck with a +3 DRM. A clever tanker might then exit the hex to the southwest such that the gun will even be covered by drifting smoke in the ensuing British PFP for a total of +7 DRM, without even considering acquisition or the dust dr.

No matter what else is going on, probably the most certain way to take out these guns is to pull up adjacent with several panzers to maul the enemy with PB Bounding and Advance Phase fire. In the event of AFPh, the gun crew can be Encircled, which will weaken their resistance to fire (lowered morale) and make it tougher for them to hit anything in turn (+1 TH DRM). The point-blank MG fire of these MkIII's are the big threat, although once

any smoke in the target hex disappears at the start of the next German PFP, the 57L is facing adjacent "-2" acquisition fire which might lead to a few 50mm hits.

This is what appeals to me most about this scenario. The opportunity to employ such mobile tactics is not matched in any other published scenario to date. The flexibility to mount this attack in varying sequence, mixing the Overruns, Bounding Fire, sD usage, TPBF, CC, Melee, Advancing Fire and Encirclement make for a very exciting and reveal-

Figure 1: Positions shown at conclusion of German MPh of Turn 1. Notice that all tanks are in Motion and no sD smoke is shown for clarity, although all tanks would have rolled the attempt. Any successfully placed smoke would drift two hexes to the SW at the start of the AFPh. British mortar is borsighted on the hillock to fire smoke should any MkIII's opt for HD status there. The squad in 28T9 will attack any tank which Overruns the ATG, or will serve as a crew if needed. In this attack, the panzers will most likely try to run at the ATG in 28R9, using vehicular dust to screen their rear from the 27T1 ATG. There is no vehicular dust in I7 or F5 because the tanks in I7 and G6 spent three MP to enter those hexes due to the vehicular dust and hammad there.



ing battle for both players. The winning determination might be as elementary as whether it is that 9-2 leader directing that Overrun or CC, or whether it was "only" the 9-1.

With 15 tanks available, the Germans on this rare occasion can afford the losses which come with such aggressive tactics. They needn't adopt the standard attitude of such parsimony with their panzers that they handcuff themselves through fear of excessive losses. And this is precisely the style of play the VC was intended to encourage. Oh sure, to keep your frequent British opponent guessing, you should once in awhile move for that quick win on Turn 2. But if you decide that the early win is the German's "best" chance, then I fear the scenario design has missed its mark. Our hope is you will discover the German's chance much improved when you go after the guns (at least one of them), for only then will you be playing "AHWDWS" at its highest potential excitement level.

Undue German concern over losing tanks to infantry clustered around the ATGs (in addition to the slim possibility of an early win which does not entail any attack upon the guns) leads to what I liked least about the scenario in its earliest stages of playtest. If it becomes a matter of the British always huddling their infantry around the 57Ls and the Germans heading straight for the victory area, the scenario degenerates to merely a "run-and-gun" show. The crucial showdown between tanks and guns fighting at close quarters is lost; and once that is gone, there is precious little reason to have printed the scenario. That is why the version seen in this year's *ASL Annual* reduces the number of victory tanks by two (instead of one) for each ATG silenced. The intent is to entice a German assault upon the British guns. This seems to fulfill both the requirements of fitting the historical context and enhances the offensive tactical doctrine of armor versus guns which we wanted to highlight.

There are many other considerations at play in this little encounter. Be wary of SSR #5, which makes a small concession to the unfortunate Hero who enters play only to man a malfunctioned gun—or even one which is surrounded, acquired and encircled (although the Hero does not suffer any penalties for Encirclement). Such are the fortunes of war. Don't forget to use the LMGs to roll THs and TKs against the AFVs, and to apply the Case D TK# Change for ranges "0-6" for the MGs and ATR, as they all receive a modifier for being less than 25mm. Boresight the gaps in the sand, like 28P5, 27R8, 27Q9 and/or 28T7. These locations are ideal for two reasons: they are the most likely points for the panzers to traverse since by entering them the tanks avoid an extra Bog roll; and, should you knock out a tank in these hexes, both that tank and its vehicular dust will either slow any following tanks or will encourage them to pass around the stopped panzer, which will entail "extra" Bog rolls.

Fire smoke with your 51mm mortar, and fire some HE at those tanks as well. The greatest disadvantage of light mortars is the high probability that you may call in enemy sniper shots with the volume of mortar shots needed for any result. In this encounter, at last you can fire the mortar to heart's content without that worry. Sure, it may seem ineffective, but you'll roll some ROF, obtain some hits, and sooner or later even roll a "3" on the IFT to hurt a panzer. Remember that British troops don't cower, and that they can throw smoke grenades. With dust, vehicles in motion, smoke, and such, there ought to be a wealth of opportunities for some CC usage.

Be very careful with your Intensive Fire. All too often the defender in a situation such as this one will risk Intensive Fire long before it is necessary. You don't have to stop the first tank to reach the victory area; you don't even have to stop the eighth

TOPOGRAPHY

SL/ASL MAPBOARDS:

Number	Description	Module
1	City; stone buildings	SQUAD LEADER
2	Country; two Level 3 Hills	SQUAD LEADER
3	Village amidst Level 2 Hills	SQUAD LEADER
4	Farmland; woods and grainfields	SQUAD LEADER
5	Woods; gullies	CROSS OF IRON
6	Chateau; orchard and grainfields	CRESCENDO OF DOOM
7	River; islands and marsh	CRESCENDO OF DOOM
8	River; cliffs and hill	G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY
9	Mountain; Level 4 Hill, crags, cliff	
10	Village; rowhouses, path, pond	PARTISAN! (Axis Minor)
11	Country; hedgerows and low hills	LAST HURRAH (Allied Minor)
12	Village; gullies, graveyard	G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY
13	Country; elevated road and stream	G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY
14	Airfield; sunken road	G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY
15	Mountain; two Level 4 Hills	G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY
16	Rural Crossroads; grainfields	YANKS (American)
17	Farmland; brush, woods and grainfields	YANKS (American)
18	Rolling Country; seven Level 1 Hills	YANKS (American)
19	Open Country; bordered by woods	YANKS (American)
20	City; rowhouses and gully	BEYOND VALOR (German/Russian)
21	City; rowhouses and graveyard	BEYOND VALOR (German/Russian)
22	City; suburbs and stream	BEYOND VALOR (German/Russian)
23	City; canal	BEYOND VALOR (German/Russian)
24	Village; valley, gully and cliffs	PARATROOPER (German/American)
25	Mountain; wadis, hammada	WEST OF ALAMEIN (British)
26	Desert; scrub, hammada	WEST OF ALAMEIN (British)
27	Desert; scrub, hammada	WEST OF ALAMEIN (British)
28	Desert; scrub, hammada	WEST OF ALAMEIN (British)
29	Desert; scrub, hammada	WEST OF ALAMEIN (British)
30	Desert; scrub, hammada	HOLLOW LEGIONS (Italian)
31	Desert; scrub, hammada	HOLLOW LEGIONS (Italian)
32	Woods; stream	PARTISAN! (Axis Minor)
33	Farmland; extensive grainfield	LAST HURRAH (Allied Minor)
34	Woods; marshy stream	CODE OF BUSHIDO (Japanese)
35	Farmland; orchard and grainfields	CODE OF BUSHIDO (Japanese)
36	Wooded Hills; marshy streams	CODE OF BUSHIDO (Japanese)
37	Country; woods, orchard and grainfields	CODE OF BUSHIDO (Japanese)
38	Airstrip; farmland	GUNG HO! (Marine/Chinese)
39	Wooded Ridge	GUNG HO! (Marine/Chinese)


DELUXE ASL MAPBOARDS:

Letter	Description	Module
a	City; factor	STREETS OF FIRE
b	City; rowhouses	STREETS OF FIRE
c	City; lumberyard	STREETS OF FIRE
d	City; gully	STREETS OF FIRE
e	Country; Level 2 Hill	HEDGEROW HELL
f	Country; sunken road	HEDGEROW HELL
g	Country; stream	HEDGEROW HELL
h	Country; farm	HEDGEROW HELL

All of the mapboards on this listing are available separately from The Avalon Hill Game Company (SL/ASL mapboards—\$5.00; DELUXE ASL—\$6.00). The nationalities listed in parentheses are those accompanying the named ASL module. While SQUAD LEADER, CROSS OF IRON, CRESCENDO OF DOOM and G.I. ANVIL OF VICTORY are not part of the ASL system, the mapboards of these games are fully compatible with ASL (and necessary to play many of the scenarios); the reverse is likewise true (although no scenarios in these four SL modules require use of boards released for ASL play). Note that the unmounted mapboards of RED BARRICADES (depicting the factory complex in Stalingrad where the action is centered) are not listed among the above; these "historical" mapboards are not geomorphic.

...AND HERE WE DAMNED WELL STAY

ASL SCENARIO A50



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Germans win if they have ≥ 8 Mobile AFVs with functioning MA/MG on/east-of hexrow U at the end of any Game Turn. Each AT Gun that has been eliminated, or that is currently malfunctioned and/or *not* possessed by a Good Order British unit, subtracts two from the needed German total.

TURN RECORD CHART

⊕ BRITISH Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5	END
⊕ GERMAN Moves First						

14 miles West of EL ALAMEIN, EGYPT, 27 October 1942: In an ill-organized night attack during Operation *Lightfoot*, a battalion of the British 7th Motor Brigade had thrust forward to seize a German-held position codenamed "Snipe". However, unaware that their maps were faulty, the men and carriers had advanced along an incorrect compass bearing, halting around midnight in a shallow, sandy area a half-mile south of Snipe. There they dug in for all-around defense, while with great difficulty their 6-pounder AT guns were brought up through the soft sand. When asked if they were actually on their objective, the battalion commander, Lt.-Colonel V.B. Turner replied, "God knows. But here we are and here we damned well stay." Just before dawn, as nearby Axis tank formations, unaware of the British presence, began moving to their battle positions for the coming day, they were met suddenly by the sharp crack of 6pdrs at point-blank range. Throughout the morning and afternoon, cut off from their own lines, the Tommies withstood continuous artillery and direct fire (several times from friendly units), and repelled successive armored attacks. The battalion had unwittingly halted directly in the path of a major Axis counterattack. It was incurring heavy losses, especially among the precious 6pdrs and their crews; ammunition for the few surviving guns was critically low. And now a company of panzers was forming up for yet another attack—possibly the one that would finally overwhelm the exhausted defenders.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:



BALANCE:

- ⊕ Any two British AT Guns begin play already marked with a Low Ammo counter.
- ⊙ Each AT Gun eliminated/malfunctioned/unmanned as per the VC subtracts *one* from the needed German total.

28	27
S8	H3
S3	S5
S6	S1
SD4	SD7
SD3	S4
SD5	SD1



Elements of A Company, 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade, and of 239 Battery, 76th A-T Regiment [ELR: 4] set up as indicated (see SSR 3): {SAN: 3}

On/between hexrows L and U:

4-5-7	2-2-8	8-0	4-12	2-7	1-12	5-1 [2-11]	5-7	5-1
6	2		2				2	6

On/east-of hexrow AA:

2-2-8	5-7
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Elements of Panzer Regiment 5, Panzer Division 21, enter on Turn 1 along the west edge: {SAN: 0}

13-6-3	13-6-3	13-6-3	9-2	9-1
6	6	3		

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Very Dry, with a Mild Breeze from the northwest at start. Moderate Dust (F11.72) is in effect.
- Place overlays as follows: H3 on 27E9-F8; S1 on 27T7-S7; S3 on 28R2-R3; S4 on 27CC8-CC9; S5 on 27Q4-Q5; S6 on 28T5-U5; S7 on 28X2-X1; S8 on 28L7-M7; SD1 on 27CC3-DD3; SD3 on 28W10-W9; SD4 on 28Q9-R8; SD5 on 28DD4-DD5; and SD7 on 27U2-U3. All Dunes are Low.
- All British units may use HIP in sand. (A foxhole will be revealed only if its protective TEM is used, it is exited/entered during a MPH/RtPh/APh, a unit in it performs any ?-loss action, or a German unit moves adjacent to it.) All foxholes must be set up in sand, and each must contain at least a squad (or equivalent). No MMC may set up in the same hex with, or adjacent to, another MMC.
- The British suffer from Ammunition Shortage (A19.131).
- The first British crew that breaks involuntarily, or is eliminated, by any means while manning an AT Gun immediately creates a Hero in its Location. This Hero is unaffected by the attack that broke/eliminated the crew, and is assumed to immediately take possession of that crew's Gun. He retains all normal heroic capabilities [EXC: he may apply his -1 modifier to an AT's TH DR (thus partially offsetting the +2 TH DRM for non-quali-

fied use), his manning an AT Gun does not itself lower the AT's B/X#, and he may attempt to repair a malfunctioned AT]. However, when the Hero takes possession of an AT Gun, it loses all Target Acquisition. He may utilize Emplacement/Gunshield benefits while manning an AT Gun, provided they would apply to a crew if one were (or is) present.

- No PzKpfw III/L have AAMG.

AFTERMATH: Fifteen panzers advanced cautiously, using slight undulations in the terrain as cover and spraying the area ahead of them with their machineguns—for the AT guns were dug in so well as to be invisible through the thick dust and smoke. Initially only two guns could be brought to bear on the approaching enemy; then another, on the eastern side of the perimeter, was also turned to face the threat. The British gunners, clinging to the protection of their gunshields as bullets spattered on them like driving rain, held their fire until they could be assured of hitting with each precious round. One gun crew, finally unmoved by the tanks' fire, broke to take cover—whereupon another gunner crawled to the gun and manned it alone. By then, the range had closed to just a few hundred yards and the panzers were overrunning the infantry. Suddenly, three 6pdrs opened fire. In the ensuing exchange, seven tanks were knocked out and the rest reversed away. The AT guns, now down to only three rounds apiece, held their fire as the Germans retreated. Turner, realizing that one more strong attack would put them all "in the bag", burned his map and codes. But no further attacks materialized; and after dark, the battalion—to everyone's great relief—was pulled back to its own lines. Around its position lay some 60 knocked-out AFVs, both German and Italian.

SIGNALS

Dear Mr. Martin,

I'd like to respond to Mark Nixon's comments on the IIFT in his survey of the scenarios of *LAST HURRAH*, "Early Victories, Early Victims". When someone of Mark Nixon's reputation and experience says something's wrong with a variant, I pay strict attention. If the IIFT is damaging to play of *SL/ASL*, then there is no appeal—short of the complete revamping of the IIFT from what might be the "germ of something great". I don't doubt that Mr. Nixon is more experienced than myself, and may well have an insight which my lesser experience with *ASL* hasn't uncovered. I can, however, provide some insight into the process of creating the original IIFT, and come to its defense.

When I drew up the IIFT, the only criterion which was sacrosanct was that the original columns (1FP, 2FP, 4FP . . . 36FP) would be unchanged. From that point, the work became a balancing act between several principles:

1. There would be a smooth mathematical progression from one column to the next, without the "fits and spurts" which have annoyed so many players.
2. There should be relatively significant differences between the effects of each column.
3. There should be a smooth progression of results from one line to the next within each FP column, again without "fits and spurts".
4. I wanted to use half-FP columns.
5. I did not want the new chart to become unwieldy.

Now, it was impossible to always fully satisfy all these criteria; they often came into conflict with one another, so the IIFT I submitted was a compromise.

The prototype IIFT which I originally sent to *THE GENERAL* emphasized criteria #1, #2 and #4 above, at the expense of #3 and #5. Like Mr. Nixon, I wanted a smooth progression in the effectiveness of each column as possible—I didn't want there to be any columns of "choice" which a player might specifically aim for. I wanted to recreate my experience using incremental CRTs in other game systems, where one thinks in terms of regiments or corps (or what-have-you) and don't count factors seeking exact odds ratios. Instead of the 18th factor versus a 6-strength defender being enormously more important than the 13th through 17th (which would have no value in themselves), I wanted every additional half-FP to be of equal value to every other half-FP . . . with a couple of caveats.

The original IIFT had .5-FP columns running throughout. Every column differed from the immediately preceding and following columns in either one or two combat results. There were three pairs of columns (3.5, 10.5/11, and 17.5/18) which were identical—no changes between the columns. And there were five changes between the .5 and 1FP columns, and four changes from 1.5 to 2FP—representing a sharp drop-off in fire effectiveness from 2FP to 1FP.

This smooth progression had a cost. As one read down a column, there might be gaps or jumps in the progression of results (say, from 1MC directly to a PTC) or a result might be repeated as many as three times in succession. Some columns had no PTC at all, the weakest result in such columns (short of no effect) being a MNC. In other words, my IIFT had a smooth progression from column to column, from left to right, but not from line to line, from top to bottom. In game terms, there was no point in trying to "hit" any specific FP column (the system didn't reward such play), but an astute gamer might occasionally juggle certain DRMs (e.g., the 2.5 column listed 1MC for DR of "3", "4" and "5", so one might hold back too long over open ground at long range from a single enemy 5FP squad knowing that the -1 DRM really only benefited the defender if he rolled very low or if he happened to hit the PTC at the bottom of the column). However, I felt this latter abuse, manipulating DRMs, was less likely and less harmful than the former abuse of aiming for specific columns (by the 4FP, 6FP, 8FP, 12FP columns of the IIFT, or any columns of choice on an IIFT which failed to progress smoothly). While my original IIFT did progress continuously and smoothly, it might reward manipulation of DRMs and was not entirely pleasing with its skips and long repetitions in some columns. I consciously pushed the "uglier" columns into FP columns which were least likely to be used (such as the exiling of the identical twins to the 3.5, 10.5 and 17.5 entries). I resisted the temptation to have the more perfectly smooth progression which I could have achieved by having columns

where, say, a DR of "4" was a MNC and "5" was a 1MC. There were times when doing this would have increased the mathematical precision of the smooth increase in fire effectiveness, but at a real cost in esthetics. I knew most players would strongly object to any change in the principle that a lower DR is always better than a higher DR; this was yet another compromise, at the expense of Principle #1.

Charlie Kibler and Bob McNamara, in refining the prototype IIFT, emphasized different principles than I had. They restored the smoothness of the progression of results in each column. No more jumps from 1MC to PTC, or of MNC to no effect. No more three-time repetitions of 1MC (or of 2MC higher in the chart) which I had found so useful. Also, KIA and K results are not repeated in the "official" IIFT, as I had done on the original.

This is the root of Mr. Nixon's complaint I think—the fits and starts that the published IIFT occasionally shows. It's all a question of which criterion for building the chart gets preference. The IIFT found in the '89 *ASL Annual* is better-looking and less offensive to one's sensibilities, but does have some quirks in it if you compare it column to column. My original IIFT was mathematically smoother, but rather ugly in spots and sure to upset some players' pre-conceptions.

Mr. Nixon points out that the 1.5 column differs from the 1FP only if the attacker rolls "snakes"—an insignificant difference unless you've got a handful of negative DRM. There isn't a smooth progression from the 1FP to the 2FP column. My original draft of the 1.5FP column read: 1KIA, 1KIA, 1MC, 1MC, 1MC, PTC, No K/I, no MNC, and it repeats the 1MC result three times. This was probably the toughest decision I was forced to make, and resulted in the ugliest column on the IIFT. That column would be used relatively often (some LMGs at long-range, Minor or inexperienced MNC firing whenever halved, single US squads firing while pinned or in the APPh, etc.), but down at the low-end of the chart there are few combat results to play with, and thus little room to maneuver. The IIFT I finally submitted (I think it was the fourth-generation) was one in which I'd bitten down hard and gone with an emphasis on mathematical continuity—damn esthetics if it wasn't pretty. When the team of Kibler and McNamara decided to better balance my principles #1 and #3 stated above, they were even more strait-jacketed than I had been, and nearly identical 1FP and 1.5FP columns is the result. While I'd murdered smooth linear progression, they had to sacrifice smooth lateral progression.

Now, if you try to design a new IIFT along the lines set out in the '89 *ASL Annual*, whether or not it's the germ of a great idea, you will inevitably run into these same dilemmas. If my smooth-but-ugly IIFT had been printed, gamers would have disliked the columns without a PTC, or without an MNC, or with multiply-repeated MCs; it might have been little used, and thus not worth printing. Messrs. Kibler and McNamara avoided that problem, but with the attendant fits and spurts of which Mr. Nixon writes. One simply can't have it both ways, short of, say, using percentile dice—a much more radical variant!

In reference to the problem of the 15FP column being nearly identical to the 16FP, but differing in six results from the 14 column (I take that this is the real concern of Mr. Nixon, and not his references to the 12-column), this is a product of the AH team's decision to never repeat KIAs and Ks, to never skip a result, and to never repeat a result three times. Just try to construct column 13, 14 and 15 and achieve both smooth progressions while insisting on this rules. It can't be done. So Messrs. Kibler and McNamara did what they could: most of the changes on this column occur on low DRs only, and then they also relegated this column to the 15FP entry—the one which would be used less often than the 13 or 14. (Of course, in a scenario in which one side consists solely of German *Luftlanders*—5FP each—who fire in platoons and don't bring their LMGs along, then it becomes easy to roll on the "choice" 15FP column.) It is obvious if you're aware that there's a significant jump in fire effectiveness from the 14FP to the 15FP column, so this is a "black mark" against the official IIFT, but I really don't feel it to be more than a slight blemish.

By putting more emphasis on "wieldiness", the half-FP columns occur only at the lowest end of the Kibler-McNamara IIFT (the original IIFT covered two typewritten pages). I've addressed, more or less, the first two reservations described by Mark Nixon. As for the overall increased effectiveness of

firepower if the IIFT is used, the only way to correct this "short-coming" would have been to change the original IIFT columns. For reasons I think are obvious I wasn't about to mess around with the established columns; I would fill in the gaps between them, but wouldn't overturn precedent. If one uses the IIFT, there will be a mathematically real increase in the effectiveness of fire, but this is a product of the game system and not of any historical research revealing firepower to have been more effectively than previously believed. If it doesn't harm the simulation value of *SL/ASL*, if the change is so small as to fall well within the bounds of actual fire effectiveness, then I don't believe this to be a significant issue. The increased effectiveness of Concealment from *SL* to *ASL* probably isn't the result of new historical research between 1977 and 1985 revealing a previously unguessed over-effectiveness of fire in such cases. In short, I believe the IFT and IIFT are both well within the bounds of realism.

Lastly, re the FP values of squads and half-squads, if the US 7-4-7s were rated such because they are deliberately equal in a firefight to US 6-6-7s but superior in CC, then the IIFT errs by making them superior in a firefight as well (at ranges of four or less, anyway). I don't believe this to be the case, but I don't know what criteria guided the assignment of combat ratings. I'm sure Mr. Nixon, who's been very deeply involved in the development of *SL/ASL* is a better judge. If "weight of metal"—modified by subjective measures of tactical doctrine, arms proficiency, higher percentages of "natural fighters" or of automatic weapons fostering fire-kill—was the principle criteria, then perhaps the IIFT's differentiation between 7's and 6's, between 5's and 4's, etc. is the better simulation. I am surprised that Mr. Nixon brings up the German 5-4-8s, because if he hadn't, I would have; they are one of the best examples of the flaws in the old IFT. It always amazed me that the German *cavalrymen/luftlander* could fire on the 4FP column in the PPhs, or if they so wanted, move and then fire in the APPhs—still on the 4FP column. This unfortunate flaw is corrected with the IIFT, where they fire on a weaker column in the APPh.

As Mark Nixon states, the value of the IFT and the IIFT ought to be discussed, weighed and measured—particularly if some official or semi-official status is being touted for the IIFT. I'm very gratified, of course, if my "baby" is well-regarded by many players—but if she's a "Bride of Frankenstein" and does harm to *SL/ASL*, then this needs to be scrupulously investigated. Keep in mind that shooting for the 2FP or 15FP column is probably a lot less prevalent on the IIFT than the old practice of scrambling for the odd FP factor to hit the 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 30 and 36 columns with no wasted FP left over. Lastly, one doesn't need to "count" factors before firing; the gamer thinks more strictly in terms of squads and platoons, and lets the numbers take care of themselves.

Mr. Nixon is quite correct about the PTCs which replaced IFT "misses" and how this strips Concealment more frequently than in the past. His greater experience with the system has uncovered this; I had never noticed the effect. But shouldn't 14FP have a slightly greater chance to uncover concealed enemies than 12FP? If the IIFT is harming the flow of play by relegating Concealment to a relative waste of effort, then we might need to change more of the PTCs to misses; but then you'd have to reach into the middle of the columns and change some other results to re-establish principles #1 and #2—another involved balancing act. I won't challenge Mr. Nixon's assertions on this issue; I'm just not sure if he has a point or not—though I respect his intuition. The effect on play-balance in the scenarios is, I think, relatively insignificant. Obviously, if one side is composed largely of 3FP, 5FP or 7FP squads versus an enemy of 4FP or 6FP, and the scenario was playtested with the IFT, then playing it with the IIFT in effect must give some advantage to the odd-valued squads. But I don't really think this is so pronounced a difference as to actually harm play balance. Ultimately, the players have a couple of means to correct any perceived imbalances—the official play-balance modifiers . . . or simply agreeing not to use the IIFT.

Jay Kaufman
Mankato, Minnesota

★★★★★

Dear Rex,

OK—somebody's got to speak up, so it might as well be me. Your "no comment" response to Philip Lohre's letter in the "Signals" column of the '91 *ASL Annual* was presumably intended as an invitation for piqued readers to sound off on their own. But, so far, all I've read is a meek supportive letter (by Lee Conner) in Vol. 27, No. 3 of *THE GENERAL*.

To recap for new readers, Mr. Lohre vehemently decried *CODE OF BUSHIDO*, as well as Avalon Hill's plans to release additional *ASL* modules on the Pacific and China/Burma/India theaters. The reasons he cites for his disapproval of such modules are: (a) "the *ASL* system is best suited for portraying . . . combat in Europe and North Africa"; (b) *COB* could stand to have better mapboards, more specifically suited to Pacific-theater terrain; and (c) real *ASL* players don't want to play the Chinese.

Now, I'll have to be honest; I haven't yet seen the inside of *CODE OF BUSHIDO*. I've been playing at *SQUAD LEADER* off and on ever since February 1980; but since time is a precious commodity for me and since the game has undergone some extensive changes, I'm still learning the system. As a matter of fact, I'm back at square-one, with "The Guards Counterattack" set up on my table right now as I've gone to follow Jim Stahl's programmed instruction method. Nevertheless, I've been playing the game for a long time—long enough, I think, to be entitled to an opinion of my own.

Is *ASL* specifically designed for portraying only European-theater combat? Are there any elements inherent in the design which make it unsuitable for Pacific war scenarios? I think not. I can see why Mr. Lohre might think so . . . but as far as I am concerned, he's missing a vital point. My guess is that Mr. Lohre (and his friends) envision European-theater combat as an intricate and "scientific" interplay among squad-sized units, individual vehicles, and heavy weapons—a lot like what we used to see on the old *Combat* TV series. At the same time, many people—Mr. Lohre among them evidently—imagine Pacific-theater combat in terms of massive human-wave (or *banzai*) attacks, followed by inhumanly tenacious Asian warriors holding up in caves, laying ambushes, or making suicidal forays—the very stuff we used to see in Hollywood's WWII propaganda films.

Well, I wasn't there, but I've done a bit of reading and have talked with some of the people who were; and I can confidently say that the reality was quite a bit different than what we've gotten used to seeing in the movies. There were plenty of human-wave type attacks in the Western theaters too . . . and not just by the Russians. Furthermore, except in block-by-block city fighting, the basic unit of maneuver was the battalion, not the squad. Any game which puts players in the position of sitting every gun, driving every tank, and giving explicit orders to each individual squad or leader is anything but "true-to-life".

Furthermore, the Pacific theater saw much action remarkably similar to the European theater. For all the propaganda about the "yellow borders", the Japanese and Chinese armies were reasonably up-to-date, for the most part, in matters of tactics. True, they had their own particular style of fighting, based partly on cultural differences but mainly, perhaps, on the top-down supply situation. How would American and British troops have fought if they had been the ones starving while the Japanese were well supplied with food and ammo? Caves and ambushes, and even suicidal charges, start to look pretty good under those conditions.

But, back to *ASL*. It is a game. As a game, it gives players the vicarious experience of driving tanks around a battlefield, mowing down enemy infantry with concealed machineguns, and making heroic one-man assaults with demolition charges to turn the tide and save the day. It does all this very, very well. It's exciting; it's just like the old movies, only better because you get to "be there" and "do stuff". And while you're at it, you can even learn something, because the game is based on history. This stuff really happened.

That's precisely where history properly comes into the picture. Adults who want to play simulation games generally need some kind of excuse. You have to be able to justify all the fun you're having—and one way to justify it is to call it a "history lesson". But let's be honest with ourselves for just a

moment before we return to the comfort of our delusions: nobody has ever, at any time in history, been in the position in which an ASL player is cast. Real-life battlefield commanders would give a lot to be in such a manageable position. For all our scientific thinking, and for all the necessity of planning, when it comes right down to the nitty-gritty, war is immediate, chaotic, terrifying, unmanageable hell. It's something only remotely hinted at by all the dice-rolls of ASL.

I'll reiterate that ASL is, after all, just a game. And what does it matter to Mr. Lore if some of us have grown tired of playing with toy Germans and want to move on to something new—like playing with toy Japanese or toy Chinese? If the “human wave” attack and paucity of leaders gives the Russians a distinctive flavor, I'm sure the designers and developers have provided similarly distinctive features for the Japanese and Chinese—and it'd be kinda neat to find out what's unique about those nationalities in ASL terms. It'll be fun to lay an ambush or two, or lead a so-called *banzai* charge. That's the stuff of military literature, the stuff most wargamers thrive on. Are we now to turn our backs on having fun and spend our time splitting hairs over what's historical? Haven't we outgrown that after so many years of debating over playability versus realism?

To my way of thinking, Mr. Lore's letter is misleading. It inspires us to say to ourselves, “Gee, maybe ASL really is incapable of accurately simulating Pacific-theater combat . . . and, well, if it's not historical, maybe we shouldn't play it at all. After all, that would be childish, wouldn't it—just to have fun playing a game?”

At the same time, curiously, Mr. Lore is himself expressing what I'd call a childish point of view when he says he's “not impressed with the prospect of having an entire OB of Chinese 3-4-6 squads whose sole leaders consist of a single 6+1 and 7-0 being run off the map by hordes of fanatic Japanese squads.” Without seeing even the outside of the *GUNG HO* box, Mr. Lore has already made up his mind about what the game will be like. He's gone way past judging a book by its cover; he's judging it even before he sees the cover! I won't say anything here about the racial prejudice that seems evident in Mr. Lore's remarks. But I will say this: Surely a real die-hard ASL player would welcome the unique challenge of leading a Chinese force such as Mr. Lore described, and only a mediocre player would rely on always having elite troops and Tiger tanks at his disposal. Any fool can win a battle against militia if he has seasoned troops! The less your ASL units are capable of, the more important it becomes for you as a player to make the most of each and every move.

For my part, I'm confident that Avalon Hill has done a decent job of bringing the Pacific theater to ASL. I expect to see balanced, intriguing scenarios in both *CODE OF BUSHIDO* and *GUNG HO*. And if I ever make it that far through the programmed instruction system, I fully expect to have a ball with those modules. It's something to look forward to, not only for the sheer imaginative fun of it—but for the challenge of learning to handle the new nationalities. If the Chinese forces prove to be as weak as Mr. Lore predicts, they may well prove to be the greatest ASL challenge of the whole system.

Not having seen the modules, I can't say whether Mr. Lore is right or wrong about the mapboards. Personally, I'm not fond of terrain overlays, so I hope Avalon Hill hasn't gone overboard with those again. At this point, I can only hope that *COB* didn't suffer the same fate with respect to ASL as *BANZAI* did with respect to *UP FRONT*. (Namely, lack of unique terrain, which forces players to “imagine” what ought to be graphically depicted.) If that turns out to be the case, I suppose I'll have to support Mr. Lore on the point. Certainly one of the most enjoyable aspects of playing a Pacific-theater scenario would be exploring the unique kinds of terrain; so I hope that by the time I get to them, they're there to be enjoyed.

In short, while I recognize that there are limitations to the ASL system, I do not believe the game is specifically designed to depict European and North African combat. It's a game of WWII tactical land combat, and it can be adapted to cover just about any type of action within those broad parameters.

Patrick Carroll
New Hope, Minnesota

★★★★★

Dear Sir,

I find it remarkable that in the pages of *The GENERAL* there has never been anything but praise for the physical components of the *SLASL* system. Remarkable because there have been, in my opin-

ion, some irritating slip-ups in putting the polish on an otherwise excellent product.

To make my point, I would start from the accepted premise that in wargaming it's all about trying to create a believable “alternative reality”. Enhancing the correct “period feeling” is one often neglected aspect of this endeavor, and this translates to the physical components of the game as well as to the mechanics. On this latter point, I feel that *SLASL* is good, but not the “hope” as it should be. Consider these few points:

Rodger MacGowan was simply irreplaceable as the artist for the box covers. “GP” has done well on some (*PARATROOPER*, *HEDGEROW HELL*), fantastic on others (*YANKS*, *RED BARRICADES*), but has also produced some dogs (*BEYOND VALOR*, *CODE OF BUSHIDO*). What's needed is not just a nice picture, but rather a sense of drama and historical accuracy has to be conveyed. This fails utterly in *BEYOND VALOR*, where the parade-ground officer in front of a Tiger tank (in Africa-paint) is less than convincing if you wanted to illustrate an East Front module, centered around city-fighting. The Tiger wasn't even operative then, and the average *landser* looked rather less immaculate in combat. Could be that the artist has a problem with the coal-scuttle helmets; his efforts certainly fail on this box—and consider that he succeeded to avoid picturing any Germans at all on no less than eight following modules which had them as the main adversaries! Nevertheless, he has great potential, and I hope that on your next historical release, he doesn't miss the chance to portray a cigar-chewing Peiper in his Schwimmwagen at the Malmédy/Sankt Vith signpost. It would certainly add that extra bit which the connoisseur cherishes!

The basic color for the boxes could have been chosen more carefully, so as to let them “blend” into each other on a shelf. The present choice seems indifferent and—if seen as a whole—gives no sense of unity unless you file them out of order. Also, one wonders why the *BEYOND VALOR* box has another format than the others. Remember that for the real aficionado, a game of this magnitude should not only be a pleasure to play, it should also look attractive in your bookcase—a treasure to cherish, to show off to other people.

As for the counters, I have always thought that the vehicle silhouettes rather than the present bird's eye view, would have added a lot more recognition and feeling with minimum hindrance to LOS rules. Also, the infantry squads looked much more dynamic in the original *SL* releases; and I still feel the Germans should have been done in *feldgrau* rather than light blue. The least you should consider in this respect is to reprint, as an optional item, the German infantry and ordnance counters on buff-shaded paper for use in desert scenarios. These blue Germans stand out as a sore thumb in the desert—a real shame! (Confusion with the British would be no problem; in reality they were difficult to tell apart in the North African theater.)

On the scenario cards, please take care not to reuse the same illustration for different scenarios. Some in-house checking could prevent this. Also, please make these pictures relevant and to the point; I have seen Soviets on a German-US scenario, and numerous are the cases where a historical photograph was actually taken at an entirely different time on a different front. Remember that most ASL enthusiasts are aware enough to see these errors.

Trivial nit-picking? I don't think so. A player who is in for so much money (ever figured what it has cost us here in Europe to get the full array of ASL releases) and even more commitment has a right to expect a perfect product—not just a very good one.

Paul Henderyckx
Wommelgem, Belgium

In response, I'm not sure how to begin. In general, much of what M. Henderyckx touches upon is a matter of taste; where it may not be, it's a matter of the realities of the printing industry. However, to take up a few specific points:

George Parrish has been the cover artist of all the modules to date, and I'm sure that the fact that he (in his 60s now, and a well-respected artist in the book and movie industries for some decades) “has great potential” will encourage him to continue thus. In point of fact, the cover painting for *BEYOND VALOR* was his first piece of art for Avalon Hill. He worked without guidance, under a daunting deadline, with little knowledge of our expectations. Since then, with Bob supplying photo and technical references, his work has been nothing short of superb in my opinion. (By the way, for the upcoming *RGP* cover, I doubt that he'll make use of the famous photo M. Henderyckx refers to, since the figure is not Peiper—something the “connoisseur” might not appreciate.) As for the box colors, these

are chosen with a view towards what will best set off the cover art, with the single caveat that we had a distinct shade for the modules of each theater (Europe, North Africa, Pacific), *DASL* and now *HASL*.

Regarding the counters, there are some very sound reasons for the layout and colors chosen, for such decisions are not made willy-nilly. Imagine trying to fit the information shown by the overhead view (open-topped, turret traverse, etc.) and all the text around a silhouette. And imagine the difficulty in reading black-type (especially as small as on some of the vehicles) on a dark “feldgrau” background. As for the suggestion regarding offering the Germans in desert colors, I can only imagine that this was made with tongue firmly in cheek. While we're at it, let's print the *Flans* (and Russians, Germans, Americans, and the mapboards too) in white so we can better simulate winter actions.

Finally, so far as I know, no scenario picture has been repeated in the eight 300 scenarios we have offered for ASL. And the case of the appearance of the Soviets in *SL* scenario 10 has long since been corrected (in Vol. 25-2 of *The GENERAL*). With respect to occasionally making use of a photo not directly related to the action being simulated, it was most inconsiderate of the folks on the historical scene not to have carried their cameras with them at all times while they were fighting for their lives. Since they didn't, we'll have to just bumble along with what's available.

★★★★★

Dear Rex:

It is not often that anything that is written in any of the “Letters” columns ever bothers me, but I must take exception to the letter from Mr. Philip Lore. Since you offered “No Comments” to his letter, I hope you will allow another ASL player, *GENERAL* subscriber, and *ASL* Annual reader to make a rebuttal.

I guess that I am not the long-time player Mr. Lore is, but I have played this game for the last six years. I, too, have spent hundreds of dollars on all the various ASL products that have appeared on the market. If it has an ASL logo on it, I will buy it. I have spent hours researching and writing the “Reference Notes”. This is also part of my investment in ASL, to help it grow and flourish. What we need is not someone who wants to strait-jacket ASL, but players who will help it grow to its full maturity.

From his letter, I receive the feeling that Mr. Lore resents the money that he spends on some parts of the ASL line. In addition to all of the ASL products, I have spent hundreds of dollars on buying all types of reference material dealing with World War II. Even more money is spent each year by our ASL club in travel expenses, mailings and copy services. We may be just some country hicks living way out in South Dakota and Iowa, but I spend that money willingly for the pure playing satisfaction of the *total ASL* game system.

Mr. Lore also gives the impression in his letter that WWII was fought mostly in Europe, and that some other areas (such as the South Pacific and Burma) were just second-rate and minor theaters of the war. It is too bad that Mr. Lore has obviously not read the casualty figures for the PTO from 1941-45. He even gives the impression that the Japanese simply ran into the guns of the US Marines and soldiers, just to help us win the war. But the Japanese soldier was a well-trained and dedicated foe, not just a target. If Mr. Lore knows any ex-Marines who served in the PTO versus theater, it would benefit him greatly to have a good, long talk with them about the “fanatic Japanese”.

Mr. Lore states that ASL was designed to accommodate all of the variables encountered in the European theater. I don't believe that any ASL player would dispute that statement; I know I wouldn't. But to some of us, that same design concept is the primary reason that ASL is such a great game, in that it is adaptable to any tactical situation that occurred during WWII (including in the CBI and PTO). I don't want just an “unique experience” of any one theater or nationality. I want to be able to play all aspects of WWII—regardless of climate, theater, nationality, weapons or terrain. I will put it into even simpler words for Mr. Lore . . . I WANT IT ALL! No, Mr. Lore is not an ASL fanatic; he is a European theater fanatic. If he wishes to meet some true ASL fanatics, he should travel to one of the ASL tournaments we have. I will play ASL with anyone, anywhere, and anytime.

And Mr. Lore will be missing an important part of the European experience of the war if he rejects the *GUNG HO* module. To the best of my memory, the ETO action included assaults such as *Torch*, *Dragon* and *Overlord*, not to mention

numerous other smaller sea-borne actions. The landing craft counters and amphibious assault rules are a part of *GUNG HO*, and are presented in such a way that they will apply to any African or European sea-borne operation also. I am sure that we will see many scenarios set in the ETO making use of them.

I am an ex-Marine myself, and the PTO modules are the prime reason that I became interested in ASL. It has been a long wait, and I have felt honored that Bob McNamara has let me work with him on this project for the last three years. The Pacific Theater is my main interest, but I have had a ball playing all the nationalities of the ETO while I waited for the Marines (hell, I even want to play the Chinese). Now that the “Marine module” is published, I can assure everyone that I will continue to collect any ASL materials and products as they arrive; as I said, I want it all.

Yet if criticism is needed, no one should ever be afraid to write Mac and Rex with their comments. I know for a fact that Bob McNamara has received plenty of criticism, because I have bickered with him for over two years regarding Marine values and capabilities. Bob put up with me, not because I told him he was “wrong”, but because I also offered suggestions on improvement of the system. Some was incorporated into the game, while some was not. I still bought the module, and will play it, and will enjoy it—even though it does not have everything I thought should be there.

All-in-all, the *GUNG HO* module will be the last major addition of rules to the ASL system. You will now be able to simulate any action all over the world, 1939-1945. That is what I call a universal wargame. In fact, it will be very easy to add the Spanish Civil War to pre-1939 ASL and the Greek Civil War to post-1945 ASL history. Or, how about a couple of firefights based on the action between the Red Chinese and US Marines in 1945-46?

No, Mr. Lore, you are wrong. By restraining ASL and preventing its growth, you would cause the death of the system in the commercial marketplace. Avalon Hill needs to continuously expand ASL, and all ASL players should support that effort. By catering to one small portion of WWII or to only one type of customer, the widespread commercial acceptance would wither away and costs would rise. As the costs increased, the number of new players would decrease—and eventually the break-even point for sales would be passed. That day would be the death of *ADVANCED SQUAD LEADER*.

Steven C. Swann
Hartford, South Dakota

★★★★★

Dear Rex,

The ASL Annual '91 arrived today; many thanks for sending these. Thank you for publishing “The Forgotten Legions”, in which some unfortunate errors crept in:

1. On page 21, first column, “Vlad Dracul” should read “Vlad Dracula”, Vlad Dracul being the tyrant's father.
2. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia was only seemingly pro-German (reference on page 21); apologies to any reader who may have taken offense to the statement.
3. In the paragraph on “other weaponry” in the first column on page 25, with respect to the ATR, the phrase “Hungarians . . . German 20mm models” should have read “Hungarians and Rumanians who had some German or Swiss 20mm models.”

However, experience shows that your staff did a fine job translating my piece into print, with only three small errors. I will endeavour to have the Japanese piece ready later this year (although mid-November is probably too tight a deadline).

Finally, let me also voice my regrets that there will be (by all accounts) no more Deluxe ASL mapboards. My gaming group and I are frankly amazed that these have never caught on with the ASL fraternity, as they are an absolute joy to use compared to the cluttered “normal” mapboards. Is there any hope of at least some new boards with different terrain being issued in the future?

Charles Markuss
Bolton, Lancashire

I'm afraid that, despite a number of letters praising the utility of the *DASL*-scale boards, there are no plans to offer new ones—either individually or as part of any new module. With our emphasis shifting to the *HASL* (“Historical”) ASL modules, Charlie Kibler's limited time devoted to researching and painting the maps for the system must be concentrated upon these. Sorry to say.

LANGRUNE-SUR-MER, FRANCE, 6 June 1944: In the grand design of *Overlord*, five Royal Marine Commando groups were organized into two Special Service battalions and detailed to clear German strongpoints along the 20-mile frontage of Gold, Juno and Sword. Under the command of Lt.-Colonel J.L. Moulton, one such—48 Commando—landed a half-hour after the initial Canadian assault wave came ashore at St. Aubin-sur-Mer. With the Canadians allotted a scant 30 minutes to silence the enemy along the beach, it was unsurprising when the Marines' landing craft came under heavy fire. Displaying to the full their traditions of fortitude and duty, the bulk of the commandos succeeded in assembling on their start line at the eastern end of St. Aubin, from which they struck out for the nearby village of Langrune. Encountering only scattered resistance at first, the two troops—X and B—and two tanks of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Group made good progress . . . until they came up against the fortified core of the strongpoint.

AN



- ✚ Add two 2-2-8 crews to the German OB.
- ⊙ Add one 6-4-8 to each of X and B Troops' OBs.

GERMAN Sets Up First [84]

© BRITISH MOVIES FIRST [196]

[⊙] 1	[⊙] 2	3	4	[⊙] 5	6	7	8	END
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12				2	3	2	24		3	8



							
7				3	2	2	

 6 ² 4-8	 10-2	 9-1	 8-0	 7-0	 6-1	 5-2	 4-3	 3-1
7				3	2	2		

Turn 2:



Turn 5:



AFTERMATH: Advancing along parallel axes, X and B troops came under heavy sniper fire as they penetrated the outskirts of the village, B Troop's commander being killed by one. Despite being "second-rate" troops, the defenders of the stronghold were well-armed and surprisingly resolute. The bombardment and approach of the British had not caused them to waver, as other Germans did that day. In the smokey dawn, the commandos soon saw the reason; the stronghold's fortifications were extensive, and included a five-foot anti-tank ditch. Two attacks were repulsed. A second Centaur was sent forward when the first ran out of ammunition. But Langrune did not fall until the next day, when A Troop—with the support of two M10 tank destroyers and a Sherman—succeeded in breaching an anti-tank wall and penetrating the fortified core of the village.

Series Replay . . . Cont'd from Page 32

The middle game was a disaster, primarily because most of the IJA was forced into the teeth of the British defense due to Perry's maneuvering with the Staffords and the restrictive natural and artificial terrain. Also, it was at this time that both Hayashi and Kiro bought the farm. Fortunately, Japanese prowess at CC began to take its toll, and a few HS and step-reduced squads snuck around the flanks to create havoc with the British. In fact, it was those units which ultimately won the day for the IJA by capturing additional Level-3 hill hexes on the rear of the plateau and setting up the final encirclement of hex K6. In sum, other than the major LOS gaffe with Ono and J.A., and the failure to encircle hex K6 on Turn 9, the IJA maneuvered as I wanted. Such maneuvering ultimately won the game for the IJA.

Perry's strategy and tactics were sound, with one or two errors that paid big dividends for the IJA. I initially thought that the HMG should be on the front line to maximize shots at the vulnerable IJA units as they move across the paddies. I am now convinced, however, that the best strategy is locating it up on the hill near where Perry had it placed, particularly in conjunction with a trench line such as Perry had prepared. I do think, though, that the HMG eventually must be manned by a 6-4-8 squad to maximize its effectiveness and Perry's failure to do so allowed the IJA to capture the HMG for a few crucial turns. What was important about the capture of the HMG was not the damage the IJA caused to the British with the HMG (minimal), but rather the missed opportunities of the British during the vital mid-game when one more blow could have crippled the IJA, either psychologically or physically. I also think it is generally a mistake to send units into CC against the Japanese. This goes double for units that are CX; against a CX unit even a "1-4" succeeds in causing casualties over 72% of the time and kills everyone nearly 60% of the time (assuming, of course, the Attacker is ambushed by the defending IJA units). Without my Turn 7 CC victories, half of which were initiated by Perry, the IJA loses the bitter fight for OP Hill. Finally, Perry made one bad rout decision in Turn 9 when he did not stack squad M with Ellis and squad E. Perry nearly recouped everything by his own last-minute maneuvers, though. I particularly liked the movement of B.N. and HMG to hex I6. If Perry had been a little luckier with his Defensive Fire, he might have finished off the Berserk J.P. and had an additional (heavily-armed) squad to help with the recapture of Level-3 hill hexes.

In conclusion, I feel fortunate to have won. This is not to say I played poorly, only that I feel the odds are stacked against a Japanese win when the British are led by a commander as capable as Perry. So much of my early game success depended on good Smoke and WP rolls and the malfunctioned status of the HMG during my Movement Phase. Without this good fortune, there is no good way for the IJA to get across the paddies quickly and relatively intact. And the IJA must move quickly to win this scenario. Although the game is 11 turns, that is not much time when you consider how far the IJA has to move, the initial hazardous terrain it must cross, and the impact of the arrival of twelve fresh Nigerian squads just as the ragged ranks of the IJA begin to assault OP Hill proper. Moreover, the Japanese leaders are so brittle, you can almost guarantee that neither negative modifier will be around for the end-game. (On the other hand, it must be hairy for the handful of Staffords facing the initial IJA horde; one bad break and the whole Staffordshire contingent may go down in front of an unstoppable Japanese wave.) Ultimately, the game was won by the IJA because I forced Perry into a "tough choice": the attack up the center was such a threat to win the game that Perry could not afford to divert units to protect his flanks and prevent the gradual infiltration of small IJA units into the British rear.

British: I am quite happy with the set-up I used. While certainly not the "perfect" defense, it served me well enough. I could see using it again, even if the element of surprise is lost. In spite of the set-up, though, the IJA made it across the paddies with remarkably few losses, thanks to Mac and Kiro. This was destined to make itself felt in the end-game when it seemed that the IJA had just enough units to do what was needed. Chuck deserves a lot of credit, both for getting his units into position and then for his finesse in their use at the end.

Kiro "the Hero" roughed up my front line pretty good in the top of the second turn. Of all the Movement Phases to lose the HMG, Turn 2 was the most crucial. The IJA was able to flood forward versus only minimal opposition. I don't know about Mac and that HMG—seemed like J.B. could operate it better than Mac and my crew #2. At least Mac was able to repair it quickly, really only missing one full game-turn. I don't think I have ever malfunctioned and repaired a B12 weapon three times in six turns before.

The high-water mark for the British came in the bottom of the sixth turn. Hayashi died, the HMG was manned and operable, and Chuck was ready to quit. I had him where I wanted, but let him slip away. In the top of the seventh, Chuck takes out Mac and captures the HMG. In the bottom of the seventh, in an attempt to keep the pressure on and to retake the HMG, I lose a 4-4-7, a 6-4-8, and my other 9-1 leader! Chuck and the IJA are suddenly back in the game. If I could have taken that HMG back then, or even just made Kiro and his crews have to CX to advance into L7, my chances would have looked a lot better.

The British downfall became apparent in the bottom of the ninth, after Chuck had maneuvered into excellent positions in his half of the turn. The net result of seven attacks of 6FP (+1) or better (up to 20FP) was two berserk IJA squads. Troha and B.F. paid dearly for drawing the MMGs' fire away from K6, but this was to be expected. British M's morale failure was unexpected, however. Then in the Rout Phase, I compounded its failure by routing the squad adjacent to B.F. and Ellis (nee Troha). B.M. needed to either stack with the others or rout north off the hill. As it was, he doomed B.F. and Ellis, and never came back himself. I also have to question HIS R's "charge" into L5 during the bottom of the tenth (into more fire power than he could eventually handle). A Minimum Move into J5 would certainly have been safer, allowing a Turn 11 move towards various threatened areas. On the other hand, if B.R. survived the two attacks in L5, he then presents the IJA with a big problem and I have a good chance of controlling L5 at the game's end. The final straw was losing B.N. and the HMG to another "1-4" CC attack. With B.N. and his HMG, I have a fair chance at hex J6, and would then be able to reinforce the K7 melee with Cox and send B.E. to L6 (assuming both had survived all of Chuck's Defensive Fire).

All-in-all, a very bloody, hard-fought battle, well-played for the most part. Except for Ono and J.A. running out in front of the HMG, Chuck played an excellent game. I played the "competent" game promised in the introduction. As usual in ASL, the better player won. If only Chuck had followed his instincts and quit after six turns. If only Rex had let us use our Series Replay of "The Bushmasters." (Now there is a scenario that has it all: American assault engineers with FTs and DCs, Shermans and 60mm mortar OBA attacking a dug-in elite IJA force in Dense Jungle, with an 18-squad Banzai charge in the wings; a Tank-Hunter hero hidden in a Swamp was the straw that crushed Chuck's spirit in that one.) Maybe next time.

Neutral Commentator: The initial outlook favored Perry, due to his well-planned defense and to a bit of uncertainty in the early Japanese strategy. But Chuck grabbed the first golden opportunity to make progress when the British HMG proved to be unreliable, and the Japanese crossed the paddies with relatively

minor losses. The plentiful SMOKE available to the Japanese certainly made things easier as well. However, I think Chuck could have pressured the Staffords even more than he did; as a consequence of his caution, he allowed Perry to work his way back into the game.

Perry quickly reversed the fortunes of war and was clearly on top of the situation after Hayashi and his followers were smashed. Coupled with Perry's excellent arrangement of the OP Hill fortifications, the Japanese did not have a way to seize the initiative again without a little help from the British. Perry well knows that a few wild dice rolls can do wonders in nearly any situation, and he decided that the best way to guard against such an unpleasant occurrence was to make sure that there were no enemy units left alive. Such a strategy is often effective, but I think it was not so here because the enemy was the dreaded Japanese, whose strengths (especially in close combat) are evident even at very low odds. If only it had been the Italians attacking OP Hill . . .

Chuck benefitted greatly from a rash of good dice rolls during Turns 7 and 9, but in the end game Perry made two key but subtle tactical mistakes that finally cost him the game. The first was his failure to deploy squad B.E., which would have maximized the opportunities for British counterattack. The second was the misuse of the HMG during Turn 10; the possibility existed for the British to prosper tremendously from a few average die rolls (i.e., 50-50 for HMG rate-of-fire), but squad B.N. was never given the chance to earn a Victoria Cross.

In summation, both Chuck and Perry had opportunities to seize the victory, despite the various calamities that fell upon each. In fact, I feel that with average dice rolls, Perry had at least a 33% chance to pull out a win on the last turn . . . if he had deployed B.E. This, to my mind, helps to illustrate why players such as Chaney and McGrath continue to win so many ASL tournaments; they always seem to execute the minor move that needs to be made at just the right moment. Nonetheless, I think the squad leaders who take the time to set up the pieces and follow through each turn of this Series Replay will learn a great deal about the Japanese (in ASL), and recognize the winning moves and tactical blunders made by our two combatants. And, in the process, they'll become better players themselves.



Recently, it has been my sad task to return to the authors unread a number of replays of ASL scenarios, submitted for possible use in this publication. Unfortunately, in all these cases, the author/players had not contacted us prior to submission to ask if we might be interested in reviewing their work. If they had, I would have been able to save them a great deal of effort. Unlike most of the material found herein, the SRs are not the result of free-lance submissions by fans of the game. Please, if your friends hanker to display their abilities in the replay of an ASL scenario, advise them to first contact the editors to determine whether there is any interest in the project. Such a brief query, accompanied by a SASE, might save them some time and expense in the long run.

DEBRIEFING

A1.11 Is a leader without a functioning SW considered "armed" for all purposes?

A. Yes, unless he is currently being held as a prisoner.

A2.3 If a piece is set up in a half-hex between two allowed boards, does it count against scenario-specified limitations on both of those boards?

A. Yes.

A4.5 If Infantry enters terrain that requires "ALL" of its MP allotment, may it then declare Double Time to gain an extra MP?

A. No.

A7.212 If a Bypassing friendly AFV occupies a hex that contains an enemy unit at a higher level, do the firing restrictions of this rule apply to that enemy unit? Do they apply if a BU friendly AFV, regardless of whether or not it is in Bypass or is OT, occupies a Location that contains an enemy unit?

A. Only if the AFV is CE/OT. Yes.

A7.53-.531 & A10.72 These seem to imply that leader direction and the application of a leader's DRM can be declared independently of each other. Is this true?

A. No—the two are synonymous in all cases. However, if leader direction is used for an attack/action to whose DR/dr "A" applies, that leader's DRM/drm cannot apply to that DR/dr.

A8.15 If hexes G7, H7 and I7 in the illustration comprised a Level 1 hill, would both Snap Shots described in the example be subject to Height Advantage TEM?

A. Yes.

A10.51 If a DM broken unit that must rout is within six MP of the nearest woods/building, must it attempt to reach that woods/building in a single RPh?

A. Yes, unless it uses Low Crawl, but it need not take the shortest route (in hexes/MP) to do so. Even if it uses Low Crawl, however, it must still do so toward that woods/building (i.e., at no time may it increase the hex range between itself and that woods/building, and must end that RPh closer to it than it was at the start of that phase).

A10.51 & A10.61 Are the rubble Locations of a partially rubble building still considered building Locations for rout/rally purposes?

A. No.

A10.532 May a MTR Interdict using Spotted Fire?

A. No.

A10.532 If a unit's/weapon's FP was halved in the preceding APPhs, does this prohibit it from Interdicting?

A. No, such halving does not carry over into the RPh.

A10.64 If a squad's Rally DR is an "Original 12", can that DR (given sufficient negative DRM) still rally the surviving HS?

A. No—an Original 12 DR never rallies a unit.

A11.14 & A18.12 If a MMC both attacks and is attacked in simultaneous CC, and in its own CC attack it rolls an "Original 2" and creates a leader, what effect does that leader have on those two CC attacks?

A. Unless one or both sides Withdraw(s) due to Infiltration (A11.22), both attacks must be resolved using both of the same Original DR and the new leader's Inherent-PP/leadership just as if he had been present all along. Note that if the "2" DR that allowed leader creation was made for > one MMC engaging in a combined attack, Random Selection must be used to determine which MMC that leader will defend with.

A11.15 If a concealed unit in a Melee Location loses its "T", is it immediately in Melee?

A. Yes, after resolving all effects of the action that caused it to lose its "T".

A11.16 Does a Disrupted unit in Melee remain in Melee or is it eliminated for Failure to Rout? Is it eliminated for Failure to Rout if still Disrupted and in Melee at the end of that CCPH.

A11.2, A11.22 & A19.12 May a Disrupted unit attempt to Withdraw from CC/Melee?

A. No.

A12.154 If more than one Searched Location contains anything that can cause Search casualties, is one Search Casualty dr made for each such Location?

A. No; only one such dr can be made per Search dr.

A14.2 If some/all of the possible targets of a sniper attack in a Location are concealed, how does the sniper player determine its target(s)?

A. First, if the eligible possible targets include both concealed and unconcealed units, treat the concealed stack as one possible target (regardless of how many units it actually contains) for Random Selection purposes. Then, if (or whenever) a concealed stack is chosen as the sniper's target, the sniper player's opponent must declare the number (only) of eligible possible targets that stack contains. If it contains none (i.e., is a Dummy stack), it is automatically eliminated (14.3). If it contains one, that unit is attacked. If it contains two or more, the sniper player rolls for Random Selection accordingly.

A14.21 If two building hexes/Locations of the same wooden or stone construction type are equidistant possible sniper targets but, unknown to the sniper player, one of them is Fortified, can/must the opponent declare that Fortified status to increase its TEM?

A. He may do so.

A14.4 If Random Selection for a Sniper attack (A14.2) chooses multiple units in a Location, is a Sniper Check possible before Sniper dr have been made versus all of those units?

A. No; all Sniper dr versus that Location must be made (and fully resolved, including LLMC/LLTC, Heat of Battle, etc.) before a Sniper Check is allowed.

A15.2 If a pinned unit creates (or becomes) a Hero, is that Hero pinned?

A. No.

A15.24 Can the -1 Heroic DRM be used to modify a FT/DC attack?

A. No.

A15.42 Regarding the last sentence of this rule, may a Good Order leader direct the IFT attack of a berserk unit? Even if the latter is part of a same-Location PG containing a Good Order unit?

A. No to both.

A15.42 May a Good Order leader apply his leadership drn to an Ambush dr in conjunction with a berserk unit? Even if another Good Order friendly unit is part of that Ambush attempt?

A. No to both.

A15.42 May a Good Order leader apply his leadership DRM to a CC attack made in conjunction with a berserk unit? Even if another Good Order friendly unit participates in that attack?

A. No to both.

A15.431 If a berserk unit is already in Melee at the start of a friendly MPH, must it at that time drop all excess SW it possesses?

A. No.

A15.431 & A23.6 These two rules contradict each other regarding whether a berserk unit can Throw a DC. Is it in fact allowed?

A. Yes. In line 6 of A23.6 add "(or berserk)" after "Order".

A19.12 If a Disrupted Infantry unit is in/ADJACENT to both enemy Infantry/Cavalry and an enemy vehicle, does it still surrender? Can a Disrupted unit surrender while in Melee?

A. Yes, unless in Melee. No.

A19.131 What happens to a squad with underlined morale and a 5 ELR if it rolls an "Original 12" IFT DR while afflicted by Ammunition Shortage?

A. It is Replaced by its two unbroken HS.

A20.5 If a crew is captured, an unarmed HS counter is substituted for it. However, doing so makes it impossible to tell whether the unit is worth one or two VP. Should an unarmed HS counter's ID be noted on a side record if it represents a crew?

A. Yes.

A23.1 When a DC detonates in a hex, does it attack its hex or its Location?

A. Its Location.

A23.7 Assume a squad, assisted by a leader, Sets a DC. Is that leader qualified to detonate it? If that squad later Deploys, will both of its HS be qualified to detonate it?

A. No. No—when the squad Deploys, record on a side record the ID of one HS that retains the ability.

A23.7 Is the FP of a Set DC halved versus a concealed unit?

A. Yes.

A23.7 Is the Malfunction DRM of a Set DC attack DR affected by enemy Infantry in a Location above/below that of the DC?

A. No. Change the last "hex" in A23.7 to "Location".

A25.231 Does a Human Wave's morale-increase affect units of that Human Wave for the entire turn? A. Yes, provided they remain in Good Order.

A26.21 & D6.82 Is a Carrier HS worth one or two VP when eliminated?

A. Two if it is Inherent, or one if in counter form.

B1.3 Does "any applicable positive DRM" really void FFMOT?

A. No. Delete "which . . . hex" in this rule.

B6.2 How is a non-pontoon Bridge counter treated for LOS purposes?

A. As per B6.2, but each such counter is also Inherent Terrain (B.6) [EXC: a LOS into/through its hex does not incur the bridge Hindrance/TEM if it crosses only the road hexside(s) (exclusive of vertices) of that hex]. In addition, all non-pontoon Bridge counters and printed bridges are one-and-a-half level LOS Hindrances rising from one level < that of the bridge Location [EXC: no bridge Hindrance LOS drawn either along the bridge's road depiction or from and to Locations that are lower than the bridge's Location; no LOS exists from a bridge Location to any other Location beneath that bridge, even if that bridge is multi-hex in length].

B23.74 & B23.86 If a rooftop can never be rubbled, is there any way an Interior Factory Location can be rubbled by Indirect Fire or by any attack made from a height > that of the roof?

A. For any such (including Aerial) HE attack versus any playable rooftop, check for rubble as if the rooftop Location were a non-rooftop building Location. If rubble occurs, the building level directly beneath that rooftop Location is considered rubbled (check for falling rubble also). Note that OBA can cause rubble only during the PPPhs/DPhs (C1.51).

B24.11 & B25.13 If an Area-Target-Type/OBA attack versus a multi-level building rolls an Original KIA, is each building level checked separately for Rubble/Flame purposes?

A. No—use Random Selection. However, only those levels in the LOS of the fire can be eligible for Random Selection if that attack was made by non-mortal ordnance.

B24.74 If an Infantry unit creates a partial TB to attempt minefield Clearance, may other units freely use that TB?

A. Not The second half of the rule clearly states that only the unit(s) that placed the TB can receive its special benefits. Consider the TB non-existent for all other units.

B25.15 Can more than one Flame ever exist per Location?

A. Yes (see B24.72 and the B25.7 example).

C.4 How is ordnance penalized when firing from terrain in which Area Fire applies (e.g., a LATW firing from marsh or shallow stream)?

A. TH Case K applies. Such use would be cumulative with any application of Case K for firing at a target that is not Known to the firer.

C2.29 May an IFE-capable Gun that has exhausted its Multiple ROP use IFE again as Intensive Fire?

A. No; it could only use Sustained Fire, and only if also using Subsequent-First/Final-Protective Fire or Final Fire (since the use of Sustained Fire is permitted only to a DEFENDER MG/IFE-Gun and only during the MPPh/DPh).

C6.43 Does a Bore-Sighted weapon that enters or exits an entrenchment retain its Bore-Sighting if it otherwise remains in the same Location?

A. No—nor could it if it changed Crest status, became dm and/or was loaded/hooked/Packed onto some form of conveyance in its Location.

C8.2 How is C8.2 "elite" status determined for the purpose of higher ordnance Depletion Numbers?

A. An armed-vehicle/weapon in a printed scenario is considered "elite" for this purpose only if the historical formation to which it belongs is either SS or Russian Guards; otherwise it must be specified as "elite" by SSR. For a DYO scenario it is considered "elite" only if the Majority Squad Type of its side's total OB is Elite. Note that such an armed-vehicle/weapon would have all of its Depletion Numbers—not just those for APCR/APDS—raised by

one. Note too that such "elite" status would apply to any applicable armed-vehicle/weapon with > one Depletable ammo type (i.e., not just to AFVs).

C8.31 Can HEAT potentially cause rubble regardless of its Caliber Size?

A. Yes, even if fired by a SCW (i.e., the 70-mm restriction of B24.11 does not apply to HEAT).

C8.6 Within the restrictions of C8.6, can WP be fired at a moving enemy unit during the enemy MPH? If yes, would only the moving unit(s) in the target Location be subject to the NMC?

A. Yes to both. However, the WP would still have to be fired before any non-SMOKE ammo in that phase.

C16.1 May a unit attempt to repair a hooked-up GUN?

A. No.

D2.5 If a tracked AFV enters terrain that requires "ALL" of its MP allotment, may it then attempt ESB to gain extra MP?

A. No.

D6.4 & D6.5 A Gun's crew pays no extra MF to (un)load from/to a vehicle while (un)hooking a Gun. Can a crew that is (un)loading from/to a vehicle while (un)hooking a Gun be attacked by Defensive First Fire?

A. Yes, based on the crew's (un)hooking MF expenditure. See the D5.43 example.

D6.64 May half-track- or carrier-mounted FT/IFE FP be part of a FG?

A. No. After "vehicular-mounted non-ordnance weapon(s)" add "[EXC: FT; IFE]".

E1.21 Do armed but unarmored vehicles gain Freedom of Movement as if they were AFV?

A. No.

E2.1 Are Personnel subject to Interrogation when they surrender (as opposed to captured)?

A. Yes.

E8.3 How is ordnance fire conducted versus a landed glider?

A. As per E8.3, but also treating the glider as a Stopped truck (of "V" Target Size), and using the proper TK Table and Unarmored TKW (or IFT * Vehicle Line for a mortar). A DPh ordnance attack versus a glider that landed in the preceding MPH would also use TH Case J.

G1.422 Can a Hidden T-H Hero cause Search-ing/Mopping-Up casualties?

A. No.

G1.422 May a T-H Hero be set up HIP possessing a DC?

A. No, because he cannot set up possessing a SW (see G1.423).

G12.211 MIRE: Change rule number to 12.2111.

G17.41 Can a Napalm Blaze possibly Spread (B25.6) before it becomes—or even if it cannot become—a Terrain Blaze?

A. No.

G17.41 Does a Napalm Blaze force units to exit the hex/Location as per B25.4?

A. Yes.

O11.6057 If a German Perimeter Area contains no map-edge hex along the north/west edge of the map, is that Perimeter Area a Pocket?

A. Yes, even if it does contain > one map-edge hex along the east/south edge. Conversely, the same is true of a Russian Perimeter Area that contains no map-edge hex along the east/south edge.

O11.6112 May a crew be Battle Hardened using this rule?

A. No. In lines 4 and 6 add "non-crew" before "MMC", and in line 7 delete "(as . . . crew)".

RB SSR CG10 When Retaining an OBA module, is its draw pile Retained as is?

A. No; it is restored to the number of black and red chips it had at the start of the previous scenario.

RB SSR CG10 If an OBA module is retained but currently has no radio or field phone, may the player choose one to replace it?

A. Yes—but choosing a radio to replace a lost field phone (or vice-versa) is NA.

CHRONOLOGY OF WAR

The Scenario Survey

To date, some 205 "official" scenarios (including those printed herein) have been published by Avalon Hill for *ADVANCED SQUAD LEADER*. To act as a checklist, the following is a complete listing of these - by date, location, title, number and combatants. By spending a few minutes with it, a player can readily spot any scenario that may deal with a particular campaign, region or people he is interested in. The survey can even be used to give an ASL tournament a unified theme or provide the basis for a "campaign" of scenarios.

Date	Location	Title	Number	Combatants
5 July 1939	Nomohan, Manchukuo	Red Star, Red Sun	ASL-65	Japanese vs Russian
1 Sept 1939	Krojanaty, Poland	Into the Fray	ASL-43	German vs Polish
2 Sept 1939	Mlaw, Poland	Rattle of Sabres	92-A46	German vs Polish
27 Sept 1939	Przemysl, Poland	Age-Old Foes	ASL-50	Russian vs Polish
30 Nov 1939	Kuhmo, Finland	The Borders are Burning	89-A10	Russian vs Finnish
30 Nov 1939	Arahuhta, Finland	On the Borderline	90-A16	Russian vs Finnish
9 Dec 1939	Aittojoki, Finland	Silent Death	89-A11	Russian vs Finnish
9 April 1940	Elverum, Norway	The Gauntlet	ASL-44	German vs Norwegian
24 April 1940	Dombas, Norway	On the Road to Andalsnes	91-A31	German vs Norwegian
10 May 1940	Witry, Belgium	Toujours l'Audace	ASL-48	German vs Belgian
10 May 1940	Gennap, Holland	Piercing the Peel	ASL-49	German vs Dutch
10 May 1940	Coevorden, Holland	Bring Up the Guns	GEN-G7	German vs Dutch
11 May 1940	Briedgen, Belgium	Birds of Prey	ASL-46	German vs Belgian
21 May 1940	Beaurains, France	Ad Hoc at Beaurains	92-A40	German vs British
23 May 1940	Boulogne, France	Stand Fast the Guards	90-A15	German vs British
25 May 1940	Calais, France	The Crux of Calais	90-A22	German vs British
11 Aug 1940	Tug Argan, Somaliland	Showdown, Tug Argan Pass	92-A39	Italian vs British
7 Feb 1941	Sidi Saleh, Libya	Ci Arrendiamo	ASL-58	Italian vs British
9 March 1941	Scialei, Albania	Monastery Hill	90-A14	Italian vs Greek
31 March 1941	Mersa el Brega, Libya	Turning the Tables	ASL-39	German vs British
7 April 1941	Derna, Libya	Escape from Derna	ASL-38	German vs British
7 April 1941	Pirot, Yugoslavia	The Professionals	91-A28	German vs Yugoslav
9 April 1941	Alibonara, Yugoslavia	Rude Awakening	ASL-47	German vs Yugoslav
20 May 1941	Kastelli, Crete	Revenge at Kastelli	ASL-45	German vs Greek
20 May 1941	Maleme, Crete	Tavronitis Bridge	89-A1	German vs British
20 May 1941	Maleme, Crete	Bofors Bashing	89-A2	German vs British
20 May 1941	Maleme, Crete	Descent into Hell	89-A3	German vs British
28 May 1941	Babali Hani, Crete	Probing Layforce	92-A43	German vs British
22 June 1941	Zhabinski, Russia	Red Packets	ASL-6	German vs Russian
24 June 1941	Seirijai, Lithuania	A New Kind of Foe	ASL-34	German vs Russian/Partisan
25 June 1941	Brest-Litovsk, Russia	The Citadel	ASL-10	German vs Russian
25 June 1941	Raseiniai, Lithuania	First Crisis at AG North	GEN-M	German vs Russian
3 July 1941	Lipki, Russia	Land Leviathans	GEN-Q	German vs Russian
3 July 1941	Borisov, Russia	Blocking Action at Lipki	92-A44	German vs Russian
11 July 1941	Shklov, Russia	Shklov's Labors Lost	GEN-T4	German vs Russian
12 July 1941	Gomel, Russia	Timoshenko's Attack	GEN-G1	German vs Russian
12 Aug 1941	Yasnaya Polyana, Russia	Bridge to Nowhere	ASL-54	Italian vs Russian
17 Aug 1941	Panikovo, Russia	Slamming of the Door	89-A7	German vs Russian
2 Sept 1941	Terijoki, Finland	Fighting Withdrawal	ASL-1	Finnish vs Russian
14 Nov 1941	Piepsk, Russia	The Hedgehog of Piepsk	GEN-D	German vs Russian
19 Nov 1941	Gabr Saleh, Libya	Blazin' Chariots	ASL-35	German vs British
19 Nov 1941	Bir el Gubi, Libya	Half a Chance	ASL-56	Italian vs British
23 Nov 1941	Sidi Rezegh, Libya	Point of No Return	ASL-42	German vs British
23 Nov 1941	Sidi Rezegh, Libya	Sunday of the Dead	GEN-G9	German vs British
29 Dec 1941	Staritsa, Russia	The Dead of Winter	GEN-T6	German vs Russian
3 Jan 1942	Gribovo, Russia	Grab at Gribovo	GEN-G10	German vs Russian
22 Jan 1942	Mauban, the Philippines	KP 167	ASL-70	Japanese vs American
2 March 1942	Soebang, Java	Defeat in Java	91-A30	Japanese vs Dutch/British
6 March 1942	Payagyi, Burma	Bungle in the Jungle	ASL-62	Japanese vs British
26 March 1942	Toungoo, Burma	The Tiger of Toungoo	92-D10	Japanese vs Chinese
29 March 1942	Rhodopes, Greece	Ambush!	ASL-28	Bulgarian vs Partisan
29 March 1942	Toungoo, Burma	Today We Attack	ASL-69	Japanese vs Chinese
6 May 1942	Corregidor, the Philippines	The Rock	ASL-68	Japanese vs American
13 June 1942	Tobruk, Libya	Khamzin	ASL-37	German vs British
24 July 1942	Rostov, Russia	Penetration of Rostov	90-A17	German vs Russian
28 July 1942	Rostov, Russia	Storming the Factory	DASL-3	German vs Russian
9 Aug 1942	Deniki, New Guinea	On the Kokoda Trail	ASL-60	Japanese vs British/Partisan
23 Aug 1942	Ischbuchenskiy, Russia	Savoia!	89-A12	Italian vs Russian
12 Sept 1942	Tamparan, the Philippines	Hazardous Occupation	ASL-64	Japanese vs Partisan
14 Sept 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	In Sight of the Volga	ASL-5	German vs Russian
22 Sept 1942	Timor, the Lesser Sundas	Commando Hunt	92-A42	Japanese vs British
6 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Guards Counterattack	GEN-A	German vs Russian
6 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Tractor Works	GEN-B	German vs Russian
6 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Streets of Stalingrad	GEN-C	German vs Russian
7 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	First to Strike	DASL-4	German vs Russian

Continued on Facing Page

GUILT BY ACCUSATION?

One hates to see a good soldier face a dishonorable discharge. Especially if based on charges that are unjustified. But that is what may be happening with the IIFT, which has given such good service to many SL/ASL gamers for several years now. We would like to subject all the arguments for and against use of the IIFT to mathematical tests for validity, plan to do so, and have even begun some of this work already. Here we offer a brief report on our progress in response to some of the recent charges leveled against this, our favorite "old soldier".

"Concealment Stripping." For every 100 shots taken using the IIFT for resolution, one can expect concealment will be lost three to five additional times (more than use of the IFT) when 75% of all targets are concealed. If 50% of all targets are concealed, additional concealment-loss drops to less than three in a hundred, and to less than two per 100 shots if only 25% of all targets are concealed. Now, the number of shots taken by a player in each scenario will vary considerably, and a rigid statistical model would be needed to determine the average number of shots per scenario; however, the overall probability of an extra stripped Concealment counter is still less than 3% per shot resolved on the IIFT—a barely significant effect (anecdotal evidence aside).

"Increased Firepower Potency." The increase in overall FirePower (FP) is also small. This concept can be expressed in several ways. For all the range of DRMs running from -5 through +1, the increase in fire effectiveness when using the IIFT is always less than the effect if one used all available FP factors individually. That is to say, even an attack on the IIFT's choice 15FP column would be less powerful than separate attacks of 12FP, 2 FP and 1 FP (or 8FP, 6FP and 1FP; etc.). With the aged IFT, experienced ASL players sought to maximize the available FP by stacking units into FGs of 6, 8, 12, or 16 FP, with as little "wasted" unused FP as possible. With the IIFT, gamers automatically use all available FP, only without the hassle of contriving stacks that total to a printed FP column of the chart. The difference in fire-effectiveness between the way the game system was played with the old IFT, and the way it is played with the upstart IIFT, does not seem significant when looked at in this manner.

Despite the 112 "new" results on the IIFT (not the "111" as described by Mark Nixon in the '91 *Annual*), there are subtle reasons why all these results are not overwhelmingly "effective". At maximum, one can expect only 30-36% of fire results to differ between the IFT and IIFT. However, these new results are forced through a series of "filters" before they produce any increased fire effectiveness: the status of the target unit(s), the disposition of the target hex, the "Morale Check response DR", and many others. For example, a "new" PTC does not produce any variation from the IFT if the target is already broken or pinned. A "new" 2KIA is no more effective than usual versus a hex containing only one MMC or SMC. Morale Check DRs of "2" or "12" (causing Heat of Battle or Casualties) will be identical in effect no matter if the CRT result is a 2MC on the IIFT or a 1MC on the IFT. No matter what the Morale Level of the target units or their ELR, there is only a very narrow range (mathematically speaking) of MC response DRs which will produce a variation from the IFT. Most of the different fire results obtained from the IIFT will be filtered-out to produce onboard situations similar to those of the corresponding IFT fire column.

"Play Balance." If a scenario is balanced for all possible DRs when the IFT is used, it is also balanced for the IIFT. It is mathematically impossible that the IIFT could skew game results more than the variation in possible DRs on the IFT, which can produce effects that are as strong or stronger than the IIFT results. The

variation caused by resolving fire attacks with two six-sided dice must always be more significant (mathematically) than any effect of using the IIFT. Despite any fears that the IIFT might "hurt" scenarios playtested under the IFT, considerations argue against this. If one side in a balanced scenario includes 12 squads of 7FP, using the IIFT does not mean that this player simply has 12 additional FP factors, thus unbalancing the scenario. The way in which most play SL/ASL, this player would have sought to stack his forces in FGs equaling the standard FP columns, with as little excess FP wasted as possible. Again, the IIFT accomplishes this automatically for him, without forcing the player to worry about the artificial affects of the FP columns. Admittedly, this is an intuitive, informal argument; only an exhaustive study of actual games played and how effectively the FP factors were used in each could prove or disprove this point mathematically (and we sure haven't performed this survey ourselves). But, until proven guilty, we presume the IIFT to be innocent of this charge.

"Fits and Spurts." These have been inherited from the IFT, and without changing the original FP columns, cannot be entirely eliminated. In fact, the IIFT achieves an enormously improved progression of results. Why argue that there is no difference between the 1FP and 1.5FP columns, or a leap in the 14FP to 15FP columns on the IIFT, when there is absolutely no difference between attacks of 8FP, 9FP and 10FP on the old IFT. And what does one say to the tremendous leaps in fire-effectiveness from an attack of 11FP to one of 12, or from one of 15FP to one of 16FP, on the old IFT? Any perceived flaws of this nature in the IIFT cannot be too significant when compared to the original. While not perfect, the IIFT is "smoother" than the alternative.

This court of inquiry, after looking at all the available evidence, concludes that the soldier in question is *Not Guilty* of any crime and should be returned immediately to active duty. We would be glad to receive and store readers' comments—pro, con or undecided—and experiences with the IIFT, answer questions on the tests we have conducted, and report the results at the next convening of the ASL Annual. Please send your comment or questions, along with a SASE, to either:

John H. Farris (P.O. Box 547, Norman, OK 73070);
Jay Kaufman (1400 Warren Street, #327, Mankato,
MN 56001); or
George Windau (P.O. Box 13134, Toledo, OH 43613)



Well Played ... Cont'd from Page 69

or ninth, for that matter. So long as your guns are trained on targets in the victory area, remember that you will still have your Prep Fire to deal with them. There will be time enough to use Intensive Fire if that is needed. And this will allow time to see whether your infantry can do anything profitable.

On the German side, there are options for fighting BU or CE, which carries with it the possibility of throwing vehicular smoke grenades in addition to what we've already grown accustomed. Be sure to swing your turret frontal armor to face the most imposing threat as you enter each hex. Remember that if you want to limit vehicular dust you can expend extra MPs in entering any hex (F11.74). Finally, should one of your tanks be abandoned, watch out for those clever Brits trying to jump on it to utilize the 50mm gun. In one match during the playtest, our Germans suffered the ignominy of being forced into firing on their own immobilized and abandoned MkIII, since it was an easier target to take out than the enemy infantry who were well covered by dust. A thrilling game, but what would the Field Marshal say if he knew of it?

Date	Location	Title	Number	Combatants
17 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	One Down, Two to Go	HASL-1	German vs Russian
22 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Blood & Guts	HASL-2	German vs Russian
25 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Berserk!	DASL-2	German vs Russian
25 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Bread Factory #2	HASL-3	German vs Russian
26 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	To the Rescue	HASL-4	German vs Russian
27 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Guryev's Headquarters	DASL-1	German vs Russian
27 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Fire on the Volga	91-H1	German vs Russian
27 Oct 1942	El Alamein, Egypt	Here We Damned Well Stay	92-A50	German vs British
31 Oct 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Ghosts in the Rubble	HASL-A	German vs Russian
9 Nov 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Commissar's House	ASL-4	German vs Russian
9 Nov 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Commissar's House II	92-H2	German vs Russian
11 Nov 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Last Bid	HASL-5	German vs Russian
15 Nov 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	Turned Away	HASL-6	German vs Russian
5 Dec 1942	Stalingrad, Russia	The Red House	HASL-7	German vs Russian
12 Jan 1943	Leningrad, Russia	The Paw of the Tiger	GEN-F	German vs Russian
12 Jan 1943	Velikiye Luki, Russia	Escape from Velikiye Luki	GEN-H	German vs Russian
18 Jan 1943	Warsaw, Poland	Mila 18	ASL-2	German vs Partisan
4 Feb 1943	Stanichka, Russia	Back to School	89-D3	German vs Russian
4 Feb 1943	Glebivka, Russia	Beachhead at Ozerzyka Bay	91-A26	Rumanian vs Russian
6 Feb 1943	Nalchik, Russia	Avalanche!	GEN-G12	German vs Russian
15 Feb 1943	Sidi Bou Zid, Tunisia	Counterattack at Sidi Bou Zid	90-A20	German vs American
17 Feb 1943	Sbeitla, Tunisia	Sbeitla Probe	90-A18	German vs American
26 Feb 1943	Medjez el Bab, Tunisia	Fort McGregor	ASL-40	German vs British
22 March 1943	Wadi Zizgaou, Tunisia	A Bridgehead Too Wet	ASL-41	German vs British
20 April 1943	Takrouna, Tunisia	The Taking of Takrouna	ASL-51	Italian vs British
27 June 1943	Leskovice, Albania	Best-Laid Plans	92-A48	German vs Partisan
5 July 1943	Cherkassoye, Russia	With Flame and Shell	DASL-7	German vs Russian
9 July 1943	Ponyri, Russia	The Schoolhouse	DASL-8	German vs Russian
9 July 1943	Ponyri, Russia	Hill 253.5	GEN-T7	German vs Russian
10 July 1943	Syracuse, Sicily	A High Price to Pay	ASL-53	Italian vs British
10 July 1943	Gela, Sicily	Gruppo Mobile	91-D8	Italian vs American
10 July 1943	Biscari, Sicily	Niscomi-Biscari Highway	GEN-T9	German vs American
11 July 1943	Palma d'Montechiaro, Sicily	Retribution	ASL-55	Italian vs American
16 July 1943	Porto Empedocle, Sicily	Recon in Force	GEN-G8	German/Italian vs American
31 July 1943	Regalbuto, Sicily	Regalbuto Ridge	90-A24	German vs British
8 Aug 1943	Cesaro, Sicily	Able at Cesaro	90-A13	Italian vs American
13 Aug 1943	Kharkov, Russia	Draconian Measures	DASL-6	German vs Russian
9 Sept 1943	Parma, Italy	Too Little, Too Late	ASL-52	German vs Italian
9 Sept 1943	Paestum, Italy	Beyond the Blue Beach	89-A4	German vs American
10 Sept 1943	Rome, Italy	The Battle for Rome	ASL-57	German vs Italian
11 Sept 1943	Persano, Italy	Holding the Rear	89-A5	German vs American
14 Sept 1943	Salerno, Italy	Ranger Stronghold	GEN-T3	German vs American
1 Nov 1943	Bougainville, the Solomons	Hell or High Water	ASL-73	Japanese vs American
12 Nov 1943	Leros, Greece	Rachi Ridge	ASL-36	German vs British
22 Nov 1943	Bougainville, the Solomons	Chik's Ridge	ASL-67	Japanese vs American
12 Jan 1944	Kerch, Russia	Subterranean Quarry	ASL-32	Rumanian vs Partisan
30 Jan 1944	Cisterna, Italy	Six Came Back	GEN-G5	German vs American
7 Feb 1944	Maungdaw, Burma	The Eastern Gate	ASL-63	Japanese vs British
14 Feb 1944	Novaya Buda, Russia	Little Stalingrad	DASL-5	German vs Russian
Feb-April 1944	Anzio, Italy	Cat and Mouse	90-A19	German vs American
26 March 1944	Plateau Glières, France	Conquest in the Clouds	90-A23	German vs Partisan
6 April 1944	Buchach, Russia	Hube's Pocket	GEN-G	German vs Russian
17 April 1944	Mawla, Burma	OP Hill	92-A41	Japanese vs British
11 May 1944	Santa Maria Infante, Italy	Taking the Left Tie	ASL-20	German vs American
20 May 1944	Bestarabia, Russia	Sylvan Death	ASL-30	German vs Partisan
24 May 1944	Sarmi, New Guinea	The Bushmasters	ASL-66	Japanese vs American
6 June 1944	La Fierce, France	Le Manoir	ASL-13	German vs American
6 June 1944	Foucarville, France	Silence That Gun	ASL-14	German vs American
6 June 1944	St. Mere-Eglise, France	Lost Opportunities	ASL-17	German vs American
6 June 1944	Neuville-au-Plain, France	The Roadblock	ASL-18	German vs American
6 June 1944	Pont-du-Hoc, France	Backs to the Sea	ASL-19	German vs American
6 June 1944	Copenhagen, Denmark	The Globus Raid	ASL-29	German vs Partisan
6 June 1944	Chef-du-Pont, France	Gavin Take	GEN-T1	German vs American
6 June 1944	Benouville, France	Pegasus Bridge	GEN-G11	German vs British
6 June 1944	Poupeville, France	The Poupeville Exit	GEN-T5	German vs American
6 June 1944	Langrune-sur-Mer, France	Royal Marines	92-D9	German vs British
7 June 1944	St. Mere-Eglise, France	Confusion Reigns	ASL-12	German vs American
7 June 1944	La Fierce, France	No Better Spot to Die	ASL-16	German vs American
7 June 1944	Tulle, France	The Liberation of Tulle	ASL-27	German vs Partisan
7 June 1944	Ningbo, China	White Tigers	92-A47	Japanese vs British
8 June 1944	Pont l'Abbe, France	Defiance on Hill 30	ASL-11	German vs American
8 June 1944	St. Come-du-Mont, France	Trapped!	ASL-15	German vs American
8 June 1944	La Cambe, France	Buying the Farm	DASL-14	German vs American
8 June 1944	Cremsensac, France	The Price of Impatience	89-A6	German vs Partisan
8 June 1944	Tulle, France	L'Ecole Normale	89-D1	German vs Partisan

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FORWARD OBSERVER

Date	Location	Title	Number	Combatants
14 June 1944	Villers-Bocage, France	The Island	90-D4	German vs British
14 June 1944	Lingevres, France	Lehr Sanction	91-D7	German vs British
16 June 1944	Les Foulons, France	Repulsed	DASL-12	German vs American
28 June 1944	Lepel, Russia	The Puma Prowls	GEN-T2	German vs Russian
29 June 1944	Bobruisk, Russia	BreakOut	90-D6	German vs Russian
1 July 1944	Minsk, Russia	Hill 621	GEN-E	German vs Russian
8 July 1944	Pont Herbert, France	Ripe Pickings	DASL-11	German vs American
10 July 1944	Haut Vents, France	King of the Hill	DASL-18	German vs American
11 July 1944	Dufayel, France	Clay Pigeons	DASL-16	German vs American
11 July 1944	St. Jean-de-Daye, France	They're Coming!	DASL-17	German vs American
13 July 1944	Chakila, New Guinea	Chakila Sunrise	92-A45	Japanese vs American
15 July 1944	La Luzerne, France	Bogged Down	DASL-13	German vs American
21 July 1944	Guam, the Marianas	Bloody Red Beach	ASL-75	Japanese vs American
27 July 1944	Le Lorey, France	Backmann's Corner	DASL-15	German vs American
6 Aug 1944	Wola Chodkowska, Poland	Counterattack on the Vistula	90-A21	German vs Russian
12 Aug 1944	Warsaw, Poland	The Old Town	ASL-31	German vs Partisan
16 Aug 1944	Ostrovic, Poland	Preparing the Way	DASL-9	German vs Russian
17 Aug 1944	Palestik, Yugoslavia	The Cossacks are Coming	ASL-33	Croat/German vs Partisan
23 Aug 1944	Cannes, France	The Cannes Strongpoint	GEN-K	German vs American
12 Sept 1944	Warsaw, Poland	Dash for the Bridge	ASL-7	German vs Russian
15 Sept 1944	Unfeld, Germany	Midnight Massacre	89-A9	German vs American
17 Sept 1944	Zon, Holland	Zon with the Wind	91-A32	German vs American
18 Sept 1944	Amhem, Holland	Tetlau's Attack	91-A33	German vs British
18 Sept 1944	Aalst, Holland	Guards Attack	91-A35	German vs British
19 Sept 1944	Schijndel, Holland	Lash Out	91-A34	German vs American/Brit
19 Sept 1944	Nijmegen, Holland	Devil's Hill	GEN-T10	German vs American
20 Sept 1944	Nijmegen, Holland	Gavin's Gamble	ASL-25	German vs American
22 Sept 1944	Warsaw, Poland	The Czerniakow Bridgehead	ASL-3	German vs Russian/Partisan
22 Sept 1944	Veghel, Holland	Oy Veghel	91-A36	German vs American
22 Sept 1944	Dreil, Holland	Dreil Team	91-A37	German vs British
24 Sept 1944	Oosterbeek, Holland	North Bank	91-A38	German vs British
7 Oct 1944	Peleliu, the Palau Islands	Sea of Tranquility	ASL-72	Japanese vs American
10 Oct 1944	Radzymin, Poland	Soldiers of Destruction	GEN-N	German vs Russian
11 Oct 1944	Bardenburg, Germany	Tanks in the Streets	ASL-26	German vs American
15 Oct 1944	Aachen, Germany	Aachen's Pall	GEN-T8	German vs American
17 Oct 1944	Aachen, Germany	Among the Ruins	ASL-21	German vs American
18 Oct 1944	Aachen, Germany	Kurhaus Clash	ASL-22	German vs American
26 Oct 1944	Libau, Lithuania	Delaying Action	92-A49	German vs Russian
8 Nov 1944	Vic-sur-Seille, France	First Action	GEN-G4	German vs American
24 Nov 1944	Damulaan, the Philippines	Shoestring Ridge	ASL-61	Japanese vs American
26 Nov 1944	Frenzenberg, Germany	King's Castle	91-A27	German vs American
6 Dec 1944	Singling, France	Last Act in Lorraine	GEN-G2	German vs American
6 Dec 1944	Singling, France	Last Act in Lorraine II	89-D2	German vs American
9 Dec 1944	Bhamo, Burma	Jungle Citadel	ASL-71	Japanese vs Chinese
16 Dec 1944	Buchholz, Germany	Buchholz Station	GEN-I	German vs American
18 Dec 1944	Wiltz, Belgium	The Road to Wiltz	GEN-P	German vs American
21 Dec 1944	Trois Ponts, Belgium	Attempt to Relieve Peiper	GEN-T11	German vs American
22 Dec 1944	Cheneux, Belgium	Rocket's Red Glare	GEN-G6	German vs American
25 Dec 1944	Champs, Belgium	Under the Noel Trees	ASL-23	German vs American
26 Dec 1944	Hofen, Belgium	Meeting of Patrols	91-A29	German vs American
3 Jan 1945	Longchamps, Belgium	The Mad Minute	ASL-24	German vs American
13 Jan 1945	Budapest, Hungary	To the Last Man	DASL-A	German vs Russian
14 Jan 1945	Bitche, Germany	The Bitche Salient	GEN-J	German vs American
17 Jan 1945	Warsaw, Poland	To the Square	ASL-9	German vs Russian
20 Jan 1945	St. Joost, Holland	Cold Crocodiles	90-A25	German vs British
9 Feb 1945	Hennebont, France	The Forgotten Front	GEN-G3	German vs American
12 Feb 1945	Manila, the Philippines	Intimate War	90-D5	Japanese vs American
23 Feb 1945	Bologna, Italy	A View from the Top	GEN-G13	German vs American
14 March 1945	St. Goar, Germany	The St. Goar Assault	GEN-O	German vs American
24 March 1945	Hamminkeln, Germany	Hunters from the Sky	GEN-T12	German vs American
6 April 1945	Hildorf, Germany	Hildorf on the Rhine	GEN-L	German vs American
19 April 1945	Muncheberg, Germany	The Agony of Doom	89-A8	German vs Russian
28 April 1945	Berlin, Germany	The Final Battle	DASL-10	German vs Russian
3 May 1945	Berlin, Germany	The Fugitives	ASL-8	German vs Russian
13 Aug 1945	Mutanchiang, Manchukuo	Smeritniki	ASL-59	Japanese vs Russian

Date: The abbreviations used for the months should be recognizable to most readers; but for those confused by these: Jan = January, Feb = February, Aug = August, Sept = September, Oct = October, Nov = November, and Dec = December.

Location: Many of the scenarios place the action "near" a city or town, or on a specific island in a chain. To simplify matters, and since this column is meant merely to place the scenario within the context of the war, we have noted the most recognizable geographic location mentioned in the historical commentary.

Number: All scenarios listed have appeared either in the modules (denoted by the prefix ASL, DASL or HASL) or in the pages of *THE GENERAL* (denoted by the prefix GEN) or the *ASL Annual* (as indicated by the prefix showing year of publication). Numeric value refers to the specific scenario.

Combatants: This information has been provided so that readers can determine which countermeix may be necessary to play the scenario. Note that the Axis Minors encompass Croat, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Rumanian units; and that the Allied Minors encompass Polish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, Yugoslav and Greek units. Note also that all Commonwealth units are listed as British.

The past year opened new horizons to the ASL fan. With *GUNG HO!*, the completion of the rules allows us to at last re-enact seaborne landings, and brings us the US Marines and Chinese as new players in the cardboard war. The coming year looks to be at least as exciting. Certainly, it will be a busy one for Bob McNamara and Charlie Kibler.

Due for print come winter is *CROIX DE GUERRE*, the module introducing the French to the ASL system. This will be a "bare-bones" module, with no additional rules to be mastered. Two new maps, #40 featuring a narrow river and #41 featuring a stone-built village set among hills, will offer terrain for simulating the action in France in 1940. Needless-to-say, the entire French OB will be included, both infantry and vehicles/ordnance; additional pages for Chapter H cover the latter's peculiarities. Eight scenarios will bring new tactical puzzles for the dedicated player. Finally, several "errata" pages for Chapter A complete the package. Immediately upon his signing off the proofs for *CDG*, Bob will move on to the final "regular" module for ASL (tentatively titled "Armies of Oblivion"), which will complete the countermeix of the system, as well as make Chapter H the most complete reference source on hardware available to the WW2 tactical wargamer. Centerpiece of this module, optimistically slated for a Spring 1993 release, is the vehicle and ordnance mix for the Axis and Allied Minors. New mapboards and scenarios will allow players to enjoy these unique weapons to the fullest.

Meanwhile, Charlie Kibler continues his work on *KAMPFGRUPPE PEIPER*, destined to be the second "Historical" module. According to Charlie, the playtest is progressing well and should be complete by mid-1993. The five large, unmounted mapsheets are organized into three non-connecting "Map Groups" which cover the villages of Stoumont and La Gleize and the hamlet of Cheneau. Besides the villages, these non-geomorphic maps feature the densely-wooded hills rising from the banks of Belgium's Ambleve River, having as many as 11 (!!) elevation levels. Each of the maps were painstakingly adapted from Belgian cartographic surveys, circa 1927, and from aerial photographs taken during and after the Battle of the Bulge. The *KGP* rules will be organized along the lines of those in *RED BARRICADES*, and will include special rules sections for varying densities of mist and for German fuel shortages, to mention only a couple. Several new terrain types will also be introduced therein (steep locations, hexside streets, barbed wire fences, slopes). The new *HASL* module will offer seven regular scenarios, and one CG for each map group. Of course, no *ASL* module would be complete without a new countersheet or two, and *KGP* will be no exception. Additional vehicle counters for common types, as well as more US and SS infantry counters, will be added. A surprise inclusion will be the rather rare but historically present SPW 251/21, boasting a triple 20mm AA mounted atop the standard German half-track. Obviously, a lot of ASLers will be looking for *KGP* under the tree come Christmas '93.

As for the *ASL Annual*, although the question of format is yet to be settled (see Page 16), I have already begun to bring together the scenarios and articles for next year's offering. The success of the *Annual* has been nothing short of phenomenal, and immensely gratifying. No other wargame has engendered a periodical on this scale, nor has one ever been so well supported by authors and playtesters. You can expect to see more scenarios, articles and information on the *ASL* system in these pages for some years to come.

Rex A. Martin
May 1992

THE TIGER OF TOUNGOO



DELUXE ASL Scenario A10




TOUNGOO, BURMA, 26 March 1942: In order to slow the lightning advance of the Japanese, Lt.-General Stilwell sent the elite Chinese 200th Division into the walled city of Toungoo to help stabilize his ruptured front. Here, Major-General Tai An-lan carefully organized the defenses of the ancient town, clearing fields of fire and setting up well-stocked strongpoints. Meanwhile, to the south, Japanese patrols ranged through the deserted streets of Rangoon. After a bitter two-day battle to force a river crossing on 20 March, the Japanese 55th Infantry Division invested the city from the south, west and north. On the 24th, the Japanese began a series of probing attacks on the city proper, seeking a weakness to exploit. Failing to find one, they launched a general attack from all three sides. Their only success on the first day lay in the northwest corner of the ancient city, where the 112th Infantry managed to penetrate the native quarter.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- In SSR 3, the Chinese may Fortify $\leq$ three appropriate Locations.
- In SSR 1, EC are Dry.



VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win immediately when they Control every building that does not contain a Blaze.

TURN RECORD CHART

● CHINESE Sets Up First [166]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	END
● JAPANESE Moves First [347]											



Elements of the 600th Infantry Regiment [ELR: 3] set up east of the road bA3-bH1-bJ2-bO3: [SAN: 4]



20	2			2		3	2	16	2



Elements of the 112th Infantry Regiment [ELR: 4] enter on Turn 1 along the west edge of board b: [SAN: 4]



3	23	2	2	2		6	6		3

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with a Mild Breeze from the northwest at start.
- All buildings are wooden, and have a ground-level only. All rowhouses (B23.71) are Single Story houses; the thick black bar separating such hexes is considered Open Ground.
- The Chinese may Fortify $\leq$ two ground-level building Locations; tunnels are NA.
- Up to three Chinese squad-equivalents (and all SMC/SW stacked with them) may use HIP.
- The WP Depletion number for Japanese 50mm mortars is increased to "WP8".
- The three initial Japanese 4-4-8 MMC are Assault Engineers (H1.22).

AFTERMATH: The Japanese were well equipped for the assault, and no quarter was given. Making use of phosphorous shells, flamethrowers and demo charges, they sought to set afire the wooden buildings the Chinese occupied. Chinese soldiers were seen tearing off their burning clothes and continuing the fight naked. Camp followers, porters, cooks and medics armed themselves and joined the battle. But block by bloody block the Japanese progressed. Tai was very much a front-line general, and he soon arrived to personally stabilize the situation, moving from one trouble spot to another. Even the considerable heroism of Tai, who later received the sobriquet "Tiger of Toungoo", could not stop the Japanese advance. Yet only when the native quarter was a pile of smoking embers did Tai pull the Chinese survivors back to the "English" quarter with its stout stone and brick buildings. Here, under his direction, they built street barricades and at last halted the Japanese late in the day.



COMMANDO OB SHEET:



RA Commando No. _____

Commando CO: _____

HQ Cdo:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Half-Squads - _____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

Equipment - 4 Radio; 3 LMG

Vehicles - (29) Truck: (18) 5cwt

(8) 15cwt

(3) 3-Ton

(17) Sturmboat

Cdo Depot:

(35) Bicycle

(15) Kleine Flossack

(5) Grosse Flossack

(2) Jeep

(100) Mine Factors

(8) Demo Charges

(8) ATR *

(2) Flamethrower*

(8) PIAT*

(6) ATM*

* See Rules



Heavy Weapons Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Equipment - 2 Radio; 3 LMG

MTR Section:

Crews - _____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

Equipment - 4 M.L. 3" MTR

MG Section:

Crews - _____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

_____ 2-3-8

Equipment - 3 MMG

#1 Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Sniper - _____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Equipment - Radio; 3 LMG; M.L. 2" MTR

#2 Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Sniper - _____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Equipment - Radio; 3 LMG; M.L. 2" MTR

#3 Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Sniper - _____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Equipment - Radio; 3 LMG; M.L. 2" MTR

Hopitalized:

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

#4 Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Sniper - _____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Equipment - Radio; 3 LMG; M.L. 2" MTR

#5 Troop:

Officers - _____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

_____ ()

Sniper - _____ ()

Squads - _____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

_____ 6-3-8

Equipment - Radio; 3 LMG; M.L. 2" MTR

Mission Log:

Date	Mission	Cdo VP	German VP
Nov 1940			
June 1941			
Sept 1941			
Oct 1941			
March 1942			
Aug 1942			
Feb 1943			
July 1943			
May 1944			
June 1944			
Aug 1944			
Oct 1944			
April 1945			